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Judgment
Spencer, J.—I am of opinion that a Revenue Officer preparing a record of rights under Sections 164 to 167 of the Madras Estates Land
Act is only discharging an executive function of Government and is not a Court within the meaning of Section 467 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
In Muhammad Subhanullah v. The Secretary of State for India in Council ILR (1904) A. 382 it was held that a settlement officer preparing a
record of rights was not a Court but was simply an executive officer acting in his executive capacity.
In Nasarulla Mia v. Amiruddi (1905) 3 C.L.J. 133 and in Kurban Ali v. Jqfar Ali I.L.R.(1901) c. the power of a Revenue Officer disposing of
an objection u/s 103-A of the Bengal Tenancy Act which corresponds closely in wording to Section 166 of the Madras Estates Land Act were
considered and it was held that the legal effect of proceedings taken under the section was that the Revenue Officer''s order was not a Judicial
Order, was not open to appeal and would not operate as res judicata.
Section 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides for the institution of suits before Revenue Officers preparing records of rights and for suits
instituted before them being transferred by them to a competent Civil Court for trial. Section 107 further provides that they shall adopt the
procedure of the CPC in trying such suits and that their decisions shall have the force and effect of a decree of a Civil Court.
In contradistinction to this, it may be observed that the Madras Act provides in Section 173 for institution of suits in the Civil Court having local
jurisdiction, whenever the correctness of the record of rights is impugned in certain particulars.
In fact a Revenue Officer proceeding under Chapter II of the Madras Estates Land Act is not anywhere referred to in that Act as a Court in the
manner that Collectors and other Revenue Officers who hear suits and applications specified in the schedule, are described in Section 189 and
elsewhere as courts.
Mr. Grant relies on the provision in Section 164 (3) that the survey made by Revenue officers proceeding under this chapter shall be made
under the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act 1897, and on the provision in Section 29 of that Act applying the procedure of the CPC for
enforcing the attendance of witnesses and for the recording of evidence, and also on the definition of ''Court'' in Section 3 of the Evidence Act.
He has referred us to several decisions such as Raghoobune Sahoy v. Kokil Singh alias Gopal Singh ILR (1890) C. 872 Atchayya v. Gangayya
ILR (1891) M. 138 and Queen Empress v. Munda Shetti ILR (1900) M. 121 in which officers authorised to receive evidence and decide matters
on evidence have been treated as Courts.
But the notification dated May 3, 1910, in the Fort St. George Gazette supplement for June under which the Revenue Officer who passed the
order u/s 476 now under consideration was appointed does not invest him with powers to record evidence, nor with the powers of a Survey
Officer under Act IV of 1897. It merely appoints him to be Revenue Officer for the purpose of making a survey of the Pittapuram Estate and for
preparing a record of rights in respect of the said estate and it goes on to declare what particulars the record of rights shall show.
The said officer''s order directing the prosecution of the Petitioners for giving false evidence was therefore in my opinion ultra vires and must be
set aside.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.
I entirely agree.
By a notification dated the 3rd May 1910, Mr. Venkatanarayana Naidu was appointed to survey and to prepare a record of rights in the
Zamindari of Pittapur. It is conceded that this notification does not empower the officer to administer oath and to record evidence. In pursuance of
this notification, the officer entered the name of one Venkataswamy Garu as the occupancy tenant of a holding, This was objected to by the first
petitioner, the proprietor. And the Survey officer came to the conclusion that the petitioners had made false statements regarding the right of
Venkataswamy Garu. He took action u/s 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and directed the prosecution of the petitioners. The point for
consideration is whether an officer recording rights under the Estates Land Act is exercising the function of a Civil or Revenue Court so as to
enable him to take action under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
I must answer this question in. the negative. Under Chapter 11 of the Estates Land Act, the Local Government may empower a person to
conduct three classes of operations, (a) to survey the fields, (b) to enter the names of the tenants in respect of the fields surveyed as occupancy
ryots and (c).to settle the rate of rent. In this case the officer had no authority to settle the rate of rent. The false statement is alleged to have been
made in the enquiry regarding the record of rights. u/s 166 of the Act if the record of rights is not objected to, "" it shall be conclusive evidence that
the record has been duly made."" No right to contest the record is given either by bringing a suit in that behalf or by preferring an appeal. The right
of suit given by Section 173 does not affect the present question. Section 167 lays down in Clause (3) that the entry shall be evidence of the
tenant''s rights. Neither Section 166 nor Section 167 gives power to the officer to take evidence. Prima facie, therefore the entry as tenant is a
purely administrative one and the officer cannot be said to be exercising the functions of a civil or a revenue Court. The decisions in Muhammad
Sabhan Ullah v. The Secretary of State for India in Council ILR (1904) A. 382 and in Nasarulla Mia v. Amiruddin (1905) 3 C.L.J. 133 which
relate to the construction of similar provisions in the Tenancy Acts of the United Provinces and Bengal lay down that the officer entrusted with such
duties is not acting judicially, but only in his executive capacity. The learned Public Prosecutor draws attention to the fact that the officer was also
performing the duties of a survey officer and as under Clause 3 of Section 164 he is authorised as such to exercise all the powers contained in the
Madras Survey and Boundaries Act, he must be deemed to have acted as a Court. In the first place Section 29 of the Boundaries Act which is
relied upon lays down that the power to take evidence must be either specially or generally conferred. There is no such authorisation in this case. In
the second place whatever may be the officer''s duties in regard to survey in recording rights he is not given power to administer oath to witnesses.
The fact that in Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Legislature exempts the offices of the Registrar and Sub Registrar from the
designation of Courts strengthens my view that persons exercising quasi judicial functions are not generally to be regarded as Courts. The decision
in Queen Empress v. Munda Shetti ILR (1900) M. 121 proceeds on the language of Act III of 1869 which specially empowers the Thasildar to
take evidence during the course of the enquiry and to give his decision upon such evidence. The decision in Atchayya v. Gangayya ILR (1891) M.
188 is no longer law and I do not think that the obiter dicta of some Judges in that case can be relied upon. On the other hand it has been laid
down that the mere fact that an enquiry has to be made will not constitute the enquiring officer a Court. In Durga Das Rukhit v. Queen Empress
ILR (1899) Order 820 it was decided that an officer enquiring into the value of property under the Land Acquisition Act was not a Court. The
proper test for ascertaining whether an officer is a Court or not has been stated in Queen Empress v. Munda Shetti ILR (1900) M. 121 there must
be power to record evidence and to come to a judicial determination on the evidence so recorded. Myself and Mr. Justice Ayling had to consider
a similar question in the case In Re: M. Vijiaraghava Pillai; P. Theagaraya Chetti and P.M. Appaswami Pillai, applying the tests in that case and in
Be Nataraja Aiyar 23 M.L.J. 393 I am of opinion that an officer charged with the duty of recording tenants'' rights in a Zamindari under Chapter
11 of the Madras Estates Land Act is not a Court within the meaning of Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.