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Judgment
Motilal B. Naik, J.—Proceedings in G.O.Ms.Nos. 21, dated 20-1-1995 issued by the first respondent are assailed by the petitioners on various grounds and seek quashing of the same by holding that the said proceedings are illegal.
The third respondent proposed to acquire the lands of these petitioners to an extent of Acs.18.36 cents situated in Sy. Nos. 3/1, 3/2 and 3/4 in Kancherapalem village of Visakhapatnam Mandal, Visakhapatnam District along with the lands of other owners for construction of staff quarters meant for its employees. Negotiations were entered into in the year 1972 and on agreed terms, the lands were delivered to the third respondent on 29-8-1972 itself. The first petitioner and his brother late Sri A. Suryanarayana Rao were struggling to get compensation for the lands which were taken possession by the third respondent in the year 1972 itself on account of the delayed tactics by the third respondent authorities who were to refer the matter to the land acquisition authorities for initiating land acquisition proceedings. As luck would go against the petitioners, the third respondent by letter dated 2-1-1979 required the petitioners for getting exemption from the land ceiling authorities on the extent of Ac.18-36 cents of land which was taken possession by the third respondent. Urban Land Ceiling Act (U.L.C. Act) was made applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh with effect from 17-2-1976. The first petitioner and his brother Suryanarayana Rao approached the ceiling authorities and convinced them that the lands in question were taken in advance possession by the third respondent way back in the year 1972 itself and therefore, when the lands are vested with the third respondent, they cannot be held to be holders of surplus lands. The land ceiling authority satisfied with the submissions, by way of a preliminary order dated 25-5-1981 and by way of a final order on 7-11-1981 held that the said lands sought to be acquired for the purpose of third respondent do not fall within the purview of the U.L.C. Act.
The miseries of the petitioners did not end up there. Despite the third respondent depositing moneys with the land acquisition authorities tentatively estimating the land value, requesting the land acquisition authorities to complete the land acquisition proceedings, the first respondent became active and issued a show-cause notice on 20-7-1994 calling upon the petitioners to show cause as to why the order passed by the second respondent on 25-8-1981 u/s 8(4) of the U.L.C. Act shall not be set aside u/s 34 of the U.L.C. Act. Petitioners have filed a detailed representation before the first respondent by contending that the lands in question were given possession in the year 1972 itself, as a result of which the third respondent is in possession of the lands and therefore, it was stated in the explanation by the petitioners that the implication of the U.L.C. Act cannot be invoked against the petitioners. It was further stated in the explanation that the order passed by the second respondent u/s 8(4) of the U.L.C. Act is dated 25-5-1981 and it would not be open to the first respondent to reopen the issue after a period of nearly 13 to 14 years. The first respondent failed to appreciate the situation in the light of the request made by the petitioners and proceeded with the issuance of final order in G.O.Ms.Nos. 21, dated 20-1-1995 setting aside the order passed by the second respondent which is dated 25-5-1981 by holding that the first respondent has powers to initiate suo motu proceedings u/s 34 of the Act. This action of the first respondent is assailed in this writ petition.
The first and foremost submission of the counsel for the petitioners is that when once the lands in question were taken possession by the 3rd respondent in 1972 which fact has not been disputed by the third respondent, the implication of U.L.C. Act which came into force in the year 1976 would not apply to the facts of the case, to hold that the petitioners are holders of surplus land. This apart, it is contended that when the second respondent has passed an order in the year 1981 itself clearing the transaction by holding that the U.L.C. Act has no application, the first respondent under suo motu powers vested in him u/s 34 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act cannot reopen the matter after 13 years. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that even presuming that the first respondent has powers to reopen the issue u/s 34 of the Act, yet, such power has to be exercised within a reasonable period.
On behalf of the first respondent, the Government Pleader for Revenue makes an effort to convince this Court by saying that the first respondent is competent to reopen the issue regardless of the time factor. It is contended by the learned Government Pleader that Section 34 of the U.L.C. Act, the review powers vested in the Government on its own motion, can call for records and examine the orders passed by the lower authorities against which no appeal has been preferred u/s 12 or 13 or 33 for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order. The learned Government Pleader further states that the second respondent who had passed a preliminary order initially on 25-5-1981 and final order on 7-11-1981 has failed to see the implication of the transaction in the light of the A.P. Vacant Land in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 12 of 1972 and therefore, when it is known to the first respondent about the transaction between the petitioners and the third respondent though of the year 1972, being contrary to the provision of the above said Act, initiated proceedings u/s 34 of the U.L.C. Act.
It is no doubt true that Section 34 of the U.L.C. Act vests powers on the first respondent to reopen the issue on its own motion for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of an order passed by the second respondent, but this power, in my view, cannot be extended to the cases which have been decided decades ago. There is no dispute as to the power of review by the first respondent. But this power of review could be exercised within a reasonable period.
Admittedly, the lands in question, subject matter of negotiations between the third respondent and the petitioners were taken possession by the third respondent in the year 1972 by which time the U.L.C. Act was not in force. The second respondent at the request of the petitioners, passed an appropriate order in the set of circumstances by holding that when the lands are vested with the third respondent which were delivered to the third respondent on 29-8-72, the implication of the U.L.C. Act would not apply. It is only in the year 1994, on some pretext or the other, the first respondent has tried to reopen the entire issue which was settled in the year 1981. I do not think Section 34 visualises such a situation empowering the first respondent to reopen an issue on a transaction which is of the year 1972.
Even though there is no limitation contemplated u/s 34 of the U.L.C. Act to reopen an issue, it cannot be said that the first respondent is entitled to reopen the matter which is of more than 13 years, as in the present set of circumstances. In The State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, , a similar question arose before the Supreme Court as to the revisional power and the limitation within which time the revisional power could be exercised by the competent authority under the relevant Act. In the said case, Under Sections 65 and 211 of Bombay Land Revenue Code, the Commissioner was entitled to review the order made u/s 65. Section 211 of the Code empowered the Commissioner to revise the order passed u/s 65. In that context, the Supreme Court observed thus:
"It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed u/s 211 but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised."
The facts, in the case, on hand are that the transaction with regard to the purchase of Ac.18-36 cents of the petitioners'' lands, consent was arrived between the land owners and the third respondent, pursuant to which the possession of the lands were delivered to the third respondent in the month of August, 1972 itself. It was agreed to between the parties that the compensation shall be paid in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act and the land owners were not entitled to any interest for delayed payment Unfortunately, when the U.L.C. Act came into force in the State of Andhra Pradesh in the year 1976 with effect from 17-2-1976, petitioners were obliged to obtain necessary clearance from the ceiling authorities, which was obtained by them in the year 1981 itself. The first respondent though competent to review the order passed by the lower authorities, in my considered view, cannot reopen the issue on the pretext of some illegality having crept in the order passed by the second respondent which is dated 25th May, 1981 while exercising power u/s 34 of the U.L.C. Act. The issue before the second respondent was whether the petitioners could be held to be holders of surplus lands, though these lands were taken possession by the third respondent on 29-8-1972 much prior to the enforcement of U.L.C. Act in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The second respondent, in my view, has rightly held the implication of the U.L.C. Act would not apply to the facts of the case.
During the course of arguments, it is made known to this Court that some other land owners whose lands were also settled for the purpose of construction of staff quarters of the third respondent, on initiation of suo motu proceedings u/s 34 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, the land owners of S.Nos. 1 /2 of Kancherapalem village questioned the show-cause notices in W.P.Nos. 17622 of 1994. This Court by an order dated 21-7-1995 has allowed the said writ petition while quashing the show-cause notice. Since in similar cases, the initiation of proceedings u/s 34 of the U.L.C. Act has already been set aside by this Court, I am inclined to say that the petitioners cannot be denied of the same relief from this Court. After all, the law is to be such that it shall assist a citizen properly. Law cannot be an instrument to play mischief and to cause miseries. As the facts indicate, I am clear in my mind that the combined efforts of all the respondents are only intended to deny the land owners the value of their lands which they have parted with in the year 1972. Though we are in the year 1996, the land owners are unable to realise just and reasonable compensation on one pretext or the other. I am, therefore, inclined to say that the combined efforts of the respondents are unwarranted and law does not assist these respondents to deprive the petitioners just and reasonable compensation for their valuable lands.
Article 300A of the Constitution of India as enshrined in the Constitution, protects a citizen''s right to hold property. It says no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The third respondent in particular, who has entered into an understanding with the first petitioner and his brother late A. Suryanarayana Rao in the year 1972 pursuant to which understanding lands to the extent of 18-36 were delivered possession on 29-8-1972 itself to the third respondent for constructing staff quarters, has no justifying reasons to deny the value of the lands to an extent of Acs.18-36 guntas for all these 24 years and hold on possession without paying any compensation? I do not think that the third respondent could be permitted to say that he is entitled to retain the property without even paying any compensation. If the third respondent assumes that he has power to do so, this Court would in such circumstances, be inclined to say, such retention is illegal and amounts to depriving the petitioners their legitimate compensation. In all fairness, the third respondent shall persuade the fourth respondent who is the Land Acquisition Officer, to complete the land acquisition proceedings and finalise the award without waste of further time. Unfortunately, efforts in this direction are lacking as is evident from the facts placed before this Court.
In view of the above discussion, I am inclined to say that the exercise of suo motu powers by the first respondent u/s 34 of the U.L.C. Act at this point of time is unwarranted, unreasonable and intended only to deny the reasonable compensation to the petitioners. Therefore, the impugned G.O.Ms.Nos. 21, dated 20-1-1995 cannot be sustained and the same is accordingly set aside.
This order would meet the second proposition formulated by this Court in writ petition Nos. 11754 of 1994 which is disposed of separately today.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 5,000/- to be paid by the first respondent to the petitioners within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.