Atanu Chakraborty vs High Court Of Calcutta And Others

Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J

The Court : The issues raised at the bar as well as in the pleadings of the parties are quite numerous and varied. But all of them need not be addressed for the present purpose of disposal of the writ petition. However, underlying the admitted factual position lies an aspect of great importance which calls for a positive finding.

The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition may be summed up briefly. In the year 2009 an advertisement was issued announcing certain vacancies in the cadre of District Judge (Entry Level) under the West Bengal Judicial Service. The Registrar General, High Court, Calcutta issued an advertisement on April 4, 2009 for filling up 16 vacancies by way of direct recruitment from the bar to the said cadre for selection of the District Judge.

It was mentioned in the advertisement that the selection was to be on a written examination of 500 marks and a viva-voce of 100 marks. Candidates successful in the written examination were eligible to participate in the viva-voce/personality test. Pass mark for each subject would be 40 and in addition to that candidates were required to obtain 50% in aggregate in order to be successful in the written test. High Court reserved the right to relax the above eligibility criteria and qualifying marks in each subject or aggregate, if required. Other stipulations in the advertisement are not relevant for the present purpose.

The petitioner along with others participated in the written examination. After publication of the result, it was found that he secured 13th position amongst 19 candidates who had cleared the written test. He was, therefore, asked to appear for viva-voce/personality test on September 3, 2009.

The petitioner states that the respondent no. 4 submitted a representation on August 25, 2009 to the Hon'ble Chief Justice praying for exercising discretionary power to relax the eligibility criteria to enable her to pass in the subject in which she had failed to obtain the minimum marks. The Selection Board had taken a resolution on August 28, 2009 that all the candidates who had obtained two marks less than pass mark in any subject or aggregate would be called for viva-voce/personality text. This was followed by a notification by the respondent no. 2 intimating that three more candidates would also be called for the said test. Consequent upon this notification, the respondent nos. 4 and 5 had appeared at the viva-voce examination.

When the final result was published it appeared that the petitioner had obtained 17th position in overall assessment with a total of 307.33 marks. The respondents nos. 4 and 5 who had failed to clear the written test had overtaken the writ petitioner in the overall merit position.

The writ petitioner filed an application for his impleadment in W.P. (Civil) 46 of 2007 which was pending before the Supreme Court. The said application was dismissed as "not pressed" on August 29, 2011. He filed an application for recalling the said order which was also dismissed on July 23, 2012. In the year 2016, he filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India which was not entertained and was dismissed in limine by an order, dated January 11, 2016. Two years thereafter he has filed the present writ petition inter alia for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to republish the overall result of the candidates for recruitment to the post of District Judge (Entry Level) by excluding the names of the respondent nos. 4 and 5, a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to recall or rescind the decision of the Selection Board as contained in the minutes of September 9, 2009 and for other ancillary reliefs.

Considering the importance of the issues involved the court requested Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, the learned Senior Advocate, to act as an amicus curiae in the matter. Mr. Sengupta, assisted by Ms. Atasi Ghosh, the learned Advocate, has rendered notable assistance for which the court records its appreciation for the valued assistance it has received from Mr. Sengupta.

It has been the grievance of the petitioner that three candidates including the respondents nos. 4 and 5 who had failed to secure the qualifying marks and were ineligible to appear in the viva-voce/personality test were called for an interview and in the final result two of them viz., the respondents nos. 4 and 5 were placed in higher positions above the petitioner. The petitioner has assailed the decision as contrary to the rules of examination and a change in the eligibility criteria midway through the selection process.

In the affidavit-in-opposition the High Court administration, with reference to this specific has taken a point that in the advertisement inviting applications for the relevant posts the High Court reserved the right to relax the eligibility criteria and qualifying marks in each subject or aggregate, if required. After the publication of the result of the written test several representations were made to the High Court administration for relaxation of the qualifying marks in the written test. On receipt of such representations, the Selection Board decided to grant some relaxation in its meeting held on August 28, 2009 and decided to permit those candidates to appear in the viva-voce test who had fallen short of qualifying marks in the written test either in one subject or in aggregate by not more than two marks. Thereafter, the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Board were circulated amongst the Hon'ble Judges inviting comments indicating that if no comment was received by 1.15 p.m. on September 1, 2009, the decision taken by the Selection Board to relax the qualifying marks would be deemed to have been approved by the Full Court. The Hon'ble Chief Justice approved the Lay Note, dated September 1, 2009 of the learned Registrar General that the minutes, dated August 28, 2009 were deemed to have been approved by the Full Court by circulation.

The learned Registrar General of the High Court who has affirmed the affidavit for the High Court administration has specifically stated that on the basis of such decision candidates who had fallen short of the qualifying marks in the written test either in one subject or in the aggregate by not more than two marks were permitted to appear in the viva-voce test. No objection was ever raised from any corner to the decision taken by the Selection Board.

It appears from Annexure P-2 to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents nos. 1 and 2 that the Selection Board in its meeting held on August 28, 2009 had recorded in the minutes that after taking into consideration various representations made before the Selection Board by some of the unsuccessful candidates, the Selection Board unanimously resolved that if any of the candidate who had appeared in the relevant examination obtained two marks less than the pass marks fixed for any subject or in aggregate, might be called for the viva-voce test. This was obviously done in exercise of the power of relaxation contained in the relevant advertisement which reserved into the High Court the right to relax the eligibility criteria and qualifying marks in each subject or aggregate, if required. Thus, there was obviously a power vested in the hand of the High Court to relax the eligibility criteria and qualifying marks in suitable cases, if required. The question to consider is whether the High Court exercised such power justly and properly and if at all there was any necessity for the same.

The minutes of the meeting of the Selection Board are silent about the reasons for such relaxation. It has not given any details about the representations it has taken into consideration or their contents. It merely says that "various representations" were made by some of the unsuccessful candidates. Thus the High Court exercised its power on representations made by unsuccessful candidates. In a competitive examination there was hardly any scope for the Selection Board to exercise the power of relaxation on representations by the unsuccessful candidates. In fact, there was no question of making any representation by an unsuccessful candidate, far less for the Selection Board to act on it.

The decision to lower the pass marks by not more than two marks is not informed with any reason. The Selection Board should have mentioned why they had decided to lower the pass marks by two marks in one subject or the aggregate or why should such unsuccessful candidates be called for the viva-voce test.

Since there was no provision for an unsuccessful candidate to make a representation, the Selection Board should have appreciated that even if there was nothing stopping an unsuccessful candidate from making a representation there was no scope for acting on such a representation. The exercise of power of relaxation on the basis of representations made by some unsuccessful candidates might have been relevant if the advertisement contained any provision for the same. In fact, some unsuccessful candidates would make a representation and appeal that the discretionary power of relaxation should be exercised and the Selection Board without recording any reason would lower the qualifying marks, is no proper exercise of discretion.

On being directed by this Court, the High Court administration produced a copy of the representation of one such candidate. The same may be taken into consideration as the one on which the Selection Board had exercised its power. The unsuccessful candidate made a grievance that in spite of having lower marks in other papers and low aggregate other candidates had been qualified as they got pass marks in all subjects. The candidate requested the Hon'ble Chief Justice to reconsider the case for ends of justice as there was a shortfall of one mark in one paper and the aggregate marks was better than some of the qualifying candidates.

If a candidate or some candidates failed to secure the minimum qualifying mark the Selection Board should not have lowered the eligibility criteria in the absence of any special circumstances justifying the same. It is all the more so when the number of available qualified candidates was more than the vacancies. Had the number of qualified candidates been less than the vacancies there might have been a justification for the exercise of the discretionary power of relaxation. That was never the case and, in fact, that was never recorded in the minutes of the meeting by the Selection Board.

That takes us to the consideration of a far more important issue viz., why should the Selection Board constituted for the conduct of the relevant examination or for that matter any Selection Board dealing with any public examination must invoke the power of relaxation without recording any justifiable reason for the same. In Rekha Chaturvedi Vs. University of Rajasthan, reported in (1993) supp. 3 SCC 168, the Supreme Court issued the direction that a University or a Selection Committee must mention in its proceeding of the selection the reasons for making relaxations, if any, in respect of each of the candidates in whose favour relaxation is made. In the present case, the High Court has not recorded any reason for such relaxation. The order is entirely an unreasoned one never seeking to record why relaxation of two marks from the stipulated pass marks done by the Selection Board. The Selection Board and the High Court administration are certainly answerable why two marks were lowered and not one mark or three marks? The consideration that weighed with the Selection Board has not been mentioned at all in the minutes, far less elaborately discussed.

That apart, a recording such as "after taking into consideration the various representations made before the Selection Board by some of the unsuccessful candidates, the Selection Board unanimously resolved....." is no recording of reasons why this relaxation was made. Where is the compliance of the requirement of recording the reasons as mentioned in the judgment of Rekha Chaturvedi (Supra)? Even without that judgment the Selection Board should have appreciated that relaxation of marks was not the ordinary procedure to be followed by the Selection Board and such right was reserved to High Court only if the justifying circumstances so demanded.

Even if in the advertisement it was mentioned that the right to relax the eligibility criteria could be exercised, if required, it is a settled principle of law that when a power is given to an authority to be exercised only if that was required, such power cannot be exercised unless the requirement is fulfilled. Existence of the requirement is a pre-condition for the exercise of such power. Such requirement, therefore, has to be recorded or at least clearly reflected in the minutes of the proceeding. Merely because "some" unsuccessful candidates had made "various" representations did not, without anything more, confer any right upon the Selection Board to invoke the power of relaxation. The Selection Board appears to have not appreciated that the whole purpose of a competitive examination being to eliminate unsuccessful candidates lowering the minimum eligibility criterion could not be directed except for compelling circumstances, e.g. want of the requisite number of candidates vis-à-vis the vacancies. Even in that case the reason for such relaxation is always required to be recorded.

When an authority fails to record the reasons for lowering the eligibility criterion, particularly a Selection Board, the order is not only an unreasoned one but must be held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is a part of our shared experience that a similar exercise of power by any other public examining body in the manner in which it has been done in the present case receives judicial disapproval from the High Court and the decision is invariably struck down. The Selection Board has acted in a manner which this court in exercise of its judicial power has frequently struck down.

While exercising the power of relaxation, the authority must act judiciously keeping in mind the purport and object thereof. The Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India Vs. Bhanu Lodh, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 618 had observed that the power of relaxation is intended to be used in marginal cases where exceptionally qualified candidates are available. They are intended as an "open sesame" for all and sundry. Again in the case of Ami Lal Bhat (Dr.) Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614, the Supreme Court observed that the power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation is to be exercised in special circumstances by the administration. In that case also the Supreme Court observed that it might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated but who might not apply.

Both these judgments, viz., Food Corporation of India (Supra) and Ami Lal Bhat (Dr.) (Supra) were relied on by the Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others Vs. Sajal Kumar Roy and Others, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 671, where the Supreme Court had held that the appointing authorities are required to apply their minds while exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to relax the age limits. The requirement to comply with the rules were to be done fairly and reasonably. We can take the ratio of that judgment as applying to the present case, if we substitute the words "eligibility criterion" in the advertisement for age-limits which was the consideration before the Supreme Court in that case.

This being the conclusion of the court on the merits of the case it is necessary to consider the relief, if at all, the petitioner entitled to get in the writ petition.

Since the present writ petition was filed about more than eight years after the publication of the result of the concerned examination and since this petition was preceded by a writ petition filed before the Supreme Court earlier, a question cropped up about the entitlement of the petitioner to the reliefs prayed for on the grounds of delay and res judicata. For the present purpose, we need not enter into the question of res judicata as delay in filing the present writ petition appears to be quite enormous.

Delay in filing the writ petition has been sought to be explained in paragraph 33 to the effect that the petitioner was incorrectly advised that the matter could not be reopened after the dismissal of the petition by the Supreme Court. The other reason mentioned for the delay was ill-health of the learned Advocate who was entrusted with the case for the better part of the year 2017 which explains a gap of two years between the passing of the order by the Supreme Court and the presentation of the instant application.

Mr. Samanta, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, tried to overcome the objection of delay as wholly irrelevant as by the act of the High Court administration unequals have been treated as equals allowing the unsuccessful candidates to participate in the written test which has resulted in violation of the fundamental right of the writ petitioner.

In this connection, Mr. Samanta relied on the judgment in the case of K. Thimmappa and Others Vs. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India and Another, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 259. Based on this he submitted that when there was an infraction of fundamental rights delay in filing the writ petition should not stand in the way in granting the final relief.

Mr. Samanta further relied on Kaberi (Dutta) Santra and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in 2015 (1) CLT 384. There a single judge of this court observed that there was no prescribed period of limitation for approaching the court of writ but the court has to be approached with utmost expedition and if any third party is involved at least before or within a reasonable period after accrual of right in his favour. However, in an exceptional case where the larger public interest so demands, accrual of a personal right of a third party may not stand in the way of judicial intervention in exercise of extraordinary writ powers. In so far as service related disputes are concerned where it is alleged that an aspirant for the post has practised fraud on the employer to obtain public employment and the alleged fraud is found to be egregious in nature vitiating the entire process of recruitment, it would be a miscarriage of justice if the court of writ upholds the contention of the beneficiaries of the fraud that the writ petition ought to be dismissed for no better reason than that they have continued in service for years.

Mr. Samanta further relied on the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katigi and Others, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107.            The Supreme Court held that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice which is the life purpose for the existence of the institution of the courts. It is common knowledge that the Supreme Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in the court but the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. The Supreme Court summarized the principles on which the liberal approach is adopted, viz., a) ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, b) refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated, c) "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made, d) when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred as the other side cannot claim to have any vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay, e) there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides, and f) it must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds, but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

There is no fixed period of limitation for filing an application invoking the writ jurisdiction of a High Court. All that is insisted on is that the party seeking to invoke such jurisdiction must approach the court within a reasonable period from the date of accrual of the cause of action. It is an admitted position that delay in making an application is a very relevant factor for a court to decline to entertain a writ petition for granting relief. It is a settled position of law that if an action in writ is sought to be initiated beyond a reasonable period of time without any satisfactory explanation, the court may certainly refuse to entertain the same. This is all the more so if the grant of relief would be prejudicial to the party affecting his right. This is so not because of any statute of limitation, but because the court has discretion in issuing the writ and in exercise of the discretion will refuse mandamus, will not grant any relief if the petitioner approaches the court beyond a reasonable period and without any sufficient reason being shown for the belated action. The principle of law was laid down about half a century ago by the Supreme Court in Kamini Kumar Das Choudhury Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2060, where it was observed that it is imperative for a petitioner to come to court at the reasonable possible opportunity if he invokes extraordinary remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

When there is considerable delay in filing a writ petition and when during the intervening period the respondent has acquired right to the post, the delay should not be condoned. Such is the ratio of the judgment in the case of State of M.P and Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 251. In that case the Supreme Court observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It was further observed that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its trend new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay it may have effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. In that case the Supreme Court relied on Ramanna Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India, (AIR 1979 SC 1628) where even though the state action was held to be unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ petition had been filed more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondent who had during the period incurred considerable expenditure. In the present case not only a considerable time had elapsed before the petitioner instituted the writ petition a very valuable right in favour of the respondents have already been created.

In Scooters India Vs. Vijai E.V. Elderd, repoted in (1998) 6 SCC 549, the Supreme Court considered the delay of six years in moving an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to be fatal. In Rabindra Nath Bose and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, reported in AIR 1970 SC 470 the Supreme Court observed that it would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. "Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years." Again in Trilokchand Motichand and Others Vs. H. B. Munsi and Another, reported in AIR 1970 SC 898 a full Bench of the Supreme Court observed that the party claiming fundamental rights must move the court before other's rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerged by reason of delay on the part of the petitioner. A challenge to an appointment of the respondent made five years after his confirmation was held to be long and inexplicable delay and the grievance to be too stale to merit redress in State of Orissa Vs. Arun Kumar, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1640.

The importance of approaching the court without unreasonable delay for initiating a writ proceeding has been emphasized repeatedly in a large number of cases by the Supreme Court over all these years. The legal maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt meaning that equity aids only the vigilant and not the ones who sleep over their rights was relied upon by the Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration and Another Vs. Jasmine Kaur and Others, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 521.

The reasonable period within which a party has to approach the court is certainly a variable one and depends on the facts of each particular case. Even then in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bhailal Bhai, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Supreme Court fixed the upper time limit within which such an action should be initiated. It has been held that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought ordinarily may be taken to a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be measured. It was further observed that the court may consider delay as unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy. But where the delay is more than this period it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that the delay is unreasonable.

In the present case the writ petition has been filed more than eight years after the result of the concerned examination was published. In the year 2010 he filed an interim application for addition of party before the Supreme Court. After the said application was dismissed as "not pressed", he filed an application for recalling the same in the year 2012. Then he waited for about four years. After the dismissal of his writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India on January 11, 2016 the present writ petition was filed two years later.

The only explanation for the delay was the illness of the learned Senior Advocate who was entrusted with the matter, for the better part of the year 2017. The petitioner claims that there has been a gap of two years between the order of dismissal by the Supreme Court and the filing of the instant writ petition.

Such an explanation obviously overlooks a very basic aspect of the chronology. The question is not so much the time taken by the petitioner after the dismissal of the writ petition by the Supreme Court. A far more important issue to address is how soon the petitioner approached the court after the accrual of the cause of action. After dismissal of his application for recalling the order, dated August 29, 2011, on July 27, 2012 he moved the Supreme Court itself after considerable delay. In the process there has been a considerable delay from the publication of the result of the examination and about eight years from the initial appointment of the respondents nos. 4 and 5. In the meantime a very valuable right has accrued in their favour which should not be dislodged at this belated stage. This the court holds on the application of the principle laid down in Rabindra Nath Bose and Others (Supra).

It is true that in some cases some marginal delay in approaching the court has been condoned on a satisfactory explanation given by the petitioner. The present case, however, falls short of such satisfactory and convincing explanation. The only explanation given by the petitioner hardly justifies the delay for the entire period from the publication of the final result till the filing of the present petition.

In K. Thimmappa and Others (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that there was no infraction of any fundamental right of the petitioners. Even in the case of violation of fundamental right delay in approaching the Court is a very relevant factor. In Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 768, the Supreme Court observed that it is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution of India the court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of. This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental rights.

In Kaberi (Dutta) Santra and Others (Supra) there was allegation of exercise of fraud on the employer to obtain public employment and it is a settled principle of law that fraud vitiates everything. That apart, such is not the case here. There has not been any fraud on the employer. Again in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another (Supra) the delay was only of four days and the Supreme Court was considering the scope of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The considerations that a court should exercise, as laid down in the said judgment, was entirely in connection with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Since for filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India there is no statutory period of limitation, the question of delay of four days does not arise. Therefore, the question of dismissing a writ petition on the ground of "technical considerations" also does not arise. On the contrary, if one approaches the issue from the point of view of "substantial justice", as pointed out in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another (Supra), granting relief to the petitioner after more than eight years without sufficient explanation will by itself definitely operate as substantial injustice to the respondents nos. 4 and 5 whose appointments are under challenge in the present writ petition, particularly after they have been confirmed in service.

The Supreme Court in the case of Moon Mills Ltd. Vs. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay and Others, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1450, had observed that writ will not be granted if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party.

In Moon Mills Ltd. (Supra), the Supreme Court relied on a passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of The Lindsay Petroleum Company Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell and John Kemp, reported in (1874) 5 PC 221 where Sir Barnes Peacock had observed that the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or whereby his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedies were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases lapse of time and delay are most material.

From the enumeration of the above legal principle it is clear that the petitioner has forfeited his right to any relief in this challenge to the action of the High Court administration by letting so many years to pass by.

I, therefore, am not inclined to grant any relief to the writ petitioner after such an inordinate delay.

With the observations and findings as above, the writ petition is dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.