Asian Hotels (North) Ltd vs Harman Singh Bawa

By way of the present Judgment, this Court shall dispose of the captioned Petitions under Section 34 as well as Appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation, 1996 [“Arbitration Act”].

The party aggrieved by the various orders of the Arbitral Tribunal in all the captioned matters under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act is Asian Hotels (North) Ltd. It is agreed that other than the fact that the amounts and the apartment numbers involved in the contracts in question are different, the relevant clauses under which disputes have arisen as well as the orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal are common and have the same effect. As such, with the consent of all the parties represented through their counsels, this Court shall examine the pleadings and documents as filed under the Petition being O.M.P. (COMM) 344 of 2022, which has been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act against the Final Award dated 20.05.2022 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in the proceedings titled „M/s Gursharan Singh Bawa v. Asian Hotels (North) Limited‟ [“Impugned Award”].

A brief factual background of the dispute between the parties herein, as well as the procedural history, which is borne out from the material on record, is stated as under:

As per the Petitioner, it was constrained to send the Termination Notice, as it was prevented from utilizing the Premises due to the restrictive governmental regulations suspending the operation of the Hotel, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. For this reason, the Petitioner claimed that it was not responsible for any consequences and/or liabilities/obligations under the 2^nd Lease Deed w.e.f. 25.03.2020. By way of this Termination Notice, the Petitioner also called upon the Respondent to take possession of the Premises and refund the security deposit.

Since no proper response was received by the Respondent regarding its invocation of arbitration, the Respondent approached this Court by way of Petitions under Section 9 as well as Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, seeking interim protection as well as appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties. This Court, vide Order dated 23.11.2020, disposed of these Petitions under Section 9 and 11 of the Arbitration Act, by constituting the Arbitral Tribunal and directing the Arbitral Tribunal to treat the Respondent‟s Petition under Section 9 as one under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act.

The Petitioner thereafter filed its Statement of Defence before the learned Sole Arbitrator on 02.04.2021, while its Counter-Claims came to be filed on 12.06.2021.

In the interregnum, the Respondent filed an application before the Arbitral Tribunal, alleging non-compliance of the Order dated 05.03.2021 on part of the Petitioner, and requesting initiation of contempt proceedings against the Petitioner. The Arbitral Tribunal, upon receipt of this application, observed that the Order dated 05.03.2021 was not being complied with by the Petitioner, which may have the effect of rendering the arbitration proceedings futile. For this reason, the Arbitral Tribunal made a representation vide a Letter dated 02.07.2021 to this Court under Section 27(5) of the Arbitration Act, for taking appropriate action(s) against the Petitioner‟s default in complying with the Order dated 05.03.2021. This culminated into the petition being O.M.P. (CONT.) 2 of 2022, vide Order dated 31.05.2022 passed by this Court in the Appeals filed by the Petitioner under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

A tabular summary of the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Impugned Award on the claims and counter-claims is given below:

Before this Court, the Petitioner assails the Impugned Award to the extent that it allows the claims of the Respondent and rejected the counter-claims of the Petitioner.

Before delving into the rival contentions of the parties advanced before this Court, a reference to the relevant provisions under the Contract, i.e., the 2^nd Lease Deed, is pertinent to made. The same are being reproduced to read as under:

(Emphasis Supplied)

Learned Senior Counsel appearing the Petitioner has advanced the following arguments while praying for the partial setting aside of the Impugned Award on the ground that it is perverse, based on „no evidence‟, violates the fundamental policy of India, principles of natural justice and is contrary to the principles of natural justice:

In line with the Judgment of the Apex Court in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (1984) 4 SCC 679 and Salter India (P) Ltd. v. Rakesh Nayyar, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3049, Clause 15.4 of the 2^nd Lease Deed, which is the arbitration clause, has to be considered in the widest amplitude and would therefore extend to all the counter-claims arising under the 1^st Lease Deed as well.

Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent has opposed the instant Petitions inter alia on the following grounds:

Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.

Before delving into the merits of the case and the rival contentions of the parties, it is crucial for this Court to remind itself of the boundaries within which it can exercise the power under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In the present case, objection to the Impugned Award is that it is perverse, based on no-evidence and violates the fundamental policy of Indian laws. Reference is thus made to the Judgment of the Apex Court in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC 417, which discusses the term „in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law‟ as under:

Perversity as a ground challenge has also be discussed by the Apex Court in OPG Power Generation (Supra), as follows:

The fulcrum of controversy between the parties, as observed by the Arbitral Tribunal, was the Termination Notice sent by the Petitioner to the Respondent under Clause 15.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed, and whether the Petitioner was empowered to do so.

Perusal of the Impugned Award on the aforesaid question shows that the Arbitral Tribunal interpreted Clause 15.2 of 2^nd Lease Deed in two parts – first, which applies to a force majeure event which destroys or damages the property and renders the lease impossible, unsafe, unfit, and non-feasible to operate out of the said property; and second, which deals with a situation created by restrictive governmental laws or regulations, riots, insurrection, war, terrorist action, strike, public demonstration, rallies, acts of God, etc., that prevent the lessee from discharging its obligations cast on him under the terms of the lease deed. The Arbitral Tribunal deemed the first part as inapplicable, since it was neither the case of the Petitioner that there was a force majeure event leading to destruction of the Premises, nor that the Premises was damaged in any manner. As for the second part, the Arbitral Tribunal opined that though it relieved the Petitioner/lessee from the consequences arising from not being able to meet its obligations, it did not confer any right on the lessee to terminate the lease. Rather, the Arbitral Tribunal viewed the Petitioner‟s decision to terminate the 2^nd Lease Deed as a deliberate act and not a passive submission to an event which prevented/precluded/hindered it from discharging its obligations.

The Arbitral Tribunal further took into account the fact that though a lockdown was imposed by the Government of India for a few months, restaurants and hospitality services were permitted to function, subject to adherence with the COVID-19 guidelines, from 08.06.2020 or so, which is much prior to the date on which the Petitioner sent the letter terminating the 2^nd Lease Deed with a retrospective effect from 25.03.2020. Thus, while concluding that the Petitioner did not have a right to terminate the 2^nd Lease Deed under Clause 15.2, the Arbitral Tribunal observed that the Petitioner was even less empowered to do so with a retrospective effect. The Arbitral Tribunal buttressed its interpretation of the second part of Clause 15.2 with the judgments of the Apex Court in Alopi Prashad vs. UOI, (1960) 2 SCR 793 and Panna Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (1975) 2 SCC 633, which hold that a contract is not frustrated merely because the circumstances in which the contract was made, are altered.

Additionally, effect of the Petitioner‟s act of terminating the 2^nd Lease Deed on ground of the same having become onerous, financially unviable or difficult to operate, was considered by the Arbitral Tribunal in light of Section 56 of the ICA, which is being extracted below for reference:

The Arbitral Tribunal applied Section 56 of the ICA after recalling some notable judgments of the Apex Court in Raja Dhruv Dev Chand vs. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024 and T. Lakshmipathi and Ors. v. P. Nithyananda Reddy and Ors,. (2003) 5 SCC 150, to eventually conclude that even when an executed contract becomes difficult and onerous to operate by a party to the contract, it cannot resile from it and cannot escape payment of rent or legal obligations and liabilities.

Lastly, the Arbitral Tribunal distinguished a Judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ramanand v. Dr. Girish Soni, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 635, which was relied upon by the Petitioner to argue that the doctrine of frustration, which is encapsulated in Section 56 of the ICA, has no application in a case where there is a force majeure clause. The Arbitral Tribunal observed that it was the Petitioner who, in actuality, could not even avail the doctrine of force majeure which is incorporated under Section 108(B)(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 [“TPA”], which reads as under:

The Arbitral Tribunal took note that this Court in Ramanand (Supra), held that there has to be complete destruction of property before recourse can be had to Section 108(B)(e) of the TPA. After the above in-depth discussion, the Arbitral Tribunal gave the following conclusions:

In the opinion of this Court, the wordings of Clause 15.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed are clear as day to determine whether or not the Petitioner was entitled to terminate the 2^nd Lease Deed or not. The simple answer, which aligns with the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal, is no. Yet, this Court deems it fit to also refer to the wordings of the Notification dated 24.03.2020 bearing No. 40-3/2020-DM-I(A) released by the Ministry of Home Affairs imposing a nation-wide lockdown owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. Relevant portion of the said Notification reads as under:

The lockdown was further extended till 31.05.2020, by way of another Notification released by the Ministry of Home Affairs, relevant parts whereof read as under:

Subsequently, the lockdown was relaxed vide a Notification dated 21.08.2020 bearing No. F.DDMA/COVID-19/2020/1/292, allowing the opening of hotels. Relevant extract of the said Notification reads as under:

The above notifications released by the Ministry of Home Affairs fall within the ambit of „restrictive governmental laws or regulations‟, which is envisioned in the second part of Clause 15.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed. However, what is pertinent in the above Notification dated 21.08.2020 is that vide an Order dated 30.05.2020, the Government of India had permitted the re-opening of hotels and other hospitality services, subject to their compliance with the Standard Operating Procedures. Therefore, while temporary restrictions were in place, they were certainly not in perpetuity.

A perusal of Clause 15.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed, more so, the second part thereof, as dissected by the Arbitral Tribunal, indicates that there is no mention of the parties‟ power to terminate the 2^nd Lease Deed under Clause

The only respite that the Petitioner, as the lessee, may be entitled to is not being responsible for any consequences or not liabilities if it was prevented in performing its obligations under the terms of the 2^nd Lease Deed by reasons of any restrictive governmental laws or regulations, etc. – nothing more, nothing less. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in concurring with the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal that termination of the 2^nd Lease Deed under Clause 15.2 was illegal.

The next array of questions posed before the Arbitral Tribunal were regarding Clause 12 of the 2^nd Lease Deed, to determine whether or not Clause 12 rendered the 2^nd Lease Deed as determinable and as such, incapable of being specifically performed as per Section 14(1)(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 [“SRA”] and further as to whether or not the „penultimate sub-clause‟ dealing with the obligation of the Petitioner to pay on termination survives and whether or not the Respondent was entitled to monetary relief.

Clause 12.1 of the 2^nd Lease Deed provided that the lessor shall have no right to terminate the lease deed during the initial term of the deed, i.e., for 15 years. The Clause also provides an exception, in a situation where the lessee violates the terms of the 2^nd Lease Deed and does not cure the breach within 30 days of the receipt of the notice given by the lessor in that regard, the lessor has the right to terminate the lease by giving further notice of 30 days in writing to the lessee. Further, Clause 12.2 fixes a mandatory lock-in period of 84 months, during which the lessee is injuncted from terminating the 2^nd Lease Deed. But in case the lessor violates the critical terms of the 2^nd Lease Deed which are specified in sub clauses (a) and (b) thereof, and it fails to cure the breach within a period of 30 days of the receipt of notice from the lessee in that regard, the lessee will not be liable to deposit any rent or any amount with the lessor during the notice period and on expiry of 30 days the lessee is entitled to hand over the apartment to the lessor. Now, the „penultimate sub-clause‟ of Clause 12.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed provides that in case the lease is terminated by the lessee before the expiry of the lock-in period for any reason whatsoever, other than the reason of violation of the critical terms remaining uncured by the lessor, the lessee has been made fully liable to pay the lease rent along with applicable taxes thereon for the entire balance lock-in period.

The Arbitral Tribunal, after analysing the applicable case-laws in light of the wording of the „penultimate sub-clause‟, held that the 2^nd Lease Deed was determinable and consequently, incapable of being specifically performed in terms of Section 14(1)(d) of the SRA. There is no challenge to this observation of the Arbitral Tribunal by either parties herein. Even this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the findings in the Impugned Award on this aspect. With that, the next related questions that remained to be answered were as to whether or not the „penultimate sub-clause‟ dealing with the obligation of the Petitioner to pay on termination survives and whether or not the Respondent was entitled to monetary relief.

On the remaining two questions regarding monetary relief, the Arbitral Tribunal was of the opinion that the Petitioner cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time, by stating that it had the right to terminate the 2^nd Lease Deed as also the right to avoid the obligation to pay the stipulated amount after termination of the contract. The Arbitral Tribunal also considered the case, where if the Petitioner took resort to the „penultimate sub-clause‟ under Clause 12.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed to terminate the contract, its obligation to pay would not perish at the same time. Having observed that, the Arbitral Tribunal held that the „penultimate sub-clause‟ under Clause 12.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed survived the termination of the contract by way of the Termination Notice – which was done prior to the expiry of the lock-in period – and will continue to remain operative until the Petitioner discharges its liability to pay the agreed amount to the Respondent.

Having observed the aforesaid, the adjoining question remaining for consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal was as to whether or not the Respondent was entitled to monetary relief, for which it decided as to whether or not the Respondent was required to prove loss or damage Inarguably, observations of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Impugned Award on this question is the heart of the controversy before this Court.

The first remark of the Arbitral Tribunal on the above question was that in the present case, it was not possible to ascertain loss suffered by the Respondent on account of the premature termination of the 2^nd Lease Deed by the Respondent and there existed no such standard in the contract. As such, the Arbitral Tribunal, while relying on the landmark decision of the Apex Court in Maula Bux (Supra), held that this was a case where since it was not possible to assess compensation for breach of contract, the sum specified by the parties in the „penultimate sub-clause‟ under Clause 12.2 would be considered as a genuine pre-estimate of compensation. The Arbitral Tribunal turned its attention to the exchange of letters between the parties, starting from the Termination Notice. For the sake of convenience, firstly, the Termination Notice is being reproduced hereinbelow:

Next, the Letter dated 18.07.2020 sent by the Petitioner which clarifies its stand regarding termination of the 2^nd Lease Deed, reads as under:

[Emphasis Supplied]

Upon reading of the above two letters, the Arbitral Tribunal formed an opinion that since the Petitioner never claimed that the amount fixed under the „penultimate sub-clause‟ of Clause 12.2 is unreasonable or not a pre-estimation of loss suffered by the Respondent due to the premature termination of the 2^nd Lease Deed, fixation of rent as a measure of loss to the Respondent in the event of a premature termination of the 2^nd Lease Deed was a reasonable one.

The Impugned Award further depicts that the Arbitral Tribunal, while relying on the judgments of the Apex Court in ONGC vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (Supra), and Construction and Design Services (Supra), cast the onus to show that no loss was suffered by the Respondent on account of the premature termination of the 2^nd Lease Deed on the Petitioner, for the reason that the Respondent‟s monetary claim was based on a pre-estimated amount specified by the parties on the breach of Clause 12.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed. The Arbitral Tribunal observed that since the Petitioner violated Clause 12.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed, the onus was on it to show that the Respondent did not suffer any loss as a result of its breach and the amount stipulated was a penalty.

A further examination on the above aspect was undertaken by the Arbitral Tribunal by drawing similarities to the decision of the Apex Court in Chunilal V. Mehta (Supra) to the facts of the present case, while distinguishing the instant dispute with the factual matrix contained in the judgment of Kailash Nath (Supra). The similarities between the instant case and the features that emerge from the Chunilal V. Mehta (Supra) case, as jotted down by the Arbitral Tribunal are being extracted below:

What the Arbitral Tribunal especially took note of from the Chunilal V. Mehta (Supra) Judgment, was that the Apex Court did not consider the salary for the unexpired period of the terminated managing agency, akin to earnest money. Correspondingly, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it observed that unpaid rent for the unexpired lock-in period also cannot be treated as earnest money.

On the other hand, the Arbitral Tribunal distinguished the instant case from the features arising in Kailash Nath (Supra), firstly on the basis that in Kailash Nath (Supra), the Apex Court was dealing with a case wherein a party deposited a certain sum specifically as earnest money with the DDA, on the basis of a contractual stipulation, which also dictated that the said earnest money would be forfeited on the failure on part of the said party to despite the balance money. Secondly, it was noted that the Apex Court eventually held that neither was there any breach by the party that had deposited the earnest money, nor did the party having forfeited the earnest money, i.e., the DDA, suffered any loss. Most importantly, the Apex Court observed that insistence on a contractual stipulation, even when the forfeiting party did not suffer any loss, and allowing such a party to appropriate the monies, would be arbitrary.

To fully appreciate the above distinction drawn by the Arbitral Tribunal, this Court deems it fit to refer to the a few more important facts involved in the Kailash Nath (Supra) case before the Apex Court. The appeal arose out of a public auction conducted by the DDA, wherein the appellant made the highest bid. As per the following terms of the bid, the appellant deposited a particular sum as earnest money in favour of the DDA:

The deposit of earnest money by the appellant in Kailash Nath (Supra) was acknowledged by the DDA, however, the appellant thereafter sought some more time to deposit the remaining 75% amount, due to the economic recession affecting the country at the relevant time. Time for deposit came to be extended. However, later it transpired that due to certain developments, the DDA forfeited the earnest money deposited by the appellant and cancelled the bid/allotment in favour of the appellant. Moreover, later, the DDA sold the plot in question to a different bidder for a sum of Rs. 11.78 crores, which was more than the appellant‟s bid. Against this action, the appellant first filed a suit for specific performance, which came to be dismissed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court, albeit with a direction to the DDA to refund the earnest money to the appellant. This order was appealed against by the DDA before a Division Bench of this Court, who set aside the order passed by the Coordinate Bench to hold that the DDA‟s forfeiture was in order. Thereafter, the appellant approached the Apex Court.

One of the primary observations of the Apex Court in Kailash Nath (Supra) was that since there was no breach of contract on part of the appellant, which is a precondition as per clause (iv) of the terms of the bid, it was an arbitrary action on part of the DDA to forfeit the earnest money. The Apex Court also observed that since DDA did not suffer any loss, it would be arbitrary to allow it to appropriate the earnest money deposited by the appellant therein.

Now that the Court has recalled the facts involved in Kailash Nath (Supra), there is no hesitation in holding that the instant case involves vastly different factual circumstances. First and foremost, the instant case is not related to earnest money. Secondly, it was never the case of the Petitioner that the Respondent violated the terms of the 2^nd Lease Deed, so as to bring the termination thereof within the ambit of Clause 12.2. Rather, it was the Respondent‟s case that the Petitioner breached the „lock-in period‟ provision encapsulated within Clause 12.2, and as such, breached the 2^nd Lease Deed. Thirdly, the fact that the DDA sold the plot in question on a substantially higher bid than that of the appellant, was sufficient to conclude that no loss was suffered by the DDA. Per contra, in the present case, it has been established that the Respondent could not sub-lease the Premises to any other persons, since the Premises was a part of the Petitioner‟s Hotel.

From the above discussion, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Arbitral Tribunal is correct in holding that the judgment of the Apex Court in Kailash Nath (Supra) is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. As such, reliance on the same by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner is also erroneous. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the Arbitral Tribunal, after conducting an in-depth analysis into the facts of the present case, relevant contractual provisions, applicable legal provisions and case laws, has arrived at a plausible view to conclude that the Respondent was entitled to the amount designated by the parties themselves under Clause 12.2 of the 2^nd Lease Deed, once a breach thereof occurs.

This Court recalls another landmark Judgment delivered by the Apex Court in Fateh Chand (Supra), observing as under:

Further, even though the Arbitral Tribunal has rightly distinguished the judgment from the facts of the present case, a reference is appropriate to the following principles laid down by the Apex Court in Kailash Nath (Supra):

In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the foregoing case laws and upon perusal of the Impugned Award, what becomes the foundation of the Arbitral Tribunal‟s conclusion that the Respondent was not obligated to prove damages, was the fact that the Premises was a service apartment in the premises of the Petitioner‟s Hotel, wherein the services being provided were by the Petitioner‟s Hotel itself. As such, the Premises was a part of the Petitioner‟s Hotel. This, as rightly observed by the Arbitral Tribunal, would bring up a situation where it is unlikely for an individual to make bookings for the Premises without the facilities that go with it in the Petitioner‟s Hotel. In these circumstances, it was impossible for the Respondent to sub-lease the Premises to a third party for purpose of mitigation of losses. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner that since there was no effort to mitigate losses, it was upon the Respondent to plead and prove losses for claiming damages, cannot be accepted.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court has no hesitation in agreeing to the views of the Arbitral Tribunal, to the effect that the Respondent was entitled to unrealized rental amounts for the unexpired lock-in period, having occurred on account of the premature termination of the 2^nd Lease Deed and as such, breach of Clause 12.2 by the Petitioner.

Thus, this Court is in agreement with the observations of the Arbitral Tribunal qua the Claims made before it by the Respondent.

The next challenge laid by the Petitioner to the Impugned Award is against the dismissal of its Counter-Claims no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9. The Petitioner alleges that the 2^nd Lease Deed subsumed within itself the 1^st Lease Deed by virtue of Clause 9 of the 2^nd Lease Deed and as such, the Arbitral Tribunal was wrong in concluding that the abovementioned claims were outside the ambit of the 2^nd Lease Deed, having been based on Clause 6 of the 1^st Lease Deed.

Clause 9.1 of the 2^nd Lease Deed reads as under:

Since the above clause mandates compliance of the clauses of the 1^st Lease Deed only to the extent that they do not contradict those in the 2^nd Lease Deed, the Arbitral Tribunal highlighted the entire role-reversal of the parties in the two contracts, i.e., in the 2^nd Lease Deed, as per Clause 10.3, the Petitioner was liable to bear maintenance charges while as per Clause 6 of the 1^st Lease Deed, the Respondent was liable to pay such charges to the Petitioner. Since this was the only contradictory factor, the Arbitral Tribunal dismissed the Counter-Claims based on Clause 6 of the 1^st Lease, as being contradictory to and outside the scope of the 2^nd Lease Deed.

The above view does not warrant any interference, having been based on the clear reading of the wordings of the contractual provisions, as also having arrived at after distinguishing the case laws relied upon by the Petitioner. It is clear that both the 1^st and 2^nd Lease Deeds operate in their independent atmosphere and existence of one does not affect the other. Accordingly, the dismissal of the Counter-Claims no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 as having been based on Clause No. 6 of the 1^st Lease Deed, also does not shock the conscience of this Court and deserves to be upheld.

A careful and comprehensive perusal of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the Arbitral Tribunal has examined the pleadings, documentary material, correspondence exchanged between the parties, and the evidence led in support of their respective claims and assertions. The Impugned Award reflects due consideration of the relevant facts and surrounding circumstances germane to the disputes.

The Impugned Award reflects a plausible and reasoned interpretation of the contract and an evaluation of evidence within the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. It is well settled that a court exercising limited supervisory jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own interpretation of contractual clauses where the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is a possible and reasonable one.

Viewed in its entirety, the Impugned Award reflects a reasoned and structured adjudication of the disputes by the Arbitral Tribunal within the confines of the contractual terms agreed upon by the parties, the material placed on record, and the jurisdiction vested in the Arbitral Tribunal. The Impugned Award demonstrates due application of mind to the pleadings, evidence, and relevant contractual provisions.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Petitioner has failed to establish any ground under Section 34(2) or Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration Act warranting interference with the Impugned Award.

Accordingly, the Petitions being O.M.P. (COMM) 344/2022, O.M.P. (COMM) 345/2022 and O.M.P. (COMM) 346/2022 filed by the Petitioner, along with pending Application(s), if any, stand dismissed.

Since the Impugned Award, being the final award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is upheld, the appeals being filed by the Petitioner being ARB. A. (COMM.) 18/2021, ARB. A. (COMM.) 20/2021 and ARB. A. (COMM.) 22/2021, filed by the Petitioner against the Interim Order dated 05.03.2021 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, are disposed of as infructuous, along with pending Application(s), if any.

OMP (CONT.) 2/2022, OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 187/2022, OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 188/2022 & OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 189/2022

List on 05.10.2026.