Ashok Ramappa Kambale vs State Through Police Inspector, Bilgi

M.F. Saldanha, J.-The appellant before us Ashok Ramappa Kambale is alleged to have attacked deceased Padmawwa on 6-7-1994 at Badagandi Village just outside her house with a jambia and inflicted as many as fourteen stab injuries on her as a result of which Padmawwa died on the spot. The facts are within a very narrow ambit insofar as Padmawwa as also the other prosecution witnesses were all devadasis and there is no secret about the fact that the accused who had some small business came in contact with her about two to three years prior to the incident at Bombay. He thereafter developed an attachment to Padmawwa and the two of them were living together for about two to three years. There is some suggestion to the effect that her family members and associates used to visit them and that all of them benefitted from this association. About fifteen days before 6-7-1994 Padmawwa and the accused came back to the village after which Padmawwa stayed on and refused to go back. The witnesses including Padmawwa''s mother Seethavva deposed to the effect that there was an altercation between the accused and Padmawwa because he was insisting that she must go back with him and she had refused to do so. The accused is supposed to have left stating that he will teach her a lesson and that he will finish her off.

According to the prosecution witnesses, on the night of 6-7-1994 at about 8 p.m. when Padmawwa was sitting along with her cousin P.W. 1-Sabawwa outside the house, the accused appeared there with a jambia and straight away attacked Padmawwa. He stabbed her as many as fourteen times and also inflicted injuries on Sabawwa who tried to intervene and thereafter ran away from that place. He was ultimately arrested at the bus stand and the police alleged that some blood stains were found on his clothes and in the course of the investigation, the weapon was also recovered from him pursuant to a voluntary statement. The accused was charged with having committed offences under Sections 302 and 324 of the IPC, and the Trial Court at the end of the trial found him guilty under both heads and convicted him. He was awarded a sentence of simple imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the IPC and simple imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 324 of the IPC and both sentences to run concurrently. The present appeal is directed against the conviction and sentences.

At the hearing of the appeal, Smt. Anasuya representing the accused and the learned State Public Prosecutor have taken us through the record and have made their submissions. The principal line of attack on behalf of the appellant is that the prosecution witnesses 3, 4, 11 and 12 are all persons who admittedly follow the same profession and Smt. Anasuya submitted that without exhibiting any level of prejudice or bias, a Court will have to take note of two factors, the first being that these are all close associates of deceased Padmawwa and secondly that P.W. 12-Seethawwa is the mother and that the others are also equally interested witnesses. The real submission canvassed was that if the sequence of events is analysed, even though all these witnesses uniformally deposed to the fact that the accused was the person who stabbed Padmawwa to death, what Smt. Anasuya is submitting is that their versions even if not discarded must be regarded as one-sided. She states that there is virtually no ground on which the relationship between the accused and Padmawwa who were living together should have been disrupted except for the fact that it was very obvious that the group of persons who constitute the prosecution witnesses were really interested in decoying her back to her old infamous profession. She submits that this is an aspect which the Trial Court has overlooked and that if this Court were to accept this position, then two issues of consequences would arise, the first being that the version of the witnesses will have to be taken with a high degree of suspicion and secondly, that the complexion of the whole case will change insofar as they have obviously not disclosed as to what happened on that night prior to the attack on Padmawwa. What is contended is that a Court is required to recreate the incident and while doing so, a Court has got to take note of all reasonable probabilities, the first being that the accused was not only emotionally upset but was infuriated by the fact that his relationship with Padmawwa has been disrupted and secondly by the fact that despite everything that he did that she was still refusing to return with him. It is submitted that in this background the accused was placed in the unenviable position insofar as it was a combination of hurt feeling compounded by the emotional aspect as he was deeply attacked to Padmawwa and the desperation that he could do nothing to persuade her to return and live with him and that the combination of these factors on an unsophisticated mind had driven him to a level of fury over which he had no control. Lastly, what was pointed out was that from the number of injuries inflicted that it was very clear that the accused had lost control over himself and that it happened in a situation whereby he really had no reason to take revenge on Padmawwa or to attack her or to kill her that he had done it in the course of an outburst.

The evidence in this case conclusively establishes that it was the accused who inflicted the injuries on Padmawwa and was responsible for her death and the finding of the Trial Court cannot be disturbed under any ground whatsoever. Despite a careful review of the evidence, we see no ground on which we can disturb those findings.

A strong plea was put forward before us on the basis of the aforesaid material and submissions that the head of charge should be altered and that the case would be covered by one of the exceptions to Section 299 of the IPC. Effectively, it was submitted that the accused had been provoked to a point whereby he had temporarily lost control his senses.

The learned State Public Prosecutor has pointed out and perhaps with considerable justification, that these arguments would not be available because the altercation between the parties was two weeks earlier and that the provocation must be both grave and sudden and not something that is two weeks old. Secondly, his submission was that even if the defence were to contend that some verbal altercation must have driven the accused to fury on that day even if the prosecution witnesses are not disclosing it, the learned State Public Prosecutor pointed out to us that the accused had admittedly come there armed with a jambia and that this conduct indicates careful premeditation and on this ground, the aforesaid arguments would have to be rejected. Though we do concede that there may be a few angles in the present case which could bring it very close to one of the exceptions on a strict and careful examination of the law, we find that it would not be permissible to reduce the head of conviction to any other one other than under Section 302 of the IPC. We need to further record that the evidence in this case is totally silent with regard to any form of provocation that the accused may have been subjected to on the date of incident nor has anything been suggested to the witnesses in cross-examination and in this background where the record clearly indicates that the accused came with a jambia and straight away attacked Padmawwa would be straight away liable under Section 302 of the IPC. As regards the subsidiary conviction under Section 324 of the IPC again, there is no ground on which we can interfere with that head of conviction on the basis of the present record.

Having very carefully reviewed the entire record and having applied our minds to the submissions canvassed by the two learned Counsels in our considered view, the findings and the conviction recorded by the Trial Court do not deserve any interference with. In these circumstances, the appeal fails and stands dismissed.