High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 DEL CK 2902

Ashok Kumar vs Shri Bhagwan Transport Co & Ors.

Delhi High Court · Decided on 4 November 2026 · Citation: 2025 INSC 490

HON’BLE JUDGES
Anish Dayal, J
RESULT
Partly Allowed
CASE NUMBER
CM(M) 311/2026 & CM APPL. 8265-8266/2026

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Judgment

72 paragraphs · 3,215 words

ANISH DAYAL, J (ORAL)

1.

This petition has been filed by the petitioner/plaintiff assailing impugned orders dated 11th July 2025 and 10th October 2025, passed by the District Judge- 02, North District, Rohini Courts, New Delhi [‘Trial Court’] in CS DJ No. 621/2018, whereby the petitioner/plaintiff was directed to file his PAN Card, considering that an amount of Rs. 49,00,000/- had been paid in cash to the respondent/defendant no.1, as per the plaint [‘impugned orders’].

2.

This direction had been passed in view of compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court in RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar & Anr., 2025 INSC 490.

3.

Mr. Naagar, counsel for petitioner, at the outset, stated that the said judgement makes it clear that the Court was concerned with the violation of Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which was introduced in 2017 through an amendment, in order to curb black money. On this basis, he contends that since the transaction had taken place in 2015, petitioner/plaintiff would not be covered under the said direction.

4.

This Court appointed Ms. Prabhsahay Kaur, Advocate, as Amicus Curiae, to assist the Court on the legal issue involved.

5.

Ms. Prabhsahay Kaur, Amicus Curiae, apprised the Court of the broad aspects of the issues raised by petitioner/plaintiff while assailing the impugned order.

6.

The crux of the matter is that a suit was filed by petitioner/plaintiff for recovery of Rs.35,67,000/-. During the course of final arguments, the Trial Court directed the petitioner/plaintiff to file a copy of his PAN card, considering that, as per the plaint, an amount of Rs.49,00,000/- had been paid in cash to respondent/defendant no.1.

7.

Amicus Curiae pointed out the following aspects:

(i)

As per the plaint, various amounts were provided by petitioner/plaintiff to defendants/respondents over a period of time, from 2012 onwards, as friendly loans. The initial amounts were in round figures; however, as is evident from paragraph 8 of the plaint, the amounts paid from December 2012 onwards were specific amounts, such as Rs.23,47,216/-, followed by Rs.63,712/- and so on.

(ii)

On the face of it, the money does not appear to be provided towards stock loans or friendly loans, and instead appears to have been paid towards certain transactions, that may have occurred between the parties, in respect of which cash payments were made.

(iii)

Specifically in order to curb proliferation of such cash transactions above a certain value, the Supreme Court in RBANMS Educational Institution (supra), issued certain directions vide paragraph 18.1 of the said judgment. The Supreme Court, essentially, directed the Courts to inform the Income Tax Department, in cases where suits were filed with claims that more than Rs.2,00,000/- was being paid in cash towards any transaction. At that time, the Supreme Court relied upon the extant provisions of the Income Tax Act viz. Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [‘the Act’].

(iv)

Section 269SS of the Act, also prohibits transactions of Rs.20,000/- or more in cash, particularly in respect of loans or deposits exceeding the said threshold.

(v)

Therefore, considering that the transactions, as stated in the plaint, occurred at the time when Section 269SS was applicable, Ld. Amicus Curiae contends that it was incumbent upon the Trial Court to comply with the directions of the Supreme Court. She submits that the directions of the Supreme Court could not be read in isolation from a particular provision which came on the statute book in 2017, since the purpose was to ensure that information regarding transactions, made outside the formal channels of payment, was to be provided.

8.

It is an admitted position that the transaction in this case related to a loan of Rs.49,00,000/- being paid by the petitioner/plaintiff to respondents/defendant nos. 1 and 2 in cash, on different dates up till September 2015. Considering that the transactions in question took place prior to 2017, one of the issues before the Court was whether the said transaction would have to be reported to the jurisdictional tax authorities in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in RBANMS Educational Institution (supra), wherein the Supreme Court dealt with the violation of Section 269ST of the Act, introduced in 2017.

9.

What is now clear, to this Court, is that prior to the introduction of Section 269ST of the Act by the Finance Act, 2017, another provision i.e. Section 269SS, had already been inserted by the Finance Act, 1984, with effect from 01st April 1984. Section 269SS was made operative in respect of loans and deposits taken or accepted on or after 01st July 1984. Initially, the monetary threshold prescribed was Rs.10,000/-, which was subsequently enhanced to Rs.20,000/- with effect from 01st April 1989. For ease of reference Sections 269SS and 269ST have been reproduced hereinbelow:

“269SS. Mode of taking or accepting certain loans, deposits and specified sum.—No person shall, after the 30th day of June, 1984, take or accept from any other person (herein referred to as the depositor), any loan or deposit or any specified sum, otherwise than by an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft or use of electronic clearing system through a bank account or through such other electronic mode as may be prescribed, if,—

(a)

the amount of such loan or deposit or specified sum or the aggregate amount of such loan, deposit and specified sum; or

(b)

on the date of taking or accepting such loan or deposit or specified sum, any loan or deposit or specified sum taken or accepted earlier by such person from the depositor is remaining unpaid (whether repayment has fallen due or not), the amount or the aggregate amount remaining unpaid; or

(c)

the amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (a) together with the amount or the aggregate amount referred to in clause (b), is twenty thousand rupees or more:

Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any loan or deposit or specified sum taken or accepted from, or any loan or deposit or specified sum taken or accepted by,—

(a)

the Government;

(b)

any banking company, post office savings bank or co-operative bank;

(c)

any corporation established by a Central, State or Provincial Act;

(d)

any Government company as defined in clause (45) of Section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013);

(e)

such other institution, association or body or class of institutions, associations or bodies which the Central Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, notify in this behalf in the Official Gazette:

Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any loan or deposit or specified sum, where the person from whom the loan or deposit or specified sum is taken or accepted and the person by whom the loan or deposit or specified sum is taken or accepted, are both having agricultural income and neither of them has any income chargeable to tax under this Act.

Provided also that the provisions of this section shall have effect, as if for the words “twenty thousand rupees”, the words “two lakh rupees” had been substituted in the case of any deposit or loan where,—

(a)

such deposit is accepted by a primary agricultural credit society or a primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank from its member; or

(b)

such loan is taken from a primary agricultural credit society or a primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank by its member.]

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—

(i)

“banking company” means a company to which the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) applies and includes any bank or banking institution referred to in Section 51 of that Act;

(ii)

“co-operative bank”, “primary agricultural credit society” and “primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank” shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Explanation to sub-section (4) of Section 80-P;

(iii)

“loan or deposit” means loan or deposit of money;

(iv)

“specified sum” means any sum of money receivable, whether as advance or otherwise, in relation to transfer of an immovable property, whether or not the transfer takes place.

269ST. Mode of undertaking transactions.—No person shall receive an amount of two lakh rupees or more—

(a)

in aggregate from a person in a day; or

(b)

in respect of a single transaction; or

(c)

in respect of transactions relating to one event or occasion from a person, otherwise than by an account payee cheque or an account payee bank draft or use of electronic clearing system through a bank account or through such other electronic mode as may be prescribed:

Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply to—

(i)

any receipt by—

(a)

Government;

(b)

any banking company, post office savings bank or co-operative bank;

(ii)

transactions of the nature referred to in Section 269-SS;

(iii)

such other persons or class of persons or receipts, which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—

(a)

“banking company” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (i) of the Explanation to Section 269-SS;

(b)

“co-operative bank” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (ii) of the Explanation to Section 269-SS.”

10.

The legislative competence to enact Section 269SS was upheld by the Supreme Court in Assistant Director of Inspection (Investigation) v. A.B. Shanthi, (2002) 6 SCC 259, wherein the Supreme Court indicated that the objective behind the said provision is to “curb the menace” of unaccounted money. Relevant paragraphs from A.B. Shanthi (supra) are extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:

“8.

The contention of the appellant's counsel has no force. The object of introducing Section 269-SS is to ensure that a taxpayer is not allowed to give false explanation for his unaccounted money, or if he has given some false entries in his accounts, he shall not escape by giving false explanation for the same. During search and seizures, unaccounted money is unearthed and the taxpayer would usually give the explanation that he had borrowed or received deposits from his relatives or friends and it is easy for the so-called lender also to manipulate his records later to suit the plea of the taxpayer. The main object of Section 269-SS was to curb this menace. As regards the tax legislations, it is a policy matter, and it is for Parliament to decide in which manner the legislation should be made. Of course, it should stand the test of constitutional validity.

xxx

10.

The above dictum applies in full force as regards the present case. The object sought to be achieved was to eradicate the evil practice of making of false entries in the account books and later giving explanation for the same. To a great extent, the problem could be solved by the impugned provision.

(emphasis added)

11. Furthermore, keeping in mind the underlying principle forming the basis of the decision in RBANMS Educational Institution (supra), various Courts have also reported transactions undertaken prior to 2017 to the jurisdictional tax authorities. In this regard, attention was drawn by the Amicus Curiae to the decision of the High Court of Madras in R.V. Venkateshan v. Sanjay, 2026 SCC OnLine Mad 5000, wherein the suit for recovery of money was based on a promissory note executed in respect of a loan of Rs.80,00,000/-, advanced in cash in 2016. Taking note of the fact that the transaction occurred prior to 2017, the Madras High Court observed as under:

“9.

In the case on hand, as per the plaint averment, the plaintiff said to have paid Rs 80,00,000 in cash to the defendants on 21-6-2016. Though the amount said to have been paid prior to coming into force of Section 269 ST of Income Tax Act, such a huge transaction by the plaintiff should have been reflected in his income tax return. If it is not duly mentioned in its income tax returns, certainly, the transaction should be viewed with suspicion. Whether the transaction which has not been brought into the book or a black money transaction can be a subject matter of the suit and whether the Court can lend its helping hand to recover money based on such transaction are all matters to be decided at the time of final disposal of the suit. Therefore, I do not want to express any opinion on the said aspect. If ultimately the plaintiff is able to prove the payment of Rs 80,00,000 by cash to the defendants, certainly it should be brought to the notice of the income tax Department for setting law into motion. 10. The Supreme Court, in the above mentioned decisions with the noble object of abolishing black money transaction, issued general guidelines to Courts in India to intimate such kind of heavy cash transaction to the jurisdictional Income Tax Authorities. Though the present suit transaction had taken place prior to introduction of Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, even in the absence of said provisions, this kind of heavy cash transaction requires consideration by the income tax Department. Therefore, I do not want to interfere with the order passed by the trial court directing the Ministerial Officer of the Court to intimate the suit transaction to the income tax Department by forwarding the copies of the plaint documents. (emphasis added)

12.

Similarly, in Nishant Creations Pvt. Ltd. v. Prasad Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., CS(OS) 1887/2015, order dated 18th March 2026, the Court was dealing with an amount of Rs. 2,60,00,0000/-, out of which Rs. 2,00,00,000/- was paid in June 2011 and Rs.1.25 crores, out of the said Rs.2,00,00,000/- was paid in cash towards an agreement to sell. The Court thereby directed the Registrar General of this Court to forward the case for information and necessary action to the Principal Chief Commissioner, Income Tax Department, New Delhi, along with a copy of a suit and the documents annexed thereto.

13.

Accordingly, the opinion of this Court would resonate with the opinion previously put forward by the Coordinate Bench of this Court as well as by the Madras High Court, for the reason that the objective of the Supreme Court in RBANMS Educational Institution (supra) was to ensure reporting of cash transactions to the Income Tax Authorities in order to curb the menace of unaccounted money/black money.

14.

In any event, since the transaction in question is a ‘loan’, it would, in any case, fall within the purview of Section 269SS, which was in existence even prior to 2017.

15.

Accordingly, in the opinion of this Court, the reporting directed by the Trial Court, vide order dated 11th July 2025, is appropriate, except in respect of one issue. The Trial Court has also directed the petitioner/plaintiff to file a copy of his PAN Card. The subsequent application moved by the petitioner/plaintiff, prayed for a recall of this particular direction. However, while rejecting the plea for recall vide order dated 10th December 2025, the Trial Court, in paragraph 9, stated that the Permanent Account Number [‘PAN’] of the petitioner/plaintiff was also required to be sent and that there was no ground to recall the said order.

16.

To this extent, the Trial Court may not be correct, particularly since the Supreme Court in RBANMS Educational Institution (supra) has not issued any specific direction for disclosure of plaintiff’s PAN card.

17.

In this context, Amicus Curiae pointed out that the PAN card contains personal identifying particulars, including the holder's name, PAN, date of birth, photograph and signature and, where applicable, the father's name. The particulars are also encoded in the QR code which facilitate verification of the holder's identity. Even though the PAN No. serves as an important identifier, particularly for financial information ecosystem, if the same comes into the possession of an unauthorized person, it may be misused, thereby exposing the PAN holder.

18.

Therefore, this direction requiring disclosure of the petitioner/plaintiffs’ PAN is neither in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in RBANMS Educational Institution (supra) nor per Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, wherein the nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court recognised information privacy as a facet of the fundamental right to privacy.

19.

Support in this regard may also be drawn from the decision of this Court in Nishant Creations (supra), wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court merely directed the Registrar General of this Court to forward ‘the case” for information and necessary action “along with the copy of the suit and the documents annexed thereto”. In R.V. Venkateshan (supra) as well, the Madras High Court dealt with the plea of the defendant pleading for the PAN number of petitioner to be revealed as well as the direction issued by the Trial Court to that effect. The Madras High Court rejected the said plea and thereby held as under:

“11.

As far as the direction issued by the trial Court to reveal the PAN number of the petitioner is concerned, in the guideline issued by the Apex Court in the above-mentioned case, no such direction is given and the petitioner cannot be compelled to reveal his PAN number to the respondents. Therefore, the direction issued by the trial Court to the petitioner to reveal his PAN number to the respondents is set aside and that portion of the impugned order is modified. The direction issued by the trial Court forward the copy of the plaint and the plaint documents to the jurisdictional Income Tax Authority is confirmed.” (emphasis added)

20.

The direction issued by the Madras High Court was therefore to “forward the copy of the plaint along with documents to the Jurisdictional Income Tax Authority”.

21.

In yet another matter before this Court, namely, Birmala Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashwani Ahluwalia, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6784, this Court directed the Registry to send the entire paper book of the concerned case to the Jurisdictional Income Tax Authority to enable it to take appropriate steps in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court in RBANMS Educational Institution (supra).

22.

In light of the above, the impugned order is set aside to the extent that it requires the petitioner/plaintiff to disclose his PAN Card. However, it is hereby directed that a copy of the suit along with the other relevant documents shall be duly sent to the Jurisdictional Tax Authority/Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, in line with what has been opined hereinabove.

23.

The petition is partly allowed to the extent as stated above.

24.

We express our deep appreciation for Ms. Prabhsahay Kaur, Advocate, Amicus Curiae, who has traversed various nuances relating to the matter before us in great detail and precision.

25.

Needless to state that the trial may proceed in accordance with law, considering that the direction herein is merely for the purpose of supplying necessary information to the jurisdictional tax authorities and ought not to serve as an impediment in the proceedings before the Trial Court.

26.

It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion relating to the merits of the matter and therefore, the suit before the Trial Court shall be decided on its own merits.

27.

This petition stands disposed of with above directions.

28.

Order be uploaded on the website of this Court.