Ashok Kumar Sethi vs ACIT, Central Circle-31, New Delhi

“3.

At the outset, ld. Counsel for the assessee took us through the brief factual matrix of the case concerning AY 2014-15. Order u/s 153C was passed on 27.03.2024 determining total income of the assessee at Rs.9,03,36,073/- as against returned income of Rs.7,23,53,980/-. While determining the taxable income of Rs.9,03,36,073/-, the ld. Assessing Officer took cognizance of the search and seizure action u/s 132 in the case of Alankit Group on 18.10.2019. As per the impugned assessment order u/s 153C based upon the information and incriminating documents available on account of search proceedings, the appellant assessee was deemed to have been a beneficiary of accommodation entry.

4.

The ld. Counsel submitted that it has, inter alia, raised legal ground of appeal no.12 which is challenging the very initiation and validity of proceedings u/s 153C. It was argued that as the legal ground strikes at the root of the matter, the same may be considered first for adjudication. It is the case of the assessee that in the instant case, the Assessing Officer of the searched person has recorded his satisfaction and handed over seized material to the Assessing Officer of the assessee on 26.06.2022. Inviting attention to provisions of section 153C(3), the ld. Counsel submitted that consequently the date of search in assessee’s case would be deemed to be 26.06.2022 and that the provisions of section 153C(3) are inoperable qua searches taking place after 01.04.2021. The ld. Counsel placed heavy reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Hargovind vs ACIT, of Rajendra Kumar in ITA No.4811/Del/2025 and of Smt. Geetanjali Bhayana of this Tribunal. It was requested that accordingly, the impugned order u/s 153C dated 27.03.2024 be declared as invalid and quashed.

5.

The ld. DR placed reliance on the orders of the lower authorities.

6.

We have heard rival submissions in the light of material placed on record. We have noted that on identical facts, this Tribunal in the case of Shri Rajendra Kumar in ITA No.4811/Del/2025 vide order dated 05.06.32026 has held as under:-

“9.

We have noted that the facts of the present case are identical to those in the case of Smt Geetanjali Bhayana (supra) and no distinguishment of facts could be pointed out by the respondent Revenue. We have noted that in the case of Smt Geetanjali Bhayana, the Hon’ble Co-ordinate Bench has observed as under:-

“…11. First, we take additional Grounds of appeal Nos. I to IV raised by the assessee wherein the assessee has challenged the jurisdiction of the AO in completing the assessment u/s 153C of the Act ignoring the fact that when the satisfaction was recorded by the AO of the assessee on 03.12.2021, the law stood amended and provisions of section 153C become inapplicable and alternatively claimed that the satisfaction note is not in accordance with law.

12.

Before us, Ld.AR for the assessee submits that proceedings u/s 153C of the Act were initiated in the case of the assessee on the basis of the documents found and seized during the course of search on third person. Ld.AR further submits that based on the entries found noted in one diary seized during the search on third person, a satisfaction note was recorded on 03.12.2021 by the AO of person searched that some entries in the said diary pertained to the assessee. Accordingly, proceedings u/s 153C were initiated in the case of the assessee and additions were made. Ld.AR submits that from 01.04.2021, law has been amended and as per the order of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of PCIT Vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2024) 465 ITR 101(Delhi), the date of search should be the date when the AO of the assessee has recorded his satisfaction which in the present case is 03.12.2021 relevant to AY 2022-23. However, since the law has been amended w.e.f. 01.04.2021, according to which no proceedings could be initiated u/s 153C of the Act for the searches conducted on or after 01.04.2021 and thus provisions of section 153C of the Act could not be applied and the Ao should have initiated the proceedings u/s 148 of the Act. For this reliance is placed on the judgement of hon’ble Madras High court in the case of Harigovind v. ACIT reported in [2025] 180 taxmann.com 197 (Madras). Ld. AR further submits that search in the case of Kuldeep Bishnoi from where the documents pertaining the assessee were seized, was carried out on 23.07.2019 however, when the satisfaction is recorded in the case of assessee, the law stood amended thus the provisions as existed as on the date when the satisfaction in the case of assessee was recorded should be applied and not the old law. For this reliance is placed on the judgement of hon’ble Supreme court in the case of ITO Vs. Vikram Sujit Kumar Bhatia reported in [2023] 149 taxmann.com 123 (SC).

13.

Alternatively, ld. AR submits that in the satisfaction note recorded, it is not mentioned by the AO that these documents contained the phrase “have bearing on the total income of the assessee”. In the satisfaction note record, AO has observed that entries found noted in the diary pertained to the assessee however, has failed to record his satisfaction as provided u/s 153C of the Act that paper should “have bearing on the income determined of the assessee”. In this regard, reliance is placed on the judgement of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Saksham Commodities Ltd reported in (2024) 161 Taxmann.com 485 (Delhi). Ld. AR prayed accordingly.

14.

On the other hand, ld. CIT DR submits that the assessment was carried out based on the entries found noted in the documents seized from the possession of the third person and accordingly the AO has recorded his satisfaction and initiated the proceedings u/s 153C of the Act which are valid proceedings. Ld. CIT DR further submits that the hon’ble supreme court in the case of Vikram Sujit Kumar Bhatia (supra) relied upon by the assessee has held that if the date of search is prior to the amendment, the law stood at the time of search would be applied. As per ld. CIT DR, search was conducted on 23.07.2019 in the case of Shri Kuldeep Bishnoi from whose possession, the documents containing the transaction carried out by the assessee in cash were found thus for the purpose of initiating the proceedings us/ 153C of the Act, the date of search in the case of Kuldeep Bishnoi is to be considered. Ld. CIT DR thus submits that the AO has rightly initiated the proceedings u/s 153C of the Act which deserves to be held as valid proceedings. Regarding the common satisfaction and invalid satisfaction ld. CIT DR submits that the AO has recorded the clear satisfaction based on the admission of the person who has written the diary and the assessee has failed to controvert the same thus she prayed for the confirmation of the initiation of proceedings u/s 153C of the Act in the present case.

15.

Heard the parties at length and perused the material available on record. Claim of the assessee is that the AO has recorded his satisfaction on 03.12.2021 thus the date of search should be reckoned from that date only. Assessee further claimed that the law was amended w.e.f. 1.4.2021 by Finance Act, 2021, and as per the amended law, no action u/s 153C of the Act could be taken on the search carried out on or after 01.04.2021 and the assessment should have been completed u/s 148 of the Act as per the amended provisions. Before going further, we examine the provisions of section 153C of the Act, which reads as under:

153C.Assessment of income of any other person.—

(1)

“Notwithstanding anything contained in section 139, section 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and section 153, where the Assessing Officer is satisfied that,—

(a)

any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing, seized or requisitioned, belongs to; or

(b)

any books of account or documents, seized or requisitioned, pertains or pertain to, or any information contained therein, relates to, a person other than the person referred to in section 153A, then, the books of account or documents or assets, seized or requisitioned shall be handed over to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person and that Assessing Officer shall proceed against each such other person and issue notice and assess or reassess the income of the other person in accordance with the provisions of section 153A, if, that Assessing Officer is satisfied that the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned have a bearing on the determination of the total income of such other person for six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted or requisition is made and] for the relevant assessment year or years referred to in subsection (1) of section 153A

Provided that in case of such other person, the reference to the date of initiation of the search under section 132 or making of requisition under section 132A in the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 153A shall be construed as reference to the date of receiving the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person:

Provided further that the Central Government may by rules made by it and published in the Official Gazette, specify the class or classes of cases in respect of such other person, in which the Assessing Officer shall not be required to issue notice for assessing or reassessing the total income for six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted or requisition is made and for the relevant assessment year or years as referred to in sub-section (1) of section 153A except in cases where any assessment or reassessment has abated. ( 2) Where books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned as referred to in subsection (1) has or have been received by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person after the due date for furnishing the return of income for the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted under section 132 or requisition is made under section 132A and in respect of such assessment year—

(a)

no return of income has been furnished by such other person and no notice under sub-section (1) of section 142 has been issued to him, or

(b)

a return of income has been furnished by such other person but no notice under sub-section (2) of section 143 has been served and limitation of serving the notice under sub-section (2) of section 143 has expired, or

(c)

assessment or reassessment, if any, has been made, before the date of receiving the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person, such Assessing Officer shall issue the notice and assess or reassess total income of such other person of such assessment year in the manner provided in section 153A.

(3)

Nothing contained in this Section shall apply in relation to a search initiated under Section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisitioned under Section 132A on or after the 1st day of April, 2021.”

16.

As per first proviso to Section 153C(1), the date of initiation of search u/s 132 or making requisition u/s 132A in terms of second proviso to Sub Section (1) of Section 153A shall be construed as reference to the date of receiving the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person. As observed above, in the present case, the AO of the assessee has recorded the satisfaction on 03.12.2021 after taking the seized material thus the date of search in the case of assessee should be 03.12.2021. This view is supported by the judgement of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare (supra), the headnote reads as under:

“Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - Search and seizure -Assessment of any or person (Block assessment) - Assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14 - Whether first proviso to section 153C, and which has been consistently recognized to also embody commencement point for reckoning six or ten assessment years’, shifts relevant date from date of initiation of search or a requisition made to date of receipt of books of account or documents and assets seized by jurisdictional Assessing Officer of non-searched person - Held, yes Whether furthermore where date of handing over of documents was not available, date of issuance of satisfaction Note by Assessing Officer under section 153C would be pertinent for purpose of First Proviso to section 153C - Held, yes -Whether significant difference between computation of relevant assessment year for identification of six assessment years and to construct a block of ten assessment years is that while six assessment years’ hinge upon phrase “immediately preceding” assessment year pertaining to search year, ten assessment years’ are liable to be computed or reckoned from end of assessment year relevant to year of search - Held, yes -Whether thus, in instant case where satisfaction note were issued between 1-4-2021 and 31-3-2022, relevant assessment year would be 2022-23 and assessment years’ 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 would clearly fall outside block period of ten assessment years as provided under section 153C read with section 153A - Held, yes [Paras 85, 86, 96 and 97] [In favour of assessee].”

17.

Now coming to the sub-section (3) of section 153C of the Act which provides that provisions of section 153C are not applicable to the search initiated on or after 1^st day of April,2021. Since in the present case, date of search is to be taken as 03.12.2021 i.e. the date when the satisfaction note was recorded by the AO of the assessee and, such date (03.12.2021) is fallen after 01.04.2021, therefore, as per sub-section (3) of section 153C, provisions of section 153C would not be applicable and the initiation of proceedings u/s 153C and subsequent assessment order passed us/ 153C of the Act is invalid and without jurisdiction. The hon’ble Madras High court after considering these facts under identical circumstances, in the case of Harigovind v ACIT (supra) has held as under:

35.

“A reading of the second proviso to Section 153A(1) would show that the assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years and for the relevant assessment year or years referred to in this sub-section, 153C(1) pending on the date of initiation of the search under Section 132 or making of requisition under Section 132A, as the case may be, shall abate. Therefore, any pending proceedings shall be abated as per the above proviso.

36.

On the strength of the above second proviso to Section 153A(1), the respondents had strongly contended that the first proviso to Section 153C is only with regard to the abatement of proceedings and not for anything else.

37.

On the other hand, the petitioners had contended that it is not only for abatement but for all the other purposes. According to the petitioner, if a particular date is determined for the purpose of abatement of proceedings, then the same would be applicable for all the purposes, including the date of initiation of proceedings under Section 153C against the other person.

38.

Even a reading of Section 153C makes it clear that determination of total income of such other person for 6 assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year, in which the search was conducted or requisition was made and for the relevant assessment year or years, referred in sub Section (1) of Section 153C of the Act.

39.

As far as the other person is concerned, the six years period would be calculated, the date on which the requisition was made and that would be the date, for the purpose of determination of assessment of income. On the other hand, as far as the searched person is concerned, this 6 years period would vary and the same would be calculated from the date of search made in the premises of searched person. Therefore, for the purpose of initiation and determination of income for 6 assessment years, two different dates have been fixed by the Statute, i.e., for the searched person, it was taken the date of search, whereas, for the other person, it was taken the date, on which the requisition is made to the JAO of the other person.

40.

Thus, as far as the searched person is concerned, the date of initiation of search is the date, on which the search was conducted in his premises. The said date would be the date of initiation of search for searched person for all purposes. As far as the other person is concerned, the date of initiation of search would be the date, on which the materials, books of accounts, etc., are handed over to the JAO of the other person and this date would be considered as the date of initiation of search for other person for all purposes. Thus, there cannot be two different date of initiation of search, either for the searched person or for the other person.

41.

The provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 153C states that "153C(3).nothing contained in this Section shall apply in relation to a search initiated under Section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisition under Section 132A on or after the 1st day of April, 2021" which means, if the search is initiated subsequent to 01.04.2021, the provision of Section 153C will not apply and accordingly, no proceedings can be initiated against the other person.

42.

According to the petitioner, the date of handing over of the seized materials, i.e., 25.11.2022, is the date of initiation of search. If the said contention of the petitioner is accepted, obviously, the issuance of impugned notices dated 07.02.2023 by the 2nd respondent is without any authority and contrary to Sub-Section (3) of Section 153C of the Act and thus, the same is liable to be quashed.

43.

In terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 153C of the Act, for the purpose of calculating the six years period, the date of handing over of the materials to the petitioner's JAO has to be construed as the date of initiation of search for other person. Further, in terms of first proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 153C, for the purpose of abatement also, the date of handing over of the materials to the petitioner's JAO has to be construed as the date of initiation of search for the other person. In such view of the matter, this Court is unable to comprehend the submissions made by the learned counsel for respondents that yet another date is available for the purpose of initiation of search in respect of the other person.

44.

Certainly, there cannot be two different dates for initiation of search for the other person. Hence, for all practical purpose, the initiation of search would be the same date and it is apparent upon reading the provisions of Section 153C of the Act. In the provision of Section 153C(1) of the Act, the date of initiation of search is mentioned as the date of handing over of materials and as per the first proviso, the same date would apply for the purpose of abatement also. When such being the case, no other date will come into picture for the purpose of determination of initiation of search for other person. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer the judgement rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Jasjit Singh (supra), wherein, it was held on the aspect as to whether the first proviso to Section 153C would apply only for the purpose of abatement of pending proceedings or otherwise.

45.

When a similar contention was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Jasjit Singh (supra), the same was recorded in the said judgement as

"..The revenue argued that the proviso to Section 153C(1), is confined in its application to the question of abatement".

However, while deciding the said issue, the Hon'ble Apex Court had arrived at a conclusion and rendered its judgement by stating that

".the revenue's argument is insubstantial and without merit"..

When such being the case, it is clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court had rejected the contention of the revenue that "the first proviso to Section 153C(1), is confined in its application to the question of abatement", which means, as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the said provision is not only for the purpose of abatement but also for all the other practical purposes.

46.

For ready reference, the relevant portion of the judgement rendered in the case of Jasjit Singh (supra) is extracted hereunder:

"9.

It is evident on a plain interpretation of Section 153C(1) that the Parliamentary intent to enact the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also with regard to the date from which the six year period was to be reckoned, in respect of which the returns were to be filed by the third party (whose premises are not searched and in respect of whom the specific provision under Section 153-C was enacted. The revenue argued that the proviso [to Section 153(c)(1)] is confined in its application to the question of abatement.

10.

This Court is of the opinion that the revenue's argument is insubstantial and without merit. It is quite plausible that without the kind of interpretation which SSP Aviation adopted, the A.O. seized of the materials - of the search party, under Section 132 - would take his own time to forward the papers and materials belonging to the third party, to the concerned A.O. In that event if the date would virtually "relate back" as is sought to be contended by the revenue, (to the date of the seizure), the prejudice caused to the third party, who would be drawn into proceedings as it were unwittingly (and in many cases have no concern with it at all), is dis-proportionate. For instance, if the papers are in fact assigned under Section 153-C after a period of four years, the third party assessee's prejudice is writ large as it would have to virtually preserve the records for at latest 10 years which is not the requirement in law. Such disastrous and harsh consequences cannot be attributed to Parliament. On the other hand, a plain reading of Section 153-C supports the interpretation which this Court adopts. [**Emphasis supplied]

47.

A reading of the above shows that the Hon'ble Apex Court had rejected the contention of the respondent and hence, it is clear that the first proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 153C is not only for the purpose of abatement but also for all other purposes, viz., initiation of search for other person in terms of Section 153C(3) of the Act. In such case, the date of initiation of search for the petitioner is the date, on which the documents were handed over to the JAO of the petitioner, i.e., 25.11.2022 is the date of initiation of search for the petitioner.

48.

In terms of Sub-Section (3) of Section 153C, the provision of Section 153C will not apply for any search, which is initiated on or after 01.04.2021.

49.

As stated above, in this case, the date of handing over of seized material to the petitioner's JAO is on 25.11.2022 and the said date is the date of initiation of search for the petitioner. Thus, in the present case, it is crystal clear like cloudless sky that the initiation of search was subsequent to 01.04.2021, for which, the provisions of Section 153C will not apply. Therefore, the impugned notices dated 07.02.2023 is unsustainable and the same were issued without authority and against the provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 153C of the Act.

50.

In such view of the matter, all the impugned notices are liable to be quashed and accordingly, all the impugned notices dated 07.02.2023 issued by the 2nd respondent are quashed.”

18.

The facts of the aforesaid case of hon’ble Madras High court are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. It is also a matter of fact that the AO himself has initiated the proceedings u/s 153C of the Act for AY 2018-19 to AY 2020-21 though the date of search in the case of Shri Kuldeep Bishnoi was 23.07.2019 and as per the same, the search year was AY 2020-21. Thus, by respectfully following the judgement of hon’ble Madra High court in the case of Harigovind vs ACIT (supra), we set aside the notice issued u/s 153C on the assessee as the date of handing over the material i.e. 03.12.2021 is the date of initiation of search. The issuance of notice us 153C dt. 06.12.2021 is without any authority and contrary to sub-section (3) of section 153C of the Act and thus the consequent order passed u/s 153C of the Act is quashed. The additional grounds of appeal Nos. I to III are thus, allowed….”

10.

As the facts of the present case are identical to those Smt. Geetanjali Bhayana (supra). Hence, in respectful compliance to the decision therein, we are of the considered view that the assumption of jurisdiction for assessment by the ld. AO was vitiated for invalid action. We are of the considered view in view of the fact that the search had taken place after 01.04.2021, the AO was ousted of jurisdiction u/s 153C of the Act. Consequently, the appeal of the assessee qua its additional ground is allowed and the impugned assessment order stands quashed…..”