Ashok Kumar Ranga And Another vs State Of H.P. And Another

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of complaint in case No. 105 of 2022, titled Dr. Anvesha Negi Vs. State of H.P. and others, pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnaur at Rekong Peo, District Kinnaur, H.P. (learned Trial Court), and summoning orders dated 8.6.2023 and 1.5.2024 passed by the learned Trial Court. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court asserting that she was married to Akshay Kumar Ranga on 22.10.2015 as per Hindu rites and customs. She and Akshay Kuma Ranga started residing t gether as husband and wife after the solemnization of heir marriage. The accused persons started demanding money, gold, furniture and other household articles fr m the complainant. The complainant’s maternal uncle and other paternal relatives purchased the items demanded by the accused and delivered them to the accused on 23.10.2015. Accused Akshay and his parents snatched all the jewellery and ornaments from the complainant. Her ornaments were retained by her mother-in-law. The complainant was restrained from wearing clothes of her choice. She was not permitted to take calls from her parents and brother. Akshay and Urmila used to harass the complainant. Complainant and Akshay went to visit the complainant’s parents in November 2015. The complainant was not given jewellery and told that she could not take care of the ornaments, and would misplace them in the bus. Urmila and Ashok did not allow the complainant to visit her parents’ house even during the festivals. The complainant was asked to gift something to Urmila and Ashok on every occasion and festival. She was told to ask her parents to send apple boxes and dry fruits on every occasion. The accused, Akshay, took leave and shifted with his parents in December 2015. Urmila started taunting the complainant by saying that she was sitting idle at home, surviving on their money, and she should do some work. The complainant was forced to wo k. She applied for a job in Delhi NCR. She joined her d ties on 17.12.2015. She was forced to stay with her sister-in-law in Sector-21, Noida. Akshay came to Noida in January 2016 on the pretext of joining a Coaching Institute for the SSC Examination. He told the complainant that he could not commute and needed a motorcycle. The complainant was forced to purchase a motorcycle for Akshay. She paid ₹40,000/- on 10.3.2016 to Akshay and ₹50,000/- to Ram Chander from whom the motorcycle was purchased. Akshay applied for a visa to Canada, but it was turned down. He started quarrelling with the complainant and harassing her. He blamed the complainant for the rejection of the visa. The complainant was forced to pay the premium of the LIC Policy taken in Akshay’s name. The complainant, her sister-in-law and Akshay went out for dinner on 14.2.2016. Akshay received some messages. The complainant objected, and Akshay started abusing her. Urmila told the complainant not to disturb her sister-in-law, and the complainant was forced to have an additional helper/maid. The complainant spent ₹35,000/- per month at Noida, out of which she paid ₹7,000/- rent, ₹6,000/- to the maid and ₹10,000/- on groceries. She was forced to work o bear her expenses. She used to take e-Riksha to the Met o Station, but Akshay objected to it by saying that she was wasting money. She was earning ₹70,000/-per month but was n t allowed to spend ₹9,000/- on herself. Akshay took admission in the social design course in Ambedkar University. He told the complainant that he wanted to become an Orchardist and start a tourism business. The complainant tried to reason with him, but Akshay became abusive and assaulted her. The complainant left the Job in September 2016. She suffered from Chikungunya Virus on 10.9.2016. Akshay did not take care of her. He did not even allow the complainant to call her mother. Akshay Kumar and the complainant were forced to shift to Chaupal in January 2017. Akshay started looking for an orchard. The complainant was forced to escort him and bear the expenses of the stay and travel. The complainant was selected as Medical Officer at Sunni, but she was not permitted to join. She qualified for M.D. Anaesthesia at LHMC, Delhi, but she was not permitted to join and was forced to join M.D. Community Medicine at PGI, Rohtak. The complainant had two bank accounts, one in the SBI and another in the Central Bank of India. Akshay asked the complainant to hand over her ATM Cards to him. The complainant was forced to deposit money so that it could be withdrawn by Akshay. Akshay withdrew ₹1,50,000/- from the complainant’s account. Urmila used to taunt the complainant by saying that she was enj ying herself, whereas Akshay was forced to do everything himself. She was not a good wife. Akshay used to threaten t e complainant and obey his unjust demand. Urmila forced the complainant to ask her parents to arrange cash for the purchase of the orchard. The complainant called her father and asked for the loan of ₹10.00 lacs. Complainant’s father arranged ₹6.00 lacs and transferred the amount to the account of the complainant. The complainant was also forced to open a Recurring Deposit Account of ₹25,000/- per month in the name of Urmila. She transferred ₹5.00 lacs to Urmila. Akshay and Ashok demanded a 4x4 vehicle in June 2018, and the complainant was forced to buy a second-hand Maruti Gypsy for ₹2,70,000/-. Akshay took admission in law in Punjab University. Akshay and Urmila asked the complainant not to visit Akshay and not to disclose that he was married. Akshay forced the complainant to plan a child in January 2019. The complainant did not agree to this demand, and Akshay gave her beatings. The father of the complainant retired on 30.04.2019. She was not asked to go to her parental home alone. She asked for her jewellery, but it was not given to her. She was not even permitted to send Rakhi to her brother. She was not permitted to tie a Rakhi to her first cousin residing in Chandigarh. She was forced to regularly visit Chandigarh by travelling in a bus. The family had three cars, but she was not permitted to use any. The complainant became ill, and Akshay and Urmila taunted her by saying that she was not fed properly by her parents. Akshay told the complainant on 16.1.2019 not to visit the home; however, Urmila forced the complainant to visit the home. On the next day, Akshay forced the complainant to rub her nose on his feet. Complainant was called on the eve of her wedding anniversary on 21.10.2019. She was harassed on 26.10.2019. Urmila called her ‘Manhoos Aurat’ and tried to throw ‘Diyas’ upon her. Akshay took her to the Bus Stand on 28.10.2019 and told her not to return. He also quarrelled with her. The complainant was also selected as a Medical Officer at Haryana, but she could not join due to the fear of her husband and her parents-in-law. The complainant served a notice upon Akshay on 26.11.2019 for the dissolution of marriage. Akshay informed her that he had moved the Punjab & Haryana High Court for pre-mediation litigation. Akshay backed ut f the terms of the settlement. Akshay came to Himachal Pradesh on 23.7.2020 and threatened the complainant and her family members with dire consequences. The complainant reported the matter to the police. Akshay threatened the c mplainant by saying that he had sent the normal pictures, and in case of any complaint, he would send other pictures. The complainant was forced not to pursue her complaints. Ultimately, the complainant filed the written complaint to the police on 5.4.2022; however, the police did not take any action in the matter. Hence, a complaint was filed before the Court.

Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint, the petitioners have filed the present petition, asserting that the complainant resided happily with her husband. She had cordial relations with the petitioners. She left Chandigarh to Noida and thereafter to New Delhi to pursue her education. She shifted to Gurgaon, Haryana and remained in Haryana till December 2016 She attended counselling sessions for M.D. Course in various States and got selected for M.D. Course at PGI, Rohtak She had a quarrel with her husband on 23.7.2020. She made a complaint to the police. The police investigated the matter and found that various litigations were pending, and no case was made out. She made a complaint to the Superin endent of Police, Rekong Peo, on 30.3.2022, but the police did not take any action. The police also submitted a copy of the investigation report to the learned CJM, Kinnaur. She filed a false complaint against the petitioners. The contents of the first complaint (Annexure P-4) are in variance with t e subsequent complaints. These variations show that the complaints are false and the complainant has materially mproved upon her version. She purchased the orchard and the vehicle in her name. Efforts were made to settle the dispute, and Akshay was ready to settle the dispute; however, the complainant refused to settle the matter. She also stated before the Mahila Kalyan Parishad, Kinnaur, that she did not want to reside with her husband. She filed a case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, in which no interim relief was granted.

The petitioners bought the land in the complainant’s name by paying ₹38.00 lacs. The proceedings were initiated to force the petitioners to give the land to the complainant. The value of the orchard is ₹93.50 lacs. The petitioners also filed a complaint against the complainant and her father. The informant was summoned on 3.3.2022. She filed various petitions to quash the proceedings. The petitioners want to settle the matter with the complainant, but she is adamant not o do so. The continuation of the proceedings before the Cou t amounts to an abuse of the process of the law. A false story was propounded by the complainant. The petiti ners and the complainant never resided together under the same roof. She was residing separately from the petitioners. The relatives of the petitioners should not be arrayed as accused based on general and vague allegations. The ngredients of Section 498-A and 506 of the IPC are not satisfied in the present case; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.

Respondent No.1 filed a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the lack of maintainability and the petitioners being estopped from filing the petition on account of their acts of omission and commission. The contents of the petition were denied on merits; however, it was admitted that the complainant had filed the complaint before the learned Trial Court, and the Court had ordered the summoning of the petitioners. It was asserted that the complainant made a statement before the police that she was being harassed and forced to go to Delhi to find a job. The complainant filed the complaints, which were duly investigated. It was found that the dispute between the parties was rela ed to domestic violence, and the matter was pending befo e the Mediation and Conciliation Centre, Punjab & Haryana High Court. A complaint was made to the Superintendent f P lice, and an investigation was carried out. The reports were submitted to the learned CJM, Kinnaur. The petitioners intended to purchase the land in Shimla, but they could not purchase it in their name because of the bar contained n Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Hence, they purchased the land in the complainant’s name. The petitioners backed out of the settlement and arrived at the Mediation Centre of the High Court. The Court called the parties for conciliation, but Akshay never attended because he had gone to the United Kingdom. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have heard Mr. Ashwani Pathak, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by M/s Dev Raj and Ganesh Barowalia, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

Mr. Ashwani Pathak, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners/accused, submitted that a false complaint was lodged against the petitioners. The informant never resided with the petitioners. She has a dispu e wi h her husband, and the petitioners should not be targeted in the dispute between the husband and wife. The c mplainant had filed various complaints to the police, in which the incidents mentioned in the complaint were not disclosed. This clearly shows that the incidents are improvements and no reliance can be placed upon them. The complaint is false and was filed by the complainant to compel the petitioners to part with the property purchased in her name. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishan Lal Chawla Vs. State of U.P. (2021) 5 SCC 435 in support of his submission.

Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondents/State, submitted that the complainant has given the complete details of the incident in the FIR, which shows that she was being harassed in her matrimonial home The Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction should not go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. The allegations in the complaint show the commission of a cognizable offence. The ma er is pending before the learned Trial Court, and the lea ned T ial Court should be left to adjudicate the dispute as per the law. Therefore, he prayed that the present petiti n be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at t e bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid f rmulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a speci ic provision in the Code or the concerned Act, pr viding efficacious redress for the grievance of he aggrieved party.

(7) Whe e a c iminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authori y, he High Court must exercise it sparingly. The condi ions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself,  allowing the High Co rt to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or  where intervention is  essential to  uphold  the ends of justice.

It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)

The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Chadha v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094 that the provisions of Section 498A of IPC are being invoked without mentioning any specific date, time or incident, which casts serious suspicion on the complainant’s version. It was observed:-

Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are distressed with the manner, the offences under Section 498A IPC, and Secti ns 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant-wives, insofar as aged pa en s, dis ant relatives, married sisters living separately, a e a ayed as accused, in matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to append every relative of the husband casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegati ns made by the Complainant-wife or her family members, and vitiates the very objective of a protective legislation. The observations made by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana (2025) 3 SCC 735 appropriately encapsulate this essence as under:

“25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement, should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations, unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations, cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellants Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant No. 1, have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution, and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.”

The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel misuse by the parties, and cannot be established simpliciter without specific instances, to say the least. The tendency of roping these sections, without mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, weakens the case f the prosecution, and casts serious suspicion on the viability of the version of the Complainant. We cannot ignore the missing specifics in a criminal complaint, which is the premise of invoking the criminal machine y of the State. Be that as it may, we are informed that the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved and the divorce decree has attained finality; hence, any further prosecution of the Appellant will only tantam unt to an abuse of process of law.

This position was reiterated in Ghanshyam Soni Vs. State, NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1301, wherein it was observed:-

A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing an insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to a few instances of such atrocities; however, the allegations are generic and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped in, are that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure, beat her up, but there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he, being a friend of the Appellant, instigated him against the Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home(2018) 14 SCC 452, fits perfectly in o he present scenario:

“6. The Cou ts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband sh uld n t be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegati ns unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.”

As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat 2024 INSC 960 and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 671. The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dated. 06.12.1999, six days later, on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his family, and the investigative agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Janshruti v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 909 that there are hundreds of genuine cases as contrasted to a false case registered under Section 498A, and the Courts should be conscious of the ground reality while adjudicating the cases under Section 498-A of IPC. It was observed:-

We are cognizant of the growing discourse highlighting instances where the provision may have been misused. However, it m st be borne in mind that for every such instance, there are likely hundreds of genuine cases where Section 498A has served as a crucial safeguard for victims of domestic cruelty. We are also aware that certain unconscionable individuals, emboldened by the rising fervour to dismantle such protective provisions, have gone so far as to publicly share videos depicting the exchange of dowry —an act not only unlawful but also indicative of the entrenched nature of the very evil this provision seeks to combat.

We also remain acutely attuned to the ground realities. As the Constitutional Court and the apex judicial body of the country, we bear the solemn responsibility of safeguarding justice for our entire population. The harsh truth is that dowry continues to persist as a deeply entrenched social evil, prevalent across vast sections of the country. A significant majority of such cases go unreported, with countless women compelled to endure injustice in silence. This underscores the continuing need for legal provisions such as Section 498A, which serve as vital instruments of protection and redressal for those most vulnerable.

Thus, the Court has to strike a fine balance and it has to see that the allegations made against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC are not general, vague or omnibus to rope in the relatives of the husband. At the same time, the Court should not scuttle a genuine case filed under Section 498A of the IPC.

In the present case, he complaint is detailed. It not only contains the details of the incidents but also mentions the time, date and place when the incidents had taken place. The complainant has mentioned the taunts aimed at her to belittle her and her background. She mentioned that her ornaments were kept by er parents-in-law and were not handed over despite the demand. Her husband and her mother-in-law asked for money. She mentioned above the opening of the RD Account in the name of her mother-in-law and the withdrawal of money from her account by her husband through an ATM Card. She mentioned the purchase of a motorcycle and Gypsy at the instance of the petitioners. She also mentioned ₹6.00 lacs paid by her father for the purchase of the land. All these allegations are quite detailed and cannot be said to be omnibus, vague or general.

It was submitted that the allegations in the complaint are false, which is evident from the fact that no such allegations were mentioned in the complaint made to the police. Reliance was placed upon Krishan Lal Chawla (supra). In Krishan Lal Chawla (supra), information was given to the police, on which a non-cognizable report was p epa ed by the police. Subsequently, an application for investigation of the non-cognizable report was filed. The Court rdered the registration of the FIR, which resulted in the filing of the charge sheet. A private complaint was filed by the complainant, and it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court t at t e private complaint could not have been filed re arding the incident for which a charge sheet was filed before the Court. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the proceedings.

In the present case, the police have not initiated any proceedings pursuant to the complaints made by the complainant. The police concluded that it was a case of domestic violence. The matter was pending in the Punjab & Haryana High Court, and no action was to be taken. Thus, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case.

It was submitted that the complainant never resided with the petitioners, and she made a false complaint against the petitioners. It is not permissible to go into the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that while exercising jurisdiction to quash the complaint/FIR, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It was observed:-

“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.”

It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed:-

“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must discl se the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in he present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complain , even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the acc sed. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC  59: (2011)  3  SCC  (Cri)  23].  In Joseph  Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. r not.”

It was laid down by  he Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397:

“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

… As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

… At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.”

A reference was made to the complaint filed before the Court and the complaints made to the police, to submit that there are material improvements. It is true that the complaints made to the police do not contain the details mentioned in the complaint made to the Court; however, it was speci ically mentioned that Akshay Kumar tortured the informant by beating her repeatedly, and her mother-in-law suppo ed him. The complainant was threatened with being thrown out of the house and tortured on Karvachauth in 2019. She was threatened with being burnt on Diwali in 2019. She mentioned the threats advanced to her. The FIR is not an encyclopedia of details, and the mere fact that complete details were not given to the police and only a brief sketch was given will not make the complaint made to the Court doubtful.

No other point was urged.

The jurisdiction to quash the complaint is to be exercised as per the law and not in routine. The present case does not make out a case for exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law, and the petition is liable to be dismissed.

In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.

The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits  f the case.