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Judgment
Hon'Ble Irshad Ali, J.
Heard Ms. Pushpila Bisht, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Adarsh Srivastava, Advocate holding brief of Sri Anand Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondent.
The present writ petition has been filed on following prayer(s):
“I. issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certicrary, quashing the impugned orders dated 28.6.2003, passed by the opposite party no.4, (con-tained in annexure no.1) and impugned appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by the opp party no.3 (contained in annesire no.2) with all conse quential benefits.
II. issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to give effect the impugned orders dated 28.6.2003 passed by the opp party no.4 (contained in annexure no.1) and impugned appellate order dated 12.12.2003, passed by the opp party no.3 (contained in annexure no.2)
III. Any other appropriate order or direction may kindly also be passed which the Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case.
IV. Cost of the writ petition may be awarded to the petitioner.”
The present writ petition has been filed challenging the dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 passed by opposite party no.4, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from the services of UCO Bank, as well as the appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by opposite party no.3, rejecting the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal. The petitioner assails the aforesaid orders on the ground that the departmental proceedings were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice, without affording adequate opportunity of defence and without supplying the original documents necessary for an effective defence. It is further contended that the charges levelled against the petitioner were vague and did not constitute misconduct and the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.
The petitioner further contends that the impugned dismissal order was passed with mala fide intention, despite the fact that his request for voluntary retirement under the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000 had already been accepted on 16.06.2001. According to the petitioner, his voluntary retirement was initially scheduled to take effect from 30.06.2001, but his relieving was subsequently extended up to 31.07.2001. Thereafter, he was transferred from Gomti Nagar Branch to the Regional Office, Lucknow, on 05.07.2001 and was placed under suspension on 16.07.2001. Subsequently, without issuing any show-cause notice or affording any opportunity of hearing, his voluntary retirement was cancelled on 23.07.2001. The petitioner has, therefore, alleged that the subsequent disciplinary proceedings were initiated with a predetermined and mala fide intention. Copies of the voluntary retirement scheme, the suspension order and the order cancelling voluntary retirement have been brought on record as Annexures Nos. 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner was initially appointed as a Clerk in the erstwhile United Commercial Bank on 22.04.1968 and was confirmed on the said post with effect from 01.11.1968 by order dated 15.10.1968. On the basis of his service record, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Officer Grade-D with effect from 01.01.1976 vide order dated 30.12.1975. Subsequently, he was confirmed on the said post with effect from 01.07.1976 vide order dated 04.05.1978.
In the year 1982, the posts of Grade-D and Grade-C in the Bank were categorised as Junior Management Scale-I and Middle Management Scale-II and III, respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted to Middle Management Grade-C (Scale-II) with effect from 01.07.1983 vide order dated 30.07.1983. It has been stated that the petitioner maintained an unblemished service record throughout his career and his work and conduct were consistently appreciated by the superior authorities. At the relevant time, he was working in Middle Management Grade-C (Scale-II), drawing a basic salary of Rs.15,380/-and total monthly salary of Rs.19,518.79.
In pursuance of the decision of the Board of Directors, UCO Bank introduced the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000, which was implemented on 16.11.2000. Since the petitioner fulfilled the eligibility criteria prescribed under the said scheme, he submitted an application dated 01.01.2001 to opposite party no.1, seeking voluntary retirement from the services of the Bank. A copy of the application has been annexed as Annexure No.7 to the writ petition. The petitioner's application for voluntary retirement was submitted through the proper channel, namely, opposite party no.4, who duly forwarded the same to opposite party no.1 for consideration.
The competent authority accepted the petitioner's request for voluntary retirement, which was communicated to him by the Deputy General Manager vide order dated 16.06.2001, stipulating that he would be relieved from the services of the Bank on 30.06.2001. A copy of the acceptance order has been annexed as Annexure No.7-A to the writ petition.
However, on 30.06.2001, the petitioner's services were extended for a further period of one month on account of administrative exigencies and it was decided that he would be relieved from service on 31.07.2001. Subsequently, vide order dated 05.07.2001, the petitioner was transferred from Gomti Nagar Branch to the Regional Office of the Bank at Lucknow, with a direction to report at the transferred place by 06.07.2001.
Thereafter, the petitioner was placed under suspension by opposite party no.4 vide order dated 16.07.2001. According to the petitioner, the said action was taken with mala fide intention, as immediately thereafter, on 23.07.2001, his voluntary retirement was cancelled without issuance of any show-cause notice or providing him an opportunity of hearing.
The petitioner has relied upon Clause 5.2(c) of the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000, which provides that employees against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or pending, or who are under suspension, are not eligible to seek voluntary retirement under the scheme. It is contended that, on the date when the petitioner's request for voluntary retirement was accepted, no disciplinary proceedings were contemplated or pending against him, nor was he under suspension. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the subsequent cancellation of his voluntary retirement was contrary to the provisions of the scheme.
The petitioner has further placed reliance upon Clause 10.6 of the scheme, which provides that the competent authority has discretion to accept or reject an employee's request for voluntary retirement, but reasons for rejection are required to be recorded in writing and the decision is to be communicated to the concerned employee in writing. It is contended that no reasons were recorded by opposite party no.4 while cancelling the petitioner's voluntary retirement, thereby rendering the cancellation contrary to the aforesaid clause.
Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 27.12.2001 was issued to the petitioner, containing allegations which, according to him, were vague, baseless and did not constitute misconduct in the eyes of law. A copy of the charge-sheet has been annexed as Annexure No.8 to the writ petition.
The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 11.01.2002, categorically denying the allegations levelled against him. He contended that the relevant documents referred to in the charge-sheet had not been supplied to him and, consequently, he was unable to furnish an effective and specific reply to the charges. It was further asserted that the allegations were false, fabricated and did not disclose his involvement in any misconduct.
According to the petitioner, he was compelled to submit his reply before the Inquiry Officer. Subsequently, on 03.03.2003, the Presenting Officer of the Bank submitted a written statement before the Inquiry Officer, substantially reiterating the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. A copy of the written statement submitted by the Presenting Officer has been annexed as Annexure No.9 to the writ petition.
The petitioner claims that he repeatedly demanded the original documents referred to in the charge-sheet, but the same were not supplied by the Inquiry Officer. He also sought permission to inspect the original records on the ground that the photocopies supplied to him were allegedly fabricated and tampered with and contained overwriting. A copy of the petitioner's application dated 10.09.2002, seeking inspection of the original documents, has been annexed as Annexure No.10 to the writ petition.
On 26.09.2002, the petitioner was permitted to inspect the original records at the Gomti Nagar Branch of the Bank. However, according to him, certain material documents were not made available for inspection, namely, the correspondence file; account-opening forms relating to Savings Bank Accounts Nos. SB-8600, SB-8576, SB-86584 and SB-6529; signature cards; and Savings Bank account vouchers dated 03.05.2001. The petitioner relies upon the letter dated 27.11.2002 written by the Branch Manager, Gomti Nagar Branch, to the Inquiry Officer, wherein it was allegedly acknowledged that the aforesaid documents had not been shown to the petitioner. A copy of the said letter has been annexed as Annexure No.11 to the writ petition.
The petitioner further asserts that, on 02.12.2001, he demanded authenticated photocopies of several documents required for preparing his defence. These included the withdrawal form dated 13.11.2000 relating to withdrawal of Rs.22,500/- from Savings Bank Account No.86584; loan account records relating to certain borrowers; various circulars issued by the Bank; a letter dated 12.03.2001; vendor call registers and rectification reports; the External Auditor's report for March 2001 and RBI Form No.567 dated 31.03.2001; a letter dated 30.01.2002; loan account statements and sanction letters; and document No. EP 3133/01 dated 07.06.2001. It is contended that these documents were not supplied to him, thereby seriously prejudicing his defence before the Inquiry Officer. A copy of the petitioner's application dated 02.12.2001 has been annexed as Annexure No.12 to the writ petition.
The petitioner has further stated that the Presenting Officer, along with his written statement, furnished details of several bank accounts which were allegedly opened on the basis of photocopies of account-opening forms. However, according to the petitioner, the said Savings Bank accounts had not been opened by him.
In the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner submitted a tentative reply to the charge-sheet on 29.03.2003 before the Inquiry Officer. In the said reply, he specifically reiterated that he had not been permitted to inspect the original documents and had only been supplied photocopies which were allegedly tampered with, fabricated and contained overwriting. He further alleged that the entire disciplinary proceedings were being conducted with mala fide intention. A copy of the tentative reply dated 29.03.2003 has been annexed as Annexure No.13 to the writ petition.
It is further the case of the petitioner that the Inquiry Officer did not permit him to produce or lead evidence in his defence. No material witness was examined during the inquiry, nor did the Presenting Officer produce any material evidence or witness to establish the charges levelled against the petitioner.
According to the petitioner, after submission of his reply, the Inquiry Officer neither recorded the oral statements of any witnesses nor afforded him an opportunity to cross-examine any witness. Instead, the Inquiry Officer forwarded the inquiry report to opposite party no.4 merely on the basis of the reply submitted by the petitioner, without fixing any date, time or place for conducting the inquiry. The inquiry report dated 29.04.2003 has been annexed as Annexure No.14 to the writ petition.
Upon receipt of the inquiry report, the petitioner submitted his reply dated 21.05.2003, raising objections to the findings recorded therein. A copy of the said reply has been annexed as Annexure No.15 to the writ petition. The petitioner has alleged that several documents produced by him in support of his defence were not considered by the Inquiry Officer. According to him, this omission was apparent from the inquiry report itself and was specifically pointed out in his reply dated 21.05.2003. However, opposite party no.4 also failed to consider the said objections and proceeded to pass the impugned dismissal order in an illegal manner, despite the alleged procedural irregularities vitiating the entire departmental inquiry.
It is further contended that, while passing the impugned dismissal order, opposite party no.4 also took into consideration the petitioner's past service record without issuing any show-cause notice or affording him an opportunity of hearing in that regard. The petitioner has also questioned the authority of the opposite parties to initiate and continue disciplinary proceedings against him after acceptance of his request for voluntary retirement. According to him, despite acceptance of his voluntary retirement, he was deliberately retained in service with mala fide intention so as to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him.
The petitioner has further asserted that the charge-sheet contained five charges and twelve statements of allegations, out of which six statements of allegations were not proved during the inquiry. It is alleged that the Presenting Officer failed to establish any correlation between the charges and the statements of allegations. Despite the failure to prove six statements of allegations, the Inquiry Officer, without assigning cogent reasons, erroneously recorded a finding that all the charges stood proved against the petitioner.
It is further stated that, after submission of the petitioner's reply to the inquiry report, opposite party no.4 passed the dismissal order without issuing any further show-cause notice or affording an opportunity of personal hearing. The petitioner has alleged that no cogent reasons or findings were recorded in support of the conclusions drawn by the disciplinary authority. It is also contended that, although certain allegations, including allegations Nos.4, 10 and 11, were not proved during the inquiry, opposite party no.4 recorded that allegations Nos. 6, 8 and 12 were partly proved against the petitioner without assigning adequate reasons.
Aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 28.06.2003, the petitioner preferred a statutory appeal before opposite party no.3 on 05.06.2003, challenging the legality and validity of the disciplinary proceedings and the punishment imposed upon him. The statutory appeal was rejected by opposite party no.3 vide order dated 12.12.2003. The petitioner contends that the appellate authority rejected the appeal in a cryptic manner without properly considering the grounds raised therein. It is, however, alleged that the appellate authority itself noticed that opposite party no.4 had failed to consider certain material facts raised by the petitioner, which, according to the petitioner, rendered the entire departmental inquiry unsustainable.
The petitioner has further challenged the imposition of recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- along with the punishment of dismissal, contending that the simultaneous imposition of both penalties amounts to double jeopardy. It is also stated that no recovery proceedings have been initiated against him till the filing of the writ petition. Hence, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition, seeking appropriate relief against the impugned dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 and appellate order dated 12.12.2003.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 passed by opposite party no.4 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by opposite party no.3 are illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law, being contrary to the principles of natural justice and the settled principles governing disciplinary proceedings. It was contended that the disciplinary authority failed to consider the material facts, the petitioner's defence and the objections raised by him during the course of the departmental inquiry.
Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had applied for voluntary retirement under the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000 and his application was duly accepted by the competent authority vide order dated 16.06.2001, with the stipulation that he would be relieved from service on 30.06.2001. Thus, the acceptance of the petitioner's request for voluntary retirement was a concluded decision of the competent authority. However, subsequently, his relieving was extended up to 31.07.2001, without assigning any specific reason affecting the acceptance already communicated to him.
It was further submitted that, after acceptance of the petitioner's voluntary retirement, he was transferred from Gomti Nagar Branch to the Regional Office, Lucknow, on 05.07.2001 and was placed under suspension on 16.07.2001. Thereafter, his voluntary retirement was cancelled on 23.07.2001, without issuance of any show-cause notice, without affording him an opportunity of hearing and without communicating any legally sustainable reason for such cancellation. Learned counsel contended that the subsequent actions of the Bank, particularly the suspension and initiation of disciplinary proceedings, were arbitrary and intended to defeat the petitioner's accrued rights flowing from the acceptance of his voluntary retirement.
Learned counsel specifically placed reliance upon Clauses 5.2(c) and 10.6 of the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000 and submitted that, on the date when the petitioner's application was accepted, no disciplinary proceeding was pending or contemplated against him, nor was he under suspension. Therefore, the subsequent initiation of disciplinary proceedings could not retrospectively invalidate the acceptance of his voluntary retirement. It was further argued that, even assuming that the competent authority possessed discretion to cancel or reject the request, such discretion was required to be exercised in accordance with the scheme and for reasons recorded in writing. In the present case, no such reasons were recorded or communicated to the petitioner, rendering the cancellation order dated 23.07.2001 legally unsustainable.
Learned counsel next submitted that the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2001 was issued only after the petitioner's voluntary retirement had been accepted and its subsequent cancellation. The timing and sequence of events clearly demonstrated that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated with a predetermined and mala fide intention. It was argued that the Bank could not be permitted to take advantage of its own subsequent actions to defeat the consequences of an earlier decision accepting the petitioner's voluntary retirement, particularly when no disciplinary proceeding was pending or contemplated at the relevant time.
It was further submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner were vague and did not disclose the specific misconduct allegedly committed by him. The charge-sheet was not supported by the relevant original documents and the petitioner was not supplied the material relied upon by the Bank. Consequently, he was deprived of an effective opportunity to understand and rebut the allegations. Learned counsel contended that a disciplinary proceeding founded upon vague charges and conducted without supplying the material documents necessary for an effective defence cannot be sustained in law.
Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had categorically denied the charges in his reply dated 11.01.2002. However, the Inquiry Officer failed to consider the specific defence taken by the petitioner and proceeded with the inquiry without ensuring supply of the documents relied upon by the Bank. It was argued that the disciplinary authority was under a legal obligation to consider the petitioner's defence and examine whether the allegations were supported by admissible and reliable material. The failure to consider the defence goes to the root of the validity of the inquiry.
Learned counsel further contended that the petitioner had specifically demanded inspection of the original documents and had pointed out that the photocopies supplied to him were allegedly tampered with and contained overwriting. Although permission for inspection was granted on 26.09.2002, several material documents, including the correspondence file, account-opening forms, signature cards and relevant vouchers, were not made available to him. The non-supply of such documents materially prejudiced the petitioner's defence and deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to controvert the allegations.
It was further submitted that the petitioner had also demanded authenticated copies of several documents, including withdrawal forms, loan account records, relevant circulars, correspondence, vendor call registers, rectification reports and audit records. However, the Inquiry Officer failed to furnish the same. Learned counsel argued that the right to defend oneself in a departmental inquiry necessarily includes the right to inspect and obtain copies of material documents relied upon by the employer, particularly when their authenticity and correctness are specifically disputed by the delinquent employee.
Learned counsel laid particular emphasis upon the fact that the Presenting Officer had relied upon details of several Savings Bank accounts allegedly opened on the basis of photocopies of account-opening forms. The petitioner had specifically disputed his involvement in the opening of those accounts and had pointed out that the said accounts had not been opened by him. Despite this specific objection, the Inquiry Officer failed to examine the relevant original records or undertake any proper scrutiny to establish the petitioner's individual responsibility. It was contended that mere production of account particulars or documents, without establishing their connection with the petitioner, could not constitute proof of misconduct.
Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner had submitted his tentative reply dated 29.03.2003, specifically raising objections regarding non-supply of original documents, non-permission to inspect material records and the alleged tampering of photocopies supplied by the Bank. However, neither the Inquiry Officer nor the disciplinary authority considered these objections in their proper perspective. It was argued that the failure to deal with material objections raised by the delinquent employee renders the findings recorded in the inquiry report arbitrary and vitiated by non-application of mind.
Learned counsel specifically assailed the manner in which the Inquiry Officer conducted the proceedings and submitted that the entire inquiry was founded upon the statement of a solitary witness produced on behalf of the respondent Bank. The petitioner had raised specific objections regarding the testimony of the said witness, the absence of independent corroboration and the failure to establish the charges through the original documentary evidence. However, the Inquiry Officer failed to properly consider or adjudicate upon those objections. It was argued that where the entire case of the employer rests upon the testimony of a sole witness, the Inquiry Officer is legally required to examine the credibility, reliability and evidentiary value of such testimony, particularly when its correctness is specifically disputed by the delinquent employee.
Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner was not afforded an effective opportunity to cross-examine the said witness or to controvert the material relied upon by the Bank. The Inquiry Officer failed to appreciate that the petitioner's objections regarding the testimony of the sole witness were material to the determination of the charges. It was contended that the findings recorded without proper consideration of such objections and without affording an effective opportunity to challenge the evidence relied upon by the Bank were contrary to the principles of natural justice.
It was further argued that the Inquiry Officer failed to permit the petitioner to lead evidence in his defence, whereas the Presenting Officer also failed to establish the charges through reliable evidence. The inquiry report dated 29.04.2003 was submitted without properly examining the evidence, considering the petitioner's objections or recording a reasoned finding on the defence taken by him. Learned counsel contended that the findings of guilt recorded in such circumstances were perverse and unsustainable.
Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner, upon receipt of the inquiry report, submitted a detailed reply dated 21.05.2003, specifically pointing out the deficiencies in the inquiry proceedings, the non-consideration of his defence documents and the failure of the Inquiry Officer to deal with his objections regarding the evidence produced by the Bank. However, the disciplinary authority failed to consider the said reply independently and mechanically proceeded to impose the punishment of dismissal. It was argued that consideration of the delinquent employee's representation against the inquiry report is not an empty formality; the disciplinary authority is required to apply its independent mind to the objections raised and record reasons for accepting or rejecting the same.
Learned counsel further submitted that the disciplinary authority failed to record any cogent reasons for disagreeing with or rejecting the petitioner's defence. The petitioner had specifically pointed out that several statements of allegations were not proved during the inquiry and that the Presenting Officer had failed to establish any correlation between the five charges and the twelve statements of allegations. Nevertheless, the Inquiry Officer erroneously recorded that all the charges stood proved. The disciplinary authority, without examining these material discrepancies, accepted the inquiry findings and imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal.
It was also contended that the disciplinary authority relied upon the petitioner's past service record while imposing the punishment, without giving him any prior notice or opportunity to explain the alleged adverse material. Learned counsel submitted that reliance upon such material without affording an opportunity of hearing was contrary to the principles of natural justice and further demonstrated the arbitrary manner in which the punishment was imposed.
Learned counsel next submitted that the punishment of dismissal was grossly disproportionate to the nature of the allegations, particularly when several statements of allegations were not proved and the evidence relied upon by the Bank itself was not properly examined. It was argued that the disciplinary authority failed to consider the petitioner's long and otherwise unblemished service record and imposed the extreme penalty without recording adequate reasons demonstrating why such punishment was warranted.
Learned counsel further submitted that the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner on 05.06.2003 was rejected by opposite party no.3 vide order dated 12.12.2003 in a wholly mechanical and illegal manner. The appellate authority failed to examine the principal grounds raised in the appeal, including the prior acceptance and subsequent cancellation of voluntary retirement, non-supply of original documents, denial of an effective opportunity of defence, non-consideration of the petitioner's reply to the inquiry report and the objections concerning the sole witness produced by the Bank. It was contended that the appellate authority was required to independently examine the legality and correctness of the disciplinary findings and could not dispose of the statutory appeal by passing a cryptic and non-speaking order.
Learned counsel also submitted that the appellate authority itself noticed that certain material facts raised by the petitioner had not been considered by the disciplinary authority. Despite noticing such deficiencies, the appellate authority failed to examine their effect on the validity of the inquiry and mechanically rejected the appeal. It was argued that the appellate order suffers from non-application of mind and failure to exercise the statutory appellate jurisdiction in accordance with law.
Learned counsel lastly submitted that the disciplinary authority had also imposed recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- along with the punishment of dismissal, without properly examining the legal basis and justification for such recovery. It was contended that the imposition of the aforesaid consequences, in the facts of the case, further demonstrates the arbitrary exercise of disciplinary power.
On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the impugned orders cannot be sustained, as the entire disciplinary proceedings were initiated after acceptance of the petitioner's voluntary retirement and were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The disciplinary authority failed to consider the petitioner's reply and material objections, particularly those relating to the testimony of the sole witness produced by the Bank, whereas the appellate authority also failed to independently examine the legality of the proceedings and rejected the statutory appeal through a non-speaking order.
Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that the writ petition be allowed and the impugned dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 passed by opposite party no.4 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by opposite party no.3 be quashed, with all consequential service and monetary benefits admissible to the petitioner.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent on the basis of written submission placed before this Court submitted that the impugned orders dated 28.06.2003 and 12.12.2003 have been passed by the competent authorities in accordance with the UCO Bank Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, and do not suffer from any illegality warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
It was contended that although the petitioner's voluntary retirement application was accepted, he was never actually relieved from service and the date of relieving had been deferred to 31.07.2001. Since he was placed under suspension on 16.07.2001, before the effective date of retirement, he became ineligible under Clause 5.2(c) of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000. Consequently, cancellation of his voluntary retirement vide order dated 23.07.2001 was justified. The petitioner has also not challenged the suspension or cancellation orders, which have attained finality.
Learned counsel submitted that the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2001 contained specific allegations of financial irregularities and fraudulent transactions during the petitioner's tenure as Manager/Senior Manager of the Gomti Nagar Branch. The petitioner submitted detailed replies denying the charges and, therefore, cannot subsequently claim that the charges were vague or indefinite.
It was further submitted that the departmental inquiry was conducted in accordance with the applicable Regulations, affording the petitioner adequate opportunity to defend himself, cross-examine witnesses, produce defence evidence and submit his explanation. Relevant documents were supplied and original records were made available for inspection. The petitioner has failed to establish that non-availability of any particular document caused actual prejudice to his defence.
Learned counsel contended that the inquiry report dated 29.04.2003 was duly supplied to the petitioner, who submitted his representation dated 21.05.2003. Thus, the principles of natural justice, as explained in the case of Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar; (1993) 4 SCC 727 were duly complied with. No further show-cause notice regarding the proposed punishment or separate personal hearing was legally required.
It was submitted that the Disciplinary Authority independently examined the charges and imposed punishment only in respect of the allegations found proved. The Appellate Authority also considered the petitioner's appeal on merits and affirmed the punishment. Therefore, the impugned orders cannot be termed mechanical, arbitrary or non-speaking.
Learned counsel further submitted that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 is limited and this Court cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the departmental authorities unless the findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence or vitiated by procedural illegality. No such infirmity has been established in the present case.
Repelling the plea of double jeopardy, it was submitted that Article 20(2) of the Constitution has no application to departmental proceedings. Further, dismissal from service and recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- relate to different charges and recovery of pecuniary loss is a permissible penalty under Regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976.
Lastly, it was submitted that the misconduct involving fraudulent transactions and financial irregularities is grave in nature, particularly when committed by an officer holding a responsible managerial position in a banking institution. The punishment of dismissal is proportionate to the misconduct established. Reliance was placed upon the case of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364.
Accordingly, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner has failed to establish any violation of statutory provisions, breach of natural justice, perversity in the findings or disproportionality of punishment. The writ petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as law reports cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.
To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant portion of judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent – Bank and Clause 5.2(c) of the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000 are being quoted below:
Judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent:
a) Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (Supra):
“29.Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.
30 [v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.
31.31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.”
b) Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank (Supra):
“11.The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.
12.To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
13.In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as to how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion on this aspect. The only discernible reason was the punishment awarded in M.L. Keshwani case. As was observed by this Court in Balbir Chand v. Food Corpn. of India Ltd. [(1997) 3 SCC 371 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 808] even if a co-delinquent is given lesser punishment it cannot be a ground for interference. Even such a plea was not available to be given credence as the allegations were contextually different.
15.It needs no emphasis that when a court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union [(1971) 1 All ER 1148 : (1971) 2 QB 175 : (1971) 2 WLR 742 (CA)] observed : (All ER p. 1154h) “The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.” In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree [1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)] it was observed:“Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The “inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. But as noted above, the proceedings commenced in 1981. The employee was placed under suspension from 1983 to 1988 and has superannuated in 2002. Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings. At the most the factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment. It would depend upon the facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application.”
UCO Bank Employees Voluntary Retirement Scheme – 2000:
“5.2However, the employees falling in the following categories are not eligible to seek voluntary retirement under the scheme: -
a)………………..
b)………………...
c)Employees against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated/pending or who are under suspension.
d)……………….
e)……………….
f)…………………”
Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and having carefully examined the material available on record, this Court finds that the controversy involved in the present writ petition is not confined merely to the correctness of the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer or the proportionality of the punishment imposed upon the petitioner. The principal questions which arise for consideration are whether the Bank was justified in cancelling the petitioner's voluntary retirement after its acceptance by the competent authority; whether the subsequent disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the applicable service regulations and the principles of natural justice; whether the petitioner was afforded an effective opportunity to defend himself against the charges; and whether the disciplinary and appellate authorities discharged their respective obligations by independently considering the material placed before them.
At the outset, it would be appropriate to examine the effect of acceptance of the petitioner's application for voluntary retirement under the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000. The material on record establishes that the petitioner submitted his application for voluntary retirement on 01.01.2001, which was duly forwarded through the prescribed channel and accepted by the competent authority vide communication dated 16.06.2001. Under the said communication, the petitioner was to be relieved from service on 30.06.2001. Thus, the petitioner's request had not remained at the stage of consideration but had culminated in an affirmative decision by the competent authority.
The subsequent extension of the date of relieving up to 31.07.2001, allegedly on account of administrative exigencies, is an intervening circumstance which requires consideration. However, mere extension of the date of relieving, by itself, cannot be construed as an automatic withdrawal or cancellation of the earlier decision accepting voluntary retirement. The Bank was required to establish that such extension was legally permissible under the scheme and that the acceptance already communicated to the petitioner had been lawfully modified or withdrawn in accordance with the applicable provisions.
The submission advanced on behalf of the respondent Bank that the petitioner had not actually been relieved from service before 31.07.2001 and, therefore, his voluntary retirement could be cancelled on account of his subsequent suspension dated 16.07.2001, cannot be accepted in the manner in which it has been advanced. Admittedly, when the competent authority accepted the petitioner's application on 16.06.2001, no disciplinary proceeding was pending or contemplated against him and he was not under suspension. The disqualification contemplated under Clause 5.2(c) of the scheme, therefore, did not exist on the date of acceptance of his application.
The Bank has not demonstrated from the material placed on record that the petitioner's application was accepted subject to any specific condition reserving an unrestricted power to subsequently withdraw the acceptance on the basis of circumstances brought into existence after such acceptance. Equally, the Bank has not satisfactorily explained the circumstances necessitating the extension of the relieving date and the subsequent cancellation of voluntary retirement immediately after placing the petitioner under suspension.
The distinction between acceptance of an application and actual cessation of the employer-employee relationship is undoubtedly relevant. Nevertheless, the employer cannot disregard an earlier decision communicated to an employee and subsequently alter its legal consequences arbitrarily. Any such action must have the sanction of the governing scheme and must satisfy the requirements of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution.
The further submission of learned counsel for the respondent Bank that the petitioner has not independently challenged the suspension order dated 16.07.2001 and the cancellation order dated 23.07.2001, which have attained finality, also requires consideration. It is true that the petitioner has principally sought quashing of the dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003. However, the legality of the circumstances in which the petitioner's voluntary retirement was cancelled constitutes an important part of the foundation of his challenge to the subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
This Court is conscious of the limitation that an order which has not been specifically challenged cannot ordinarily be set aside by granting relief beyond the pleadings. Nevertheless, the respondent Bank cannot rely upon the subsequent cancellation as an unanswerable justification for its disciplinary action without demonstrating that the cancellation was made in accordance with the governing scheme. The existence of the cancellation order does not dispense with the obligation of the Bank to establish the legal foundation and procedural fairness of the disciplinary proceedings which culminated in the petitioner's dismissal.
Another significant aspect of the matter is that the respondent Bank has relied upon Clause 5.2(c) of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000, which provides that employees against whom disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or pending, or who are under suspension, are not eligible to seek voluntary retirement under the scheme.
A plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that the disqualification relates to the eligibility of an employee seeking voluntary retirement. In the present case, the Bank has not established that any disciplinary proceedings were contemplated or pending against the petitioner when his application was accepted on 16.06.2001. The suspension order was passed subsequently on 16.07.2001, followed by cancellation of voluntary retirement on 23.07.2001. The subsequent events cannot, without an appropriate legal basis under the scheme, be retrospectively employed to establish that the petitioner was ineligible on the date when his request was accepted.
The respondent Bank was, therefore, required to establish the existence of a valid legal basis for cancelling the acceptance already communicated to the petitioner. In the absence of such justification, the sequence of events gives rise to a serious doubt regarding the fairness of the action taken against the petitioner.
This Court now proceeds to examine the legality of the departmental inquiry independently of the controversy relating to voluntary retirement. It is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings must be conducted in a fair and transparent manner and that the delinquent employee must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations levelled against him. Such opportunity is not merely a formal right to submit a written explanation; it necessarily includes an effective opportunity to know the material relied upon by the employer, inspect the relevant records, challenge the evidence produced against him and place his defence before the Inquiry Officer.
In the present case, the petitioner submitted his reply dated 11.01.2002, specifically denying the allegations contained in the charge-sheet dated 27.12.2001. He also repeatedly demanded the original documents and authenticated copies of the records relied upon by the Bank. His request was not a general or vague demand for documents but related to specific account-opening forms, signature cards, withdrawal vouchers, correspondence files, loan records, bank circulars, audit reports and other material which, according to him, was necessary to establish his innocence.
It is significant that although the petitioner was permitted to inspect certain original records on 26.09.2002, the Branch Manager, Gomti Nagar Branch, subsequently communicated to the Inquiry Officer vide letter dated 27.11.2002 that certain documents, including the correspondence file, account-opening forms, signature cards and Savings Bank account vouchers, had not been shown to the petitioner.
This circumstance assumes considerable significance because the allegations against the petitioner primarily concerned financial transactions and the opening and operation of bank accounts during his tenure as Manager/Senior Manager. The original account-opening forms, signature cards and transaction vouchers were, therefore, not peripheral documents but were directly relevant to determining whether the transactions in question were attributable to the petitioner.
Once the petitioner specifically disputed the authenticity and correctness of the photocopies supplied to him and pointed out alleged overwriting and tampering, the Inquiry Officer was required to ensure that the original records were made available for inspection and that the petitioner was afforded a meaningful opportunity to controvert the same.
The respondent Bank has failed to demonstrate from the material placed before this Court that the aforesaid documents were subsequently made available to the petitioner or that their non-availability had no bearing whatsoever on his defence.
The contention of learned counsel for the respondent Bank that the petitioner was supplied relevant documents and permitted to inspect the original records and that he has failed to establish actual prejudice, cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case.
The requirement of establishing prejudice cannot be converted into an impossible burden upon the delinquent employee, particularly where the very documents necessary to establish or disprove the allegations were within the exclusive custody and control of the employer. The petitioner had specifically identified the documents required by him and explained their relevance to the charges. The Bank, on the other hand, has not satisfactorily explained why the documents were not made available or how the inquiry could fairly proceed without examining the original records.
The prejudice is, therefore, not merely conjectural. It is evident from the nature of the allegations and the specific documents which were withheld or not made available for inspection. Had the petitioner been provided the opportunity to examine the original account-opening forms, signatures, vouchers and relevant correspondence, he could have effectively challenged the alleged transactions and demonstrated whether the same were attributable to him.
Consequently, the denial of access to material documents has materially impaired the petitioner's right of defence and has vitiated the fairness of the departmental proceedings.
The next important aspect requiring consideration is the manner in which the evidence was recorded and evaluated by the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner specifically raised objections regarding the testimony of the solitary witness relied upon by the respondent Bank and questioned the reliability of the evidence produced against him. He also disputed the absence of independent documentary corroboration connecting him with the alleged irregular transactions.
It is well settled that departmental proceedings are not governed by the strict technical rules of the Evidence Act and that even the testimony of a solitary witness may, in an appropriate case, constitute sufficient evidence to establish misconduct. However, the mere fact that one witness has been produced does not automatically establish the charges. The Inquiry Officer is required to examine the credibility of the witness, the consistency of his testimony, its connection with the charges and the supporting documentary material, if any.
In the present case, the petitioner's specific objections regarding the testimony of the sole witness and the absence of reliable supporting material were required to be examined. The Inquiry Officer could not have treated the allegations as proved merely because the Presenting Officer had reiterated the allegations contained in the charge-sheet or because the petitioner had submitted a written explanation denying them.
The record, as placed before this Court, further indicates that the petitioner was not afforded an effective opportunity to cross-examine the witness whose testimony was relied upon by the Bank. Nor is there any satisfactory demonstration that the Inquiry Officer properly examined the petitioner's objections concerning the evidentiary value of such testimony.
The opportunity to cross-examine a witness is particularly significant where the witness's testimony constitutes the principal basis for recording a finding of guilt and the delinquent employee disputes the factual assertions made by him. In such circumstances, denial of an effective opportunity to test the testimony strikes at the very foundation of a fair inquiry.
The respondent Bank has asserted that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and lead defence evidence. However, such assertion, in the absence of satisfactory support from the inquiry proceedings, cannot outweigh the specific objections raised by the petitioner and the deficiencies demonstrated from the material on record.
The Inquiry Officer was under an obligation to conduct an inquiry and not merely to collect the petitioner's explanation and record a conclusion on the basis of the allegations made by the employer. The failure to undertake a meaningful evaluation of the evidence and the petitioner's objections renders the findings vulnerable to judicial interference.
This Court also finds substance in the submission that the Inquiry Officer failed to properly correlate the five charges with the twelve statements of allegations and did not satisfactorily explain how the evidence available on record established each charge.
It is evident from the petitioner's defence that he specifically disputed the findings concerning several statements of allegations and pointed out that six out of the twelve statements had not been proved. He further asserted that allegations Nos. 4, 10 and 11 were not established, whereas allegations Nos.6, 8 and 12 were treated as partly proved without adequate reasoning.
In disciplinary proceedings, the burden lies upon the employer to establish the charges on the basis of some legally acceptable and reliable material. A finding of guilt cannot be sustained merely by reproducing the allegations or by recording a general conclusion that all the charges stand proved. The Inquiry Officer must identify the evidence supporting each charge and explain how the same establishes the delinquent employee's responsibility.
Where several allegations are clubbed together under a composite charge, it becomes all the more necessary to examine the evidentiary foundation of each material allegation and its connection with the employee concerned.
The inquiry report dated 29.04.2003, as assailed by the petitioner, does not satisfactorily demonstrate such an exercise. The failure to distinguish between proved, partly proved and unproved allegations and to record reasons supporting the findings reflects non-application of mind to the material questions involved.
It is also relevant that the petitioner submitted his tentative reply dated 29.03.2003, specifically reiterating his objections regarding non-supply of original documents, alleged tampering of photocopies and denial of an effective opportunity to defend himself. These objections went to the root of the fairness of the inquiry and could not have been brushed aside as routine objections.
An Inquiry Officer is not expected to accept the explanation of the delinquent employee merely because it has been submitted. Equally, he cannot reject the defence without examining its substance and the supporting material. The requirement of a fair inquiry operates equally upon the employer and the employee and demands an objective evaluation of the material placed by both sides.
The record further indicates that the Inquiry Officer forwarded the inquiry report dated 29.04.2003 without satisfactorily dealing with the petitioner's material objections and without demonstrating that a fair evidentiary exercise had been undertaken.
The respondent Bank has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL (Supra), particularly paragraphs 29 to 31 thereof, to contend that the petitioner was supplied with the inquiry report and was permitted to submit his representation dated 21.05.2003 and, therefore, the requirements of natural justice stood satisfied.
There can be no dispute with the legal proposition laid down in the aforesaid judgment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically recognised that the delinquent employee must be supplied with the inquiry report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusion and that the effect of any violation of this requirement must be examined in the light of the prejudice caused to the employee.
However, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment does not assist the respondent Bank in the facts of the present case. The controversy herein is not merely whether the inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner admittedly submitted his detailed representation dated 21.05.2003 after receipt of the inquiry report. His grievance is that the disciplinary authority failed to consider the specific objections raised therein and proceeded to impose the extreme punishment of dismissal without examining whether the inquiry itself had been conducted fairly.
The judgment in the case of B. Karunakar (Supra) does not lay down that mere supply of the inquiry report and receipt of a representation automatically cure all other procedural irregularities committed during the inquiry. Rather, the underlying principle of the judgment reinforces the requirement that the employee must receive a real and effective opportunity to defend himself and that the disciplinary authority must examine whether any procedural deficiency has caused prejudice.
In the present case, the prejudice is apparent from the non-availability of material documents, the failure to effectively test the evidence relied upon by the Bank, the non-consideration of the petitioner's defence and the absence of adequate reasons supporting the findings of guilt. Thus, the respondent Bank cannot derive any benefit from the judgment cited by it to sustain an inquiry otherwise vitiated by material procedural irregularities.
The next issue relates to the consideration of the petitioner's reply dated 21.05.2003 to the inquiry report by the disciplinary authority.
The requirement of furnishing the inquiry report and inviting the representation of the delinquent employee is not a mere procedural formality. It is intended to enable the disciplinary authority to independently examine the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and consider whether the same deserve acceptance in the light of the objections and supporting material furnished by the employee.
The disciplinary authority is not expected to function as a rubber stamp of the Inquiry Officer. It must apply its independent mind to the findings, examine the defence and determine whether the conclusions are supported by the material available on record.
In the present case, the petitioner had specifically pointed out that several statements of allegations had not been proved, that the Presenting Officer had failed to establish a correlation between the charges and the alleged transactions, that material documents had not been supplied and that his objections concerning the testimony of the sole witness had not been properly examined.
These were substantial objections having a direct bearing upon the validity of the inquiry report. The disciplinary authority was, therefore, required to deal with them by recording appropriate reasons. However, the material placed before this Court does not demonstrate that the disciplinary authority undertook such an independent and reasoned examination before passing the dismissal order dated 28.06.2003.
The failure to consider the petitioner's representation in its proper perspective renders the impugned dismissal order unsustainable.
This Court further finds substance in the petitioner's grievance that the disciplinary authority relied upon his past service record while imposing the punishment of dismissal without affording him an opportunity to explain any adverse material forming part of such record.
It is true that the past service record of an employee may, in an appropriate case, be relevant for determining the nature and quantum of punishment. However, where the disciplinary authority proposes to rely upon adverse material relating to the employee's past service, which was not part of the charges or inquiry proceedings, fairness requires that the employee be informed of such material and afforded an opportunity to offer his explanation, particularly where such material has a bearing upon the severity of punishment.
The disciplinary authority cannot introduce additional adverse considerations at the stage of punishment without affording the employee an effective opportunity to meet them.
In the present case, the petitioner had served the Bank from 22.04.1968 and had earned successive promotions, ultimately reaching Middle Management Grade-C (Scale-II). His length of service and the circumstances of his employment were relevant considerations while determining the proportionality of punishment. The disciplinary authority was required to demonstrate that these aspects had been considered objectively and that the punishment imposed was justified by the misconduct actually established.
Another important infirmity in the impugned proceedings is the failure of the appellate authority to exercise its statutory jurisdiction in the manner required by law.
An appeal under the UCO Bank Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, is a substantive statutory remedy. The appellate authority is required to examine the legality of the disciplinary proceedings, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, the objections raised by the delinquent employee and the proportionality of the punishment imposed.
The appellate authority cannot discharge its obligation merely by affirming the conclusion of the disciplinary authority. It must independently consider the grounds raised in the appeal and record reasons indicating why the objections do not merit acceptance.
In the present case, the petitioner challenged the dismissal order on several specific grounds, including the prior acceptance and subsequent cancellation of voluntary retirement, non-supply of original documents, denial of an effective opportunity of cross-examination, non-consideration of his defence, absence of reliable evidence establishing his individual responsibility and the failure to correlate the charges with the statements of allegations.
These grounds went to the root of the validity of the departmental proceedings and required independent adjudication by the appellate authority.
The appellate order dated 12.12.2003, however, does not demonstrate satisfactory consideration of the aforesaid material objections. More importantly, it is the petitioner's specific case that the appellate authority itself noticed that certain material facts raised by him had not been considered by the disciplinary authority, yet proceeded to reject the appeal without examining the legal consequences of such omission.
If the appellate authority found that the disciplinary authority had failed to consider material facts, it was incumbent upon it to examine whether such failure had affected the fairness of the proceedings and whether the findings of guilt could legally be sustained. Merely noticing an omission without addressing its effect cannot be regarded as proper exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
The requirement of recording reasons assumes greater significance where an employee's livelihood and long-standing service career are at stake. A non-speaking or cryptic appellate order deprives the affected employee of the assurance that his statutory remedy has been genuinely considered and also prevents effective judicial scrutiny of the decision-making process.
Accordingly, the appellate order suffers from non-application of mind and failure to discharge the statutory obligation of independent consideration.
The respondent Bank has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank (Supra) to contend that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is limited and that the High Court cannot substitute its own decision for that of the disciplinary authority.
This Court has carefully considered the aforesaid judgment. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not sit as an appellate authority over departmental findings and ordinarily does not reappreciate the evidence merely because another view is possible.
However, the same judgment recognises that judicial interference is permissible where the administrative decision suffers from procedural impropriety, is illogical or is such that it shocks the conscience of the Court. It also emphasises that reasons constitute an essential link between the material considered and the conclusion arrived at by the decision-making authority.
Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the respondent Bank does not confer immunity upon disciplinary orders from judicial scrutiny. Rather, it recognises the power of judicial review where the decision-making process suffers from material illegality or procedural impropriety.
In the present case, this Court is not undertaking a fresh appraisal of the evidence to substitute its own conclusion for that of the disciplinary authority. The interference is necessitated by identifiable legal infirmities, namely, non-supply of material documents, denial of an effective opportunity to challenge the evidence relied upon by the Bank, failure to consider the petitioner's material objections, absence of satisfactory reasons supporting the findings of guilt and non-application of mind by the appellate authority.
The judgment in the case of P.C. Kakkar (Supra) is, therefore, distinguishable on facts and does not advance the case of the respondent Bank.
The question of proportionality of punishment also requires consideration. The petitioner was subjected to the extreme punishment of dismissal from service, coupled with recovery of Rs.1,44,616/-. Such punishment has serious civil and financial consequences, particularly in the case of an employee who had rendered more than three decades of service with the Bank.
It is true that an officer holding a managerial position in a banking institution is expected to maintain the highest standards of integrity, diligence and financial propriety. Any established financial irregularity or fraudulent transaction committed by such an officer is required to be viewed seriously, having regard to the fiduciary nature of banking operations and the confidence reposed in the institution by its customers.
However, the seriousness of the nature of the allegations cannot dispense with the requirement of proving the charges through a fair and legally sustainable inquiry. The responsibility of a managerial officer may justify strict disciplinary action where misconduct is established, but it cannot justify punishment on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations or findings recorded in violation of the principles of natural justice.
In the present case, the disciplinary authority has not satisfactorily demonstrated how the individual acts and omissions attributed to the petitioner were established through reliable evidence, particularly when material documents were not made available and his objections concerning the testimony of the sole witness were not properly adjudicated.
The long service rendered by the petitioner, his previous promotions and the assertion that he maintained an unblemished service record were also relevant circumstances requiring consideration. The disciplinary authority was required to balance the gravity of the misconduct actually established against the petitioner's service record and the circumstances of the case.
The punishment of dismissal, being the most severe consequence in the service hierarchy, cannot be imposed mechanically without recording reasons demonstrating why such extreme action is warranted. The impugned dismissal order does not satisfactorily establish that the disciplinary authority undertook such an exercise.
This Court is conscious that proportionality is not a ground for interference merely because a different punishment could have been imposed. However, where the very findings of guilt are vitiated by material procedural irregularities and the disciplinary authority has failed to consider the employee's defence and relevant circumstances, the resulting punishment cannot be sustained by merely invoking the seriousness of the allegations.
So far as the recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent Bank has submitted that Article 20(2) of the Constitution is not attracted to departmental proceedings and that recovery of pecuniary loss is a permissible penalty under Regulation 4 of the UCO Bank Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976.
The proposition that Article 20(2) of the Constitution does not ordinarily apply to departmental disciplinary proceedings is not in dispute. Equally, the applicable disciplinary regulations may provide for recovery of pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by an employee's misconduct.
However, the power to impose recovery is not an unregulated or automatic power. Before directing recovery, the disciplinary authority must establish the employee's responsibility for the alleged loss, determine the amount attributable to the misconduct and record appropriate reasons supporting the direction.
In the present case, since the findings of misconduct themselves suffer from material procedural infirmities and the petitioner's individual responsibility has not been established through a fair and reliable inquiry, the consequential direction for recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- cannot independently survive.
The recovery direction is, therefore, liable to be set aside along with the impugned dismissal order.
This Court is also unable to accept the submission of the respondent Bank that the petitioner has failed to establish any prejudice on account of the procedural irregularities committed during the inquiry. The prejudice in the present case must be assessed cumulatively and not by isolating each procedural defect from the other.
The petitioner was not supplied with certain material documents despite specific requests; the original records necessary to verify the disputed transactions were not fully made available for inspection; his objections concerning the testimony of the sole witness were not properly examined; he was not afforded an effective opportunity to controvert the material relied upon by the Bank; and his detailed representation dated 21.05.2003 was not dealt with by the disciplinary authority through a reasoned decision.
These deficiencies, when considered together, demonstrate that the petitioner was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to defend himself. The inquiry, therefore, cannot be regarded as a fair and impartial exercise conforming to the requirements of natural justice.
It is well settled that the principles of natural justice are not empty formalities. Their object is to ensure that a person likely to suffer adverse civil consequences is afforded a genuine opportunity to meet the case against him and that the authority deciding the matter acts fairly and objectively.
In the present case, the consequences of the departmental proceedings were extremely serious, as the petitioner was dismissed from service after having served the Bank for more than three decades, apart from being subjected to a substantial monetary recovery. In such circumstances, strict adherence to procedural fairness and an objective evaluation of the evidence were indispensable.
The respondent Bank, being a public sector banking institution, is expected to act fairly, reasonably and in accordance with the governing service regulations. Its disciplinary powers, though necessary for maintaining institutional discipline and financial integrity, must be exercised within the bounds of law.
The impugned proceedings, unfortunately, do not satisfy these requirements.
The cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion leads this Court to the conclusion that the inquiry report dated 29.04.2003 suffers from material procedural infirmities and the findings recorded therein have not been shown to rest upon a fair and adequate consideration of the evidence and the petitioner's defence. The disciplinary authority failed to independently consider the petitioner's objections dated 21.05.2003 and did not record satisfactory reasons for rejecting his material submissions before imposing the punishment of dismissal. The appellate authority, in turn, failed to correct these deficiencies and rejected the statutory appeal without undertaking the requisite independent scrutiny.
The impugned orders, therefore, suffer from procedural impropriety, non-application of mind and violation of the principles of natural justice. Such infirmities go to the root of the decision-making process and cannot be treated as minor or inconsequential irregularities.
The contention of learned counsel for the respondent Bank that this Court should refrain from interfering with the impugned orders in view of the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is, therefore, misconceived in the facts of the present case. The limitation on judicial review does not prevent this Court from examining whether the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted in accordance with law, whether the delinquent employee has been afforded a reasonable opportunity of defence and whether the conclusions recorded by the authorities are supported by a fair and reasoned decision-making process.
The Court is not substituting its own assessment of the alleged financial transactions for that of the disciplinary authority. Rather, it is examining the legality of the process through which the petitioner was found guilty and dismissed from service. Once the process itself is found to be materially defective, the resulting orders cannot be permitted to stand merely on the ground that the allegations are serious or that the disciplinary authority possesses jurisdiction to impose punishment.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 passed by opposite party no.4 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by opposite party no.3 cannot be sustained in law. The respondent Bank has failed to demonstrate that the inquiry was conducted in a manner ensuring an effective opportunity of defence to the petitioner or that the disciplinary and appellate authorities independently considered the material objections raised by him.
The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent Bank, namely, Managing Director, ECIL (Supra) and Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank (Supra), lay down well-recognised principles governing disciplinary proceedings and judicial review. However, the said judgments do not support the proposition that a disciplinary order can be sustained despite material violations of natural justice and failure to consider the employee's defence. On the contrary, the principles enunciated therein reinforce the necessity of a fair inquiry, consideration of prejudice and recording of reasons by the competent authorities. The aforesaid judgments are, therefore, distinguishable on the facts of the present case and do not come to the rescue of the respondent Bank.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed.
The impugned dismissal order dated 28.06.2003 passed by opposite party no.4 and the appellate order dated 12.12.2003 passed by opposite party no.3 are hereby quashed.
The consequential direction for recovery of Rs.1,44,616/- imposed upon the petitioner pursuant to the impugned disciplinary proceedings is also quashed. In case any amount has been recovered from the petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the same shall be refunded to him in accordance with law.
So far as the consequential service and monetary benefits are concerned, the respondent Bank shall undertake an appropriate exercise for determining the petitioner's entitlement in accordance with the applicable service regulations and the UCO Bank Employees' Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2000, keeping in view the acceptance of his voluntary retirement communicated on 16.06.2001, the subsequent extension of the relieving date and the cancellation order dated 23.07.2001.
While undertaking the aforesaid exercise, the Bank shall not treat the impugned dismissal order as a valid basis for denying the petitioner his lawful service and terminal benefits. The Bank shall specifically examine the legal effect of the acceptance of voluntary retirement and the subsequent cancellation thereof and shall pass a reasoned order determining the date from which the petitioner is entitled to be treated as having ceased to be in service and the consequential monetary and retiral benefits admissible to him.
The aforesaid exercise shall be completed by the competent authority of the respondent Bank within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The consequential monetary and retiral benefits found admissible to the petitioner shall thereafter be released within a further period of one month, subject to adjustment of any amount already paid to him under the applicable service provisions.
There shall be no order as to costs.
