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Judgment
Dipak Misra, J.
The appellants, five in number, have preferred this intra-Court appeal u/s 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 (for brevity ''the Act'') calling in question the pregnability of the order dated 23-1-2007 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 13273/2003.
The facts which are imperative to be exposited are that the appellants/petitioners are working as Science Teachers in the Tribal (Education Department). They had knocked at the doors of the M.P. Administrative Tribunal (in short ''the Tribunal'') in O.A. No. 60/1999 for grant of relief of promotion to the posts of Upper Division Teachers on many a ground. After abolition of the Tribunal by operation of law the matter stood transferred to this Court and was registered as a writ petition.
It was contended in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the respondents to promote the appellants against 50% quota in Science subject. The said claim was founded on the anvil of the Circular dated 20-1-1987 issued by the State Government. It is noteworthy to mention that the said circular has been brought on record as Annexure A-2. It was contended before the learned Single Judge that on the basis of the said circular, certain incumbents had been extended the benefit of promotion and hence, they were entitled to be treated at par with the said teachers. To bolster the aforesaid stand, reliance was placed on Indra veer Singh Tomar v. State of M.P. and Ors. 2004(2) M.P . 3 (NOC).
The learned Single Judge distinguished the said decision on the ground that in the said decision reliance was placed on the circular dated 20-1-1987 issued by the School Education Department but the said circular had been withdrawn by the State Government as per order dated 5-5-1988, which had been brought on record. The learned Single Judge placed reliance on the decision rendered in Uttaranchal Road Transport Corpn. and Others Vs. Mansaram Nainwal, , and declined to grant the relief except observing that the petitioners are at liberty to assail the legal validity of the circular dated 5-5-1988 whereby the earlier circular has been withdrawn.
Questioning the correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, it is contended by Mr. D.S. Thakur, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants that when the controversy was put to rest in various decisions of the Tribunal and that of this Court in the case of Indraveer Singh Tomar (supra), it was obligatory on the part of the learned Single Judge to follow the same and not to distinguish the same on the ground that the circular had been withdrawn. It is contended by him that when the controversy is no more res Integra, it was requisite on the part of the learned Single Judge to follow the trodden path and not to deviate from the same as the judgment in the field was actually not distinguishable.
Mr. Jaideep Singh, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State resisted the aforesaid submission and contended that when a judgment is delivered on the basis of the particular facts situation, the said judgment is a precedent as far as the said facts situation is concerned but cannot be regarded as a precedent if the circular itself has been withdrawn. It is propounded by Mr. Jaideep Singh that it is the duty of a Court to address itself with regard to the concept of a binding precedent and not to follow the same without appreciating the factual scenario that has been frescoed in the decision. It is submitted by him that a judgment is a precedent for what has been stated therein and not what is the possible inference as inferential fall out cannot earn the status of a precedent.
At the outset, it is appropriate to mention that the facts are not in dispute. There was a circular dated 20-1-1987, whereby a postulate was laid down to the effect that the promotion to the post of Science Teacher would be made according to the qualification provided the applicant is a graduate.
In the case of Indraveer Singh Tomar (supra), the learned Single Judge placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Tribunal in T.A. No. 112/1993 on 5-8-1999, whereby the Tribunal had issued certain directions. It is worth noting that the learned Single Judge in the case oilndraveer Singh Tomar (supra) in Paragraph 2 has expressed the opinion as under:
Both Counsel appearing for parties submitted that in the light of the Government Circular as also the direction issued by the Tribunal, petitioner''s representation (Annexures A- 7 and A-9), dated 1-2-2001 shall be considered and disposed of under intimation to the petitioner. In view of this submission advanced by Counsel for parties, this petition is disposed of by giving following directions. The respondent No. 1 shall consider petitioner''s representations referred to above and dispose of the same at an early date, preferably within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order in accordance with law, keeping in mind the circulars issued by State Govt, as also the directions given by the Tribunal in similar matters.
On a studied scrutiny of the aforesaid order, it is clear as day that the whole case was based on the circular dated 20-1-1987. As has been held by the learned Single Judge in the order impugned that the said circular has been withdrawn. The learned single Judge has distinguished the said decision on the base that the circular dated 5-5-1988 was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. When the basis of the judgment was founded on a circular, in our considered opinion, it would be a judgment as regards the petitioners therein if that decision goes unchallenged and the same has to be given effect to, but, it cannot be a precedent for conferral of benefit to another employee.
In the case of Mansaram (supra), the Apex Court has laid down the principles with regard to the conception of precedent. The relevant portion is as under:
According to the well settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates
(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the interference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts;
(ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts;
(iii) judgments based on combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decided. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. [See The State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Others, and Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Dhanwanti Devi and Others, ]. A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. On Queen v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 . Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what is actually decides.
In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision rendered in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 213 , whereby it has been held as under:
The ratio of any decision has to be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows it.
(Quoted from the plactium)
In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is absolutely impeccable and there is no reason to interfere inasmuch as the claim founded by the appellants/ petitioners on circular dated 20-1-1987 is non-existent and no relief can be granted on the basis of a non-existing circular.
Thus, the inevitable result has to be dismissal of the writ appeal which we direct. There shall be no order as to costs.
