Ashes Deb And Ors vs State Of Tripura And Ors

In view of identical factual matrices, obtaining in the above mentioned Petitions, the following Issues of pivotal significance have surfaced for consideration:-

a) In view of the statutory mandates, contained in Section 11(6) read with Explanations 1 & 2 of Section 12(1) read with Section 12(5) read with the Sixth & Seventh Schedule, as inserted, by the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, with effect from 23.10.2015, whether the petitioner could have submitted an Application, to the Chief Engineer, for appointment/nomination of an Arbitrator?

b) In view of the statutory mandate, contained in Section 43 of the AC Act, whether the period of limitation of 3 years, as prescribed, under Article 137 of Part II of the Schedule, appended to the Limitation Act, 1963, can be superseded, by taking recourse to any Clause of an Agreement?

c) Whether such supersession of the statutory prescription, contained in Article 137 as falling under Part II of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963, can be sustained, in view of the statutory mandates, contained in Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Contract Act for short) and Section 28 of the Contract Act, more particularly, on the heels of the amendment thereof?

d) Whether the stipulations, namely, "If any dispute or difference ..... another Chief Engineer or Arbitrator appointed by the Chief Engineer of the same department", as contained in Clause 22.1 & Clause 22.2 of the Agreement, can be read to be an Arbitration Clause?

Present petitions filed under Section 11(6) read with Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended vide the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 notified on 23.10.2015 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act), seeks appointment of an arbitrator for adjudication of disputes having arisen in connection with work order agreement dated 11.12.2009 and dated 05.08.2013 respectively entered into with the Executive Engineer, Longthorai Valley Division, Manu.

The nature of the work is defined as "Setting up of General Degree college at L.T.Vally Chailengta, Tripura, Dhalai Under ACA/Construction of Academic building (Ground Floor only), Administrative Building (Ground Floor Only), Type-III Qtr. (Four unit) Twin double storied & 50 seated Hostel - Phase-I/SH:-Building portion including internal water supply and sanitary installation & Maintenance of Manu-Kanchanpur road (L-22.00Km) during the year 2013-14/SH:- Formation, repairing the pot holes & restoration of road surface by providing Metalling, Grouting in different stretches, re-carpeting and seal coating of whole road surface in/c protection work (Portion from 3.90 Km to 8.40Km".

For execution of the works, as referred to in details in the Arbitration Petitions (Petitions for short), the Executive Engineer, Longthorai Valley Division issued respective Work Orders, in favour of the claimant-petitioner (petitioner for short), pursuant whereto, respective Agreements were entered into, by and between the parties.

For resolving the disputes, the petitioner had submitted Letters to the Executive Engineer, each dated 19.12.2017 (Annexure-1 at Pages- 11 to 13 of the respective paper books). Since, the said Prayers of the petitioner did not fetch any result, the petitioner had presented two respective Petitions, under Section 11(6) read with Section 12 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (AC Act for short), before this Hon'ble High Court, for appointment of an Arbitrator, and by a common Order dated 28.11.2018 (Annexure-2 at Pages-14 to 15 of the respective paper books), the petitioner was permitted to withdraw the said two Petitions, enabling him to exhaust the in-house remedy, as provided under Clause 22 of the Agreement.

Thereafter, inter alia urging for resolving the disputes, the petitioner had submitted Letters to the Superintending Engineer, each dated 04.12.2018 (Annexure-3 at Pages-16 to 21 of the respective paper books).

By a Communication dated 05.01.2019 (Annexure-4 at Page-22 of the respective paper books), the Superintending Engineer repulsed the claims of the petitioner.

Thereafter, the petitioner did not approach the Chief Engineer, and on 03.05.2019, straightaway presented the connected petitions, marked as Arb. P. Nos. 15 & 16 of 2019, for appointment of an Arbitrator, for resolving the disputes, as raised by him.

After presentation of the said Petitions, Notices were issued upon the respondents, and initially, in the Counter Affidavit, a plea was taken that since, the petitioner did not approach the Chief Engineer, for appointment of an arbitrator, the said petitions of the petitioner, seeking appointment of arbitrator, is not maintainable.

Thereafter, the respondents have filed a Supplementary Affidavit, whereby in addition to the above referred previous plea, the respondents have raised a further plea (Paragraph 3(b) at Page-52 of the respective paper books) that after efflux of 15 days, from the date of the decision of the Superintending Engineer dated 05.01.2019 (Annexure-4 at Page-22 of the respective paper books), the said decision has become final and binding, and there is no scope for continuation of the disputes, nor any claim for arbitration can be sustained.

In re: Issue No.1:- In view of the statutory mandates, contained in Section 11(6) read with Explanations 1 & 2 of Section 12(1) read with Section 12(5) read with the Sixth & Seventh Schedule, as inserted by the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, as promulgated with effect from 23.10.2015, whether the petitioner could have submitted an Application to the Chief Engineer, for appointment/nomination of an Arbitrator?

In view of the statutory mandates, contained in Section 11(6) read with Explanations 1 & 2 of Section 12(1), read with Section 12(5), read with the Sixth & Seventh Schedule, as inserted, by the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, with effect from 23.10.2015, the Chief Engineer has become statutorily disqualified to act as an Arbitrator, and therefore, he has also become statutorily disqualified to appoint/nominate an Arbitrator for resolving the disputes. In view of the following judicial pronouncements, the said Issue is no longer res integra. In Jivraj Vrs. Hashwani, ; MANU/UKSC/0041/2011 : (2011) 1 WLR 1872, the United Kingdom Supreme Court in paragraphs 44 & 45 observed as under:

"44. In this regard an arbitrator is in a very different position from a judge. The precise status of a judge was left open by this court in O'Brien MANU/UKSC/0068/2010 : [2010] 4 All ER 62, in which the court referred particular questions to the Court of Justice: see para 41. However, as Sir Robert Carswell said in Perceval-Price [2000] IRLR 380 and Lord Walker said in O'Brien (at para 27), judges, including both recorders and all judges at every level are subject to terms of service of various kinds. As Sir Robert put it, although judges must enjoy independence of decision without direction from any source, they are in other respects not free agents to work as and when they choose, as are self-employed persons.

In both those cases the court was considering the relationship between the relevant department of state and the judges concerned. It was not considering the relationship between the judges and the litigants who appear before them. Here, by contrast, the court is considering the relationship between the parties to the arbitration on the one hand and the arbitrator or arbitrators on the other. As I see it, there is no basis upon which it could properly be held that the arbitrators agreed to work under the direction of the parties as contemplated in para 67 of Allonby [2004] ICR 1328. Further, in so far as dominant purpose is relevant, I would hold that the dominant purpose of appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators is the impartial resolution of the dispute between the parties in accordance with the terms of the agreement and, although the contract between the parties and the arbitrators would be a contract for the provision of personal services, they were not personal services under the direction of the parties."

The aforesaid principle stands acknowledged, accepted and applied by the Constitution Courts in India as it is noticed hereinafter.

In HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical Division) Vrs. Gail (India) Limited (Formerly Gas Authority of India):(2018) 12 SCC 471 where in para-12 the Apex Court further held:

"12. After the 2016 Amendment Act, a dichotomy is made by the Act between persons who become "ineligible" to be appointed as arbitrators, and persons about whom justifiable doubts exist as to their independence or impartiality. Since ineligibility goes to the root of the appointment, Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule makes it clear that if the arbitrator falls in any one of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule, he becomes "ineligible" to act as arbitrator. Once he becomes ineligible, it is clear that, under Section 14(1)(a), he then becomes de jure unable to perform his functions inasmuch as, in law, he is regarded as "ineligible". In order to determine whether an arbitrator is de jure unable to perform his functions, it is not necessary to go to the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13. Since such a person would lack inherent jurisdiction to proceed any further, an application may be filed under Section 14(2) to the Court to decide on the termination of his/her mandate on this ground."

Prior thereto the Apex Court in TRF Limited Vrs. Energo Engineering Projects limited: (2017) 8 SCC 377 in paragraphs 53 and 54 observed as under;

"53. The aforesaid authorities have been commended to us to establish the proposition that if the nomination of an arbitrator by an ineligible arbitrator is allowed, it would tantamount to carrying on the proceeding of arbitration by himself. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, ineligibility strikes at the root of his power to arbitrate or get it arbitrated upon by a nominee.

In such a context, the fulcrum of the controversy would be, can an ineligible arbitrator, like the Managing Director, nominate an arbitrator, who may be otherwise eligible and a respectable person. As stated earlier, we are neither concerned with the objectivity nor the individual respectability. We are only concerned with the authority or the power of the Managing Director. By our analysis, we are obligated to arrive at the conclusion that once the arbitrator has become ineligible by operation of law, he cannot nominate another as an arbitrator. The arbitrator becomes ineligible as per prescription contained in Section 12(5) of the Act. It is inconceivable in law that person who is statutorily ineligible can nominate a person. Needless to say, once the infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse. One cannot have a building without the plinth. Or to put it differently, once the identity of the Managing Director as the sole arbitrator is lost, the power to nominate someone else as an arbitrator is obliterated. Therefore, the view expressed by the High Court is not sustainable and we say so."

The view taken by the R. F. Nariman(J) in HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical Division)(supra) stands reiterated in Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. Vrs. United Telecom Ltd.:(2019) 1 TLR (SC) 73.

Also this Court has already expressed its view, on similar lines, in Ashes Deb Vrs. State of Tripura:(2019) 1 TLR 267.

Thus, neither the petitioner could have submitted an Application, to the Chief Engineer, requesting him, to appoint/nominate an Arbitrator, for resolving the disputes, nor the Chief Engineer could have appointed/ nominated an Arbitrator. In such view of the matter, contention of the respondents that for not making a Prayer to the Chief Engineer, to appoint/nominate an Arbitrator, and as such, the Petitions presented by the petitioner, are liable to be dismissed, is wholly untenable, and hence, the same merits outright rejection.

In re: Issue No.2:- In view of the statutory mandate, contained in Section 43 of the AC Act, whether the period of limitation of 3 years, as prescribed, under Article 137 of Part II of the Schedule, appended to the Limitation Act, 1963, can be superseded, by taking recourse to any Clause of an Agreement?

Section 43(1) of the AC Act expressly mandates that the prescriptions, contained in the Limitation Act would apply to arbitration as it applies to proceedings in the Court. Section 43(2) of the AC Act mandates that for the purposes of the said Section and the Limitation Act, a legal fiction has been created, by mandating that Arbitration would commence on the date, as referred to in Section 21 of the AC Act.

That both Sections 21 & 43 fall under Part-I i.e., Arbitration. Since, Section 43(2) of the AC Act correspondingly refers to Section 21, it would be profitable to refer herein to Section 21 of the AC Act which mandates that unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, an Arbitral Proceeding in respect of a dispute, commences on the date on which a request for that dispute for referring to arbitration, has been received by the respondent.

Admittedly, in the instant case, nothing otherwise was agreed upon by the parties, and therefore, Section 21 of the AC Act would have its full play. As stated supra, vide the Letter dated 19.12.2017 (Annexure-1 at Pages-11 to 13 of the respective paper books), the petitioner had raised his dispute, which was received by the respondent on 20.12.2017. Applying the mandate, contained in Section 21 of the AC Act, it emerges therefrom that the proceedings had commenced on 20.12.2017.

A quick reference may be made to Article 137 of Part II of the Schedule, appended to the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads thus:-

Article

Description of Suit

Period of limitation

Time from which period begins to run

137.

Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division.

Three years

When the aright to apply accrues

In view of the following judicial pronouncements, it is no longer res integra that Article 137 of the Limitation Act squarely applies in Arbitral Proceedings.

Applying the principle laid down in Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi Vrs. Delhi Development Authority: (1988) 2 SCC 338 that the date relevant for determining the cause of action would be reckoned such as would fall under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and not the provisions of the Arbitration Act, the Apex Court, in somewhat similar circumstances, in Utkal Commercial Corporation Vrs. Central Coal Fields Ltd.: (1999) 2 SCC 571 held the proceedings to have been emerged from the date the dispute stood raised by the parties.

The principle stands reiterated in Morena Mandal S.S.K. Ltd. Vrs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.: (1999) 5 SCC 697; Hari Shankar Singhania and others Vrs. Gaur Hari Singhania and others: (2006) 4 SCC 658; Punjab State and Others Vrs. Dina Nath: (2007) 5 SCC 28; Visakhapatnam Port Trust Vrs. Continental Construction Company: (2009) 4 SCC 546.

In fact in Hari Shankar Singhania(supra) the Apex Court categorically held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to the applications under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. We are dealing with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short A.C Act). Even with regard to the instant act i.e. A.C. Act, the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would be applicable which view stands taken by the Apex Court in Visakhapatnam Port Trust(supra).

Before proceeding further, it is deemed fit and proper to refer herein to Section 43(3) of the AC Act. From a perusal of the said statutory provision, it is crystal clear that where an Arbitration Agreement, to submit a future dispute to arbitration provides that any claim to which the Agreement applies, shall be barred, unless some steps to commence the arbitral proceedings is taken within the time, fixed by the Agreement.

In the instant cases, admittedly by submitting the Letters dated 19.12.2017 & 04.12.2018 (Annexures-1 & 3 to the respective paper books), the petitioner had taken some steps, in connection with the arbitration, and therefore, the petitioner cannot be non-suited, by taking aid of Section 43(3) of the AC Act. That apart, the latter part of Section 43(3) of the AC Act has clothed the Court with the jurisdiction, to extend the time so fixed, on equitable considerations, namely, undue hardship.

What is curious to note herein is that soon after the promulgation of the AC Act, including Section 43(3) of the AC Act, on 08.01.1997, Parliament had made a corresponding change of Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872. For determination of the present lis, Exception 3 of Section 28 of the Contract Act, as has been inserted, by the Amendment, is inconsequential, and hence, for ready reference, Section 28 of the Contract Act, as it stood, prior to amendment and posterior to amendment (with effect from 08.01.1997), without Exception 3 thereof, are put up hereinbelow in a tabular form:-

Section 28 pre-1997 amendment

Section 28 post-1997 amendment

28 Agreements in restraint of legal proceedings, void:-

Every agreement, by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent.

Exception 1.- Saving of contract to refer to arbitration dispute that may arise -This section shall not render illegal a contract, by which two or more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, and that only the amount awarded in such arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the dispute so referred.

Exception 2.- Saving of contract to refer questions that have already arisen - Nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing, by which two or more persons agree to refer to arbitration any question between them which has already arisen, or affect any provision of any law in force for the time being as to references to arbitration

28 Agreements in restraint of legal proceedings, void:- Every agreement,-

(a) by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights; or

(b) which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto, from any liability, under or in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his rights, is void to that extent.

Exception 1.- Saving of contract to refer to arbitration dispute that may arise -This section shall not render illegal a contract, by which two or more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, and that only the amount awarded in such arbitration shall be recoverable in Exception 2.- Saving of contract to refer questions that have already arisen - Nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing, by which two or more persons agree to refer to arbitration any question between them which has already arisen, or affect any provision of any law in force for the time being as to references to arbitration.

From a bare reading of the above table, it would be amply clear that whereas the substantive part of un-amended Section 28 of the Contract Act mandated that an Agreement, by which any party thereto, is absolutely restricted from enforcing his rights, under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings, in ordinary Tribunals, or which limits the time, within which he may otherwise enforce his rights, would be void to that extent. Apart from the said substantive part, there were two exceptions.

However, the substantive part of amended Section 28 of the Contract Act comprises of two components, namely, Section 28(a) & Section 28(b). A contrast of the substantive parts of un-amended & amended Section 28 of the Contract Act reveals that the substantive part of un-amended Section 28 of the Contract Act corresponds to amended Section 28(a) of the Contract Act, and the substantive part of amended Section 28(b) of the Contract Act is a new inclusion which mandates that every Agreement which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto, from any liability, under or in respect of any contract, on its expiry of the specified period, so as to restrict any party, from enforcing his rights, is void to that extent.

A comparison of amended Section 28(a) & amended Section 28(b) of the Contract Act, would reveal that whereas Clause(a) protects the rights of the party seeking enforcement, Clause(b) dilutes any negation of enforcement of such rights under Clause(a). The import of the amendment of Section 28 of the Contract Act, as obtaining, prior to the amendment and posterior thereto, has been culled out in the following judicial pronouncements: (i) Food Corporation of India Vrs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others :(1994) 3 SCC 324[Paragraphs- 2, 8, 18 & 19]; (ii) A.V.M. Sales Corporation Vrs. Anuradha Chemicals Private Limited: (2012) 2 SCC 315[Paragraphs- 10, 16 & 17] & (iii) Union of India and another Vrs. Indusind Bank Limited and another: (2016) 9 SCC 720.

Exceptions (1) & (2) would not have any bearing on to the Issues raised herein.

At this juncture, though not relevant, it would be prudent to refer to the amendment carried out on 18.01.2013 whereby Exception (3) to Section 28 of the Contract Act was also inserted and the same reads as under:

"[Exception 3.-Saving of a guarantee agreement of a bank or a financial institution.-This section shall not render illegal a contract in writing by which any bank or financial institution stipulate a term in a guarantee or any agreement making a provision for guarantee for extinguishment of the rights or discharge of any party thereto from any liability under or in respect of such guarantee or agreement on the expiry of a specified period which is not less than one year from the date of occurring or non-occurring of a specified event for extinguishment or discharge of such party from the said liability."

Such amendment would be of no consequence for the simple reason that the agreement inter se the parties in relation to which the arbitral clause stood invoked was executed much prior to such amendment.

Inclusion of Section 28(b), by way of an amendment, is a pointer to the conclusion that Parliament intended that in fixing the period of limitation, there should not be any uncertainty, and the same would be solely governed, by the mandate, contained in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, and hence, any artificial diminution/reduction of the period of limitation, by any Agreement, would be impermissible.

Consequent upon the amendment of Section 28 of the Contract Act, Section 43(3) of the AC Act has lost its efficacy. In this context, reference can be made to the Report of the Law Commission.

Report of the Law Commission (Ninety-seventh report) in relation to Section 28 of the Contract Act i.e. 2.3 & 2.5 of the Report are reproduced hereunder:

"2.3 Effect of section 28.- The effect of section 28 of the Contract Act (so far as relates to the subject-matter of this Report) may, on the basis of the case law on the subject be stated in the form of two propositions, to begin with:-

(a) The parties to an agreement are not allowed to substitute their own periods of limitation in place of the period laid in the general law of limitation.

(b) But the parties to an agreement are allowed to substitute their own periods of prescription, that is to say, they are free to provide that if a party does not sue within a specified period, then the rights accruing under the contract shall be forfeited, or extinguished or that a party shall be discharged from all liability under the contract.(The precise words used may differ from agreement to agreement, but in substance their object is usually to forfeit or extinguish the rights). In other words, a clause limiting the time for enforcing a remedy is prohibited, but a clause limiting the time for enforcing a remedy is prohibited, but a clause limiting the duration upto which the rights remain alive, and extinguishing those rights at the end of such period, is permissible.

We are concerned with the latter proposition and our object will be to examine whether it is sound in justice and logic and beneficial in practice.

2.5 Reasoning.-The reasoning under lying these decisions is that section 28 is aimed at phohibiting agreements which could operate only so long as the rights were in existence. The section is aimed only at --

(a) covenants not to sue at any time; and

(b) covenants not to sue after a limited time.

A condition is a contract providing for a forfeiture of all benefits unless an action is brought within a specified period does not therefore violate the section. As per contract itself, the fights that might have accrued to the party cease to exist on the expiry of the periof provided in the contract. What is hit by section 28 is an agreement relinquishing the remedy only, by providing that if a suit is to be filed, then it should be filed within the specified time limit (the time limit being shorter than the period of limitation provided by the Limitation Act).Under such a clause, though the rights accrued continue even beyond the time limit and are not extinguished, yet there is a limiting of the time to sue as prescribed by the Limitation Act. It is such a clause that is regarded as void by reason of section 28. But if the rights themselves are (under the contractual clause as widely worded) extinguished, then there is no violation of limitation law. How far this distinction is supportable or workable is a matter to which we shall presently address ourselves."

In any event one find the issue to have been conclusively settled by the Apex Court in Grasim Industries Limited Vrs. State of Kerala: 2018 (14) SCC 265 in the following term:

"11. Section 28(b) unequivocally provides that an agreement which extinguishes the right of a party on the expiry of a specified period, would be void. Therefore, even if a restricted period for raising an arbitral dispute had actually been provided for (as was determined in the impugned order), the same would have to be treated as void."

In re: Issue No.3:- Whether such supersession of the statutory prescription, contained in Article 137 as falling under Part II of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963, can be sustained, in view of the statutory mandates, contained in Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Contract Act for short) and Section 28 of the Contract Act, more particularly, on the heels of the amendment thereof?

In view of what have been submitted vis-à-vis Issue No.2 supra, any reduction of the period of limitation, by referring to any Clause of the Agreement would have the effect of supersession of the statutory prescription, contained in Article 137, falling under Part II of the Schedule, appended to the Limitation Act, 1963. Such reduction of the period of limitation would, apart from doing violence to the mandate, contained in amended Section 28 of the Contract Act, would also result in violation of the statutory mandate, contained in Section 23 of the Contract Act. In view of the same, respondents cannot be permitted to take umbrage of Clause 22 of the Agreement, so as to non-suit the petitioner, on the ground of limitation.

In re: Issue No.4:- Whether the stipulations, namely,

"If any dispute or difference ..... another Chief Engineer or Arbitrator appointed by the Chief Engineer of the same department", as contained in Clause 22.1 & Clause 22.2 of the Agreement, can be read to be an Arbitration Clause?

The above stipulations, contained in the Agreement, do not constitute an Arbitration Clause, and therefore, such stipulations cannot be read as an Arbitration Agreement.

In view of the issues raised thus answered accordingly.

The petitions are allowed and as mutually agreed, the dispute inter se the parties are referred to the arbitration. As such, this Court proceeds to appoint the arbitrator, more so, when there is no legal bar in doing so. The disputes having arisen in relation to the contract in question require to be adjudicated in terms thereof. There is no other legal impediment in doing so.

As such, this Court appoints Justice Shri S. C. Das (former Judge of this Court), as an arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute inter se the parties, having arisen out of agreements No.24/CE/SE-V/EE/ LTV/PWD/M/2009-10 & No.07/SE-V/EE/LTV/PWD/M/2013-14 in relation to work orders dated 11.12.2019 & 05.08.2013 respectively. The arbitration shall be held in the High Court at the earmarked place or any public place mutually convenient.

The parties shall appear before the Ld. arbitrator on 30th September, 2019 and apprise him of the passing of the order. Parties shall fully cooperate and not take any unnecessary adjournment.

The Ld. arbitrator shall decide/adjudicate the disputes at the earliest and certainly within the timeframe stipulated under the law.

The Ld. arbitrator shall be entitled to fees as per prescribed schedule.

Registrar (Judicial) shall ensure that copy of order is received by the learned Arbitrator.

The petitions stand disposed of in the above terms. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.