Arun Mohan Joshi vs Union Of India & Ors.

Per Harvinder Kaur Oberoi, Member (J):

Since both these Original Applications arise out of the same sequence of events and involve substantially common questions of fact and law concerning the nomination of the Applicants for Central Deputation, the consequential appointment orders and the orders relieving them from the Uttarakhand Cadre, they are being considered and disposed of by this common judgment. Though the Applicants were proposed for deputation to different Central organisations, namely, the BSF and the ITBP, the foundation of the impugned action is common. The principal grievance of the Applicants is that, while they were substantively holding the rank of Inspector General (IG) in the Uttarakhand Cadre, their names were forwarded by the State Government for Central Deputation on 16.02.2026 without obtaining their fresh willingness and notwithstanding the debarment earlier imposed upon them for a period of five years. It is further their case that their subsequent appointment to the post of Deputy Inspector General (DIG) at the Centre, followed immediately by their release from the State Cadre, resulted in an impermissible lowering of their rank and status and was contrary to the statutory and administrative framework governing Central Deputation.

The Applicants have principally challenged the nomination/forwarding letter dated 16.02.2026 issued by the Government of Uttarakhand, the Central Government’s appointment/deputation orders dated 05.03.2026, and the consequential relieving/discharge orders dated 06.03.2026. Their challenge is founded, inter alia, upon the subsisting debarment imposed under paragraph 17 of the IPS Tenure Policy, the instructions governing consideration of debarred officers, the absence of their fresh willingness for the subsequent deputation, the circumstances in which their names had earlier been withdrawn, their substantive rank of IG in the parent cadre, their non-empanelment for IG-level Central Deputation, the proposed placement at the DIG level, and the alleged violation of Articles 14 and 311 of the Constitution. The Applicants have also questioned the manner and haste with which the appointment and relieving orders were implemented.

The reliefs sought by the Applicants, in substance, are for quashing the nomination dated 16.02.2026, the appointment/deputation orders dated 05.03.2026 and the consequential relieving/discharge orders dated 06.03.2026, and for restoration of the Applicants to the respective positions which they would have occupied in the Uttarakhand Cadre but for the impugned action. They have further sought consequential service benefits, appropriate regularisation of the intervening period, protection of their seniority and promotional prospects, and a direction that the period in question should not be treated adversely against them, including by debit of leave or by making any adverse service entry.

The Applicants are officers of the Indian Police Service belonging to the Uttarakhand Cadre. The Applicant in O.A. No. 1181/2026 is a single mother and has the sole responsibility for her daughter, who is presently studying in Class XI in Dehradun. She is also the only child of her aged parents, both of whom reside with her and are dependent upon her. She has no siblings or other immediate family member who can assume responsibility for her daughter or aged parents in her absence. The Applicant had suffered a life-threatening brain haemorrhage in March 2024 and underwent emergency open craniotomy/brain surgery. She continues to remain under periodic review of the neurosurgical team at Dehradun, Uttarakhand, which had performed the surgery, and continues to suffer from recurrent stress-induced headaches and related symptoms. The Applicant is also a decorated police officer and a recipient of the Police Medal awarded by the Hon’ble President of India. Both had earlier been considered for Central Deputation. During the earlier process, their willingness had been sought by the State authorities and the Applicants had expressed their unwillingness to proceed on Central Deputation. Notwithstanding such unwillingness, their names came to be included in the offer process and the Central Government subsequently approved their appointment at the DIG level. The State Government, however, communicated on 04.01.2025 that their names be removed from the offer list. The earlier deputation was thereafter cancelled and the Applicants were subjected to debarment from Central Deputation and foreign assignments/consultancies for a period of five years under paragraph 17 of the IPS Tenure Policy.

Before examining the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to notice the broad factual background. The Applicants are officers of the Indian Police Service belonging to the Uttarakhand Cadre. Both had earlier been considered for Central Deputation. During the earlier process, their willingness had been sought by the State authorities and the Applicants had expressed their unwillingness to proceed on Central Deputation. Notwithstanding such unwillingness, their names came to be included in the offer process and the Central Government subsequently approved their appointment at the DIG level. The State Government, however, communicated on 04.01.2025 that their names be removed from the offer list. The earlier deputation was thereafter cancelled and the Applicants were subjected to debarment from Central Deputation and foreign assignments/consultancies for a period of five years under paragraph 17 of the IPS Tenure Policy.

The Applicants rely upon the Government of India’s communication dated 27.11.2008 and the subsequent communication dated 10.12.2025, contending that an officer who has been debarred is not to be included in the offer list or considered for Central Deputation during the currency of such debarment. The Applicants submit that the State Government was fully aware of the debarment when their names were again forwarded on 16.02.2026. According to them, no order of relaxation had been placed before the State authorities at the stage of nomination and, therefore, the nomination itself was legally defective.

It is also relevant that, by the time the subsequent nomination was made, the Applicants had already attained the substantive rank of Inspector General in the State Cadre. The Applicants contend that they had not been empanelled for appointment at the IG level at the Centre and that, under the applicable policy, they could therefore be considered only for a DIG-level Central post. They submit, however, that non-empanelment for IG-level Central appointment does not reduce their substantive rank in the parent cadre. The placement against a DIG-level post, according to them, therefore amounted, in substance, to a downward placement from IG to DIG, carrying consequences relating to status, authority and professional standing.

The subsequent events occurred within a short span of time. On 16.02.2026, the State Government forwarded the names of the Applicants for Central Deputation. On 05.03.2026, the Central Government issued the appointment/deputation orders appointing the Applicants at the DIG level. On the very next day, i.e. 06.03.2026, the State authorities issued the consequential relieving/discharge orders requiring the Applicants to hand over charge and proceed to the respective Central organisations. The Applicants contend that the entire process was undertaken without their fresh willingness and without affording them any effective opportunity to raise their objections to the proposed deputation.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid action, the Applicants initially approached the Hon’ble High Court of Uttarakhand. The writ proceedings were ultimately disposed of with liberty to the Applicants to avail the appropriate remedy before this Tribunal, leaving the issues open. The present Original Applications have thereafter been instituted.

During the pendency of the proceedings, the Applicants also instituted Contempt Petitions bearing CP No. 359/2026 and CP No. 360/2026 alleging wilful disobedience of the interim order dated 07.04.2026 passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1181/2026, whereby the impugned orders dated 05.03.2026 and 06.03.2026, along with all consequential actions, were stayed. According to the Applicants, despite having knowledge of the said interim order, the Respondents failed to permit them to resume duties and continued to act upon the orders which had been stayed, thereby allegedly committing civil contempt of this Tribunal.

The Respondents challenged the interim order dated 07.04.2026 before the Hon’ble High Court by filing WP(C) No. 6182/2026 along with connected applications. However, the said writ petition was withdrawn by the Respondents on 06.05.2026, whereupon the Hon’ble High Court granted liberty to the Respondents to approach this Tribunal for vacation of the interim order. The Hon’ble High Court disposed of the matter without expressing any opinion on the merits. Consequently, the interim order dated 07.04.2026 continued to remain operative and binding upon the parties.

In the contempt proceedings, this Tribunal, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and noting that the interim order dated 07.04.2026 continued to remain operative and binding, was prima facie satisfied that the Respondents were under a legal obligation to faithfully comply with the said order in its letter as well as spirit. It was observed that the subsequent filing of WP(C) No. 6182/2026 before the Hon’ble High Court did not dilute or suspend the operation of the interim order, particularly when the said writ petition stood withdrawn vide order dated 06.05.2026 with liberty only to seek appropriate relief before this Tribunal.

This Tribunal further noticed the settled principle that an order of a competent Court or Tribunal, so long as it subsists, has to be obeyed unreservedly and cannot be ignored merely because a party proposes to challenge the same or considers it to be erroneous. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443, wherein it was held that interim orders remain effective and binding until modified, vacated or set aside by a competent court, and that a party cannot take upon itself the authority to decide whether an order deserves compliance or not.

The conduct alleged against the Respondents, namely, refusal to permit the Applicants to resume duties, non-acceptance of their joining communications, and continuation of consequential actions flowing from the stayed orders, was found to strike, if established, at the very root of judicial discipline and to undermine the authority, dignity and majesty of this Tribunal. The Tribunal observed that no litigant or authority can be permitted to overreach judicial orders with impunity.

Accordingly, in order to preserve the sanctity and efficacy of judicial proceedings, the Respondents were directed to forthwith comply with the interim order dated 07.04.2026 in its true letter and spirit and to restore the position as it existed prior to the issuance of the impugned orders dated 05.03.2026 and 06.03.2026, subject to further orders in the Original Applications.

Learned Sr. Advocate Shri Sidharth Luthra appearing for the Applicants submitted that the impugned nomination dated 16.02.2026 was defective at its very inception. According to learned counsel, paragraph 17 of the IPS Tenure Policy had resulted in a specific five-year debarment of the Applicants from Central Deputation, foreign assignments and consultancies. The debarment was imposed after the earlier deputation process had been withdrawn by the State Government on 04.01.2025, following its communication seeking withdrawal of the Applicants’ names, and subsequent to the empanelment list dated 02.01.2025, in which the Applicant was not empanelled at the IG level. It was submitted that, in terms of Clause 4.5 of the IPS Tenure Policy, any reconsideration could arise only after the prescribed period of two years. Despite the subsisting debarment, the State Government, without seeking the Applicant’s consent, once again nominated his name for Central Deputation on 16.02.2026, without any intervening change in circumstances. The said nomination was followed by the impugned deputation order dated 05.03.2026, appointing the Applicant as DIG in the Border Security Force, and relieving orders dated 06.03.2026. Learned counsel contended that the subsequent nomination could not lawfully have been made during the currency of such debarment unless the competent authority had first exercised the power of relaxation in accordance with the governing policy.

Learned counsel placed particular reliance upon the Government of India’s communication dated 27.11.2008 and the subsequent instructions dated 10.12.2025. It was submitted that these instructions were intended to ensure that an officer who had incurred debarment was not included in the offer list during the currency of such debarment. According to learned counsel, the language of the instructions is significant because the prohibition operates at the stage of consideration and nomination itself and not merely at the final stage of appointment. The State Government, therefore, could not first forward the names of the Applicants and leave the question of their eligibility to be considered subsequently by the Central Government.

Learned counsel further submitted that the subsequent assertion of the respondents that the Central Government possessed a power of relaxation could not cure the illegality in the State’s nomination. It was argued that the existence of a power of relaxation and the actual exercise of that power are two distinct matters. Unless the competent authority consciously considered the subsisting debarment and granted relaxation in accordance with the policy, the mere existence of such power could not authorise the State Government to treat the Applicants as eligible.

Learned counsel also drew our attention to the conduct of the State Government during the earlier deputation cycle. It was submitted that the State Government had itself sought the Applicants’ willingness, had acted upon their unwillingness and had subsequently requested withdrawal of their names from the offer list. The same State Government, notwithstanding the resulting debarment, again nominated the Applicants in February 2026. According to learned counsel, no intervening circumstance had been shown which would rationally explain this complete change of position.

It was next submitted that the Central Government’s request for more nominations could not constitute an answer to the individual eligibility of the Applicants. Learned counsel pointed out that the communications seeking nominations contemplated names of eligible officers and did not amount to a direction to nominate officers irrespective of their individual service position. It was therefore argued that the State Government could not rely upon general administrative requirements to override an individual restriction arising from the Applicants’ debarment.

On the question of willingness, learned counsel submitted that the Applicants were not asking this Tribunal to lay down an absolute proposition that every Central Deputation of an IPS officer necessarily requires individual consent in every circumstance. The submission, rather, was that, in the peculiar facts of the present case, the Applicants’ willingness was a material consideration because the State Government had expressly sought and acted upon it during the earlier process. Once the State had adopted that course, the subsequent nomination without obtaining fresh willingness required a cogent explanation which, according to learned counsel, was absent.

Learned counsel further submitted that the Applicants were substantively holding the rank of IG in the Uttarakhand Cadre and were placed in Pay Matrix Level 14, whereas the Central posts to which they were appointed were at the DIG level, corresponding to Level 13A. It was contended that their non-empanelment at the IG level for Central Deputation did not alter their substantive rank in the parent cadre. The fact that they could be considered for a DIG-level post at the Centre on the basis of length of service, according to learned counsel, could not mean that their substantive State Cadre rank stood reduced.

It was argued that pay protection under Rule 7 of the IPS Pay Rules could not answer the substantive objection. According to learned counsel, pay protection is intended to safeguard the financial position of an officer and cannot be treated as a statutory source authorising an otherwise impermissible deputation. The question whether the Applicants could lawfully be deputed to the proposed posts had to be answered under Rule 6 of the IPS (Cadre) Rules and the applicable deputation policy independently of the question of financial protection.

It was further submitted that the manner in which the orders were implemented also demonstrated procedural impropriety. It was pointed out that the appointment orders were issued on 05.03.2026 and the State authorities released the Applicants on 06.03.2026. According to learned counsel, the Applicants were not afforded a meaningful opportunity to make a representation regarding their debarment, their unwillingness or the proposed lower-level placement. The immediate relieving, therefore, converted the administrative decision into a fait accompli before the Applicants could effectively challenge it.

Learned counsel invoked Article 14 of the Constitution and submitted that the State cannot exercise administrative discretion arbitrarily or on considerations which are irrelevant to the statutory purpose. It was argued that the combination of the subsisting debarment, absence of fresh willingness, unexplained reversal of the State’s earlier position, non-empanelment at the IG level and placement against a DIG-level post demonstrated an arbitrary exercise of power.

Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned action had the effect of lowering the Applicants’ rank and status and therefore attracted the constitutional protection contained in Article 311(2). Reliance was also placed upon the principle that an administrative action cannot be permitted to achieve indirectly what could not lawfully be achieved directly. The Applicants accordingly prayed for quashing of the entire chain of impugned orders and for restoration of their service position with consequential benefits.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposed the Original Applications and submitted that the impugned action had been undertaken within the statutory framework governing Central Deputation of IPS officers. It was submitted that Rule 6(1) of the IPS (Cadre) Rules contemplates deputation with the concurrence of the State Government and the Central Government and that the State Government’s nomination is only one stage of the overall process, the ultimate decision regarding appointment being taken by the competent authority of the Central Government.

Learned counsel submitted that the State Government was faced with a significant requirement to make available IPS officers for Central Deputation. It was pointed out that a substantial number of posts forming part of the Central Deputation Reserve were lying vacant and that the Ministry of Home Affairs had repeatedly requested the Government of Uttarakhand to forward sufficient nominations. According to the respondents, the nomination dated 16.02.2026 was made in response to those repeated requests and in discharge of the State Government’s responsibility for proper cadre management.

It was further submitted that, at the relevant time, the State Cadre had an imbalance in the number of officers available at different levels. According to the respondents, there were more officers at the IG level than the sanctioned strength of IG posts, while there was a corresponding shortage at the DIG level. The nomination of IG-rank officers for Central Deputation was therefore stated to be a rational administrative decision taken in the larger interest of cadre management and not for any extraneous purpose.

On the question of debarment, learned counsel submitted that the applicable Tenure Policy itself contains a power of relaxation. It was specifically contended that paragraph 20 of the IPS Tenure Policy empowers the competent authority to relax the restrictions and that, in the case of officers at the level of IG and above, the prescribed approval mechanism applies. The respondents further submitted that the Central Government, in exercise of the said power and with the approval of the competent authority, had revoked the debarment of the Applicants before issuing the appointment orders dated 05.03.2026.

It was therefore argued that the Applicants could not contend that the debarment continued to operate so as to invalidate the final appointment. According to the respondents, the fact that the appointment orders expressly followed the revocation of the debarment demonstrated that the competent authority had duly considered the issue and exercised the power available under the Tenure Policy.

On the issue of individual consent, learned counsel submitted that Rule 6(1) of the IPS (Cadre) Rules does not expressly make the individual consent of an officer a mandatory precondition for every Central Deputation. The statutory rule, according to the respondents, refers to the concurrence of the State Government and the Central Government. It was submitted that the Applicants could not read into the rule a condition which the rule itself does not contain.

Learned counsel further submitted that the fact that willingness had been sought during an earlier deputation cycle did not create a permanent legal requirement that willingness must necessarily be sought in every subsequent nomination. The earlier process, according to the respondents, arose in a different factual setting and the later nomination was made in response to the Central Government’s continuing requirement for officers. It was therefore contended that the Applicants’ earlier unwillingness could not operate as an absolute bar against subsequent nomination.

On the question of IG and DIG levels, learned counsel submitted that the Applicants’ substantive rank in the parent cadre and their eligibility for appointment to Central posts are governed by different considerations. Under the amended Tenure Policy, according to the respondents, empanelment is mandatory for appointment to IG and above at the Centre, whereas an IPS officer having the prescribed length of service is eligible for consideration at the DIG level. Since the Applicants had not been empanelled at the IG level for Central Deputation, their appointment at the DIG level was stated to be fully consistent with the applicable policy.

It was submitted that a Central Deputation posting at the DIG level does not amount to reduction in substantive rank in the parent cadre. The respondents contended that an officer may continue to hold the substantive rank of IG in the State Cadre while serving at a DIG-level post at the Centre and that such temporary deployment does not alter the officer’s inter se seniority or future career progression in the parent cadre.

Learned counsel also submitted that the Applicants would suffer no loss of pay because the applicable pay protection provisions safeguard their financial interests. It was contended that Rule 7 of the IPS Pay Rules ensures protection of the pay admissible to the officers and that the mere fact that the Central post carries a lower level cannot be treated as a reduction in rank for the purposes of Article 311.

It was further submitted that the Applicants’ allegation of mala fide was unsupported by any cogent evidence. According to the respondents, the nomination was made pursuant to repeated requests from the Central Government and was based upon genuine administrative requirements. The existence of vacancies, the shortage of officers at certain levels and the requirement of filling the Central Deputation Reserve were stated to be legitimate considerations and not extraneous factors.

Learned counsel lastly submitted that the State Government, having received the Central Government’s appointment orders, was required to relieve the Applicants in accordance with Rule 6 and the administrative arrangement governing Central Deputation. The issuance of the relieving orders on 06.03.2026 was therefore stated to be a consequential administrative act and not an independent decision against the Applicants.

We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and have carefully examined the pleadings, documents and material placed on record. The controversy, in our view, cannot be resolved by isolating any one aspect of the matter. The validity of the impugned action has to be examined in the context of the entire sequence of events, the statutory framework governing Central Deputation, the IPS Tenure Policy, the previous conduct of the State Government and the circumstances prevailing when the Applicants’ names were forwarded on 16.02.2026.

There is no dispute that the Applicants had earlier declined Central Deputation and that their names were subsequently withdrawn from the offer list by the State Government. There is also no dispute that the earlier deputation process was cancelled and that the Applicants were thereafter subjected to a five-year debarment under paragraph 17 of the IPS Tenure Policy. The factum of debarment is, therefore, not in issue. The first and foremost question which falls for our consideration is as to the legal effect of such debarment at the stage when the State Government subsequently forwarded the Applicants’ names for Central Deputation, particularly when the debarment was subsisting at the relevant time.

Learned counsel also relied upon the surrounding circumstances to contend that the impugned action could not be regarded as a routine administrative exercise. It was pointed out that the Applicants were substantively holding the higher rank of IG, whereas another officer of a subsequent batch had been appointed at the IG level at the Centre. According to the Applicants, their selection for DIG-level posts, despite their seniority and substantive rank, therefore required a rational and cogent explanation, particularly when the Central Government had sought nominations of eligible officers at various levels. We have also considered the D.O. letter dated 10.12.2025, annexed as Annexure A-13, which specifically deals with the consequence of withdrawal of the name of an officer after recommendation by the Civil Services Board. Paragraph 7 thereof reads as under:

The respondents are right in submitting that the Tenure Policy contains a power of relaxation. However, the existence of such power does not, by itself, answer the question before us. A power of relaxation is a power vested in a competent authority and has to be exercised in the manner prescribed by the governing framework. The existence of the power and its exercise are two distinct legal events.

In the present case, the respondents have specifically asserted that the Central Government subsequently revoked the debarment in exercise of the power under paragraph 20 of the Tenure Policy before issuing the appointment orders dated 05.03.2026. We take note of that submission. However, the issue before us is not confined to whether the Central Government could ultimately relax or revoke the debarment. The question is whether, when the State Government forwarded the names on 16.02.2026, the nomination itself was made in accordance with the restrictions governing the consideration of debarred officers.

The communications relied upon by the Applicants dated 10.12.2025 contemplate that officers who stand debarred from Central Deputation are not to be included in the offer list during the currency of such debarment. The State Government was admittedly aware of the earlier debarment. Therefore, before forwarding the names of the Applicants, the State Government was required to address the legal effect of that debarment and the manner in which the Applicants had become eligible for consideration notwithstanding the restriction.

The respondents have not placed before us any contemporaneous decision of the State Government demonstrating that, before making the nomination dated 16.02.2026, it had considered the subsisting debarment and obtained or relied upon a specific relaxation authorising the inclusion of the Applicants in the offer list. The subsequent action of the Central Government in revoking the debarment before issuing the appointment orders may explain the legality of the appointment at the later stage, but it does not, by itself, demonstrate that the initial nomination was made in conformity with the restriction which was then operating.

We are conscious that the Central Government is the authority competent to make the final appointment on Central Deputation. Nevertheless, the nomination by the lending State is not an empty or ministerial formality. The State Government identifies and forwards the names of officers for consideration. Such nomination has to be made within the governing statutory and policy framework. The Central Government’s subsequent exercise of power cannot automatically convert an otherwise defective nomination into a lawful nomination retrospectively.

If an officer is subject to a restriction which materially affects his eligibility for being offered for Central Deputation, the State Government cannot simply ignore that restriction and leave it to the Central Government to cure the defect later. Such an approach would reduce the restriction to an empty formality and permit the administrative process to proceed first, leaving the question of eligibility to be addressed only thereafter.

The respondents’ reliance upon the repeated requests from the Central Government also does not answer this difficulty. We accept that the Central Government had sought adequate nominations from Uttarakhand and that the State Government had a legitimate administrative responsibility to address vacancies in the Central Deputation Reserve. But the requirement to nominate officers and the eligibility of an individual officer are separate matters. A general request for nominations of eligible officers cannot, by itself, amount to a relaxation of a specific restriction applicable to a particular officer.

We also take note of the respondents’ submission that the State Government was faced with an imbalance in the cadre, with a comparatively larger number of officers at the IG level and a shortage at the DIG level. Such considerations are undoubtedly relevant to cadre management. Yet, even a bona fide administrative objective has to be pursued within the limits of the applicable statutory and policy framework. Administrative convenience cannot, by itself, displace an individual restriction imposed under a policy.

The circumstances surrounding the earlier deputation also require consideration. The State Government had earlier sought the Applicants’ willingness. The Applicants had expressed their unwillingness. Their names nevertheless appeared in the offer process and the State Government subsequently requested withdrawal of their names from the offer list. The earlier deputation was cancelled and debarment followed. When, after this sequence, the same authority again nominated the Applicants, the departure from its earlier position called for some explanation.

We do not hold that an administrative authority is forever bound by an earlier decision or that the State Government can never reconsider an officer for Central Deputation. The Government is entitled to alter its administrative position where circumstances so warrant. However, where an earlier decision is followed by a specific consequence such as debarment, and the same authority subsequently proceeds in a manner apparently inconsistent with that consequence, the record must disclose the basis for such departure.

The respondents have relied upon the Central Government’s continuing requirement for officers and the need to fill vacant CDR posts. Those considerations explain the broader administrative context but do not, by themselves, explain why these particular Applicants were selected notwithstanding their known history of debarment and their earlier unwillingness. The general administrative requirement cannot be treated as a complete answer to the individual legal question.

We next consider the question of willingness. As already noticed, we do not consider it necessary to decide that individual consent is an absolute statutory precondition to every Central Deputation under Rule 6(1). Such a broad proposition is not necessary for the disposal of these applications. The narrower issue is whether the absence of fresh willingness assumes significance in the peculiar circumstances of the present case.

In the earlier process, the State Government itself invited the Applicants to convey their willingness. The Applicants communicated their unwillingness. The State thereafter requested withdrawal of their names. The subsequent debarment arose from that sequence. Against this background, when the Applicants’ names were again forwarded on 16.02.2026 without any disclosed fresh willingness on their part, the State Government was required to explain why the earlier position had ceased to be relevant.

The respondents have not furnished a satisfactory explanation on this aspect. If willingness was wholly immaterial, the earlier process of seeking and acting upon it becomes difficult to reconcile with the subsequent nomination. If willingness was relevant in the earlier process, the State Government ought to have disclosed the intervening circumstance by which the position had materially changed. In the facts of the present case, the absence of fresh willingness, when considered alongside the earlier refusal, subsequent debarment and unexplained reversal of the State’s position, materially contributes to the conclusion that the impugned nomination was not the result of a properly considered exercise of discretion.

The issue of the Applicants’ substantive rank also requires separate consideration. The respondents are correct to the extent that empanelment at the IG level is a mechanism for appointment to IG-level posts at the Centre. An officer who is not empanelled at that level may nevertheless be eligible for consideration at the DIG level if the applicable policy so provides. Non-empanelment for Central appointment does not, however, by itself alter the substantive rank held by an officer in the parent cadre.

The Applicants were substantively holding the rank of IG in the Uttarakhand Cadre. The fact that they had not been empanelled for IG-level Central Deputation therefore cannot be treated as though their substantive rank had been reduced to DIG. The Central Deputation policy may determine the level at which an officer can be appointed at the Centre; it does not, merely by reason of non-empanelment, amend the officer’s substantive position in the parent cadre.

We also take note of the respondents’ submission that several IPS officers serve at the Centre at a level different from their substantive rank in the parent cadre and that such deputation does not ordinarily affect their seniority or future promotion in the parent cadre. That proposition may be accepted as a general administrative principle. However, the present case is not a challenge to every such deputation. The question is whether, in the particular circumstances before us, the Applicants could lawfully be sent to a lower-level Central post when the nomination itself was affected by the circumstances already noticed.

Pay protection does not materially alter the position. The respondents are correct that the applicable pay rules provide safeguards regarding the pay of officers proceeding on deputation. However, protection of pay addresses the financial consequences of the deputation; it does not independently establish the authority to make the deputation. The legality of the underlying placement must first be established under Rule 6 and the applicable deputation policy.

Thus, even if the Applicants were entitled to protection of their pay, such protection could not, by itself, validate a nomination which was otherwise contrary to a subsisting restriction. Pay protection and the legal validity of the deputation operate in different fields.

We are equally mindful of the respondents’ submission that the Central Government subsequently revoked the debarment before issuing the appointment orders. This is a circumstance which cannot be ignored. Its effect, however, has to be properly appreciated. The later revocation may establish that the Central Government was competent to overcome the debarment at the stage of appointment. It does not establish that the State Government, when making the nomination, was entitled to disregard the debarment without recording or demonstrating the basis upon which the Applicants could be included in the offer list.

In other words, the subsequent exercise of the power of relaxation does not automatically answer the anterior question of whether the State Government acted lawfully when it initiated the nomination process. The two stages cannot be collapsed into one merely because the latter stage resulted in an appointment. Rather it points to a distinction that the impugned nomination itself was illegal.

We next consider the contention relating to Article 311(2). We do not consider it necessary to hold that every deputation to a Central post carrying a lower designation automatically constitutes a reduction in rank attracting Article 311(2). Such a broad proposition would not be justified merely on the basis of designation. The nature and legal effect of the impugned action must be examined in the context of the substantive status of the Applicants in their parent cadre.

Nevertheless, the Applicants’ substantive rank and the consequences of the proposed placement remain relevant circumstances. They were holding the rank of IG in the State Cadre and were directed to proceed to DIG-level posts at the Centre. The respondents’ justification is based principally upon Central empanelment and the applicable eligibility criteria for DIG-level appointments. That explanation may establish the Central Government’s general policy regarding the level of appointment, but it does not cure the defects which preceded the appointment.

We therefore do not rest our decision solely upon Article 311(2). The constitutional issue reinforces the need for careful examination where administrative action materially affects an officer’s status and service position. However, the primary basis of our conclusion is the manner in which the nomination was made and the failure to satisfactorily reconcile it with the governing restrictions and the peculiar factual history of the case.

We may now consider the cumulative effect of the circumstances noticed above. The Applicants have also alleged mala fide. We are not inclined to record a finding of personal mala fide against any individual officer in the absence of clear and cogent material establishing personal animus or improper motive. However, administrative action may nevertheless be invalid on the ground of malice in law where a statutory or policy power is exercised for a purpose not authorised by law or in disregard of the conditions governing its exercise.

In the present case, we find that the principle of malice in law is relevant. The nomination was made despite the known history of debarment, without any satisfactory contemporaneous material showing how the restriction had ceased to operate at the nomination stage, without fresh willingness having been obtained, and without any adequate explanation for the State Government’s departure from its earlier position. These circumstances demonstrate that the power of nomination was not exercised with the degree of legal discipline required in the circumstances.

Article 14 is also attracted because arbitrariness in State action is not confined to hostile discrimination. Administrative discretion must be exercised on relevant considerations and in accordance with the framework within which the discretion exists. A decision which overlooks a material restriction, fails to demonstrate consideration of relevant circumstances and is justified only through reasons supplied after the commencement of litigation cannot readily be sustained.

We are conscious that the respondents have referred to legitimate administrative considerations, including the Central Government’s requirement for officers, CDR vacancies and cadre management. We do not question the legitimacy of those objectives. What we find lacking is the necessary nexus between those objectives and the decision to select these particular Applicants notwithstanding their individual service position.

The fact that the Central Government had sought nominations from SP to IG levels also assumes significance. The request was for eligible officers. The State Government therefore had to satisfy itself that the officers whom it nominated met the applicable conditions. The record does not satisfactorily disclose the contemporaneous reasoning by which the Applicants, despite their known debarment and previous unwillingness, were selected for nomination.

The subsequent appointment orders and relieving orders were issued with remarkable proximity. The appointment orders were dated 05.03.2026 and the State relieving orders followed on 06.03.2026. Again, urgency by itself is not illegality. Administrative authorities may act expeditiously. However, when the underlying eligibility of the officers is itself affected by a specific debarment and the officers have not been given any effective opportunity to raise the issue before being relieved, the haste becomes a relevant circumstance in assessing whether the process was fairly administered.

The respondents contend that the State Government was bound to relieve the Applicants after receiving the Central appointment orders. That proposition cannot be considered in isolation. The relieving orders were consequential upon the appointment and nomination. If the foundation of the appointment process is found to be legally unsustainable, the consequential relieving action cannot be insulated merely by describing it as ministerial.

The nomination, appointment and relieving orders constitute successive steps in one administrative process. The State Government consciously nominated the Applicants; the Central Government acted upon those nominations and issued the appointment orders; and the State Government thereafter acted upon the appointment orders and relieved the Applicants. The legality of the later stages must therefore be examined with reference to the validity of the foundation upon which they rest.

We are also not persuaded by the submission that the existence of the Central Government’s power to revoke the debarment necessarily validates everything that preceded that exercise. A power to relax is intended to provide a lawful mechanism for dealing with exceptional cases. It cannot be treated as an automatic answer to a challenge based upon the absence of such exercise at an earlier stage.

Administrative authorities must distinguish between the existence of power and its lawful exercise. The former does not dispense with the latter. Where a restriction operates against an individual, the authority must either comply with it or demonstrate the lawful basis on which it ceased to apply. That principle assumes particular importance where the restriction arose from the authority’s own earlier action.

The cumulative effect of the circumstances before us is therefore decisive. The case is not merely about the Applicants’ willingness; nor is it merely about debarment, the IG/DIG distinction or pay protection. It is the cumulative effect of the earlier refusal, the State Government’s subsequent request for withdrawal of the names, the resulting debarment, the later nomination during the currency of the debarment, the absence of a demonstrated basis for inclusion at that stage, the absence of fresh willingness, the unexplained reversal of the State’s earlier position, the substantive IG rank of the Applicants, the proposed DIG-level placement and the immediate implementation of the appointment which, taken together, assumes significance.

Viewed cumulatively, these circumstances demonstrate that the impugned nomination cannot be regarded as a routine administrative act taken in the ordinary exercise of cadre-management discretion. The State Government was required to address the legal impediments specifically attached to the Applicants. The record does not disclose satisfactory contemporaneous consideration of those impediments before their names were forwarded.

We accordingly hold that the nomination dated 16.02.2026 was vitiated by the failure to properly account for the governing restrictions applicable to the Applicants at the relevant stage. The subsequent revocation of debarment by the Central Government does not retrospectively cure the defect in the nomination. Nor can the subsequent appointment orders independently sustain the process when the foundation upon which they rest is found to be legally infirm. The defect is therefore not merely procedural or technical, but goes to the legality of the very initiation of the deputation process.

Once the nomination is found unsustainable, the appointment/deputation orders dated 05.03.2026, insofar as they relate to the Applicants, cannot be permitted to operate independently of that nomination. The consequential relieving/discharge orders dated 06.03.2026 must necessarily fall with the orders pursuant to which they were issued.

We clarify that we have not adjudicated upon the correctness of the Applicants’ original non-empanelment at the IG level. That issue is neither necessary for the disposal of the present applications nor does the present judgment express any final opinion thereupon. We have considered non-empanelment only for the limited purpose of examining the respondents’ justification for the subsequent DIG-level appointment.

Likewise, we do not hold that an IPS officer can never serve at the Centre at a level different from the substantive rank held in the parent cadre. Our conclusion is confined to the facts of the present case and to the manner in which the present nomination and appointment were brought about.

We also make it clear that nothing contained in this judgment prevents the competent authorities from taking any future decision concerning Central Deputation in accordance with law and the applicable statutory and policy framework. Any such decision, however, shall be taken independently, upon consideration of the circumstances then prevailing, and without treating the present judgment as an impediment to the lawful exercise of administrative power.

In view of the conclusions recorded above, the appropriate relief, in our considered view, is to restore the position which existed immediately before the impugned chain of action intervened. The Applicants cannot be placed at a disadvantage in their parent cadre merely because an administrative process, which we have found legally unsustainable, was initiated and implemented against them.

In the result, the Original Applications are allowed. The nomination/forwarding letter dated 16.02.2026 issued by the Government of Uttarakhand nominating the Applicants for Central Deputation is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the Central Government’s appointment/deputation order dated 05.03.2026, insofar as it relates to the Applicants, as well as the consequential release/discharge order dated 06.03.2026 issued by the State authorities, are also quashed and set aside. The respondents shall accordingly restore the Applicants to the positions in the Uttarakhand Cadre which they would have occupied but for the impugned orders, together with all consequential service benefits admissible under the applicable rules. The respondents shall take all necessary steps to give effect to these directions in their true letter and spirit and shall ensure that no procedural or administrative formality causes any avoidable delay in such restoration. For all legitimate service purposes, the Applicants shall be placed in the position in which they would have been had the impugned orders not intervened.

The period during which the Applicants remained out of the State Cadre pursuant to the impugned orders shall be regularised in accordance with the applicable rules and shall not, by reason of the impugned action, operate to their prejudice in any manner whatsoever in relation to their seniority, qualifying service, promotion, career progression or any other legitimate service benefit.

The respondents shall take all necessary steps to give effect to the aforesaid directions and shall place before the Tribunal a complete compliance report.

We have also been apprised that Contempt Petitions bearing CP No. 359/2026 and CP No. 360/2026, arising out of the alleged non-compliance of the interim order dated 07.04.2026 passed by this Tribunal in O.A. No. 1181/2026 & 1180/26, are pending consideration. In view of the directions issued herein quashing the impugned nomination, appointment/deputation and relieving/discharge orders and directing restoration of the Applicants to their respective positions in the Uttarakhand Cadre, the aforesaid Contempt Petitions shall be listed for consideration/reporting of compliance on 07.10.2026.

Pending MA(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.