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Judgment
The present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking following reliefs :
A writ in the nature of certiorari may kindly be issued by quashing the impugned order dated 13/09/2007 (Annexure P/10), passed by the respondent no. 1, being illegal, malicious and contrary to the provisions of Section 36 (2) M.P. Public Trust Act.
Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper may also be awarded in favour of the petitioners in the interest of justice."
The case of the petitioner is that Late Shri Vishwanath Rao Shindey purchased the agricultural land at village Gaur Jhamar, Khasra No.336, area 3.04 acres and Khasra No.343/1, area 0.13 acres total land 3.17 acres and Khasra No.39 area 0.45 acres in village Fatehpur by registered sale deed dated 02.04.1943 executed by one Rani Bahu, widow of Ayodhya Prasad Gaur Jhamar in the name of Shri Deo Dattatraya Mandir, Mohatamin Pandit Vishwanath Shindey. The temple and agricultural land remained in the exclusive possession of the petitioner’s father Vishwanath Rao, who used to worship the deity out of the income from agricultural land. Smt. Rani Bahu moved an application under Section 4 of the M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951 for registration of Shri Deo Dattatraya Mandir, Gaur Jhamar as a Public Trust in the year 1967 and after enquiry the Registrar, Public Trust, Sagar passed order dated 23/09/1970 ordering registration of Shri Deo Dattatraya Mandir, as a Public Trust.
It is submitted that the temple of Shri Deo Dattatrayaji is a ‘Private’ temple of the petitioner’s family, who was worshipped by his father during his life time and after his death, being worshipped by the petitioner. It is submitted that in the year 1971, daughter of Late Rani Bahu had filed the Civil Suit claiming declaration and possession of property of Shri Deo Dattatrayaji Temple as their private property. In the Civil Suit, the petitioner was also one of the defendants which was dismissed by the Trial Court on 17/11/1998 for want of prosecution. It is submitted that an application was filed under Order 9 Rule 7 of CPC on 27/02/1999 by the plaintiff but the same was also dismissed by the Trial Court on 24/03/2000. It is submitted that respondent No.4 filed Miscellaneous Appeal before the Appellate Court against the order dated 24.03.2000 but the same was also dismissed. Thereafter, respondent No.4 filed an application before the Registrar, Public Trust, Deori on 02.04.2004 stating that vacancies of the Trustee are lying vacant in the Trust and prayed that the same be filed by appointing them as Trustees. The Registrar vide order dated 15.12.2004 wrongly appointed respondent No.4 and his close relatives as Trustees in the Trust. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed an application under Section 25(3) of the Act before Additional District Judge, Sagar for setting aside the order which was dismissed vide order dated 09.08.2007.
It is submitted that in the year 2001 petitioner filed an application under Section 36(2) of the MP Public Trust Act before respondent No.1 for exemption of the Trust from all the provisions of MP Public Trust Act, 1951. After due inquiry, on the report of SDM and Collector, Sagar, respondent No.1 vide order dated 05.01.2005 has exempted the Trust from all provisions of the Act. Thereafter, respondent No.4 filed a complaint to the respondents No.1 and 2 on 24.01.2005 for cancellation of order dated 23.09.1978 and 05.01.2005, whereon the order dated 05.01.2005 was declared void ab initio by observing that the State Government has no powers to exempt any Trust from the provisions of MP Public Trust Act.
It is submitted that if there is no specific provision for review in the statute, no authority can exercise power of review and declare any order or notification void ab initio. It is submitted that power under Section 36(2) of the Act is only to grant exemption and not for registration and inclusion of Trust. It is submitted that respondent No.1 grossly erred in overlooking the provision of Section 36(2) of the MP Public Trust Act in its note sheet dated 11.09.2007 which empowers the State Government to exempt the Trust from all the provisions of the Act. It is submitted that the impugned order dated 13.09.2007 (Annexure P/10) has been passed without any show cause notice to the petitioner and without conducting any inquiry which violates the principle of natural justice. It is submitted that the impugned order is wholly illegal and deserves to be quashed.
To bolster the submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth (1996) 1 SCC 435 , Kalabharati Advertising vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437, Khasgi (Devi Ahila bai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore vs. Vipin Dhanaitkar 2022 SCC Online SC 900 and Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Shri Pradyumansigji Arjunsinghji (1971) 3 SCC 844.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that before passing the impugned order, the Authority has considered the entire aspects of the matter and from the note sheets, it is clear that, the matter was forwarded to the concerned Minister and after considering the same it was found that in terms of the provision of the M.P. Public Trust Act, 1951, no such powers are provided for exempting any Trust from the ambit of Public Trust and thus, the impugned order has rightly been passed by the authority. It is submitted that the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Public Charitable Trust Act confers jurisdiction to the Government to review an order or notification. It is further submitted that the petitioners are not allowing the respondents and other villagers to enter the temple and worship and do other cultural activities.
The learned senior counsel has invited attention of this Court towards the proceedings which have been initiated at the instance of one Ratan Singh Lodhi, who is said to be Member of Legislative Assembly of the area. It is submitted that the application to review has been submitted under the provisions of CPC which are not applicable to review/recall the notification issued under Section 36(2) of the MP Public Charitable Trust Act. It is submitted that the proceedings which have been initiated at the instance of the local MLA is based on bias and was culminated due to pressure. It is further submitted that in the note-sheet, it has been observed by the authorities that there is no provision of granting exemption of application of provision of Act of 1951, which were exercised by issuing the earlier notification. It is also observed that certain proceedings were pending before the competent Civil Court in respect of the same Trust which was ignored while issuing the earlier notification. It is further submitted that the said land attached to the temple was sold by one Rani Bahu who is the predecessor of the applicant Ratan Singh Lodhi in the year 1943 through registered sale deed. It is submitted that it was registered on 23.09.1970 and at the time of registration, six Trustees were appointed and as per Trust deed, their vacancy was required to be filled up by way of election but, however, at a later point of time, the vacancies had arisen and only two Trustees were left and thereafter, the Pujari had started claiming it to be his own temple for which an application before the Registrar, Charitable Trust for mis-management of Trust was filed which was allowed vide order dated 15.12.2004 and some more Trustees were appointed including the applicant of the review application. The matter was again referred to the District Court and interim order was passed vide order dated 01.01.2005, whereby, parties were restrained from taking any decision on administrative as well as financial side. It is submitted that the application was filed by Pujari/Petitioner claiming the temple to be a private property. On that basis, the proceedings were initiated and ultimately vide notification published in the official gazette of State dated 14.01.2005, the Trust in dispute has been exempted from application of all the provisions of the Trust Act, 1951.
The question herein is not that the notification which was issued exempting the application of the provisions of Trust Act, but the question is whether the power and the jurisdiction vest with the State Government to again recall the said notification by recalling the earlier notification on the application of MLA by passing the order dated 13.09.2007, declaring the earlier order dated 05.01.2005 as void ab initio and the subsequent notification.
The learned senior counsel has submitted that the Act of 1951 does not provide such power of review with the State Government. It is further submitted that Section 30 of the MP Charitable Trust Act though provides the application of provisions of CPC in the proceedings of Trust Act, 1951, however, it is submitted that as per the provision, it is for before the Court, said proceedings shall be applicable, i.e. the provisions which are meant for proceedings before the Civil Court and Civil Court is defined in the definition clause as "Principal Civil Court". Therefore, observing that the review power vests with the authorities by application of CPC in the Act of 1951 is absolutely not in consonance of law.
Further, it is submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments viz. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth (supra), Kalabharati Advertising (surpa) and Khasgi (Devi Ahila bai Holkar Charities) Trust, Indore (supra) has held that the order/notification, however, bad in law or alleged to be based on fraud but still remains in operation until it is set-aside by the competent Court of law and is binding on all the parties. It is also submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth (supra) has also held that even if the order/notification/decisions are based on fraud, but that automatically does not make the order void ab initio, but for that proper proceedings before the competent Civil Court of law is required to be initiated and by the Court of law the said order/decision/notification can be set-aside.
It is submitted that the action of State Government recalling its own order/notification by applying principle of CPC is not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth (supra) has held :
It is not necessary for us to go into the merits of the case. We are of the view that the order passed inter partes in CRP No. 3440 of 1977 dated 2-11-1977, has become final, and it concludes the matter. The observations made in the proceedings, at the instance of the first respondent regarding the validity of the order of the Board, in CRP No. 3696 of 1977, will not, in any way, affect the legality and validity of the proceedings declining to implead Respondents 3 and 4 or the order passed in revision therefrom — CRP No. 3440 of 1977. It is true that the proceedings dated 28-6-1977 were observed to be void in law in CRP No. 3696 of 1977, filed by the first respondent. In our opinion, even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will, in fact, be effective inter partes until it is successfully avoided or challenged in a higher forum. Mere use of the word ‘void’ is not determinative of its legal impact. The word ‘void’ has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise and in this case, the only complaint about the initiation of the suo motu proceedings by the Board was, that it was not initiated on intimation by the State Land Board about the non-filing of the statement as required by Section 85(7) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In our opinion, this is not a case where the infirmity is fundamental. It is unnecessary to consider the matter further.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., (Re-issue) Vol. 1(1) in para 26, p. 31, it is stated, thus:
“If an act or decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should, in principle, be null and void for all purposes; and it has been said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved.”
In the Judicial Review of Administrative Action, De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, 1995 Edn., at pp. 259-60 the law is stated thus:
“The erosion of the distinction between jurisdictional errors and non-jurisdictional errors has, as we have seen, correspondingly eroded the distinction between void and voidable decisions. The courts have become increasingly impatient with the distinction, to the extent that the situation today can be summarised as follows:
All official decisions are presumed to be valid until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Similarly, Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, Seventh Edn., 1994, have stated the law thus at pp. 341-342:
“… every unlawful administrative act, however invalid, is merely voidable. But this is no more than the truism that in most situations the only way to resist unlawful action is by recourse to the law. In a well-known passage Lord Radcliffe said:
‘An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’
This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy Council without distinction between patent and latent defects.”
The above statement of the law supports our view that the order of the Board dated 28-6-1977, declining to implead Respondents 3 and 4 (which stood confirmed in revision) concludes the matter against Respondents 3 and 4.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kalabharati Advertising (supra) has held :
12.It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [AIR 1965 SC 1457] and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh [AIR 1966 SC 641] .)
13.In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji [(1971) 3 SCC 844 : AIR 1970 SC 1273] , Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 321] , Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [(1987) 4 SCC 525 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 491 : AIR 1987 SC 2186], State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records and Settlement [(1998) 7 SCC 162] and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain [(2008) 2 SCC 705 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 537] this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction.
14.Therefore, in view of the above, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that in the absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Khasgi (Devi Ahila Bai Hokar Charities) Trust, Indore (supra) has held :
43.We may note here that the High Court has proceeded on the erroneous footing that as there was no notification issued under sub-Section (2) of Section 36, Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 36 will not apply. Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 36 operate in different fields. When sub-Section (1) is applicable to a Public Trust, none of the provisions of the Public Trusts Act is applicable to the Trust. Sub-Section (2) is an independent power of the State Government to issue a notification exempting certain Public Trusts from all or any of the provisions of the Public Trusts Act. Thus, we have no manner of doubt that the Khasgi Trust will be governed by the Public Trusts Act and that the same is required to be registered accordingly.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi (supra) has held :
4.The first question that we have to consider is whether Mr Mankodi had competence to quash the order made by the Saurashtra Government on October 22, 1956. It must be remembered that Mr Mankodi was functioning as the delegate of the State Government. The order passed by Mr Mankodi, in law amounted to a review of the order made by Saurashtra Government. It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order. The question whether the Government's order is correct or valid in law does not arise for consideration in these proceedings so long as that order is not set aside or declared void by a competent authority. Hence the same cannot be ignored. The Subordinate Tribunals have to carry out that order. For this reason alone the order of Mr Mankodi was liable to be set aside.
Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that order of the recall is very much available under the MP Public Charitable Trust Act as the provisions of CPC are applicable and even if it is assumed that the provisions of CPC is not applicable, then also, under the General Clauses Act and the Central Administrative Tribunal Act, the power vests with the Government to recall any order/decision/notification.
As per Section 30, the provisions of CPC have been made applicable in the proceedings before the Court under the Trust Act. The "Court" is defined in the definition clause which says the "Principal Civil Court", however, action which has been initiated by filing an application under Section 114 was before the authorities of the State Government, therefore, in no stretch of imagination it can be said to be a Court. It is an administrative authority which work as per the jurisdiction conferred on the authorities in accordance with law or Act of 1951.
Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 which is a Central Act provides that any administrative decision/notification issued by the Government can add, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. The said Act though by aid of Article 367 of the Constitution of India is enforceable in the State of Madhya Pradesh, however, the State of Madhya Pradesh has also legislated similar Act namely the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957, which also contain pari materia provisions.
When the case law cited by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner have been perused, it is found that it was passed in the context of power of review/recall under the Act where some quasi judicial proceedings have been tried to be recalled, then it is held that in absence of such power under the statute, the order/notifications cannot be reviewed by applying the general principle of CPC.
However, in the present case in hand, the powers have been exercised by the State Government on administrative side, though on the application submitted by one person said to be Trustee. It is found that such powers, as per the provisions of CPC, though not available with the State Government to recall the orders/decisions/notifications but same can be exercised under the provisions of General Clauses Act because the said decision of notifying the decision of exempting the Trust from the applications of the provisions of the Trust Act, in the considered opinion of this Court, is an administrative decision which has to be recalled by an administrative decision.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare (2002) 5 SCC 685, in para 39 has held as under :
39.On perusal of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, we find that the expression “order” employed in Section 21 shows that such an order must be in the nature of notification, rules and bye-laws etc. The order which can be modified or rescinded on the application of Section 21 has to be either executive or legislative in nature. But the order which the Commission is required to pass under Section 29-A is neither a legislative nor an executive order but is a quasi-judicial order. We have already examined this aspect of the matter in the foregoing paragraph and held that the function exercisable by the Commission under Section 29-A is essentially quasi-judicial in nature and order passed thereunder is a quasi-judicial order. In that view of the matter, the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked to confer powers of deregistration/cancellation of registration after enquiry by the Election Commission. We, therefore, hold that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act has no application where a statutory authority is required to act quasi-judicially.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rasid Javed v. State of U.P. AIR 2010 SC 2275 has held as under :
(D) Invocation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act: whether valid-
53.Having already held that the order of the Hearing Authority dated 11-10-1999 is in excess of the authority given to him and that the said order has no legal effect, we do not find that there was any impediment for the State Government in exercising its power under Section 102 of the 1988 Act read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to rescind the Notification dated 16-4-1999.
56.It seems to be fairly settled that under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, an authority which has the power to issue a notification has the undoubted power to rescind or modify the notification in the like manner. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the Notification dated 15-4-2000 has been made in the same manner as the earlier Notification dated 16-4-1999. Since the order of the Hearing Authority dated 11-10-1999 is not an order of approval under Section 102(1) of the 1988 Act and cannot be treated as such, the power of the State Government to rescind the Notification dated 16-4-1999 did not get exhausted. The argument that the draft Notification dated 16-4-1999 merged in the order dated 11-10-1999 is fallacious and devoid of any substance.
57.Mr Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel urged on behalf of the appellants that even otherwise the material on record demonstrated that the order of the modification dated 11-10-1999 was approved by the Principal Secretary of the Department and, thus, there was an approval by the State Government.
58.We are unable to accept this submission. In the first place, except the decision of the Hearing Authority dated 11-10-1999 there is nothing on record to conclude that the State Government had approved the proposed modification as notified on 16-4-1999. Secondly, even if we assume that an executive action not expressed to be made in the name of the Governor as contemplated under Article 166(1) of the Constitution may not vitiate such action as nullity and as held by this Court in Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay [(1952) 1 SCC 372 : AIR 1952 SC 181 : 1952 Cri LJ 955 : (1952) 1 SCR 612] the non-compliance with the provisions of either of the clauses of Article 166 would lead to the result that the order in question would lose the protection which it would otherwise enjoy had the proper mode for expression and authentication been adopted, but then there has to be some formal order by the State Government under Section 102(1) of the 1988 Act. Moreover, there is nothing on record even to indicate that the order dated 11-10-1999 of the Hearing Authority was communicated to the appellants or any of the affected parties. For all these reasons, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the order dated 11-10-1999 is not an order as contemplated under Section 102(1) of the 1988 Act by the State Government approving the modification proposed in the Notification dated 16-4-1999.
59.In view of our finding that the order of the Hearing Authority dated 11-10-1999 cannot be treated as an order of the State Government under Section 102(1) of the 1988 Act, it is not necessary to consider the question as to whether the order of the State Government under Section 102(1) of the 1988 Act is required to be published in the Official Gazette or not.
60.The contention of Mr P.N. Gupta, learned counsel for some of the appellants that the opportunity of hearing was required to be given to the appellants before issuance of the Notification dated 15-4-2000 has no merit for more than one reason. For one, this contention is founded on the premise that the order of the Hearing Authority dated 11-10-1999 is the order of the State Government. Secondly, what Section 21 of the General Clauses Act requires is that the authority empowered to issue notification must exercise its power to rescind such notification in the like manner. We have already noticed in the preceding discussion that the Notification dated 15-4-2000 has been made in the same manner as the earlier Notification dated 16-4-1999.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 SCC 193, has held :
38.Section 21 is based on the principle that power to create includes the power to destroy and also the power to alter what is created. Section 21, amongst other things, specifically deals with power to add to, amend, vary or rescind the notifications. The power to rescind a notification is inherent in the power to issue the notification without any limitations or conditions. Section 21 embodies a rule of construction. The nature and extent of its application must be governed by the relevant statute which confers the power to issue the notification, etc. However, there is no manner of doubt that the exercise of power to make subordinate legislation includes the power to rescind the same. This is made clear by Section 21. On that analogy an administrative decision is revocable while a judicial decision is not revocable except in special circumstances. Exercise of power of a subordinate legislation will be prospective and cannot be retrospective unless the statute authorises such an exercise expressly or by necessary implication.
39.The principle laid down in Section 21 is of general application. The power to rescind mentioned in Section 21 is without limitations or conditions. It is not a power so limited as to be exercised only once. The power can be exercised from time to time having regard to the exigency of time. When by a Central Act power is given to the State Government to give some relief by way of concession and/or rebate to newly-established industrial units by a notification, the same can be curtailed and/or withdrawn by issuing another notification under the same provision and such exercise of power cannot be faulted on the ground of promissory estoppel.
40.It would be profitable to remember that the purpose of the General Clauses Act is to place in one single statute different provisions as regards interpretations of words and legal principles which would otherwise have to be specified separately in many different Acts and Regulations. Whatever the General Clauses Act says whether as regards the meaning of words or as regards legal principles, has to be read into every statute to which it applies. Further, power to curtail and/or withdraw the notification issued under Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 giving rebate is implied under Section 49 itself on proper interpretation of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, this Court is of the firm opinion that, power to curtail and/or withdraw the notification issued under Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, granting certain benefits, was available to the respondents.
41.By virtue of Sections 14 and 21 of the General Clauses Act, when a power is conferred on an authority to do a particular act, such power can be exercised from time to time and carries with it the power to withdraw, modify, amend or cancel the notifications earlier issued, to be exercised in the like manner and subject to like conditions, if any, attached with the exercise of the power. It would be too narrow a view to accept that chargeability once fixed cannot be altered. Since the charging provision in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 is subject to the State Government's power to issue notification under Section 49 of the Act granting rebate, the State Government, in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, can always withdraw, rescind, add to or modify an exemption notification. No industry can claim as of right that the Government should exercise its power under Section 49 and offer rebate and it is for the Government to decide whether the conditions are such that rebate should be granted or not.
From the proceeding which has been submitted as Annexures, which has culminated into the order of recall and consequent notification, it is found that those proceedings though have been initiated on an application, but as the procedure to take decision from the Minister of the department has been taken, therefore, the decision which has been taken is found to be in consonance of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
The other contention in regard to application of the Administrative Tribunal Act, this Court finds that the argument is absolutely untenable in the eye of law and provisions are misconstrued by the respondent. The Administrative Tribunal Act is legislated for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunal of dispute and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by Government in pursuance of Article 323A of the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
The object of the said Act is reproduced hereinabove to justify that the said Act is applicable in the given context and not otherwise, applicable, therefore, no powers can be invoked under the Central Administrative Tribunal Act by the authorities to recall the notification issued under the Act of 1951.
However, as it is found by this Court that such powers were inherent in the State Government and the State Government was having jurisdiction under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to add, amend, vary or rescind the notification issued under the Act of 1951, therefore, exercising such power is absolutely administrative in nature. The decision taken by the State Government by issuing order dated 13.09.2007 (Annexure P/10), is in consonance of the law. The State has the jurisdiction to recall its own notification. Procedure which has been initiated to recall was not according to statute but final decision which has culminated into recall of notification is purely administrative and has been found to be passed by the approval of Minister within the ambit of Article 166 of the Constitution of India which cannot be faulted with.
Therefore, Petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed.