Arputha Mary vs The Chairman, Neyveli Lignite Corporation, Neyveli, The Director Personnel, Neyveli Lignite Corporation, Neyveli and Davidraj

Mishra, J.—Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondents. The petitioner herein is the widow of one M.

Devaraj, who died in harness on 4-12-1987 while working in the Neyveli Lignite Corporation as Operator Grade II. She has alleged that the

deceased had taken her as his wife, after his first wife has died. At the time of the death of her husband, there were children through his first wife,

named Davidraj and Stellamari, and two children through her, named Sofia and Darbing Joseph. All the children were minor at the time of his

death. The petitioner applied for appointment in a job on compassionate grounds as at the time of taking the application, Lone of their children was

a major. It seems, however, that her step-son Davidraj in the meanwhile attained majority. He too applied for appointment on the plea that his

father had died in harness and under the scheme for giving appointment on compassionate grounds, he ranked first in the order of preference.

Finding that her step-son who had attained majority and decided to ignore his father''s family, that is to say, the petitioner and the other minor

children, if appointed, would not provide a breadwinner to the family, the petitioner made representations to various authorities and brought to their

notice that the son, who had appropriated such deposits which the father had made for the benefit of the family, because he had the advantage of

being nominated by him, would deny to the family the needed bread. When, however, she found that none of her representations was attended to,

she came to this court.

Initially, only the Chairman and Director, Personnel of the respondents-Corporation were impleaded as party respondents. Davidraj, however,

was felt to be a necessary party. Accordingly, this court ordered notice to him. Davidraj has since appeared.

Speaking on the principle why a compassionate ground appointment will be permissible notwithstanding the guarantee under Art.16(1) of the

Constitution of India to afforded equality of opportunity of employment, the Supreme Court in Yogender Pal Singh and others Vs. Union of India

others, , has observed:

While it may be permissible to appoint a per son who is the son of a police officer who dies in service or who is incapacitated while rendering

service in the police department, a provision which confers a preferential right to appointment on the children or wards or other relatives of such

police officers would be contrary to Art.16 of the Constitution.

Reiterating this law in a case in which a widow had applied for appointment on compassionate grounds, the Supreme Court in Sushma Gosein v.

Union of India 1989-4-S.C. 468 has observed :

We consider that it must be stated unequivocally that in all claims for appointment on compassionate grounds, there should not be any delay in

appointment. The purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground is to mitigate the hardship due to death of the bread earner in the

family. Such appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such case pending for

years. If there is no suitable post for appointment supernumerary post should be created to accommodate the applicant.

Had this principle been kept in mind, the widow-the petitioner, would have been given immediate appointment to redeem the family in distress,

and had immediate appointment been given to her, the son, who was a minor then, on attaining majority later could not have come to raise any

claim for himself. This, however, was not done. Now, besides the widow the petitioner, the son has also applied for appointment on

compassionate grounds.

My attention has been drawn to a memorandum in which the scheme on how appointments on compassionate grounds should be given is

indicated, and made applicable with effect from 8-10-1983. While it has not ruled out appointment to the widow or daughter, it has indicated that

in the matter of such appointment on compassionate grounds, preference should be given to the son over the widow and to the widow over the

daughter. It appears that the son now is invoking this preference in his favour.

The main question to be considered in all such cases is, who, if given appointment, would, as observed by the Supreme Court, provide the

needed bread to the family. If the step-son is likely to neglect the step-mother and step-brothers and step-sisters, and even his own sister, who is

presently staying with the mother, evidently, he would not provide that needed bread to the family. He would corner the benefit of compassion for

himself, and thus defeat the the very purpose for which such considerations have been introduced and appointments on compassionate grounds

have been sanctioned. If, on the other hand, it is only because the son of the deceased is the step son of the petitioner, that she has chosen to

object to the appointment given to him, she is acting more against the basics of the compassion, mainly guided by her prejudices The son in such a

case, would deserve the appointment if he is found to be ready and willing to provide the bread as the deceased provided to the family.

It is stated that the widow consented to the appointment given to the son at the first instance, but later came forward with the case that her

consent had been obtained under coercion. Courts of law in India have generally acknowledged that ordinarily women are dominated by menfolk

in the family and easily yield to pressure and undue influence. If the petitioner has chosen to say that her consent was obtained under pressure, the

onus will lie on the son to show that the petitioner had given her consent without any undue influence or coercion. It will not be possible for this

Court, however, to ascertain whether the appointment given to the son would meet the need of the family or the appointment given to the widow

would serve the need of the family. It will also not be possible for this Court to find out whether there was a free consent of the petitioner when the

third respondent applied for appointment on compassionate grounds. This is a fit case, in my opinion, in which this Court should direct the first

respondent to personally enquire into the matter and decide whether to give appointment to the petitioner or to the third respondent keeping in

view the basis behind the scheme that it is the next bread-winner to the family who should be given appointment, and not to one who wanted to use

the scheme to benefit himself. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. Let a direction issue to the first respondent to enquire into the matter and

decide within a period of two months from this date whether to appoint the petitioner or the third respondent and accordingly issue a letter of

appointment. There will be no order as to costs.