Arjun Singh @ Pappu vs Ashwani Tripathi and others

The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the learned Single Bench on 13.11.2017 whereby, the learned Single Bench relying upon a

judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Indrajit Barua and others vs. Election Commission of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 103 stayed the

election process on the ground that the preparation of electoral rolls is not a process of election.

We find that the learned Single Bench has committed grave error in law to stay the elections to a co-operative society.

The law of elections is well settled starting from the Supreme Court judgment in N.P. Ponnuswami vs. The Returning Officer, Namakkal, Saleem

Dist. and others, AIR 1952 SC 64 wherein, it is laid down that the election connotes the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to

the legislature. The expression “conduct of elections†in Article 324 of the Constitution of India specifically points to the wide meaning and that

meaning can also be read consistently into the other provisions. The court has not agreed with the argument that the preparation of electoral rolls is not

a process of election. The court held to the following effect:

(7) These arguments appear at first sight to be quite impressive, but in my opinion there are weightier and basically more important arguments in

support of the view taken by the High Court. As we have seen, the most important question for determination is the meaning to be given to the word

election"" in article 329 (b). That word has by long usage in connection with the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic

institutions, acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the narrow sense, it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate which may embrace

the result of the poll when there is polling or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll. In the wide sense, the word is used

to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected. In Srinivasalu v. Kuppuswami, A.I.R. (15) 1928 Mad. 253 at p. 255

the learned Judges of the Madras High Court after examining the question, expressed the opinion that the term ""election"" may be taken to embrace the

whole procedure whereby an ""elected member"" is returned, whether or not it be found necessary to take a poll. With this view, my brother, Mahajan

J. expressed his agreement in Sat Narain v. Hanuman Prasad, A.I.R. (33) 1946 Lah. 85; and I also find myself in agreement with it. It seems to me

that the word ""election"" has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in the wide sense, that is to say, to connote the entire procedure to be gone

through to return a candidate to the legislature. The use of the expression ""conduct of elections"" in article 324 specifically points to the wide meaning,

and that meaning can also be read consistently into the other provisions which occur in Part XV including article 329 (b). That the word ""election

bears this wide meaning whenever we talk of elections in a democratic country, is borne out by the fact that in most of the books on the subject and in

several cases dealing with the matter, one of the questions mooted is, when the election begins. The subject is dealt with quite concisely in Halsbury's

Laws of England in the following passage see p. 237 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Edn. 2, Vol. 12 under the following passage(s) under the heading

Commencement of the Election"":-

Although the first formal step in every election is the issue of the writ, the election is considered for some purposes to begin at an earlier date. It is a

question of fact in each case when an election begins in such a way as to make the parties concerned responsible for breaches of election law, the

test being whether the contest is ""reasonably imminent"". Neither the issue of the writ nor the publication of the notice of election can be looked to as

fixing the date when an election begins from this point of view. Nor, again, does the nomination day afford any criterion. The election will usually begin

at least earlier than the issue of the writ. The question when the election begins must be carefully distinguished from that as to when ""the conduct and

management of"" an election may be said to begin. Again, the question as to when a particular person commences to be a candidate is a question to be

considered in each case.

The discussion in this passage makes it clear that the word ''election"" can be and has been appropriately used with reference to the entire process

which consists of several stages and embraces many steps, some of which may have an important bearing on the result of the process.

In Indrajit Barua and others v. Election Commission of India and others, (1985) 4 SCC 722, the Court inter-alia held that that preparation and

revision of electoral rolls is a continuous process not connected with any particular election but when an election is to be held, the electoral roll which

exists at the time when election is notified would form the foundation for holding of such election. The relevant extract from the said judgment, reads,

thus:-

“12. From the materials placed by the parties and the Election Commission, we have come to the conclusion that the Election Commission did not

give directions contrary to the requirements of Section 16 of the Act and the revision of the 1979 electoral rolls could not be undertaken for reasons

beyond the control of the Election Commission. As pointed out by us in our order of September 28, 1984, there was no dispute to the electoral roll of

1977 nor was any challenge advanced against the election of 1978 to the State Legislature held on the basis of such rolls. Admittedly, the 1979 rolls

were the outcome of intensive revision of the rolls of 1977. That being the position and in view of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 21 which

we have extracted above the electoral rolls of 1979 were validly in existence and remained effective even though the process contemplated in sub-

section

(2) for revision had not either been undertaken or completed. It has been indicated by a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmi Charan

Sen v. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman (1985) 4 SCC 689 that preparation and revision of electoral rolls is a continuous process not connected with any

particular election but when an election is to be held, the electoral roll which exists at the time when election is notified would form the foundation for

holding of such election. That is why sub-section

(3) of Section 23 provides for suspension of any modification to the electoral roll after that last date of making of nominations for an election and until

completion of the election. We had, therefore, come to the conclusion that the electoral rolls of 1979 were not invalid and could provide the basis for

holding of the elections in 1983. Whether preparation and publication of the electoral rolls are a part of the process of election within the meaning of

Article 329(b) of the Constitution is the next aspect to be considered. In N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952

SC 64, this Court had to decide the amplitude of the term ‘election’. Fazl Ali, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench indicated:

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We are not prepared to take the view that preparation of electoral rolls is also a process of election. We find support for our view from the

observations of Chandrachud, C.J. in Lakshmi Charan Sen case (supra) that “it may be difficult, consistently with that view, to hold that

preparation and revision of electoral roll, is a part of ‘election’ within the meaning of Article 329(b)â€. In a suitable case challenge to the

electoral roll for not complying with the requirements of the law may be entertained subject to the rule indicated in Ponnuswami case (supra). But the

election of a candidate is not open to challenge on the score of the electoral roll being defective. Holding the election to the Legislature and holding

them according to law are both matters of paramount importance. Such elections have to be held also in accordance with a time bound programme

contemplated in the Constitution and the Act. The proviso added in Section 22(2) of the Act of 1950 is intended to extend cover to the electoral rolls in

eventualities which otherwise might have interfered with the smooth working of the programme. These are the reasons for which we came to the

conclusion that the electoral roll of 1979 had not been vitiated and was not open to be attacked as invalid.â€​

In a judgement reported as (1996) 6 SCC 303 (Anugrah Narain Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others), it was held that the Court should not

have intervened at all on the basis of allegations as to preparation of electoral rolls in regard to inclusion, deletion or correction of names. There is

hardly any scope for a court to intervene and correct the electoral rolls under Article 226 of the Constitution. In fact, if this is allowed to be done,

every election will be indefinitely delayed and it will not be possible to comply with the mandate of the Constitution that every Municipality shall have a

life span of five years, or less, if dissolved earlier, and thereafter fresh elections will have to be held within the time specified in clause (3) of Article

243-U. The Court held as under:-

In Lakshmi Charan Sen case (supra), this Court was dealing with Part XV of the Constitution which deals with preparation of electoral rolls for,

and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament, and to the Legislatures of different States and all elections to the offices of the President and the Vice-

President. We are in this case, concerned with the elections to municipal bodies. But the principles laid down in Lakshmi Charan Sen case (supra) will

apply in full force to municipal elections because various articles dealing with holding of municipal elections in Part IX-A of the Constitution are

similarly worded. In fact, highest importance has been attached to holding of panchayat as well as municipal elections by the Constitution. Parts IX

and IX-A of the Constitution were introduced by the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 and (74th Amendment) Act, 1992. By these two

Parts, it was intended to take democracy to the grass-root level. Part IX deals with constitution of panchayats, composition of panchayats and holding

of regular elections to the panchayats. Article 243-O contains a bar to interference by Court in electoral matters. This bar is similar to the bar

contained in Article 329 of the Constitution in Part XV, the implication of which was explained by this Court in the case of Lakshmi Charan Sen

(supra).

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Therefore, so far as preparation of the electoral roll is concerned, there are sufficient safeguards in the Act against any abuse or misuse of power.

In view of these provisions and particularly, in view of sub-section (6) of Section 39 which provides for appeals in regard to inclusion, deletion or

correction of names, there is hardly any scope for a court to intervene and correct the electoral rolls under Article 226 of the Constitution. In fact, if

this is allowed to be done, every election will be indefinitely delayed and it will not be possible to comply with the mandate of the Constitution that

every Municipality shall have a life span of five years, or less, if dissolved earlier, and thereafter fresh elections will have to be held within the time

specified in clause (3) of Article 243-U. Having regard to the provisions for filing objections and also the right of appeal against inclusion, deletion and

correction of names and also to the constitutional authority of the Election Commission to give directions in all matters pertaining to elections, the Court

should not have intervened at all on the basis of allegations as to preparation of electoral rolls.

Section 64 of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (for short “the Actâ€), provides for the resolution of a dispute including

dispute in connection with election to any officer of the society or representative of the society or of composite society. Section 64(2)(v) of the Act

reads as under:-

“64. Disputes.Â

(1) xxx xxx xxx

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a dispute shall includeâ€

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(v) any dispute arising in connection with the election of any officer of the society or representative of the society or of composite society;

Provided that the Registrar shall not entertain any dispute under this clause during the period commencing from the announcement of the election

programme till the declaration of the results.â€​

Since the statute provides for exhaustive alternative mechanism for redressal of the dispute, therefore, we find that the election cannot be permitted

to scuttled by way of interim orders. Therefore, we are unable to sustain the order of learned Single Bench on 13.11.2017.

In view of the above, we find that the order passed by the learned Single Bench is clearly erroneous. The same is set aside. The respondent

authority is directed to complete the election process expeditiously.

Writ Appeal stands allowed and disposed of.