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Judgment
V. Ramasubramanian, J.—The Petitioner has come up with the above Writ Petition, challenging an order passed by the Second Respondent
viz., the District Registrar, directing the compulsory registration of a Sale Deed dated 21.6.2010 claimed to have been executed by the Petitioner
in favour of the Third Respondent herein. I have heard Mr. P. Vasanthakumar Visveswaran, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. M.C. Swamy,
learned Special Government Pleader for Respondents 1 & 2 & Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned Senior Counsel for the Third Respondent.
The facts, on which there are no disputes, are as follows:
(i) The Third Respondent herein presented for registration before the District Registrar (Second Respondent), a document titled as a Sale Deed,
stated to have been executed by the Petitioner on 21.6.2010, conveying a house, land and premises bearing old Plot No. 29-A, new Door No.
11, Venugopal Avenue, Spur Tank Road, Chetpet, Chennai-31.
(ii) Since the Petitioner, who was alleged to have executed the Sale Deed, did not appear before the Second Respondent, the Third Respondent
appears to have filed an Application for compulsory registration of the document. Therefore, the Second Respondent issued a notice dated
6.9.2010, calling upon the Petitioner to appear in person on 27.9.2010. The Petitioner appeared before the Second Respondent and disputed the
claim of the Third Respondent that the Petitioner executed the Sale Deed. He also filed an interim reply at that time.
(iii) Thereafter, the Second Respondent passed an order dated 21.10.2010, holding that in view of the denial of execution by the Petitioner, the
Third Respondent should proceed with further action.
(iv) Thereafter, the Third Respondent filed an Appeal purportedly u/s 73 of the Registration Act, 1908, as against the order dated 21.10.2010
passed by the Second Respondent u/s 36 of the Act. Taking up the same on file, the Second Respondent issued notices to both parties, calling
upon them to appear for an enquiry.
(v) The Petitioner submitted preliminary objections to the notice issued by the Second Respondent on the ground that an Appeal to the Second
Respondent as against his own order is not maintainable. However, the said preliminary objection was overruled by the Second Respondent by an
order dated 23.11.2010.
(vi) Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a reply to the Appeal filed by the Third Respondent, on 25.11.2010.
(vii) The Second Respondent then held an enquiry, permitted both parties to lead oral and documentary evidence, heard arguments and passed the
impugned order dated 7.4.2011, directing the compulsory registration of the Sale Deed. As a matter of fact, 3 persons were examined as
witnesses on the side of the Third Respondent and two documents were marked in evidence on their side. On the side of the Petitioner one
document was filed and the Petitioner examined himself as the sole witness on his side. On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence, the
Second Respondent passed an order, directing compulsory registration. Aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner is before this Court.
The Petitioner assails the impugned order on the following grounds:
(i) That when once the Petitioner denied execution of the Deed in question, it was not open to the Second Respondent direct the compulsory
registration of the document, after adjudicating upon the question whether the Petitioner executed the document or not;
(ii) That the Second Respondent virtually decided both the original proceedings u/s 36 and the Appeal u/s 73, thereby violating the fundamental
principles that prohibit the same person who passed the original order from deciding the Appeal arising out of his own order;
(iii) That when admittedly, the statement in the form of Annexure 1-A in terms of Rule 3(1-A) of the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of
Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968, was not enclosed to the Sale Deed, the District Registrar was obliged to refuse to register the
document; and
(iv) That in any case, the findings arrived at by the District Registrar in the impugned order are totally perverse.
Ground No. 1:
The primary contention of the Petitioner is that he did not execute the Sale Deed. His case is that he had business transactions with the Third
Respondent; that the Third Respondent owed more than a sum of Rs. 2.5 crores to the Petitioner; that in the course of business transactions, the
Third Respondent obtained his signatures in blank papers, for the purpose of some statutory compliances and that those papers could have been
made use of by the Third Respondent to prepare a Sale Deed. Therefore, the core contention of the Petitioner is that he never executed the Sale
Deed in question.
However, the Petitioner admits that the signatures contained in the document presented for compulsory registration, are his own signatures. In
other words, the Petitioner categorically admits the signatures found in the document to be his own, though he denies having executed the Sale
Deed. Therefore, the question that arises first for consideration is as to whether a person whose signatures are found in a Deed of Conveyance
could be said to have ""executed"" the Deed of Conveyance or not.
Unfortunately, the expression ""executed"" is not defined in the Registration Act, 1908. But, it is defined in Section 2(12) of the Indian Stamp Act,
1899. The definition is as follows:
(12) Executed and execution.-- ""executed"" and ""execution"" used with reference to instruments, mean ""signed"" and ""signature"".
The expression ""signed"" though not defined in the Registration Act, 1908 or in the Stamp Act, 1899, is defined in Section 3(56) of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 to include even a ""mark"", if the person with reference to whom the expression is used is unable to write his name. In other
words, affixing a mark is treated akin to signing a document. Signing as per Section 2(12) of the Stamp Act, is treated as execution.
The expression ""execution"", is derived from the Latin word ""ex sequi"". It means ""to follow out"" or ""follow to the end"" or ""perform"". Therefore, in
a broader sense, the expression ""execution"" would mean carrying out some act or course of conduct, to its completion. But the Stamp Act has
restricted the meaning of the word to a mere sign or signature, perhaps on account of the fact that a broader meaning would virtually convert the
Registrar into a Civil Court, conferring powers of adjudication.
Since the word ""executed"" is not defined in the Registration Act, the said expression should be assigned the same meaning that is given to it in
the complimentary enactment viz., the Stamp Act. It is needless to point out that the Stamp Act and the Registration Act, are complimentary
enactments, dealing with the procedure to be followed for execution and registration of documents. Therefore, I cannot give to the word
executed"" appearing in the Registration Act, 1908, any meaning other than the one assigned it in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
Keeping the above basic principle in mind, if we look at the facts of this case, the Petitioner admits that the signatures contained in the
document in question are his signatures. Therefore, for the limited purpose of an enquiry under the Registration Act, 1908, the Petitioner should be
deemed to have executed the document. For all other purposes such as (i) deciding the question as to whether there was a proper conveyance of
the property (ii) deciding the question whether the signatures were made on blank stamp papers (iii) deciding the question whether blank but signed
stamp papers were made use of by the Third Respondent to type out a Sale Deed (iv) deciding the question whether title in the property had
passed on, and (v) deciding the question whether the Third Respondent committed an act of fraud and breach of trust, a mere signature in a
document may not be sufficient. But for the Registrar of Assurances to decide a limited question whether a document was executed by a person or
not, the admission that the signature is of that person is more than sufficient in view of the definition contained in Section 2(12) of the Indian Stamp
Act, 1899.
Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, mandates that a document required by law to be attested, shall not be used as evidence until at least
one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. But the Proviso exempts such documents other than a Will, which
are registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have
been executed, has specifically denied. But Section 70 of the Evidence Act, states that the admission of a party to an attested document of its
execution by himself is sufficient proof of its execution, though it is a document required by law to be attested. Section 71 enables the execution of
a document to be proved by other evidence, if the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of a document.
Despite all these provisions, the Evidence Act also does not define the word ""execution"". But the moment the signature of a person in a
document is admitted, the burden of proof shifts on him to show that there was no intention on his part to do what the document purports to do.
However, the enquiry that could be conducted after the admission by a person of his signature in a document, is not an enquiry that is capable of
being conducted by the Registrar of Assurances under the Registration Act, 1908. The scope of the enquiry to be conducted by him is very
limited. Hence, the reliance placed by Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned Senior Counsel for the Third Respondent in the decision of Viswanatha Sastri,
J. in Alluru Bapanayya v. Chintala Pati Bangarraju, AIR (36) 1949 Mad. 775, and the decision of T. Raja, J. in Abdul Kalam Azad v.
Ananthalakshmi, 2012 (2) MWN (Civil) 63 : 2012 (1) TLNJ 497 (Civil), is well founded. The relevant portion of the judgment of Viswanatha
Sastri, J. is as follows:
Under Section 35, Registration Act, a Registrar is bound to register a document if the ostensible executant admits his signature to the document.
This is the admission of execution referred to in Section 35, Registration Act. If a person admitting his signature or thumb impression proves that he
signed it under a misapprehension believing it to be a different kind of document from what it was or that he was induced to sign the document as a
result of a deception practised upon him and that he was therefore, unaware of the real nature of the document, it is a ground for setting aside the
document or having it adjudged void and inoperative in an ordinary suit in a Civil Court. But neither the Registrar nor the Court in a suit u/s 77,
Registration Act, has jurisdiction to enter into these questions.
In David Yule v. Ram Khelawan Sahai, 1901 (6) CWN 329, it was held that once the executant admitted his signature, but claimed that he
merely signed the name upon blank sheets of paper, the Registrar cannot go beyond and conduct an enquiry under what circumstances, the
signatures came to be made in the document. In M. Ramaswami Chettiar Vs. Srinivasa Pillai and Others, it was held as follows:
In fact the scheme of the Act appears to be that the Registrar is not to go into the questions as to whether the parties understood the nature of the
document or meant it to be something else than what it is. The only question which he has to decide in this respect is whether it bears the signature
of the alleged executant.
I should add a word of caution. If the Petitioner and the Third Respondent are before a Civil Court in a dispute relating to the conveyance of
title, then the question whether the Petitioner executed the document or not, cannot be decided solely on the basis of the admission of his
signatures. While deciding a dispute relating to transfer of title, the expression ""executed"" may have to be assigned a greater meaning. But the
Registrar of Assurances cannot be imposed with such an obligation for the limited purpose of deciding whether he could order compulsory
registration of a document or not. Therefore, the first contention of the Petitioner cannot be accepted.
Ground No. 2:
The second ground raised by the Petitioner is little tricky. It is an admitted fact that the Second Respondent is the Registering Officer, in the
cadre of a District Registrar. According to the Petitioner, the Second Respondent passed an order dated 21.10.2010, directing the Third
Respondent to take further proceedings in accordance with law, in view of the denial of execution by the Petitioner. Thereafter, the Third
Respondent filed what is titled as ""an Appeal"" to the very same Officer. The Third Respondent has also indicated the provision of law under which
the Appeal was filed, as Section 73 of the Act. The Appeal also states that it was filed against the order dated 21.10.2010 passed u/s 36 of the
Act. Therefore, based upon the fact (i) that the order dated 21.10.2010 was purportedly passed by the Second Respondent u/s 36 of the Act;
and (ii) that the Third Respondent termed its document as an Appeal u/s 73 of the Act, it is contended by the Petitioner that the same person acted
as the original as well as the Appellate Authority.
In response, it is contended by Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned Senior Counsel for the Third Respondent that the description of what was
presented by the Third Respondent as ""an Appeal u/s 73"" was a bona fide mistake. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the proceeding
dated 21.10.2010 was only a preliminary one, whereunder the Registering Officer initiated the proceedings. However, upon finding that the
Petitioner was not willing to register the document, the Third Respondent presented a Petition. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the
Third Respondent, the petition presented by the Third Respondent to the Second Respondent is actually one u/s 74 and not u/s 73(1). In other
words, it is the stand of the Third Respondent that the quoting of a wrong provision and a wrong description, will not make the whole proceedings
vitiated.
In the light of the above rival contentions, I must see the nature of the proceedings initiated by the Second Respondent, that culminated in the
impugned order. If, as contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the order dated 21.10.2010 was a original order, then he is right in
contending that an Appeal should have been filed only to the next higher authority viz., the Inspector General of Registration. On the other hand, if,
as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the Third Respondent, the order dated 21.10.2010 is not an order, but an initiation of the
proceedings, then he is right in contending that the proceedings were only original in nature u/s 74.
Section 34(1) of the Registration Act, 1908 mandates that in the case of a Sale Deed (i) persons executing the document, and (ii) persons
claiming under the document, should both appear before the Registering Officer, at the time of presentation. This requirement is subject to Sections
41, 43, 45, 69, 75, 77, 88 & 89. Sub-section (2) of Section 34 gives a small leverage by providing that appearances under sub-section (1) may
be simultaneous or at different times. Under sub-section (3), the Registering Officer is obliged to enquire whether or not such a document was
executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed.
The procedure to be followed by the Registering Officer upon admission or denial of execution is prescribed in Section 35. Sub-section (1) of
Section 35 deals with cases where the parties admit the execution of a document. We are not concerned with the same. Sub-section (3) of Section
35 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Registering Officer, if the person by whom the document is purported to have been executed,
denies its execution. Sub-section (3) of Section 35 together with the Proviso reads as follows:
(3)(a) If any person by whom the document purports to be executed denies its execution, or
(b) If any such person appears to the Registering Officer to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or
(c) If any person by whom the document purports to be executed is dead, and his representative or assign denies its execution, the Registering
Officer shall refuse to register the documents as to the person so denying, appearing or dead:
Provided that, where such Officer is a Registrar, he shall follow the procedure prescribed in Part XII:
Provided further that the State Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any Sub-Registrar named in the Notification
shall, in respect of documents the execution of which is denied, be deemed to be a Registrar for the purposes of this sub-section and of Part XII.
A careful reading of sub-section (3) shows that whenever any person by whom a document was purportedly executed, denies its execution,
the Registering Officer shall refuse to register the document. But where the Registering Officer happens to be a Registrar, he should follow the
procedure prescribed in Part XII of the Act. The Proviso to sub-section (3) enables the State Government to declare any Sub-Registrar named in
the Notification issued for the purpose, to be deemed as a Registrar for the purpose of Part XII, in respect of documents, the execution of which
are denied.
Before I proceed to deal with Part XII, I should also have a look at Section 36, since, the document filed by the Third Respondent before the
Second Respondent, as against the order dated 21.10.2010 is described as an Appeal u/s 73 against an order passed u/s 36. Therefore, let us see
what Section 36 deals with. Section 36 deals with the procedure where the appearances of executant and witness are desired. As per Section 36
of the Act, the Registering Officer is empowered to request an Officer appointed by the State Government for the purpose, to issue summons
requiring any person whose presence or testimony is necessary for the registration of a document, to appear before him. In other words, Section
36 does not deal with the mere appearance of an executant or witness as the caption given to Section 36 makes out to be. The power of the
Registering Officer u/s 36 is to issue summons for the appearance of ""any person whose presence or testimony is necessary for the registration of
the document"". The Registering Officer can request the issue of summons u/s 36 of the Act, both at the instance of the person presenting the
document and at the instance of the person claiming under the document. Therefore, Section 35(3) and Section 36 operate at different levels.
While Section 35(3) covers a case where the person described to be the executant of a document appears and denies execution, Section 36
covers a case where the so called executant does not at all appear.
It must be noted that the person described to be an executant may appear before the Registrar of his own volition and deny its execution. Such
a contingency is covered by Section 35(3). Alternatively, the so called executant may not even appear, in which case the Sub-Registrar is to
invoke the power u/s 36 and have a summon issued for such person to appear before him.
Once a person appears before the Sub-Registrar in response to a summon issued u/s 36, there are two alternatives that could happen. He may
either admit execution or deny execution. If he admits execution, the Registering Officer will then follow the procedure prescribed u/s 35(1). If he
denies execution, the Registering Officer will follow the procedure u/s 35(3).
In other words, the object of Section 36 is only to compel the attendance of a person who may be an executant or a Claimant or a witness or
any other person. Once the person summoned appears before the Registering Officer, in pursuance of the summon issued u/s 36, Section 35 will
come into play. While sub-section (1) of Section 35 will come into play if execution is admitted, sub-section (3) will come into play if execution is
denied. Therefore, the scope of Section 36 stops with the issue of summons. After the issue of summons and the appearance of the parties,
Section 35 alone takes care of the eventualities. Therefore, the understanding by the Third Respondent, of the order dated 21.10.2010 to be one
u/s 36, is not correct. The Petitioner was admittedly summoned and he appeared before the Second Respondent and denied execution on
21.10.2010. Therefore, on 21.10.2010, when the Petitioner appeared before the District Registrar and denied execution, the contingency
provided in Section 35(3)(a) has arisen. Hence, by virtue of the operative portion of subsection (3) of Section 35, the Registrar was to go to Part
XII of the Act, to do what is required of him.
Part XII of the Act contains 7 Sections. The Scheme of Part XII of the Act, as contained in Sections 71 to 77 can be summarised as follows:
(i) Whenever a Sub-Registrar refuses to register a document, he should make an order of refusal and record his reasons in Book No. 2 and also
endorse the words ""registration refused"" on the document, except in cases where the refusal is on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. This is by
virtue of Section 71.
(ii) Section 72 provides for an Appeal against the order of a Sub-Registrar refusing to admit a document for registration, in all cases except a case
where the refusal is on the ground of denial of execution.
(iii) Where the refusal to register a document is by a Sub-Registrar and such refusal is on the ground of denial of execution, a remedy is available
u/s 73(1). Section 73 uses the expression ""Application"" and not the expression ""Appeal"".
(iv) Section 74 prescribes the procedure to be followed when the denial of execution is before a Registrar and not before a Sub-Registrar.
(v) Section 75 deals with the nature of the orders that could be passed by the Registrar and the procedure to be followed by him, in respect of an
enquiry u/s 74.
(vi) Section 76 empowers the Registrar to pass an order of refusal. Interestingly, sub-section (2) of Section 76 prohibits any Appeal from any
order passed either u/s 72 or u/s 76(1).
(vii) However, u/s 77, a Suit will lie to a Civil Court, if the Registrar refuses to order the registration of a document u/s 72 or 76.
A careful reading of Sections 71 to 77 shows that they provide for 4 different contingencies viz.:
(i) Where the refusal to register is on account of denial of execution;
(ii) Where the refusal to register is on account of reasons other than the denial of execution;
(iii) Where the refusal to register is by the Sub-Registrar; and
(iv) Where the refusal to register is by the Registrar.
Interestingly, where the refusal to register is by a Sub-Registrar on grounds other than denial of execution, an Appeal lies u/s 72(1). Once the
Registrar also refuses to register, only a Suit lies u/s 77.
On the contrary, if the refusal is by the Sub-Registrar on the ground of denial of execution, an Application and not an Appeal would lie u/s
73(1). Therefore, the proceedings before the Registrar u/s 73(1) appear to be original in nature, though they arise out of an order of a Subordinate
Officer. Apart from an Application u/s 73(1) against an order of refusal by a Sub-Registrar on the ground of denial of execution, the Registrar also
has the power to undertake an enquiry u/s 74. This power is available, if the denial of execution is actually made before him. These proceedings
are also original in nature.
u/s 75(4), the Registrar is vested with the power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel them to give evidence, as if
he were a Civil Court. But these powers u/s 75(4) could be exercised by the Registrar only in respect of the proceedings u/s 74. In other words,
while dealing with an Application u/s 73(1), it is doubtful, in view of the language employed in Section 75(4), if the Registrar would have the power
prescribed u/s 75(4).
But Part XII of the Act, cannot be read in isolation. As we have seen from Sections 71 to 77, they deal with (i) refusal to register on the
ground of denial of execution (ii) refusal to register on other grounds (iii) either by the Sub-Registrar, or (iv) by the Registrar. But this distinction
between the exercise of the original power by the Sub-Registrar and the exercise of the original power by the Registrar, would become irrelevant if
a Notification is issued by the State Government in terms of Second Proviso u/s 35(3), declaring a Sub-Registrar to be deemed to be a Registrar
for the purpose of Section 35. In other words, every Sub-Registrar who is notified in terms of the Second Proviso to Section 35(3) as a Registrar,
would deal with the issue of denial of execution, only u/s 74 and not u/s 73(1).
In other words, if a Notification in terms of the Second Proviso to Section 35 is issued by the State Government notifying a Sub-Registrar as a
Registrar, the denial of execution before such a person would actually trigger only an action u/s 74A. Sub-Registrar notified as a District Registrar
in terms of the Second Proviso to Section 35(3), cannot be regarded as a Sub-Registrar, who refused to register the document, so as to make
Section 73(1) come into play. Section 73(1) can be pressed into service only in cases where a Sub-Registrar is not notified as a Registrar in terms
of the Second Proviso to Section 35(3). The denial of execution made by the Petitioner in this case is actually a denial of execution before a
Registrar and not before a Sub-Registrar, in view of the Notification issued by the Government and produced by the learned Special Government
Pleader.
Therefore, I am of the view that the Third Respondent was wrong in describing his Petition as an ""Appeal u/s 73 "". The Third Respondent was
also wrong in thinking that the order dated 21.10.2010 was an order u/s 36. The Second Respondent was equally wrong in recording a
preliminary finding in his order dated 21.10.2010, without realising that he had to proceed u/s 74 after following the procedure prescribed by
Section 75(4).
However, after issuing the communication dated 21.10.2010, the Second Respondent had conducted a full-fledged enquiry in terms of Section
75(4). If he was an Appellate Authority, the procedure prescribed in Section 75(4) could not have been followed.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that since the order dated 21.10.2010 was passed by the District Registrar, an Appeal
should have been filed to the next higher authority u/s 73(1) is equally wrong. This contention overlooks the Second Proviso to Section 35(3)
which makes Part XII applicable, once a Sub-Registrar is notified as a Registrar. Therefore, the order impugned in the Writ Petition is actually an
order passed u/s 74 after following the procedure prescribed by Section 75(4) and hence, the second contention of the Petitioner is liable to be
rejected.
Ground No. 3:
The third ground on which the impugned order attacked is that the Second Respondent could not have accepted the document for registration,
as the Sale Deed was not accompanied by a statement in the form of Annexure 1-A as required by Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Stamp
(Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968. Before considering the legal import of the said contention, I must record the fact that
there is no dispute on facts in so far as this aspect is concerned. The Sale Deed document in question is dated 21.6.2010. It was presented for
registration somewhere in July/August 2010. The Third Respondent was called upon to file the statement in the form of Annexure 1-A only in April
2011. Therefore, it is an admitted fact that when the Sale Deed document was presented for registration by the Third Respondent, a statement in
Annexure 1-A was not obviously enclosed to the Sale Deed. On this admitted fact, it should be seen whether the furnishing of Annexure-1-A
statement, at a later point of time, is acceptable or not.
Rule 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968, requires the party executing a document to
attach a separate statement to every instrument, furnishing information about the various items of properties involved in the transaction and his own
assessment of the market value of each of the items. Under sub-rule (1-A) of Rule 3, every instrument presented for registration, if it relates to a
building, should specify the particulars with regard to the building. The statement, whether under sub-rule (1) or under sub-rule (1-A) is required to
be ""duly signed by the party executing the instrument"". This requirement that it should be duly signed by the party executing the instrument, appears
to have been inserted by G.O. Ms. No. 1317, CT & RE Department, dated 27.11.1982.
Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 mandates the Registering Officer to satisfy himself that the party has attached with the instrument, a statement duly
signed by the party executing the instrument, giving the market value of each of the properties as required by sub-rules (1) & (1-A). Sub-rule (2-
A) of Rule 3 mandates that the Registering Officer shall refuse the registration of a document, if the market value of the property is not set forth in
the instrument. He shall also refuse the registration if the statement, as required by sub-rules (1) & (1-A), is not attached.
Therefore, it is clear from sub-rules (1), (1-A), (2) & (2-A) of Rule 3 that it is mandatory for the parties to attach a statement as per sub-rule
(1) or (1-A). The consequence of non-attachment of such a statement is that the Registering Officer should refuse the registration of the document,
as per sub-rule (2-A).
But if the Registering Officer refuses the registration of a document on the ground that the statement in terms of sub-rule (1) or (1-A), is not
attached, it is not the end of the matter. A party can always attach a statement and re-present the document once again for registration. The non-
attachment of a statement in terms of sub-rules (1) & (1-A) does not make the document or the transaction invalid. It only makes the document
unregisterable until a statement is furnished. This is why sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 uses the expression ""the Registering Officer shall before registering
an instrument"".
In this case, before registering the document, the Second Respondent appears to have issued a notice dated 8.4.2011 and the Third
Respondent did, in fact, file a statement in Annexure 1-A. It is only thereafter that the registration was completed. Therefore, I do not think that the
registration has become null and void on account of the failure of the Third Respondent to attach a statement in terms of sub-rule (1-A) in the first
instance.
On this aspect, there is one more issue. A statement under sub-rule (1) is required to be duly signed by the party executing the instrument. The
expression ""duly signed by the party executing the instrument"" was inserted into sub-rule (1) by G.O. Ms. No. 1317, dated 27.1.1982. Similarly,
by the very same Government Order, the very same expression was inserted into sub-rule (2), in so far as the statement under sub-rule (1-A) is
concerned. Therefore, the party executing the instrument in question is also required to sign the statement to be attached in terms of sub-rule (1)
and sub-rule (2). In the case on hand, the Third Respondent does not appear to have duly signed the statement under sub-rule (1-A). Therefore,
the next question, that arises as an offshoot of the third ground of attack to the impugned order, is as to whether the statement under sub-rule (1-
A) can be said to be non-est. If the statement attached on 11.4.2011 to the instrument of a Sale Deed dated 21.6.2010 is non-est in the eye of
law on account of the fact that it does not bear the signature of the Petitioner, then the Registrar should have refused to register the document by
virtue of sub-rule (2). But if the statement does not become non-est, then the District Registrar was right in proceeding with the registration.
The State of Tamil Nadu inserted a provision in the Registration Act, 1908, under the Registration (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 28 of 2000,
with effect from 14.4.2001. By the said amendment, Section 34A was inserted in the Registration Act, making it mandatory for every person
claiming under a document for sale of property also to sign such a document. In other words, in so far as the State of Tamil Nadu is concerned,
both the Transferor and the Transferee are obliged to sign the document for sale of a property, after the advent of Section 34A. No corresponding
amendment was carried in the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instrument) Rules, 1968. Therefore, sub-rules (1) and (1-A)
read with sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 make a mention only about the party executing the instrument. Consequently, if today a person claiming under the
document, does not sign the statement under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (1-A), he cannot be questioned, since the obligation for him to sign the Sale
Deed, arising u/s 34A, is only with respect to the document and has not been extended to the statement under the Rules. In other words, the Sale
Deed is required by the Act to be signed by both parties, but the statement in Annexure 1-A can be signed by one of them, namely the executant
alone. If that be so, I see nothing wrong in the Third Respondent himself signing the statement under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (1-A) of Rule 3. In
other words, the expression ""duly signed by the party executing the instrument"" appears to be only directory and not mandatory, provided it is
signed by atleast one of the parties. The provision would be mandatory, to the extent that it should contain the signature of atleast one of them.
Therefore, the third ground of attack is also rejected.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied upon a judgment of this Court in Subbulakshmi Ammal and Others Vs. Ganapathi and Another,
wherein it was held that the provisions of Rule 3(1-A) are mandatory. But a careful perusal of the said decision would show that it arose out of the
refusal of the Registrar to register a document. It was a Suit u/s 77 of the Registration Act, 1908. The refusal to register the document was not
merely on the ground that the statement under Rule 3(1-A) was not attached. The refusal to register in that case was also on other grounds.
Therefore, the said decision cannot be taken to be laying down a principle of law that has come up for consideration in this case.
Ground No. 4:
The learned Counsel for the Petitioner drew my attention to certain facts which he described as suspicious circumstances surrounding the so
called execution of the document in question. They are (i) that the stamp papers on which the instrument is typed do not match the stamp duty
payable; (ii) that the instrument is typed on single line space, which is not the normal practice; (iii) that the instrument contains a recital to the effect
that a sum of more than Rs. 13 lakhs was paid by way of cash, which is unbelievable and unacceptable; (iv) that the sale consideration of Rs. 90
lakhs mentioned in the instrument refers to the payments made in the year 2009, making it unbelievable that they were intended to be the sale
consideration; (v) that the Second Respondent failed to appreciate in the proper perspective the alibi produced by the Petitioner in the form of a
hotel bill to show that on the fateful day viz., 21.6.2010, he was actually in Nagapattinam and hence, could not have executed the Sale Deed; (vi)
that the District Registrar failed to see that the evidence of the attesting witnesses was wholly unbelievable, since they were only the employees of
the Third Respondent; (vii) that in any case, the attesting witnesses feigned ignorance of the transaction except that they identified the signatures;
and (viii) that there was no scope for anyone to execute a Sale Deed relating to such a huge property for a throwaway price. According to the
learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Second Respondent failed to consider these surrounding circumstances which raised a lot of suspicion about
the very execution of the document. The learned Counsel also submitted that the time lag between the alleged date of execution viz., 21.6.2010
and the date of presentation viz., 31.8.2010, was not properly explained. In this connection, the learned Counsel relied upon the decision of a
Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Avnash Rani and Another Vs. The Additional Deputy Commissioner-Cum-Registrar and
Others,
But I do not think that I can go into all those details. As I have observed earlier, the scope of the enquiry to be conducted by the Registrar u/s
35 read with Section 74, is very limited. There is a vast distinction between the execution of an instrument for the purposes of the Stamp Act and
the Registration Act and the execution of an instrument for all other purposes including the Transfer of Property Act. Something more is required
than a mere signature in a document, to prove its execution, for the purposes of establishing that title had passed on. But it is not the job of the
Registering Officer under the Registration Act, to find out if title had passed on. If he is invested with such a power, a Sub-Registrar would turn
himself into a Civil Court and decide disputed questions of title. This is why the Stamp Act is very cautious in giving a restrictive meaning to the
words ""execution"" and ""executed"" u/s 2(12). The surrounding/suspicious circumstances pointed out by the Petitioner, are relevant in a Civil Court,
filed either by him for setting aside the Sale Deed or by the Third Respondent for recovery of possession of the property on the strength of the Sale
Deed. They are irrelevant in so far as an enquiry u/s 74 of the Act, is concerned.
In the judgment of the Division Bench on the Punjab and Haryana High Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the High
Court set aside the order of the Registrar directing the registration of the Sale Deed. But in that case, the Division Bench found on record that there
was already a Suit for specific performance of an Agreement of Sale pending before the Civil Court. The party wanted to withdraw the Suit and
obtained an order from the Registrar. This appears to have weighed in the mind of the Division Bench and in this back ground, the Division Bench
also took into account the payment of sale consideration in cash as one of the suspicious circumstances. Therefore, the said decision is
distinguishable on facts. In view of the above, there are no merits in the above Writ Petition. Hence, it is dismissed. However, I make it clear that
the findings rendered by the District Registrar and confirmed by me with regard to the execution of the instrument by the Petitioner, are confined
only to the purposes of the Stamp Act and the Registration Act, and these findings may not have a bearing upon the issues arising for consideration
in a Civil Suit instituted either by the Petitioner for setting aside the Sale Deed or by the Third Respondent for recovery of possession. There will
be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed.