A.P. Sharma vs Secretary, Home Department, Government Of India And Ors

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

The petitioner was working as Constable in MPT Goa under the control of Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). He has been terminated by

order dated 15-6-2004 and appeal has also been dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General, CISF Unit, Goa.

Revision has been partly allowed by order dated 28-4-2005 by the Inspector General, CISF Unit, Goa and the petitioner was compulsorily retired from

service. Questioning the aforesaid orders, the instant writ petition has been filed before this Court.

At the outset, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to hear the matter, as the original order,

the appellate order and the revisional order, all, have been passed by the competent authority of CISF Unit Goa and therefore the writ petition

deserves to be dismissed on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.

Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that since the resignation was sent by the petitioner from Bhilai, Chhattisgarh and the appellate

order and the revisional order were served to the petitioner in the State of Chhattisgarh, therefore, this Court has territorial jurisdiction to hear the

matter by virtue of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. He relied upon a decision of the Sikkim High Court in the matter of Brg. Kanwar Kuldip

Singh v. Union of India and others 1996(3) SLR 389..

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions.

A Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao AIR 1953 SC 210 and

another Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and others

AIR 1954 SC 207 came-up for consideration before a larger Bench of seven judges of the Supreme Court in the matter of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v.

Union of India and another AIR 1961 SC 532 Â in which Their Lordships have held that it is not permissible to read in Article 226 the residence or

location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court, and observed as under: -

(13) ... The relevant words of Art. 226 are these--

Every High Court shall have power .. to issue to any person or authority .. within those territories..."".

So far as a natural person is concerned, there can be no doubt that he can be within those territories only if he resides therein either permanently or

temporarily. So far as an authority is concerned, there can be no doubt that if its office is located therein it must be within the territory. But do these

words mean with respect to an authority that even though its office is not located within those territories it will be within those territories because its

order may affect persons living in those territories? Now it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Art. 226 does not depend upon

the residence or location of the person applying to it for relief; it depends only on the person or authority against whom a writ is sought being within

those territories. It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Art. 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order

passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within

those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction. Thus if a

person residing or located in Bombay, for example, is aggrieved by an order passed by an authority located, say, in Calcutta, the forum in which he has

to seek relief is not the Bombay High Court though the order may affect him in Bombay but the Calcutta High Court where the authority passing the

order is located. It would, therefore, in our opinion be wrong to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the place where the order passed has effect in

order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court which can give relief under Art. 226. The introduction of such a concept may give rise to

confusion and conflict of jurisdictions. Take, for example, the case of an order passed by an authority in Calcutta, which affects six brothers living,

say, in Bombay, Madras, Allahabad, Jabalpur, Jodhpur and Chandigarh. The order passed by the authority in Calcutta has thus affected persons in six

States. Can it be said that Art. 226 contemplates that all the six High Courts have jurisdiction in the matter of giving relief under it? The answer must

obviously be 'No', if one is to avoid confusion and conflict of jurisdiction. As we read the relevant words of Art. 226 (quoted above) there can be no

doubt that the jurisdiction conferred by that Article on a High Court is with respect to the location or residence of the person or authority passing the

order and there can be no question of introducing the concept of the place where the order is to have effect in order to determine which High Court

can give relief under it. It is true that this Court will give such meaning to the words used in the Constitution as would help towards its working

smoothly. If we were to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the place where the order is to have effect we would not be advancing the purposes for

which Art. 226 has been enacted. On the other hand, we would be producing conflict of jurisdiction between various High Courts as already shown by

the illustration given above. Therefore, the effect of an order by whomsoever it is passed can have no relevance in determining the jurisdiction of the

High Court which can take action under Art. 226. Now, functioning of a Government is really nothing other than giving effect to the orders passed by

it. Therefore it would not be right to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the functioning of Government when determining the meaning of the words

any person or authority within those territories"". By introducing the concept of functioning in these words we shall be creating the same conflict

which would arise if the concept of the place where the order is to have effect is introduced in Art. 226. There can, therefore, be no escape from the

conclusion that these words in Art. 226 refer not to the place where the Government may be functioning but only to the place where the person or

authority is either resident or is located. So far therefore as a natural person is concerned, he is within those territories if he resides there permanently

or temporarily. So far as an authority (other than a Government) is concerned, it is within the territories if its office is located there. So far as a

Government is concerned it is within the territories only if its seat is within those territories.

In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, if the facts of the case are applied to the principles of law laid down in

Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), none of the respondents reside or located within the jurisdiction of this High Court and therefore the petition has to be

presented before the High Court within whose jurisdiction the respondents have had their offices or where the impugned order was passed. Merely

because, the petitioner is resident of the State of Chhattisgarh and impugned orders were served to him in Chhattisgarh, that would not confer

jurisdiction to this Court to entertain the writ petition.

In view of the aforesaid facts, this Court is of the considered opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. The writ

petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, this will not bar the petitioner to approach the jurisdictional High

Court for redressal of his grievance. No order as to cost(s).