Anthonisamy vs The Superintendent Of Police & Ors.

The dispute between the petitioner and respondents 4 to 6 is an extremely short one. Six gentlemen by names

The petitioner is the purchaser of the property from the aforesaid Vanaraj on 08.12.2022. In the said document, Vanaraj has not only transferred the property he owned in S.No.93/2A1A1, Vadaponparappi village, Malsiruvallur Madhura, Vanapuram taluk, Kallakurichi District, but also the right to the pathway he secured under the registered pathway agreement dated 26.09.2012. The petitioner claims that he attempted to use the pathway on 20.11.2025. The private respondents 4 to 6 prevented him from doing so. Hence, he moved the District Munsif Court, Sankarapuram in O.S.No.162 of 2025, seeking an order of permanent injunction restraining respondents 4 to 6 from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the pathway.

Pending the suit, he also filed an application in I.A.No.2 of 2025, seeking an interlocutory order of injunction restraining respondents 4 to 6 from preventing him from using the pathway. The learned District Munsif, Sankarapuram was pleased to grant an ex parte order of injunction. The application is still pending. As the interim order has not been complied with by respondents 4 to 6, the petitioner gave a representation to the police to grant police protection for enforcement of the interim order. As it was not favourably considered, he is before this Court.

Taking into consideration that the petitioner has an interim order in his favour and as it is the duty of the police to aid and assist in the implementation of the order of the Civil Court, this Court directed Mr.S.Yogaraja Sekar to take notice on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and to ensure that service is completed on respondents 4 to 6. Pursuant to these directions, Mr.S.Yogaraja Sekar not only is ready with instructions but has also ensured the service on the private respondents. Ms.U.Ramya has entered appearance for respondents 4 to 6.

Ms.U.Ramya has filed a counter of the fifth respondent on behalf of respondents 4 to 6. The counter does not dispute that Vanaraj had alienated the property in favour of the petitioner. The grievance expressed by the fifth respondent is that, while the pathway was set apart as a separate pathway for the six persons who were parties to the registered agreement dated 26.09.2012 and their successors-in-interest, the petitioner herein, taking advantage of the said document, had burdened the pathway with additional users. These users are none else than the purchasers of the property situated at the rear end of the passage. In other words, the plea of Ms.U.Ramya is that the petitioner wants to extend this private pathway and make it a public one accessible to one and all. She states, it was in those circumstances that respondents 4 to 6 prevented the access.

She points out that even prior to the purchase by the petitioner from Vanaraj, he had executed a document in favour of one Ramachandran on 13.09.2022 (i.e. three months before the purchase from Vanaraj) and that the passage was a subject matter of the sale. She states that the claim of the petitioner that he has an unbridled access over the property is untenable and that he is confined to the four corners of the registered pathway agreement dated 26.09.2012. She also raises a preliminary objection stating that as the petitioner has already approached the jurisdictional Civil Court, this writ petition for police protection is not maintainable.

Mr.S.Yogaraja Sekar reports that the police will comply with any directions that this Court issues.

I have carefully considered the submissions made on all sides. I have gone through the entire records.

Since a preliminary objection has been raised by Ms.U.Ramya, it will be considered first by this Court before going into the merits of the writ petition. While the argument of Ms.U.Ramya seems interesting, she fails to take note of the constitutional demand under Article 261 of the Constitution of India. In terms of the said provision, it is the duty of the executive to give full faith and credit, across the length and breadth of the country to the orders passed by courts. It is the duty of the executive, which includes the police, to afford protection and render assistance for implementation of orders passed by the jurisdictional Civil Court.

When an interim order is produced before the police and a plea is taken that the order is being violated, it is no answer to the person, who is benefited with an interim order, that he has to initiate proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2A for the purpose of implementation of the order. Order XXXIX Rule 2A is akin to the power of contempt. It empowers the Court to enforce its order under the pain of imprisonment or attachment. The fact that Order XXXIX Rule 2A exists does not mean the provision under Article 261 has to be wished away.

Therefore, this Court is of the view that as long as a party is empowered with an interim order, he is entitled to move either the jurisdictional Civil Court or this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a direction to the police to assist in the implementation/enforcement of the said order.

Furthermore, this Court would have to take notice of another aspect. It does not lie in the mouth of a person, who has violated the interim order granted, to argue that there cannot be a positive direction for enforcement of the order and the petitioner, having secured such an order, must be satisfied with the paper order alone. Hence, the preliminary objection raised by Ms.U.Ramya deserves rejection and is accordingly rejected.

Moving to the merits of this case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner's vendor one Vanaraj and the private respondents had entered into an agreement, setting apart portions of the respective property for creation of a pathway. While Ms.U.Ramya is right that the petitioner could not have alienated the pathway alone in favour of any third party thereby, creating new rights of access for the said third party over this property without the said property being a part of the property covered by the lands in the pathway agreement, I am not in a position to agree with her that the right of Vanaraj in itself is not alienable in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner is not a legal heir of Vanaraj, but would certainly be within the meaning of legal representative or assign. Whatever right, title and interest Vanaraj had over the property stood transferred in favour of the petitioner on 08.12.2022. Therefore, if Vanaraj and the five other gentlemen could use the pathway, so can the petitioner.

I find considerable force in the argument of Ms.U.Ramya that the petitioner is not entitled to burden the pathway created with usage by third parties. As much as respondents 4 to 6 are bound by the agreement, so too, is the petitioner, who is claiming under the said Vanaraj. When all these aspects have pointed out, Ms.U.Ramya states that respondents 4 to 6 will not object to the usage of the pathway by the petitioner. She adds that the petitioner must not permit any third party to use the pathway beyond the area set apart under the pathway agreement dated 26.09.2012.

Mr. V. Gunasekar is agreeable that the pathway be restricted only to the six persons, who had created and set apart the pathway for their exclusive usage on 26.09.2012. He states that the petitioner will not object for putting up a compound wall, preventing access for those beyond the area covered under the pathway to have access to it. He states he will file an undertaking affidavit to the said effect. For filing of the said affidavit, call on 12.10.2026.