Annasaheb Bandu Patil vs State of Maharashtra

The petitioner''s appeal against the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Wai, has been dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Satara on 23rd August, 1988. Aggrieved by that order this revision application has been filed in this court.

The petitioner is a driver by profession and was at the material time i.e. on 5th August, 1986 at about 1-15 p.m. proceeding towards Bangalore by Pune Bangalore Highway. The prosecution alleged that he suddenly applied breaks as a result of which the bus which he was driving turned turtle i.e. it faced exact opposite direction and my mind rally absent. It is common knowledge that the driver of the vehicle should know that if there Is light shower and the road is wet it became slippery and sudden application of breaks is bound to make the vehicle skid. Passenger loaded bus was the one which he was driving. Therefore in my opinion it is this action on the part of the driver of the vehicle that must be considered.

It is to be noted that the panchanama Exhibit 10 which has been duly admitted by the petitioner''s counsel in the court below shows that the road was straight at the material point of accident. The road was north-south. The width of the tar road was about 23 feet. At the western side of the tar road there was another newly constructed tar road of about 10 feet in width. At the eastern side, there was a kachha road of 9 feet. It is, therefore, not the width of the road or the truck being driven along the middle of the road that has compelled the driver of the bus to apply the breaks suddenly. So far as the head lights are concerned, it is seen that a truck with full speed was coming from opposite direction and he should have noticed its lights from sufficient distance. Besides this as is evident that the vehicle being driven at a low speed and that being so, it would have been possible for him to control the vehicle and stop in even at the spot. In my opinion it is application of the breaks that has been responsible for the skidding of the vehicle. This is described by the learned counsel for the petitioner as an error of judgment. In my opinion it is a case of negligence in that behalf and not mere error of judgment. Both the courts below have accepted the evidence of Shri Deshpande and other material i.e. panchanama and sketch and have come to the conclusion that there was rashness and negligence on the part of the driver. I would, however, say that it was not a case of rashness but surely of negligence and squarely covered by the provisions of Ss. 279 and 337 of the I.P.C.

I may mention here that the learned Magistrate has convicted the petitioner u/S. 338 of I.P.C. but there is no evidence of any grievous hurt being caused to any one as a result of the act of the petitioner. In that event conviction u/S. 338, I.P.C. will have to be set aside. I would therefore uphold the conviction u/Ss. 279 and 337 of I.P.C. and S. 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. So far as the sentence is concerned the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that this was his first offence. Considering the age, character and antecedents of the present petitioner, the learned Magistrate should have given him the benefit u/S. 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He submits that it was obligatory upon the learned Magistrate to record reasons for not giving that benefit to the petitioner. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision of this court reported in 1984 Mah LJ 472 Constancio Figueiro of Guirim Bardez. Goa v. State. The submission that in every case coming before the Court, a report of the Probation Officer should be called for, does not find support in this ruling. If the case is attracted by S. 360 Cr.P.C., then alone it is necessary for the Judge to assign reasons for not invoking the provisions of S. 360, Cr.P.C. For attracting the provision of S. 360, Cr.P.C., the Court has to find out whether having regard to the age, character or antecedents of the offender and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, the accused should be given the benefit of that provision. The Court has to act under it and if the Court wants to depart from it and not inclined to give this benefit, then it has to assign reasons. But if the Court is of the view, having regard to the circumstances of the case and the circumstances under which the offence has been committed, that the provisions of S. 360, Cr.P.C. could not be resorted to, then the Court is not to assign reasons u/S. 361, Cr.P.C.

In this case, both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that having regard to the gravity of the offence, the provisions of S. 360 are not attracted and I do not think sitting in revision I should take a different view.

However, so far as the substantive sentences imposed upon the petitioner are concerned, I have no hesitation in confirming that part of the order. It has been stated by the learned counsel that the petitioner has a long span of service of about 19 years and this was his first accident which he had the misfortune to meet with. He is 46 years of age as has been described in the petition. He has regular employment in the S.T. and has a family to maintain. According to the learned counsel''s calculation the petitioner has already undergone imprisonment from 6th September 1988 to 13th September 1988. He has paid the fine imposed in the lower court. In the circumstances while maintaining the conviction u/Ss. 279 and 337 of the I.P.C. and u/S. 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act, I direct that the sentence undergone from 6-9-1988 to 13-9-1988 is sufficient to meet the ends of justice.

Rule is made absolute in the above terms.

Ball Bond to stand cancelled.

Order accordingly.