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Judgment
Hon'Ble Jai Krishna Upadhyay, J.
Heard Sri L.M. Singh, learned counsel for the revisionist in Criminal Revision No. 4871 of 2026 (Ankit Vs. State of UP and another), Sri Prabhat Chandra Mishra, learned counsel for the revisionists in Criminal Revision No. 4962 of 2026 (Anshu alias Dinesh Singh and others Vs. State of UP and another) and learned AGA for the State.
The instant criminal revisions have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 23.06.2026 passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Auraiya in S.T. No. 149 of 2024 (State Vs. Shivam and Others) being as Case Crime No. 182 of 2023 for an offence under Section 147 and 302 IPC, Police Station - Auraiya, District -Auraiya summoning the revisionists for trial in exercise of power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C.
Both the revisions have been preferred against the same judgment and order dated 23.06.2026. Therefore, they are being heard together and decided by a common order.
Before addressing the rival submissions, it is crucial to outline the core question that falls for judicial determination in these connected criminal revisions. The primary issue is whether the learned trial court committed any patent illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional error in summoning the revisionists, Ankit and Anshu alias Dinesh Singh, Neelu Singh and Gulshan under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) in exercise of its discretionary powers, based upon the depositions of the witnesses of fact examined during the course of the trial.
Learned counsels for the revisionists submits that relating to occurrence dated 20.02.2023, First Information Report was lodged from the revisionists' side and the same is registered as Case Crime No. 181 of 2023 under Section 147 and 302 IPC, Police Station - Auraiya, District -Auraiya. It is further submitted that on the same date, another First Information Report was lodged bearing Case Crime No. 182 of 2023 under Section 147 and 302 IPC, Police Station - Auraiya, District -Auraiya by opposite party no. 2 against ten named accused persons. In the said FIR, after recording the statement of witnesses of fact, the Investigating Officer had submitted the charge sheet only against six persons and by which Ankit, Anshu alias Dinesh Singh, Neelu Singh and Gulshan (present revisionists) were exonerated. The matter was committed to the Court of Session where witnesses of fact, PW-1 namely Uma Devi alias Usha Devi as well as PW-2 namely Narendra Singh have been examined. Thereafter, an application under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. was moved with a prayer to summon the revisionists. On 23.06.2026, learned trial court had summoned the revisionists.
It is next submitted that PW-1 and PW-2 did not support the prosecution story in their cross-examination but learned trial court has ignored the same and summoned the accused-revisionists. He further submits that learned trial Court did not peruse the material of Case Diary and summoned the revisionists. The impugned order has been passed without appreciation of facts and evidence. There is no specific role assigned to the revisionists and they have been wrongly summoned by the trial court.
Learned counsels for the revisionists has relied upon the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and Others, AIR 2014 SC 1400, particularly paragraphs 98 and 99, which are reproduced hereinbelow:
"98.Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and an extra- ordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner.
99.Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of Cross-Examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C. the purpose of providing if 'it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence' is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused." The words used are not 'for which such person could be convicted'. There is, therefore, no scope for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused."
They added that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for summoning an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is clear and specific. It is true that the revisionist was named in the F.I.R.; however, no charge sheet was filed against him after investigation.
Per Contra, on behalf of the State, the learned AGA strongly opposed the criminal revisions and supported the summoning order passed by the trial court. He submitted that the trial court acted strictly within its legal jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. after carefully evaluating the material available on record. First, it was argued that the primary purpose of Section 319 is to ensure that no actual culprit escapes justice simply because of gaps, omissions, or deliberate flaws in the police investigation.The learned AGA emphasized that a police report or an exclusion by the Investigating Officer is never final, and the court is fully empowered to summon additional accused once credible evidence emerges during the trial. Second, the learned AGA contended that the oral testimonies of the witnesses of fact (PW-1 and PW-2) recorded inside the courtroom provided direct and specific details regarding the active involvement of the revisionists in the alleged crime. Third, the learned AGA pointed out that at the stage of summoning under Section 319, the trial court is not required to conduct a mini-trial or judge the final guilt or innocence of the accused, nor is it bound to wait for a complete cross-examination to finish before taking action. Finally, the learned AGA maintained that the impugned order of the trial court fully respects the binding principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh (supra), and since the discretionary power was exercised judiciously and sparingly to ensure that all participants in the crime are tried together, the revisions are completely meritless and deserve to be dismissed.
We have heard the learned counsels for the revisionists, learned AGA for the State, and meticulously perused the impugned judgment and order.
To evaluate the legal sustainability of the impugned summoning order, it is imperative to examine the precise legislative intent, scope, applicability, and limitations of the power vested under Section 319 Cr.P.C. along with the standards of proof recognized under Indian criminal jurisprudence.
Before proceeding, it would be best to produce the provision in question which is as follows; Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, titled "Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence," reads as follows:
"(1)Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.
(2)Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.
(3)Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.
(4)Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1), then—
(a)the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard;
(b)subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced."
This provision empowers the court to proceed against any person not being the accused if it appears from the evidence collected during any inquiry or trial that such person has committed an offence and could be tried together with the accused. The fundamental objective of this extraordinary power is to ensure that true offenders do not escape punishment due to investigative mistakes, ensuring all participants in a crime are tried together.
A very important aspect about Section 319 CrPC is when it can be invoked. The phrase "in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence" has been subject to extensive judicial scrutiny. The Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh(supra) clarified that this power can be exercised at any time after the charge-sheet is filed and before the pronouncement of judgment. For the purposes of this law, the "trial" only truly ends when the final verdict and sentence are announced. This means as long as the court case is still active and has not reached a final decision, new people can still be summoned if strong evidence against them comes to light.
Now, the question arises as to what constitutes "evidence" and what requisite standard of proof must it satisfy herein. The term "evidence" in Section 319(1) CrPC signifies material adduced before the court during the inquiry or trial. Crucially, this "evidence" is entirely distinct from the materials collected during the police investigation. Further, the evaluation and classification of evidentiary thresholds in criminal proceedings can be systematically categorized into three distinct tiers;
First, Prima Facie Evidence, which represents the baseline threshold required at the initial stages of criminal proceedings, such as taking cognizance or framing of charges. At this preliminary stage, the court is only required to see whether a ground exists for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, and a mere probability of complicity is considered legally sufficient to put the accused on trial.
Second, Strong and Cogent Evidence, which constitutes an elevated and rigorous standard explicitly mandated for invoking extraordinary provisions like Section 319 Cr.P.C. As settled by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Hardeep(supra), this standard requires much stronger evidence than a mere prima facie probability. It necessitates the emergence of compelling, robust, and cogent testimony during the trial, testimony of such high quality and credibility that, if left unrebutted or unchallenged, would ultimately lead to the conviction of the person sought to be summoned.
Third, Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt, which is the highest and final standard of proof required at the culmination of a full-fledged criminal trial to secure a conviction, wherein every incriminating circumstance must be firmly established and all reasonable hypotheses of innocence must be completely excluded by the prosecution.
The power enshrined under Section 319 Cr.P.C. operates strictly within the second category, i.e., the threshold of strong and cogent evidence. It is well-established through a catena of judicial pronouncements that the trial court is not required to attain the final satisfaction of proof beyond reasonable doubt at the stage of summoning an additional accused, nor is it expected to conduct a mini-trial or prejudge the ultimate guilt or innocence of the person. However, simultaneously, the power is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, and therefore, it cannot be exercised in a casual, cavalier, or routine manner based on vague allegations or weak probabilities.
So far as the case in hand is concerned, a meticulous examination of the record demonstrates that the occurrence dated 20.02.2023 gave rise to Case Crime No. 182 of 2023 under Sections 147 and 302 IPC, wherein opposite party no. 2 specifically named ten accused persons, including the present revisionists. Although the Investigating Officer submitted a charge-sheet against only six individuals while exonerating the revisionists (Ankit, Anshu alias Dinesh Singh, Neelu Singh, and Gulshan), such a finding by the police cannot operate as a legal embargo on the powers of the court. In accordance with the statutory framework of Section 319 Cr.P.C. detailed hereinabove, the moment the trial commenced and the witnesses of fact namely PW-1 (Uma Devi alias Usha Devi) and PW-2 (Narendra Singh) stepped into the witness box, their oral statements constituted substantive courtroom evidence. The revisionists' plea that the learned trial court failed to evaluate the materials contained in the Case Diary is wholly misconceived as the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is governed strictly by the judicial evaluation of evidence produced inside the courtroom during trial.
Next, evaluating the recorded depositions against the tier of standard of proof namely the benchmark of "strong and cogent evidence", this Court finds that the courtroom testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 go well beyond a mere probability of complicity. Both eyewitnesses have categorically deposed before the court, assigning specific overt acts and active involvement to the revisionists in the commission of the offence. Their testimony, if left unrebutted, possesses the requisite quality and probative value to potentially lead to conviction. Furthermore, the contention raised by the revisionists that PW-1 and PW-2 did not support the prosecution case during cross-examination is legally as well as factually untenable. Factually, a perusal of the trial record confirms that the essential core of the witness account pointing towards the active participation of the revisionists remains intact.
In light of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Auraiya, exercised his discretionary power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. with due judicial circumspection. The trial court, upon judicial application of mind, arrived at a satisfaction that the quality of evidence produced by the prosecution witnesses met the requisite benchmark of strong and cogent evidence necessary to bring the revisionists to trial alongside the other co-accused. The impugned order reflects a balanced, reasoned, and careful appreciation of the testimonies on record and strictly adheres to the legal benchmarks formulated by the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh (supra) as well as subsequent reiterations in cases like Sarabjit Singh v. State of Punjab 2009(16) SCC 46 and Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2017 (7) SCC 706.
The impugned judgment and order dated 23.06.2026 passed in S.T. No. 149 of 2024 is well-reasoned, legally sound, and suffers from no patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The evidence on record which was recorded before the trial court definitely makes out a case of strong and cogent evidence against the proposed accused persons. Consequently, both connected criminal revisions, Criminal Revision No. 4871 of 2026 and Criminal Revision No. 4962 of 2026 are devoid of merit and are hereby dismissed.
Copy of this order be sent to the court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
It is made clear that this order has been passed only to decide the instant criminal revisions and this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and the trial court will not be influenced with the observations made in this order while deciding the trial.