Anjay Chaudhary vs The State Of Bihar & Ors.

Date : 10-08-2026 Heard Mr. Prahalad Kumar Bhagat, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Nishant Kumar Jha, learned Advocate for the State.

The challenge in the present writ petition is made to an order contained in Memo No. 376 dated 24.02.2026, whereby the respondent Inspector General of Police, Magadh Range, Gayajee has been pleased to dismiss the appeal as time barred. The petitioner also challenged the initial order of punishment contained in Aurangabad District Order No.2438/2019 read with Memo No.6108/R.K. dated 30.11.2019 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Aurangabad as well as Order No. 971/2020 under Memo No. 1816 dated 06.10.2020 issued by the Superintendent of Police of Crime Investigation Department and Weaker Section, Bihar, Patna, by which the petitioner has been awarded punishment of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect in departmental proceeding No.107/2017.

Briefly stated, while the petitioner was working as Sub Inspector of Police in the Aurangabad District in the year 2016, he was subjected to a departmental proceeding bearing No. 107 of 2017, which culminated into punishment of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect vide impugned order passed by the Superintendent of Police.

It is the contention of the petitioner that the punishment has been inflicted upon the petitioner without serving the copy of the enquiry report and further the disciplinary authority also failed to consider the show cause reply filed by the petitioner. The order of punishment impugned herein is said to be wholly illegal and unsustainable in law. Since the petitioner was not aware with regard to the punishment imposed upon him, therefore, the delay has occurred in approaching the appellate authority. However, the appellate authority also failed to consider that where there is merit in the case, the delay should not come in the way of considering and deciding the appeal on its merits.

On the other hand, learned Advocate for the State, refuting the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that since the petitioner had been sleeping over his rights for more than five years, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. Referring to the prescription of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005, especially Rule 25 thereof, he further submits that any appeal must be preferred within a period of 45 days from the date on which a copy of the order appealed against is delivered to the appellant. Since the petitioner preferred appeal only after implementation of the order of punishment and admittedly after an inordinate delay of almost five years, there is no illegality in the order passed by the appellate authority.

Upon careful consideration of the submissions advanced by the learned Advocates for the respective parties and on perusal of the specific prescription as contained in Rule 25 of the CCA Rules, 2005, it is evident that against an order of punishment, an appeal must be preferred within a period of 45 days. However, the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period, if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid prescription, the petitioner is not able to satisfy this Court as to what prevented the petitioner to approach before the appellate authority after a delay of five years. In any circumstances, this Court is not satisfied with the grounds stated in the writ petition or the materials placed on record to explain the delay in approaching the appellate authority. It is further worth benefiting to recapitulate the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu; (1975) 1 SCC 152, where the Court clearly spelt out that “it is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.”

In view of the aforesaid facts, circumstances and the position obtaining in law on the ground of delay and laches, the writ petition stands dismissed.