Anita & Anr vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The applicants/appellants have filed the present application for seeking condonation of 349 days’ delay in filing the appeal.

It has been asserted that the applicants were never informed by the prosecution agencies of the State or the learned Trial Court about the details of the progress of the trial or about the judgment pronounced in the matter. They came to know about the decision of the case only when they attended the trial on 14.01.2025 before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Theog. The applicants made further inquiries and came to know that the trial had already been concluded in March, 2024, and the accused persons had been acquitted of all charges by the learned Trial Court vide its judgment dated 12.03.2024. The applicants approached their counsel on 23.02.2025 with the record. The delay in filing the appeal was due to the circumstances beyond the control of the applicants. Hence, it was prayed that the application be allowed and the delay in filing the appeal be condoned.

The application is opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a reply asserting that the applicant No.1 made a complaint to the police and FIR No. 88/2020 dated 27.06.2020 was registered in Police Station Theog, District Shimla, H.P. The trial was conducted by the learned Special Judge, Shimla and respondents No.2 and 3 were acquitted vide judgment dated 12.03.2024. The case was not found fit for filing an appeal/revision. The applicant was informed about the judgment dated 12.03.2024 by the office of the District Attorney vide letter dated 01.04.2024 (Annexure R-1). Hence, it was prayed that the application be dismissed.

A separate reply was filed by respondents No.2 to 4, taking preliminary objections regarding the lack of maintainability and locus standi. The contents of the application were denied on merits. It was asserted that the applicants were aware of the decision of the case. They failed to explain day-to- day delay, which is a requirement for the condonation. The appeal is hopelessly time-barred by limitation. There is no sufficient reason for the condonation of delay. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed.

Separate rejoinders denying the contents of the replies and affirming the contents of the application were filed.

I have heard Mr C.N. Singh, Advocate, learned counsel for the applicants, and Mr Lokinder Kutlehria, learned Additional. Advocate General for the respondent/State and Mr Rajinder Singh Chandel, Advocate, learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3.

Mr C. N. Singh, learned counsel for the applicants, submitted that the applicants were not informed about the progress of the trial as required under Section 15A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (SC & ST Act). They were also not informed about the decision of the case, and as such, could not file the appeal within time. They immediately contacted their counsel after coming to know about the decision of the learned Trial Court. The delay occurred because of a lack of knowledge. Hence, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the delay in filing the appeal be condoned.

Mr Lokinder Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned District Attorney had sent a letter to the applicant/informant Anita about the decision of the case; hence, the plea taken by her that she was not aware of the judgment is incorrect. The applicants have not shown any satisfactory reason for the condonation of the delay. Hence, he prayed that the present application be dismissed.

Mr R. S. Chandel, learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3, adopted the submission of Mr Lokinder Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. He submitted that the applicants have filed the present appeal to harass the respondents. They have failed to establish any sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. Hence, he prayed that the present application be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Co. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860, that the period of limitation has been enacted to ensure that the actions are commenced within a particular period and give effect to the principle that the law does not assist an inactive person. It was observed:-

“The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to en- sure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give eflect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to re- main dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus non dermientibus, jura sub- veniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time, as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.” (Emphasis sup- plied)

Therefore, the Court cannot ignore the provisions of limitations as they have been enacted with a salutary object. Respondent No.1 specially stated in the reply that the learned Public Prosecutor had sent a letter to the applicant/informant Anita about the decision of the case. The copy of the letter dated 01.4.2024 was also annexed as Annexure R-1. It was submitted that the copy of the postal receipt was not supplied by the office of the Public Prosecutor, and it was mentioned in response to application filed under the Right to Information Act that the letter was sent through ordinary post. Since there is no proof of the dispatch of the letter, hence the plea taken by respondent No.1 that the applicant was informed about the decision of the case cannot be accepted. This submission deserves to be rejected. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, corresponding to Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023, provides for a presumption regarding the regularity of the official act. This presumption would not be rebutted merely because the letter was sent by means of ordinary post and not through registered post. There is no reason to reject the plea taken by the State that applicant No.1 was informed about the decision and the plea taken by her that she could not file the appeal because of the non- communication of the decision by the State cannot be accepted.

It was submitted that the applicant was not informed about the pendency of the trial before the learned Trial Court, and a presumption can be drawn that she must not have been informed of the decision by the learned Public Prosecutor. This submission will not help the applicants. Section 15A(3) of the SC & ST Act provides that the victim has the right of a notice of any Court proceedings, and the Special Public Prosecutor of the State Government shall inform her about any proceedings under the Act. It is undisputed that the applicants appeared as a witnesses and they had notices of the date of the hearing. It was the choice of the victims to participate thereafter during the hearing, which they had not exercised, and they cannot take shelter behind the plea that no separate notices were issued to them about the date of the hearing.

It was submitted that the applicants have a very good case on merits, and the delay should be condoned. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, that the delay cannot be condoned because of the merits of the claim. It was observed:

“15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter that the court must take into consideration while consider- ing whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which the law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it can- not be presumed to be a non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side are equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the de- lay.

We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and prin- ciples of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damo- cles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.”

The applicants have no other reasonable cause for condonation of the huge delay of 349 days; therefore, the application cannot be allowed. Consequently, the instant application fails, and it is dismissed accordingly.

CR.A.(ST) No. 1257 of 2025.

Since the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, the present appeal is also dismissed as barred by limitation.