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Judgment
Chandra Reddy, J.—This appeal is against the order of Bhimasan-karam J. refusing to issue an interim injunction restraining the Respondent from executing his decree. The facts culminating in this appeal may be briefly stated.
O. S. No. 200 of 1952 was filed by the Respondent in the Court of the District Munsiff, Ramachandrapuram, on the foot of a promissory note executed by the father of the Appellants. The suit was decreed ex parte. It is said that the suit was not contested for the obvious reason that there was no defence thereto. When the execution was being levied, the Appellant filed a suit for a declaration that the suit promissory note was not binding on the minors for the reason that the debt incurred there under was tainted with immorality and illegality and therefore in execution of the decree the shares of the minors could not be proceeded against. The Plaintiffs prayed for a temporary injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing the decree. This was disallowed and a C.M.A. was preferred against it. Pending the appeal, the same request was made in this Court. Though an interim injunction was granted, it was dissolved by Bhimasankaram, J., in CM. P. No. 5211 of 1950. It is against this order that the present Letters Patent Appeal was filed.
In support of this appeal, It is contended. by Mr. Ramachandra Rao that the case comes within the four corners of Order 39, Rule 1, CPC and our learned brother Bhimasankaram, J., was in error in not granting the injunction. The main point for consideration, therefore, is whether the present case is governed by the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1, CPC Code. Mr. Ramachandra Rao wanted us to take into account, in deciding this question, the observations made by a Bench of this Court consisting of Chief Justice and Bhimasankaram, J. In Gopalacharyulu v. R. Veeranna AIR 1955 Andhra 142 (A), suggesting that the provisions of Order 39, should be enlarged so as to empower the Courts to grant injunctions in cases like the one that was dealt with by them. That was a suit filed by the archer as against the trustees for an injunction to restrain them from taking possession of the property u/s 87 of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act as amended in the year, 1953. Obviously, an injunction could not be issued as it would not fall within the terms of Order 39, Rule 1 (a) or (b) which only enabled a Court to issue an injunction where
any property in dispute is in danger of being wasted or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree or the Defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors.
It is to give effect to the suggestion of their Lordships that Clause (c) was added to Order 39, Rule l which recites that an injunction may be granted if
the Defendant threatens to dispossess the Plaintiff or otherwise cause injury or loss to the Plaintiff.
The question that falls to be decided is whether execution of a decree as in the present case would attract this clause. It could not be said that the Respondents are threatening to dispossess the Plaintiff. Can it be then said that the decree-holders were otherwise causing injury or loss to the Plaintiff In our opinion, to extend it to the case of a decree-holder who has put into execution his decree would be straining the language of this clause too much. To give that construction would be to enlarge the scope of the clause. The expression "cause injury or loss to the Plaintiff" can only mean do something wrongful which will result in loss or damage to the Plaintiff. It can have no reference to any loss caused by a person pursuing his legitimate remedies. The meaning of the word "injury" as given in Oxford Dictionary is "wrongful action or treatment, harm or damage." It could therefore have relation only to acts of a party which are wrongful and not to legitimate acts of persons who pursue the remedies allowed to them by law. To accept the interpretation sought to be placed on this clause is to put a premium on all the judgment-debtors who resort to obstructive tactics and who try to protract and prolong the litigation. In our opinion this clause is not meant to cover cases of decree-holders who are executing their decrees and it cannot bear the connotation that is attributed to it. Even otherwise no grievance could be made of the order for the reason that a Court is not bound to grant injunction in every case falling within the purview of Order 39, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure. The relief could be granted only in appropriate cases. It could not, therefore, be stated that the learned Judge has not exercised his discretion judiciously.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed.