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Judgment
T. Mathivanan, J.—This Memorandum of Crl. A. No. 44 of 2008, is directed against the judgement, dated 31.12.2007, and made in C.C. No. 245 of 2004, on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. III, Dindigul, acquitting the accused on the ground that the offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has not been satisfactorily established by the complainant as against the accused. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgement, the complainant has approached this Court by way of this memorandum of criminal appeal u/s 378(4)(5) of Code of Criminal Procedure.
For easy reference, the Appellant herein may hereinafter be referred to as the complainant and the Respondent herein may hereinafter be referred to as the accused.
The related facts and circumstances which giving rise to the memorandum of appeal may be summarised briefly as follows:
3.1. The complainant had taken the Cinema Theater under the name and style of Senthil Andavar Thirai Arangam on lease in the year of 2000 from the father of the accused, on payment of Rs. 2,25,000/- towards advance. After the expiry of lease period, the complainant had demanded to repay the advance amount of Rs. 2,25,000/- from the father of the accused, for that, he had repaid a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- on 22.12.2003. That on 22.12.2003, for the remaining balance of Rs. 75,000/-, the accused had issued three post-dated cheques dated 02.07.2004, bearing Nos. 757184, 757185 and 757186, drawn on ICICI Bank, Dindigul Branch. In witnessing there of, both the complainant and the accused had entered into an agreement in the presence of the witnesses.
3.2. When the cheques were presented on 02.07.2004, before the Canara Bank, Dindigul, for encashment they were bounced back on the ground Funds insufficient. An intimation in this regard was given to the complainant by his Banker on 03.07.2004. In consequent thereof, the complainant had issued a legal notice to the accused on 02.08.2004 and thereby put the accused under notice to pay the amount covered by the cheques. That notice was received by one Ramachandran on 03.08.2004. Since, the accused had failed to pay the amount covered by the cheques, the complainant had preferred a complaint u/s 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the learned Judicial Magistrate No. III, Dindigul.
3.3. When the trial Court, after taking cognizance of the offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, had explained the ingredients of the charges and questioned, the accused had pleaded innocent and claimed to be tried. In order to establish his case, the complainant had examined himself as P.W.1 and during the course of his examination Exs. P.1 to 13 were marked. On the other hand, neither oral nor documentary evidence was let in on behalf of the accused.
3.4. When the incriminating circumstances arising out of the testimony of the complainant were read over and explained, the accused had denied testimony of the complainant. On appraising the oral and documentary evidences available on record, the learned Judicial Magistrate No. III, Dindigul had proceeded to pronounce the judgement on 31.12.2007, finding the accused not guilty u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
3.5. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgement, the present memorandum of criminal appeal is preferred.
When the appeal came up for hearing, the Respondent had not chosen to make his presence either in person or through his counsel despite the services of summons on him. After adjourning for several hearings, the learned Counsel Thiru. L. Mathusudhanan was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the court on behalf of the accused.
Heard the learned Counsel for the complainant as well as the amicus curiae.
The learned Counsel appearing for the complainant while put forth his arguments, had submitted that the complaint filed by the complainant before the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Dindigul, was dismissed solely on the ground that the legal notice which is mandatory as contemplated under the provisions of 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act had not been served on the accused. He has also submitted that the trial court without properly scrutinizing the documentary and oral evidence adduced on the part of the complainant had proceeded to dismiss the complaint on vexatious ground. In this connection he had laid stress upon Ex.P11 which is the statutory legal notice sent to the accused on 02.08.2004.
On a cursory, perusal of Ex. P11 statutory Notice, it is very clear that it is dated back to 02.08.2004 and alleged to have been dispatched through post. Ex. P.12 is the postal receipt dated 02.08.2004. Ex. P.13 is the Postal acknowledgement which would disclose that the statutory notice under Ex. P.11 was received by one P. Ramachandran in the given address of the accused viz., N. Boopathy, S/o. C. Narayanan, M.D.S. Colony, Kodaiparaipatti, Dindigul. In the cross-examination of P.W.1 (Complainant), he had admitted that the statutory notice was sent to the accused on 02.08.2004 and he has also admitted that one Ramachandran had signed in the postal acknowledgement, which was marked under Ex. P. 13, as if he had received the notice.
It is obviously clear on the face of Ex. P.13 that beneath the signature of P. Ramachandran it is written as for N. Boopathy. When P.W.1 was in the witness box, a question was put to him by the learned Counsel appearing for the accused in the trial court stating that do you know the said Ramachandran who had received the notice is aged about 14 years and residing in the 2nd street from the street in which the accused is residing. Though P.W.1 had answered No, for this question it goes a long way to prove an important fact that the receiver of the notice (Ex. P.11) by name Ramachandran aged about 14 years is very well known to the accused and as such the accused having knowledge of the issuance of statutory notice under Ex. P.11, he could have received that notice from the said Ramachandran who is residing two street away from the street of the accused. Unless and until the said Ramachandran is known to the accused, the accused would not have given the details of the receiver of the notice to his lawyer. This piece of evidence has not been properly appreciated by the trial court. Since, the trial court has lost sight upon this important piece of evidence, it proceeded to pronounce a wrong judgement.
The learned Counsel appearing for the complainant while advancing his argument has taken this Court through the judgement of the trial court. At page 12 of the certified copy of the judgement, the trial court has discussed about the said Ramachandran aged about 14 years, who is alleged to have received the statutory notice under Ex. P.11, after putting his signature For N. Boopathy. But this important issue seems to have skipped out by the trial court. The learned Counsel has also made stress upon the proviso to Section 27 of General Clauses Act with regard to the presumption of service of notice under Ex. P.11 to the accused. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows:
Meaning of service by post:- Where any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression serve or either of the expressions give or send or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.
In this connection, he has submitted that the contrary plea, saying that the accused was not having proper knowledge of issuance of statutory notice, has not been proved, on the part of the accused and as such there is reason to believe that the notice in dispute has been properly served at the time in the ordinary course of post as evident from Ex. P.13. In order to substantiate his argument, the learned Counsel for the complainant has placed reliance upon the decision in (C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetly Muhammed and Anr.) reported in 2007 (3) R.C.R. (Cri) 185 : 2007 (3) R.A.J. 177 : 2007 (2) T.N.L.R. 70 (SC) : AIR 2007 SCW 3578. This case was placed before the three-Judge Bench in view of the Reference made by a two-Judge Bench, of the Supreme Court, pertaining to the question of service of notice in terms of Clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The actual question raised in the above sited case was Whether in the absence of any averments in the complaint to the effect that the accused had a role to play in the matter of non-receipt of legal notice; or that the accused deliberately avoided service of notice, the same could have been entertained keeping in view the decision in Vinod Shivappa's Case. The judgement in the above cited decision was penned down by the Hon'ble Thiru. Justice D.K. Jain, Judge, Supreme Court.
After considering the relevant facts and circumstances, his Lordship has observed as follows:-
Though the complainant issued lawyer's notice intimating the dishonour of cheque and demanded payment on 04.08.2001, the same was returned on 10.08.2001 saying that the accused was "out of station"." True, there was no averment to the effect that the notice was sent at the correct address of the drawer of the cheque by "registered post acknowledgement due". But the returned envelope was annexed to the complaint and it thus, form part of the complaint which showed that the notice was sent by registered post with acknowledgement due to the correct address and was returned with an endorsement that "the addressee was abroad". We are of the view that on facts in hand the requirements of Section 138 of the Act had been sufficiently complied with and the decision of the High Court does not call for interference.
In so far as the above cited decision is concerned, it is thus clear that the legal notice was actually sent to the correct address and when it was taken to the destination it was returned, and thereafter the returned envelope was enclosed along with the complaint. Under these circumstances it was observed by his Lordship that the returned envelope forms part of the complaint which would reveal that the notice was actually sent by registered post with acknowledgement due to the correct address.
Hence, it is concluded that the requirements of 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have been sufficiently complied with. On turning to the instant case on hand it is apparent that the learned Counsel appearing for the accused in the trial court had put certain questions to P.W.1 (complainant when he was in the box). The learned Counsel was able to supply all the details about the said Ramachandran who had actually received the notice on behalf of the accused (N. Boopathy). Therefore, from the conduct of the accused it would go a long way to prove that the legal notice under Ex. P11 was taken to be served upon the accused as contemplated u/s 27 of the General Clauses Act.
On the other hand, the learned Counsel Thiru. L. Mathusudanan, who was appointed as Amicus Curiae, had very well assisted the court by citing various decisions, which includes the decision in C.C. Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed and Another, , The learned Counsel Amicus Curiae has laid emphasis upon the following decisions which are as follows:
(1). Sarav Investment and Financial Consultants Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Llyods Register of Shipping Indian Office Staff Provident Fund and Another, ,
(2). Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. and Another Vs. National Panasonic India Ltd., ,
(3). K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Another, .
(4) D. Vinod Shivappa Vs. Nanda Belliappa, .
The decision reported in D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa has been referred to in C.C. Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed and Another, . In Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. and Another Vs. National Panasonic India Ltd., a Division Bench of Apex Court comprising their Lordships Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph. JJ. happened to answer for a question as to whether sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action for taking cognizance under the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is answered as under: It is one thing to say that a presumption is raised that notice is served but it is another thing to say that service of notice may not be held to be of any significance or may be held to be wholly unnecessary. Presumption raised in support of service of notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Its application is on the question of law or the fact obtaining. Presumption has to be raised not on the hypothesis or surmises but if the foundational facts are laid down therefor. Only because presumption of service of notice is possible to be raised at the trial, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the distinction between giving of notice and service of notice ceases to exist. It is also held that it is one thing to say that sending of a notice is one of the ingredients for maintaining the complaint but it is another thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself constitutes an offence. For the purpose of proving its case that the accused had committed an offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Ingredients thereof are required to be proved. What would constitute an offence is stated in the main provisions. The proviso appended thereto, however, imposes certain further conditions which are required to be fulfilled before cognizance of the offence can be taken. If the ingredients for constitution of the offence laid down in provisos (a), (b) and, appended to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are intended to be applied in favour of the accused, there cannot be any doubt that receipt of a notice would ultimately give rise to the cause of action for filing a complaint. As it is only on receipt of the notice that the accused at his own peril may refuse to pay the amount. Clauses (b) and, of the proviso to Section 138 therefore must be read together. Issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would. This Court has also carefully gone through the decision Sarav Investment and Financial Consultants Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Llyods Register of Shipping Indian Office Staff Provident Fund and Another, , After giving careful consideration this Court is of opinion that the facts and circumstances narrated therein are not made applicable to the instant case on hand.
On the other hand, the case in C.C. Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed and Another, is absolutely made applicable to the instant case on hand. The judgment has been delivered by a Full Bench by way of answering the question as to whether in the absence of any averments in the complaint to the effect that the accused had a role to play in the matter of non-receipt of legal notice. As adumbrated supra, since the returned envelope containing the legal notice was annexed along with the complaint and it thus, form part of the complaint which showed that the notice was sent by registered post with acknowledgement due to the correct address. Admittedly, the learned Counsel appearing for the accused in the trial Court while putting a related question to the P.W.1 when he was in the witness box.
Insofar as this criminal appeal is concerned the question as to whether the statutory notice under Ex. P11 has not been really served on the accused has been considered and decided in favour of the complainant. Excepting this issue, the other issues which are arisen in the case have to be decided and for this purpose the case in C.C. No. 245 of 2004 has necessarily to be remitted back to the trial Court.
In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the case in C.C. No. 245 of 2004 is remitted back to the trial Court for disposal afresh. Excepting the question of issuance of notice under Ex. P11, all other issues are left open to the trial Court. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the case within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
This Court places its appreciation on record for the excellent assistance rendered by Thiru. L. Mathusudhanan (Amicus Curiae). The High Court Legal Services Committee attached to this Bench is directed to pay the remuneration to Thiru. L. Mathusudhanan (Amicus curiae) as per the guidelines of the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority.
