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Judgment
Kumaraswami Sastri, J.—The first class Magistrate of Sankari passed orders u/s 133, Criminal Procedure Code, directing the counter-
petitioners not to work a cotton ginning factory during nights or to appear before the second class Magistrate, Trichengode, on the 25th March
1918 and move to have the order set aside or modified.
The counter-petitioners applied u/s 135 to the first class Magistrate to appoint a jury and a jury was empanelled u/s 138 who sent their verdict
to the Magistrate. The records were then sent by the first class Magistrate to the, second class Magistrate for disposal. The petitioners objected to
the order on the ground that the second class Magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter after the verdict of the jury, but their objection
was over-ruled. Hence this revision petition.
The question for decision is whether a Magistrate who sends a notice u/s 133 and directs a party to appear before another Magistrate is
competent to deal with the matter on receiving the verdict of the jury empanelled u/s 138. The case is one of first impression and agreeing with the
contention of the Public Prosecutor, I am of opinion that the first class Magistrate has jurisdiction.
Section 135 enables a party to obey the order or either to show cause or to apply to the Magistrate by whom the order was passed to appoint
a jury to try whether the order is reasonable and proper. Section 138 empowers the Magistrate who passed the order to empanel a jury and he is
given power to fix a date for the return of their verdict and to extend the time so granted. Form 17 of Schedule V of the Code requires that the
verdict should be sent to the Magistrate who passed the order and not to the Magistrate before whom the Magistrate passing the order directs the
counter-petitioner to show cause under Clause (1) of Section 135.
Section 139 enacts that if the jury or the majority of the jurors, finds that the order of the Magistrate was reasonable and proper or subject it to
a modification which the Magistrate accepts, the Magistrate shall make the order absolute. In other cases the proceedings are to be dropped.
Reading these sections, it seems to me that in all cases when the counter-petitioner elects to leave the matter to the decision of a jury, the case
has to be disposed of by the Magistrate who passed the order u/s 133.
If the effect of passing an order directing the counter-petitioner to show cause before some other Magistrate is to transfer all further proceedings
to such Magistrate and to divest the Magistrate who passed the order of all jurisdiction, it is difficult to see why the application u/s 135 Clause (b)
or the duty of empanelling a jury u/s 138 should be cast on the Magistrate who passed the order or why the verdict should be submitted to him and
not to the other Magistrate.
It has been argued for the counter-petitioners that the duty of appointing jurors is so important that the legislature did not want it to be
performed by a second class Magistrate but it should be observed that u/s 133 the accused may be directed to show cause before another first
class Magistrate and that no exception is made in such cases. It is also difficult to see how the act of calling together a jury is more important than
the decision as to whether the verdict of the jury is proper or the acceptance of any modification by them. If the latter duties can be performed by
the second class Magistrate, there is no reason why he should not empanel the jury whose verdict he has power to dispose of.
I am of opinion that the words ""the Magistrate"" in Section 139 Clause (1) refer to the Magistrate to whom application has to be made u/s 135
Clause (b) to empanel a jury and who u/s 138 does so.
I set aside the order of the Lower Court and direct that the application be disposed of according to law.