Andhra Pradesh Power Diploma Engineer''s Association vs Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and Another

Lingaraja Rath, J.—Whether an Advocate is eligible to appear before the Industrial Tribunal on behalf of a party in an Industrial dispute in his capacity as the Joint Honorary Secretary of the Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and whether the federation is an Association of employers, or is a federation of Associations of employers, are the questions arising for decision in this case.

Appearance of the counsel, Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy having not been entertained by the Tribunal, the 1st respondent-Electricity Board had come before this Court in Writ Petition No. 11101 of 1993 which was disposed of with the direction, while remanding the matter to the Tribunal, to ascertain after taking evidence as to the status of the Federation of A.P. Chamber of Commerce and Industry as an Association of employers or a Federation of Associations of employers and as to the nature of the office held by Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy. The Tribunal after taking evidence came to the conclusion of Mr. Reddy being not an Officer of the Federation, and the Federation itself being not a Federation of Associations of employers and held Mr. Reddy as ineligible to appear to support the case for the 1st respondent. The matter having again come up before this Court in W.P. No. 20626 of 1993, the learned single Judge reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held Mr. Reddy as entitled to represent the cause of the 1st respondent. The present appeal has been preferred against the decision.

Mr. Mukunda Reddy, the party-in-person appearing for the appellants, has relied upon the decisions in Hosing Ardasar Ichhaporiya Vs. Mahavir General Hospital and Another, ; Workmen v. Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, Hubli AIR 1966 Mysore 225 and Paradip Port Trust, Paradip Vs. Their Workmen, , in support of both the contentions raised in this appeal. On the other hand, Mr. K. Srinivasa Murthy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision in P. Mallesha v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal, Hyderabad 1977 LIC 248 and Mallela Suryanarayana and Others Vs. Vijaya Commercial Bank, both of which cases have been referred to in the judgment under appeal. It is submission of Mr. Murthy that proper interpretation of Sections 36(1) and 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would be to hold the words ''office bearer'' and ''an officer'' to convey the same meaning and that any one who is an ''office bearer'' in a company would be ''an officer'' for the purpose of the section and would be eligible to represent the management. According to him, the concept of a guaranteed payment or being subject to the control and direction of the management are not essential ingredients to be ''an officer''.

The concept of an ''officer'' was discussed in Suryanarayana''s case (supra) and a passage in Buckley''s Company Act was cited with approval. The passage observed that "a person who by the terms of his appointment is made and called an officer, who is appointed by the company, paid by the company and whose function is to act on behalf of the company and whose appointment is made not on a special occasion for a special limited purpose, but under the regulations governing the constitution of the company is an officer". In the decision in Paradip Port Trust case (cited supra) their Lordships observed, analysing the provisions of Sections 36(1) and 36(2) of the Act, that if a legal practitioner is appointed as ''an officer'' of a company or corporation and is in their pay and under their control and is not a practicing advocate, the fact that he was earlier a legal practitioner or has a legal degree will not stand in the way of the company or the corporation being represented by him. Basing upon the observation, submission is advanced by Mr. Reddy that an integral part of the test for an "officer" is both the payment as well as the control aspect, and that further a practising advocate can never become ''an officer'' of a company. Mr. Murthy however places reliance on the observations made by the Court in the very decision in paragraph 18 that no single test nor an exhaustive test can be laid down for determining as to who is an officer in absence of a definition in the Act. When such a question arises the Tribunal, in each individual case, will have to determine on the material produced before it whether the claim is justified.

The Tribunal considering the evidence led before it, took note of the evidence of R.W. 1, the Secretary of the respondent-Federation, that out of the four categories of members of the Federation, Firms and individuals are the fourth category and in that category, advocates are admitted for the purpose of representing the cases of the members of the Federation. The witness further stated that for that purpose the Federation maintains a panel of advocates and that they are called Honorary Secretaries of the Federation. The Tribunal found that such advocates are nominated as Honorary Secretaries but are not appointed and the Federation does not have control over the Honorary Secretaries. They are not salaried employees nor are there any terms of the appointment for them.

Since the question falling for decision has far-reaching consequences in respect of a widely adopted practice of representation of lawyers before the Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts, we feel that the question is apt to be resolved by a larger Bench. In that view of the matter, we direct the case to be put up before the Hon''ble the Chief Justice for constitution of an appropriate Full Bench to hear the matter.

This Writ Appeal coming on for hearing finally on 7-7-1995 before the Full Bench.