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Judgment
The appellant''s Vakil put his client''s case in the alternative. He first contended that the finding on the 4th issue with regard to the descent of the
plaintiffs from Tirumala, a member of the Ponnanikat tarwad, was against the weight of evidence. We were referred to the oral evidence and
reliance was placed more particularly on the admission alleged to have been made by Chenthamara, the last surviving member of the tarwad. We
see no reason to differ from the Subordinate Judge''s estimate of the oral evidence. As to the main fact spoken to, viz, that Tirumala was taken in
marriage by Rama Pisharodi and appointed his heir, there is no corroboration whatever and we note that the Subordinate Judge says that the
supposed occurrence is a very unusual one. If it be true that a woman of the Ponnanikat tarwad was so taken by a man of the Andale tarwad, that
circumstance alone does not help the plaintiff''s case. It is pretty clear that it is true, for the children of such a union would have been members of
the Ponnanikat tarwad and there is no pretence that they were so treated. The same observation applies to the alleged admission of Chenthamara.
It proves too much, for Chenthamara is supposed to have recognized an Andale man as a member of his own tarwad, whereas there is an entire
want of evidence that he or the plaintiffs were on other occasions or in other ways so recognized. Assuming that Chenthamara did really make the
alleged admission, we are unable to attach any weight to isolated acts of that character contradicted as they are by his conduct on other occasions
and the proved circumstances.
In our opinion the plaintiffs have failed to prove their descent from a member of the Ponnanikat tarwad.
The other branch of the alternative is this. Assuming the truth of the allegation made in the written statement that a member of the Andale tarwad
was taken in adoption by the Ponnanikat tarwad, the Vakil argues that the latter tarwad being now extinct, the plaintiff as members of the former
tarwad came in by virtue of Attaladakkam right. Why the allegation was made in the written statement we do not understand and still less do we
understand why there was an issue on the point.
The question raised has regard to the nature of the alleged adoption. It is argued that the effect of it was to take the person out of her tarwad as
far as present rights were concerned but not to sever her connection with that tarwad altogether as would be the case with an ordinary adoption
under Hindu law. According to the Kritrima form of adoption to which adoption in the Marumakkathayam system is likened by some of the
witnesses, the adopted child is not severed from his natural family and does not lose his rights of inheritance in it, (Mayne''s Hindu law, Section
188; Vasudevan v. The Secretary of State for India, I. L. R 11 M 174 If therefore, the appellant''s contention is sound, the Marumakkathayam
adoption is something different from both recognized kinds of adoption, and the relation established between the two tarwads is peculiar. In the
present case it is alleged that two such adoptions were made by the Ponnanikat tarwad whence it follows, according to the appellants'' argument,
that both the tarwads from which members were taken in adoption are Attaladakkam heirs of the Ponnanikat tarwad. There is really no evidence
to support the alleged custom. Witnesses are called who speak to it and others deny it, but the evidence is mere evidence of opinion. There is no
satisfactory proof of cases in which such a claim as is now made has been recognized. The result is that the appellants have failed in our judgment
to establish their claim in either way and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.