Ananda Pai vs State of Karnataka

V. Jagannathan, J.—The Appellant is before this Court following the trial court convicting him for the offence punishable u/s 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 1988 and being sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay Rs. 5,000/- fine with default sentence of one month.

The case of the prosecution, in short, is that, a complaint had been lodged by one Michael D Souza alleging that the accused was resorting to illegal stone quarrying in the land situated at Koudur Village, Karkala Taluk. In connection with the said complaint, the accused is said to have approached complainant Shontharam Chiplunkar, who was the Tahasildar of Karkala at the relevant time. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused tried to bribe the complainant by offering him Rs. 1,000/- in order to see that no adverse report is made against the accused. On 6.2.2001, when the complainant was in his office on duty, at around 4.00 or 4.30 p.m., the accused went to the chambers of the complainant and offered him Rs. 1,000/- bribe to give a favourable report and the complainant refused to take the said amount and threatened to lodge a complaint and thereafter; the complaint is said to have been lodged by P.W.9 Tahasildar with the police as per Ex.P-12. Thereafter, investigation was taken up leading to conducting the mahazar as per Ex.P-9 and, en completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed.

At the trial, following the accused denying the charge, the prosecution led the evidence by examining 11 witnesses and by producing 13 documents. The accused statement was recorded and the accused gave a separate statement in writing taking the defence that the amount of Rs. 1,000/- which he offered to the complainant was towards the N.S.C. On behalf of the accused, Exs.D-1 to D-3 were marked. M. Os. 1 and 2 were also produced on behalf of the prosecution.

The learned trial judge, after appreciating the evidence on record, took the view that the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and the evidence of P.W.9 complainant was found to have been corroborated by the evidence of P. Ws.1 and 2. Therefore, conviction and sentence followed.

Assailing the judgment of conviction, learned Counsel Shri S. Vishwajit Shetty for the Appellant argued that the trial court did not properly appreciate the evidence on record because, there are so many infirmities in the prosecution case rendering the prosecution case doubtful.

The first infirmity pointed out is that, in the complaint Ex.P-12, there is no mention of the presence of the eye witnesses for the incident viz., P. Ws.1 and 2. The second defect is that, the complaint was typewritten and despite that, the names of P. Ws.1 and 2 are not forthcoming in the complaint. The prosecution also did not examine the person who typed the complaint.

Nextly it is pointed out that the evidence of P.W.9 complainant has not been corroborated by P. Ws.1 and 2 inasmuch as, according to the version given by P.W.9, the accused offered the amount of Rs. 1,000/- to the complainant and the complainant, alter taking the cover and after counting the notes, got the complaint typewritten, whereas, P. Ws.1 and 2 do not speak of the complainant having received the amount from the accused and as such, there is no corroboration between P. Ws. 1 and 2 on one side and P.W.9 on the other.

The next defect in the prosecution case that is referred to by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that, it is not clear from the evidence as to where the complaint was received. According to the complainant, the complaint was typed in the office and the complainant, accompanied by the accused and P. Ws.1 and 2, went to the police station and there, the case was registered, whereas, the version of P. Ws. 1 and 2 is that, the police were summoned to the office of the complainant and there, the complaint was given along with other documents and P. Ws. 1 and 2 did not accompany the complainant to the police station.

It is then argued by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that there was no occasion for the accused to pay bribe of Rs. 1,000/- to the complainant because, the reports of the concerned officials had been received by the Tahasildar on 31.1.2001 itself and the said reports, which have been marked at Exs.P-4 and P-8 give a clean chit to the accused. Therefore, the question of the accused attempting to bribe the complainant does not arise. Moreover, no person by name Michael D''Souza, had been found residing at the village Ranganapalke and therefore, the very basis for the complaint against, the accused has not been sufficiently established. Under these circumstances, the trial court could not have convicted the Appellant when the presence of P. Ws.1 and 2 in the chamber of the complainant is not established beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the testimony of P.W.9 could not have been accepted by the learned trial judge.

Another ground put forward by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that, it is the case of the accused that he was asked to give Rs. 10,0.00/-''towards the N.S.C but the accused only gave Rs. 1,000/- and it was for the said purpose that the accused had offered Rs. 1,000/- to the complainant. The stand taken by the accused in his 313 statement also goes to confirm the aforesaid defence of the accused. For all these reasons and also relying on the decisions reported in Darshan Lal Vs. The Delhi Administration, and Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur Vs. State of Karnataka, , the learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that the Appellant is entitled to be acquitted and hence, the judgment of the court below be set aside.

On the other hand, the submission of learned Government Pleader Shri G.M. Sreenivasa Reddy for the State is that, the prosecution had brought home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and the evidence of P.W.9 complainant is supported by the mahazar Ex.P-9 and moreover, the Tahasildar had no axe go grind against the accused nor was there any vested interest to take revenge against the accused. The presence of P. Ws.1 and 2 in the chamber of the complainant has been established and the currency notes were seized in the presence of P.W.5. As such, the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity so as to warrant interference by this Court.

Having thus heard both sides, the point to be considered is whether it can be said that the prosecution had brought, home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.

The reason for the accused to approach the complainant is said to be a complaint given by one Michael D''Souza alleging that the Appellant had been indulging in illegal stone quarrying. The evidence of P. Ws.3 and 4 is to the effect that, after visiting the place pursuant to the direction given by the Tahasildar, the reports were submitted as per Exs.P-4 to P-8 and the inspection revealed that no complaint was lodged by any person by name Michael D''Souza residing at Ranganapalke. In fact, the evidence of these witnesses is that, a person by name Michael D''Souza was not found residing at Ranganapalke. The reports which are produced by the prosecution through these witnesses also reveal that no such illegal stone quarrying was carried on by the Appellant as alleged in the complaint of Michael D''Souza.

The further conclusion to be reached on the evidence of these witnesses is that, the reports were received on 31.1.2001, much prior to the date of the alleged incident. In other words, as on the date of the incident i.e., on 6.2.2003, the reports had already been received by P.W.9 to the effect that the Appellant had not indulged in illegal stone quarrying. P.W.9 himself has admitted that he has received the reports Exs.P-3 to P-6 on 31.1.2001.

Now, coming to the main incident, it is the case of the prosecution that on 6.2.2001, at around 4.00 or 4.30 p.m., the accused went to the chamber of P.W.9 and offered Rs. 1,000/- and at that time, the witnesses who were present in his chamber were P. Ws. 1 and 2. The evidence of P.W.9, the complainant, is that the accused offered Rs. 1,000/- as bribe and the complainant refused to accept the same and thereafter, the complainant received the envelop and on checking the envelop, he found ten notes of Rs. 100/-denomination and thereafter he got the complaint typed in his office as per Ex.P-12.

The presence of P. Ws.1 and 2 was spoken to by the complainant in his evidence. Whereas the evidence of P.W.1 Ranghunatha does not indicate that the complainant received the envelop and then checked the amount. But, according to P.W.1, the Tahasildar did not receive the envelop nor did the Tahasildar tried to find out as to what is there in the envelop. Same is the evidence of P.W.2 Ramachandra who also says that the Tahasildar did not receive the envelop nor the amount. Thus, the presence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 is rendered doubtful from the aforesaid evidence on record. If P. Ws.1 and 2 were present when the accused offered Rs. 1,000/- to the complainant, the said witnesses would not have differed with the say of P.W.9 on this material aspect. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the presence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 in the chamber of the complainant is doubtful carries enough force.

Coming to the complaint itself, it is produced at Ex.P-12 and it is a typewritten complaint. If P. Ws. 1 and 2 were present during the incident when the accused had offered Rs. 1,000/- to the complainant, the complainant would not have failed to mention the same in the typewritten complaint.

The Apex Court, in the case of Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur Vs. State of Karnataka, , has held that, where the complaint was a written document prepared before submitting to the police and there is no mention of the presence of some persons as eye-witnesses in such complaint, the presence of those eye-witnesses, therefore, has to be disbelieved.

In the case of Ismail Ibrahim Sayed v. State reported in 1975 Crl. L.J. 1335, relying on the Apex Court decision in Darshan Lal Vs. The Delhi Administration, , it has been held that, without an independent corroboration, the testimony of a complainant should not be considered sufficient to fasten a charge of bribery or abetment of bribery, especially when such corroboration could be produced and the court went on to set aside the conviction of the accused.

In the instant case, not only there is no corroboration of the evidence of P.W.9 by P. Ws. 1 and 2 in material particulars apart from the fact that the presence of P. Ws.1 and 2 itself is doubtful. But, the prosecution also has not examined the person who typed the complaint in the office of the Tahasildar. Although it is not a requirement that in every case, the person who typed the complaint should also be examined, in the instant case, having regard to the nature of the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 and their presence being rendered doubtful for the reasons mentioned earlier, the prosecution should have examined the person who typed the complaint in order to corroborate the evidence of P.W.9 that P. Ws. 1 and 2 were also present in the chamber of the complainant when the complaint was typewritten.

What follows from the above discussion is that, except the evidence of P.W.9, there is no other material to corroborate the complainant''s version that the accused offered Rs. 1,000/- as bribe to the complainant in order to receive a favourable report in his favour. The defence version is that, the accused went to the chamber of the complainant and offered Rs. 1,000/-towards N.S.C. though the complainant insisted Rs. 10,000/- to be given. The accused, in reply to his 313 statement, has come up with this defence by submitting a written statement in response to question No. 14 put to- him. In the written statement, the accused has stated that he was asked to pay Rs. 10,000/-towards N.S.C. when the accused went to the chamber of the complainant to enquire about the licence. As the accused was not in a position to pay that much of the amount, he offered Rs. 1,000/- towards the N.S.C., but the complainant gave it the colour of the accused having tried to offer bribe of Rs. 1,000/-. Apart from the said defence, the accused has also stated in his written explanation that, when he went and met the complainant, in his chamber, neither P.W.1 Raghunatha nor P.W.2 Ramachandra were present in the chamber of the complainant. He has also stated in his written explanation that Village Accountant Suresh Achar has given a report in favour of the accused in respect of the complaint said to be given by one Michael D''Souza.

Considering the entire evidence in its totality, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt as the testimony of P.W.9 suffers from serious defects and lacks corroboration in material particulars and thus rendering the testimony of P.W.9 difficult to accept as reliable. Therefore, the trial court ought to have given the benefit of doubt to the accused in the face of such evidence on record. The observation of the trial court that: the evidence of P.W.9 has been corroborated by P. Ws. 1 and 2 cannot be accepted since the evidence, if examined carefully, does not give the impression that P. Ws.1 and 2 have corroborated P.W.9 in all material particulars. The finding recorded is, therefore, not based on the evidence on record and the trial court did hot appreciate the evidence of the witnesses from proper angle.

For the above reasons, the judgment of conviction and sentence passed is liable to be set aside by giving the benefit of doubt to the accused and hence, I pass the following order:

The appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court is set aside. The Appellant; is acquitted of the offence alleged against him by giving him the benefit of doubt. The bail bond executed shall stand cancelled and the fine amount, if any deposited, shall be refunded to the Appellant.