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Judgment
The present Petition, under Section 25(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [“DRC Act”], seeks to assail the Order dated 19.08.2020 [“Impugned Order”] by which the learned Rent Controller [“learned RC”] had discussed the Application seeking leave to defend and directed the possession of the subject premises to the respondent herein.
Mr. Raghavendra Mohan Bajaj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, would contend that the learned Rent Controller has erred in passing the Impugned Order by failing to examine a fundamental issue going to the root of the eviction proceedings, namely, the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. He would submit that, in the application seeking leave to defend, the Petitioner had categorically disputed the existence of any such relationship and had specifically contended that the Respondent had failed to place on record any documentary evidence to substantiate the assertion that the Petitioner was a tenant in respect of the subject premises. Learned counsel would further contend that, despite the aforesaid specific denial and the objections raised by the Petitioner, the learned Rent Controller has neither examined nor returned any finding on this material aspect, thereby rendering the Impugned Order unsustainable.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would submit that the relationship of landlord-tenant is clearly established in view of the fact that there was a survey conducted by the MCD, and the report of that survey shows that the father of the petitioner herein was a tenant in the subject premises. He seeks to draw sustenance in this regard from the averment made in the Reply filed to the present Petition.
The arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties were limited to those as recorded herein above. In view thereof, this Court shall proceed to adjudicate the present lis on the basis of the same.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.1, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh2, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua3, has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.4, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover5.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intent underlying Section 25(B) of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against an Order passed by the learned RC is conscious and deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is, therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read as under:
“23.The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision- making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court sho uld not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned RC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute. Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Judgment suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the learned RC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be warranted.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the Impugned Order wherein the learned RC has discussed the “landlord-tenant relationship”, which reads as under:
“7.In the present case, the respondent has sought leave to contest the application for eviction mainly on two grounds i.e. (i) that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and (ii) that respondent is in adverse possession of the suit premises since 1980.
(i)So far as the plea of the respondent that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is concerned, in para 4 of the affidavit (annexed with the application under consideration), it is stated by the respondent that neither he nor his father ever paid any rent to the petitioner or his father and also that the petitioner has not supplied the rent receipts and the rent receipts, if any were forged and fabricated.
As per the documents placed on record by the petitioner, the property in question is duly assessed in the name of the father of the petitioner in records of the House Tax Department of MCD.
It was held by the Hon'ble Apex. Court of Delhi in Rita Lal Vs. Raj Kumar Singh AIR 2002 SC 3341 that “the tenant having been induced by the landlord so long as he remains in possession cannot deny the title of his landlord in view of the rule of estoppel contained in Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act. It was further held that the plea raised in the affidavit seeking leave to defend does not amount to raising a triable issue.”
It was held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Sri Ram Pasricha Vs. Jaganath & Ors. AIR 1976 SC 2335 that “in a suit for eviction – the tenant is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord.”
In Lado Vs. Nannu Ram 2015 (4) CLJ 364 Del, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that “mere denial of ownership of the landlord does mean that every case must be sent for trial involving years. It was further held that mere denial of ownership is no denial at all and it has to be something more.”
It is well settled law that bald allegations without any material on record to substantiate the same could not be looked into as mere bald allegations are not enough for grant of leave to defend. It was held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Rajender Kumar & Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & Ors. 155 (2008) Delhi Law Times 383 that:
“..... only those averments in the affidavit are to be considered by Rent Controller which have some substance in it and are supported by some material.”
(ii)It is the second plea of the respondent that he is in hostile, continuous and adverse possession of the suit premises since 1980 and prior to 1980 since 1963, his father was in possession of the same.
It was held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Ram Chander Vs. Smt. Ram Pyari 2004 (72) DRJ 545 –
“3.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends vehemently that once relationship of landlord and tenant is challenged, tenant is entitled to leave to contest the eviction petition. There is no dispute as to this proposition of law as it is the owner of the premises who has right to seek eviction of the tenant and none less on the ground of bonafide requirement of the premises. In this case petitioner claims himself to be the owner of the premises and not as a tenant. The authority of the Supra Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Manoj Kumar Vs. Bihari Lal (Dead) by LRs 91 (2001) Delhi Law Times 25 (SC) is not at all applicable in the given facts and circumstances of the case as any person who denies to be a tenant and claim to be the owner of the premises cannot claim to be granted leave to defend eviction petition as eviction proceedings initiated under the Delhi Rent Control Act cannot be converted into a title suit. The title of the party is always decided through civil proceedings. As such claim of the petitioner that he is the owner of the premises and not the tenant could have been vindicated by way of filing civil suit and not in the eviction proceedings.”
“4.The first and foremost requirement to become entitled to leave to defend is that there should exist relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. By denying the ownership or land lordship of the petitioner and claiming himself as owner, the petitioner can not be granted leave to defend the eviction petition.”
A perusal of the material on record would reveal that it is not in dispute that there are no rent receipts or tenancy agreements which were placed before the learned RC. The only point sought to be urged relates to the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.
The points sought to be urged before the learned RC in respect of a landlord-tenant relationship are, firstly, that there was a book maintained by the Petitioner’s father, which would evidence the tenancy receipts as between the parties. Secondly, it is urged that there is an MCD survey report, which evidences that the petitioner’s father was a tenant in the subject premises.
As is apparent, the Petitioner herein had denied the existence of any such book. Furthermore, there is no mention of any such MCD survey report in the Eviction Petition or in the Impugned Order herein. The said contentions seem to have been raised for the first time in the reply to the revision Petition. There is absolutely no document in support of the said contention which has been placed on record before this Court.
This Court finds that the Impugned Order suffers from a material infirmity inasmuch as the learned RC has failed to return any categorical finding on the specific contention raised by the Petitioner disputing the very existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. A perusal of the Impugned Order would reveal that, although the learned RC has noticed the objection raised by the Petitioner in this regard, the same has not been examined in its proper perspective. The learned RC has proceeded to reject the said objection primarily by relying upon the municipal house-tax records reflecting the assessment of the subject property in the name of the father of the Respondent, as well as certain judicial precedents dealing with the principle of estoppel against a tenant from disputing the title of the landlord. However, the question which arose for consideration was not merely whether the Respondent or his predecessor-in-interest could assert ownership over the subject premises, but whether the foundational relationship of landlord and tenant, on the basis of which the eviction proceedings had been instituted, stood established between the parties. The distinction between the two aspects assumes significance, particularly in view of the specific denial by the Petitioner that neither he or his father had ever paid rent to the Respondent or his predecessor-in-interest.
It was, therefore, incumbent upon the learned RC to examine the material placed on record by the parties and determine whether the plea disputing the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship was merely a bald denial or was supported by circumstances warranting consideration. It is also pertinent to note that the Respondent, in the present proceedings, has sought to rely upon an alleged MCD survey report to substantiate the existence of the tenancy. However, as already noticed hereinabove, there is no reference to the said survey report either in the eviction petition or in the Impugned Order, nor has any such document been placed on record before this Court. Consequently, the said plea, having been raised for the first time in the Reply to the present Petition, cannot be relied upon to supplement or cure the deficiency in the reasoning adopted by the learned RC.
This Court is conscious of the limited scope of its revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act and is not undertaking an independent assessment of the existence or otherwise of the landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. However, where a specific and material ground raised in the application seeking leave to defend has not been adjudicated upon, the omission goes to the root of the decision-making process and constitutes an error warranting interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The Impugned Order, therefore, cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the learned RC for fresh consideration, on the basis of the pleadings and material already available on record, and in accordance with law.
It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims, and the learned RC shall independently consider the aforesaid objection without being influenced by any observations made hereinabove.
Since the user and occupation charges have been paid during the pendency of the present Petition before this Court, the Petitioner is at liberty to take such steps as are available to him in law to recover the same in the event that he succeeds before the learned RC.
List before the learned ARC on 20.11.2026.
The present Petition is disposed of, along with pending Application(s), if any, in the aforesaid terms.