Anand Bhaskar Shirvalkar vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors.

Heard. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith and heard finally with the consent of learned counsel for the parties at the admission stage.

The Applicant has challenged the order dated 30^th January 2026 passed by the Respondent No.3–The Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, Mumbai (for short, ‘the Commissioner’) in Externment Appeal No.175 of 2025, whereby the externment order dated 28^th November 2025 passed by Respondent No.2–the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kudal, Dist. Sindhudurg (for short, ‘the S.D.O’) was confirmed. By the order dated 28th November 2025, Respondent No.2 externed the Applicant from three Districts, i.e. Sindhudurg, Kolhapur and Ratnagiri, for a period of one year. Therefore, the Applicant has preferred this Application.

The factual matrix of the case is as follows.

The Applicant is a Social Worker and an active politician, serving as Vice President of the Shiv-Sena political party in Sindhudurg District. He is also a businessman engaged in construction contracts. On 11^th November, 2024, a show cause notice was issued to him; however, he did not appear before the concerned Authority. At the outset, it appears that based on the registration of 17 offences shown in the chart below, the Applicant was externed by the respondents under section 56 (1) (a) and (b) and (2) of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 (for short, the “Police Act”). The said chart is as under;

Learned counsel for the Applicant vehemently contended that all the offences have been registered against the Applicant on account of political rivalry, as he had changed his political affiliation from one party to another; as such, the impugned orders have been passed. He further argued that, while passing the impugned order, the learned S. D. O. considered the offences for the years 2008 to 2022, which are stale, in the sense that there is no live link to the said offences. He further contended that Respondent No. 3, merely on the ground of registration of petty offences, passed the impugned order without following the principles of natural justice and without affording an opportunity of being heard to the Applicant. He has taken me through all seventeen offences registered against the Applicant and submitted that the nature of the offences clearly indicates that they were registered against him solely on account of political rivalry. He further submitted that the Applicant's wife is Mayor of the Kudal Municipal Council. The offences were registered against the Applicant at the instance of the leader of the rival political party. Therefore, he urged that the impugned order is contrary to the settled principles of law. Hence, he urged that the Application be allowed.

The learned A.P.P. submitted that seventeen offences have been registered against the Applicant and that he is a habitual offender. He submitted that, after considering the offences registered against him, the learned S.D.O., Kudal, has rightly passed the impugned order externing the Applicant from three Districts. The impugned order was passed on 28^th November 2025 and that the period of externment is to expire on 27^th November 2026. Therefore, according to him, on this ground also, no interference is warranted with the impugned order. He further submitted that the Applicant did not appear in the proceedings before the learned S.D.O. and, therefore, no interference is warranted in the impugned order as the order of externment is just and proper.

Having heard learned counsel for the Applicant as well as the learned A.P.P., the short question that arises for my consideration is :

Upon perusal of the Roznama produced on record, and as taken by the learned counsel for the Applicant, it appears that, on 18^th November 2024, the Applicant appeared before the S.D.O.; however, the complainant remained absent. Thereafter, both the Applicant and the complainant remained absent, and the matter was adjourned from time to time until 25^th November 2025. On 28^th November 2025, the complainant, i.e. the Police Inspector, Kudal, appeared before the S.D.O. and produced the relevant documents. However, without affording the Applicant an opportunity to be heard, the matter was closed for orders, and the order was passed accordingly. Thus, it appears that the S.D.O. has failed to follow the mandate of Section 59 of the Police Act. The S.D.O. has not afforded the Applicant an opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order.

A bare perusal of the aforesaid chart shows that the offences at Sr. No. 1 to 10 and 12 to 14 are registered against the Applicant for the years from 2008 to 2022, out of which he got acquitted from offences at Sr. No. 1 to 3 and 14 and other offences that are sub judice before the Court and are stale offences, in the sense, there is no live link between the said offences. Only offences at Sr. Nos. 11 & 15 have been registered against the Applicant in 2024, on the basis of which the said externment order was passed. So, the notice dated 11^th November 2024 was issued to the petitioner, and pursuant to that notice, the impugned externment order was passed on 28^th November, 2025.

Apart from this, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments of;

have dealt with the importance of the principles of natural justice, which include the need to give the parties an opportunity to be heard. Upon perusal of the aforesaid judgments, it is crystal clear that the right to be heard, also known as audi alteram partem, is considered a fundamental principle of natural justice. Although this right to be heard is not expressly enumerated as a fundamental right under the Constitution, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that, where the rights and interests of an individual are likely to be adversely affected, the principles of natural justice must be duly observed. The right to be heard is a core principle of natural justice. The right to move freely, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution, can be curtailed only in accordance with law and by following the due procedure prescribed therein. However, in the case at hand, the learned S.D.O. has failed to follow the aforesaid mandate and the requirements contemplated under Section 59 of the Police Act. On this ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

Besides, mere registration of seventeen offences does not, by itself, mean that the Applicant is a hardened criminal. The nature of each of those offences must be considered, including whether they are prima facie genuine or whether they were registered at the instance of someone else. Therefore, the mere registration of several offences does not mean that the Applicant has no right to reside in the city/town where he usually resides. Moreover, mere registration of the number of offences does not sustain an externment under Section 56 (1)(b) of the Police Act. The offences must either involve elements of force or violence, or fall within Chapters XII, XVI, and XVII of the Indian Penal Code. However, in all the cases, the allegations against the Applicant are that the Applicant formed an unlawful assembly to protest against the government by raising slogans. Prima facie, it does not appear that he used force or violence to commit a crime. Therefore, passing of the externment order without recording substantive satisfaction certainly infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India.

It is undisputed that offences at Sr. No.11 and 15 to 17 were under investigation and cannot be taken into consideration while passing an externment order, as the same would depend upon the outcome of the investigation. The investigating agency may or may not refer the accused to trial. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to issue the externment order on the basis of the offences, as the police investigation is ongoing. It is pertinent to note that the order of externment is not an ordinary measure, and it must be resorted to sparingly and in extraordinary circumstances. It was the duty of the Constitutional Court to test the said order within the well- settled parameters.

Apart from the aforesaid, I have perused the nature of the offences registered against the Applicant. Prima facie, the nature and circumstances in which the said offences have been registered indicate that the Applicant has been implicated therein on account of political rivalry. The learned A.P.P. has failed to point out the involvement of the Applicant in any serious offence and how the said offences could cause alarm, danger, or harm to any person or property.

Since all the offences registered against the Applicant are of a similar nature, I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the Applicant that the said offences came to be registered against the Applicant on account of political rivalry.

It further appears that the Applicant preferred an Appeal against the said order before the learned Divisional Commissioner. It was expected that the said Authority would consider the matter in its proper perspective and in accordance with law. However, the learned Divisional Commissioner, without considering the mandate of Section 59 of the Act and without affording the Applicant an effective opportunity of hearing, has mechanically and casually dealt with the matter and confirmed the order passed by the learned S.D.O. In my considered view, such an order, having been passed without due consideration of the statutory mandate and without affording an adequate opportunity of hearing to the Applicant, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, in the catena of judgments, has observed and held that the competent authority must be satisfied that the witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence against the persons proposed to be externed by raising apprehension on their part as regards their safety or property and without recording of the subjective satisfaction by the competent authority passing of the externment order is not of the standard required in law. It is also observed that, by passing the order of externment under Section 56 of the Police Act, a person's fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India are taken away. In the case at hand, it is not evident that the externing authority has recorded its satisfaction that the witnesses are unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public against the externee by reason of apprehension on their part regarding the safety of their person or property.

It further appears that pursuant to the impugned orders, the Applicant had suffered for more than 8 and a half months out of one year.

In light of the above discussion, in my view, the impugned order passed by the learned S.D.O and confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and both the orders are liable to be quashed and set aside.

As a result, the application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) which reads thus;

Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.

The Application is disposed of.