Amravati District Central Cooperative Bank Amravati Limited vs Hon'ble Minister, Co-operation, Marketing & Textile Department and others

On 17.08.2026, the following order was passed:

Accordingly, an affidavit of service is filed on record by the learned counsel for the petitioner and copies of the newspapers as directed vide the said order are also placed on record. Likewise, postal receipts evidencing the fact that notices were issued to respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 are also filed on record. In that view of the matter, the petition is taken up for final hearing.

Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

The present petition, filed by the Amaravati District Central Cooperative Bank, Amaravati Limited, challenges order dated 04.08.2026, whereby the revision filed by respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 was allowed.

The facts, as can be seen from the petition, are as follows:

It is this order which is impugned in the present petition.

I have heard Mr. C.S. Kaptan, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. P.A. Kadu, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. F.T. Mirza, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Shaad Mirza, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 87, 97, 153 and 339, Mr. S.V. Manohar, Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. R.R. Deo, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3, 35, 569, 696, 949, 168, 770, 788 and 922, and Mr. Bhambhurkar, learned counsel for respondent No. 639.

Mr. C.S. Kaptan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, initially, in his usual fair-mindedness, submits that the petitioner bank has no objection if respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 make fresh applications as directed by respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the petitioner has chosen not to challenge the said order of respondent No. 2. He, however, submits that the order of the revisional authority, i.e., respondent No. 1, is de hors the provisions of law. In his submission, admittedly, the amount for purchasing shares of the petitioner bank as also the admission fee is not with the petitioner bank at present and, therefore, the petitioner bank has a right to scrutinize the fresh applications (if and when received) as directed by respondent No. 2.

In this regard, he submits that the provisions of Section 23 of the Act of 1960 and more particularly sub-Section 2 thereof provide for an appeal which is admittedly filed in the present case. He, however, points me out sub-section (3), which gives finality to the decision of the Registrar in appeal. He, therefore, submits that, in view of the said fact, no revision would lie in the matter.

He further submits that, looking to the provision of Section 154 of the Act of 1960, order can be interfered with only when there is any illegality or impropriety in the order of the subordinate officer. He also submits that an opportunity of hearing is expressly granted in the said provision and, therefore, the omission of the authority to grant such hearing vitiates the entire order. He further submits that there is no error of jurisdiction warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction by the authority concerned. It is his submission that the wordings of sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 23 of the Act of 1960 along with Rule 19 of the Rules of 1961, clearly points out that there is a deeming fiction created and therefore there is no question of any illegality or impropriety.

It is his further submission that the same respondent No. 1 has allowed a revision filed by the petitioner bank in similar circumstances and, thus, there are conflicting orders passed in the matter. He further submits that, admittedly, till date, no application/s has been received nor has any money been deposited, which would entitle the respondents to become members of the bank. It is his submission that no opportunity has been granted to the bank to scrutinize the applications for membership and, therefore, the order of the revisional authority is illegal.

Per contra, Mr. S.V. Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for respondent Nos. 3, 35, 168, 569, 696, 770, 788, 922 and 949, points me out the bye-laws of the petitioner bank existing as on date. In his submission, it is not the case of the petitioner bank that the members who applied in pursuance of the existing bye-laws were not eligible on the date when they made such applications. No such case was put up by the petitioner bank either in its order which refused to enroll them as members, nor it was done before the appellate or revisional authority.

He points me out the order of this Court in the earlier round of litigation, where the petitioner bank chose to withdraw the writ petition. As far as the aspect of granting hearing is concerned, learned Senior Counsel submits that the order sheet dated 28.07.2026 clearly indicates that the preliminary objections are to be decided by the revisional authority along with the main revision. It is his submission that the petitioner bank never raised any grievance regarding the omission to give a hearing to the petitioner. It is, therefore, his submission that, in the absence of such a grievance being made before the revisional authority, the said submission cannot now be made before this Court. He also points me out the order by which the petitioner chose to withdraw the earlier writ petition, wherein also no such grievance of omission to give hearing to the petitioner was ever raised. He also points out the written submission filed by the petitioner bank, where also there is a conspicuous absence of such a grievance of not giving hearing.

It is further his submission that, as far as the order passed by the same authority in an identical set is concerned, in the said matter, the facts were totally different. The concerned member, i.e., non-applicant No. 2 therein, was already a member on 29.11.2025, much before the order was passed by non-applicant No. 1 therein on 31.12.2025. In this regard, alternatively, he submits that there cannot be any res judicata in revision and, therefore, supports the impugned order.

Mr. F.T. Mirza, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 87, 97, 153 and 339, submits that, in addition to what has been submitted by learned Senior Counsel Mr. S.V. Manohar, the entire exercise of the petitioner bank is aimed at depriving persons such as respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 from being members of the petitioner bank. In that view of the matter, it is his submission that the bye-law which provided for membership to individuals was amended in undue haste since, according to the bye-laws, a person who has been a member for two years preceding the date of voting is only entitled to vote in the said election.

Mr. V.G. Bhambhurkar, appearing for respondent No. 639, adopts the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsels.

Rival contentions fall for my consideration.

I have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned Senior Counsels as also gone through the record of the matter. In this regard, the scheme of Section 23 of the Act of 1960 is relevant. Section 23 is reproduced as under.

Furthermore, Rule 19 of the Rules of 1961 is also reproduced as under.

Section 23 is titled as “Open Membership”. Section 22 is titled as “Persons Who May Become Members” and contemplates that certain persons who are disqualified as provided in the said Section are the only persons who cannot be enrolled as members.

Section 23, which is titled “Open Membership”, and more particularly sub-section (1) thereof, contemplates that no society, without any sufficient cause, would refuse admission to membership to any person who is eligible under the provisions of the Act and as per its bye-laws. Rule 19 of the Rules of 1961 spells out the conditions to be complied with for admission as a member. The said rule provides that no person shall be admitted as a member of the society unless he has complied with all the conditions as laid down in the Act, the Rules and the bye-laws. Thus, from Section 22 and Section 23 of the Act of 1960 read with Rule 19 of the Rules of 1961, the intent of the legislature is clear. The general rule seems to be that persons who are eligible as per the provisions of the Act and Rules should be enrolled as members. It can further be seen that all those persons who comply with the conditions as laid down in the bye-laws of the society are necessarily to be enrolled as members.

It is with this intention that sub-Section (1A) of Section 23 is on the statute book. The said sub-section provides that even when a society refuses to accept the application from an eligible person, such person may submit the same to the Registrar, who is under a statutory obligation to forward the application to the society concerned within a period of 30 days. It also further provides that if the society fails to communicate any decision to the applicant within 60 days, he is deemed to be a member. Sub-Section (2) of Section 23 provides for an appeal by a person who is aggrieved by the decision of the society refusing him admission to its membership. Thus, granting of membership to persons who comply with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the bye-laws of the concerned society is a rule and refusal is an exception.

In the present case, the membership applications were made somewhere in the month of September/October 2023. Along with the said applications, the requisite amount of Rs. 1,000/- + Rs. 50/-, i.e., Rs. 1,050/-, was deposited. It is also an admitted position on the record that on the date of making such applications, the applicants were eligible to be enrolled as members. It was only on 13.10.2023 that the petitioner bank chose to amend the bye-laws. Even though a resolution to that effect was passed on 30.09.2023, the proposed amendment came to be registered only on 13.10.2023 pursuant to an order passed by respondent No. 2. It is worthwhile to mention here that the respondents herein submitted their respective applications for grant of membership before the registration of the said bye-laws on 13.10.2023. In this regard, Section 13(1) of the Act of 1960 is of relevance. The said Section provides that no amendment of the bye-laws of a society shall be valid until registered under this Act. It, therefore, follows that the effect of registration of the bye-laws would be from 13.10.2023 onwards and not before that. Thus, the fact remains that the registration of the bye-laws, if any, was effective only from 13.10.2023.

It is an admitted position on record that the said amendment to the bye-laws was challenged in an appeal under Section 152 of the Act of 1960 before the State Government. Thereafter, vide order dated 27.06.2024, the State Government directed the Divisional Joint Registrar to reconsider the registration of the bye-laws registered vide its order dated 13.10.2023. Even though the said order was challenged before this Court, the matter was remitted to the Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, to take a fresh decision. In pursuance of the said decision, the Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, passed an order on 17.01.2025 by which the proposed amendment to Clause 5A, among other clauses of the bye-laws, was rejected. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said order of respondent No. 2 is the subject matter of a writ petition, but he candidly admits that there is no stay to the effect, operation and implementation of the said order.

Thus, the fact remains that the amendment as proposed by the petitioner bank, even though it was registered by respondent No. 2 on 13.10.2023, was subsequently rejected vide order dated 17.01.2025. The necessary fallout of this would be that the amendment to the bye-laws has been refused and the old bye-laws which were existing as on the date when respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 made their respective applications for membership, are still valid. It is needless to mention that the order dated 17.01.2025 of respondent No. 2 disapproving the amendment to the bye-laws of the petitioner bank would relate back to the date when the amendments were sought to be made. It, therefore, necessarily follows that there is no amendment to the said bye-laws and the bye-laws stand as they were. It can, therefore, very well be said that when respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 made their respective applications, they were eligible and continue to be eligible thereafter also since the amendment as proposed by the petitioner bank to its bye-laws was disapproved by the competent authority, i.e., respondent No. 2. I am, therefore, not in agreement with the contentions of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner.

As far as the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that no opportunity to scrutinize the applications made by the individual persons for membership was granted is concerned, in my considered opinion, the submission is misconceived inasmuch as I have already observed supra that respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 were eligible in accordance with the bye-laws of the petitioner bank and they continued to remain eligible in view of the fact that the amendment was disapproved by the competent authority. There is no question of granting any opportunity of scrutinizing the applications of the respective applicants since, even according to the petitioner bank, there was no discrepancy in the applications made by respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 for membership and the only reason for refusing membership to them was that they were not eligible in view of the amended bye-laws. Now, since the amendment has been disapproved by the competent authority, there is no question of freshly scrutinizing the applications.

As far as the ground raised by the petitioner regarding the omission to grant a hearing is concerned, as has been rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S.V. Manohar, no grievance of such a nature was ever made before this Court in the earlier round of litigation, nor was it made in the written submissions filed before the authority or in the proceedings when the matter was closed for passing orders. The fact remains that written submissions were filed and taken on record by respondent No. 1 and have been considered in the impugned order. Thus, the ground regarding omission to grant a hearing is without any basis.

The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following judgments.

In the judgment of Prakash Ratan Sinha referred to supra, in paragraph 14 thereof the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the applicability of particular rules of natural justice must depend, to an extent, on the facts and circumstances of that case and that is only where there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit the giving of an opportunity of being heard. There cannot be any dispute about this proposition but, as I have stated supra, sufficient opportunity of hearing was given and, in fact, the petitioner bank submitted its written submissions. Furthermore, as observed supra, there was no grievance made at any point of time regarding the omission to give such an opportunity.

The Learned Senior Counsel has also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court Faime Makers Private Limited referred to supra, wherein it is stated that any quasi-judicial authority would not ordinarily have the power to unilaterally take a contrary view taken by a coordinate or predecessor authority at an earlier point of time. This judgment is not applicable in the present case since, as I have already discussed supra, the facts in the earlier revision decided by the same authority were different enough, which entitled respondent No. 1 to take a different view in the matter.

The learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on the judgment of Jay Anant Sagar Co-op. Housing Society referred to supra, to submit that a conjoint reading of Section 22 and 23 with Rule 19 clearly provides that any person seeking to be admitted as a member of the society has to apply in the form laid done for membership. In the said judgment, the scheme is discussed and there cannot be any dispute about this proposition. However, the facts in the present case are different.

He has also placed reliance on the judgment of Banganga Anurag Cooperative Housing Society Limited referred to supra, wherein the scheme of Section 22 and 23 is also discussed. He has further relied on Shivkrupa Sahakari Patpedhi Limited referred to supra to buttress the scope of Section 154 of the Act of 1960. Even though there is no dispute about the said proposition, a reading of the provision and, more particularly, Section 154 thereof would leave no room for doubt that the provision is wide enough to encompass every order or decision of the sub-ordinate authority. The provision is exhaustive in nature and no fetters can be put on the said provision, provided the statutory safeguards as mentioned in the said provision are complied with. Thus, the ground regarding non-granting of a right to scrutinize the membership of respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 does not hold any water in view of the fact that the said respondents were eligible from the date of their applications and the applications were accompanied by the requisite membership fee and were as per the provisions of the bye-laws.

As I have stated supra, the refusal to approve the amended bye-laws would relate back to the date when the said bye-laws were sought to be approved and, therefore, only because the petitioner has chosen to return the said applications along with the requisite demand drafts would not clothe it with the right to scrutinize the said applications again. The petitioner bank, in its own wisdom, has chosen to return the membership applications along with the requisite documents and now cannot take advantage of its own wrong in view of the fact that the proposed amendment has been rejected by the competent authority. If such a course is permitted, that would amount to putting a premium over the petitioner bank of its own wrong.

Mr. F.T. Mirza, learned Senior Counsel has rightly pointed me out a judgment of Shree Poornand Saraswati Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Sandeep Madhav Dhume and Others in Writ Petition No. 3589 of 2000, in which this Court, in paragraph 12, has clearly stated that there is no embargo on the powers of the Deputy Registrar to accept membership retrospectively. I am in respectful agreement with the said judgment of this Court since the facts are more or less identical. The membership of respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 has to be granted by testing their eligibility and competence as on the date of their application for membership. Only because subsequently, when the application forms were put up before the Executive Committee for consideration, the same came to be rejected in the light of the bye-laws which (admittedly) were subsequently not approved by the competent authority. That cannot be a reason to non-suit respondent Nos. 3 to 1134 if otherwise they fulfill all the other eligibility criteria. If such an exercise would be permitted, that would defeat the statutory scheme as engrafted under Section 23 of the Act of 1960 and Rule 19 of the Rules of 1961. There is nothing wrong with the order of the revisional authority which can be said to be perverse.

As far as preliminary objections regarding non-maintainability of a joint revision is concerned, the same is too technical in nature and is liable to be rejected. Further, as far as declaration about resolution dated 18.11.2023 is concerned, the same has become infructuous in view of the amendment to the bye-laws have not been approved.

As far as the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner is concerned, the same points out certain discrepancies in the order of the revisional authority. In the said additional affidavit, it is pointed out by the petitioner that, as far as respondent No. 837 in the present petition is concerned, the said person has sworn an affidavit stating that his signature on the membership application is forged. In addition to this, the said respondent has also stated in the affidavit that he has neither filed an appeal before respondent No. 2 nor filed a revision before respondent No. 1 and that his signature on the appeal and revision is forged.

It is also pointed out in the said additional affidavit that respondent No. 823 is already a member of the petitioner bank. Further, it is stated in the additional affidavit that respondent Nos. 354, 355, 666, 683, 868, 869, 870, 872, 873, 874, 875, 889, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 902 and 1112 never filed any appeal before respondent No. 2 against the order dated 20.11.2023 but, for the first time, these respondents have filed a revision before respondent No. 1. It is also stated in the said additional affidavit that, as per the order of respondent No. 2, one Shri Gopal Ramkrushna Chandan filed Appeal Nos. 94/2025 and 95/2025 and his name is at serial Nos. 313 and 314 in the order of respondent No. 2, but the name of this individual is also mentioned twice in the memo of revision at serial Nos. 254 and 255. Similar is the case of one Nilesh Shyam Kawadkar, Gita Nilesh Kawadkar and Anil Pandari Taral. The names of these persons appeared twice and, therefore, they would get a dual membership, which is contrary to the Act. The same is the case with Ashish Shriram Dharmale, Vilas Jagannath Bhande, Archana Mehendra Bhande, Yash Anil Bhande and Deepmala Vilas Bhande. I have perused the said additional affidavit.

In that view of the matter, writ petition is disposed of with following directions:

The order dated 04.08.2026, passed by respondent No. 1, which is impugned in the present petition, is modified, and the following directions are passed.