Amjad vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

This Appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 326 of 2019 dated 07.02.2019. Recovery citation dated 17.01.2019 was issued against the appellant-writ petitioner on the basis that an amount of Rs. 28,83,878/- was still due and payable by him to the Excise Department. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing Writ Petition (M/S) No. 326 of 2019 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the recovery citation dated 17.01.2019; and a mandamus commanding and directing the first respondent to conduct a high level inquiry and take action against the fourth respondent.

The appellant-writ petitioner's case is that, under the pretext of obtaining a loan from the Bank, the fourth respondent had pressurized him to sign on certain documents, which were later utilized by the fourth respondent to obtain an excise license to run a liquor shop fraudulently in the name of the appellant-writ petitioner; on the basis of the forged signatures, and other forged documents, the fourth respondent had wrongly procured a license to run a liquor shop in the name of the appellant-writ petitioner; and since it is the fourth respondent, who had defaulted in payment of excise dues, the said amount should be recovered from him and not from the appellant-writ petitioner.

In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge observed that, as per the existing records, the appellant-writ petitioner is the license holder under the Excise Act, 1910, and it is the liability of the license holder to deposit the amount which is due and payable by the license holder under the Act; if he has any grievance, he can always have recourse under law against the fourth respondent, or before the excise authorities themselves, for an act of forgery having been committed against him by the fourth respondent; an application, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., was filed by him, which is still pending; in view of Sections 24A, 3(1), 27 and 31 of Chapter 6 of the Excise Act, 1910, the appellant-writ petitioner was required to be treated as the licensee under the Excise Act, 1910, and he must be held to have been conferred with the privileges under the license; the liability to pay excise dues is on the person holding the license; excise dues are recoverable from the appellant-writ petitioner, who was the license holder at the relevant time; and the respondents cannot be faulted in seeking to recover excise dues from the appellant-writ petitioner. The writ petition was dismissed making it clear that the order passed in the writ petition would not affect the appellant-writ petitioner's right to take appropriate action, against the fourth respondent, under the Excise Act, 1910.

The appellant-writ petitioner's claim before us is that the fourth respondent had impersonated him, and had obtained an excise license in his name by forging his signatures; and since he is in no way concerned with either the liquor shop or the excise dues, and it was the fourth respondent, who was running the shop throughout, the excise dues, if any, can only be recovered from him and not from the appellant-writ petitioner.

While the submission of Mr. S.K. Shandilya, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner, that the appellant-writ petitioner cannot be mulcted with the liability to pay excise dues, when he did not even seek a license for running a liquor shop, cannot be said to be without merit, these are all disputed questions of fact which this Court would, ordinarily, not examine in judicial review proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If, as the appellant-writ petitioner now claims before us, he never ran the liquor shop nor did he seek a license, and it is the fourth respondent who had obtained a license and had run the liquor shop forging the appellant-writ petitioner's signatures, it is always open to the appellant-writ petitioner to file a suit, and establish forgery by adducing evidence, before the competent Civil Court.

We see no reason, in such circumstances, to interfere with the order under appeal. Suffice it to make it clear that neither the order under appeal, nor the order now passed by us, shall disable the appellant-writ petitioner from availing the remedy of filing a suit before the competent Civil Court against the fourth respondent and the excise authorities

Subject to the aforesaid observations the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.