Amit Kumar vs State Of Haryana

VIRINDER AGGARWAL, J. (Oral)

The present petition has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., 1973), being the third petition, for grant of regular bail to the petitioner during the pendency of trial in FIR No. 261 dated 04.07.2025, registered under Section 20(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and Section 20(c) of the NDPS Act, 1985, added later on, at Police Station Pundri, District Kaithal,

As per the prosecution, on 04.07.2025, SI Shubhkaran, along with other police officials, was on patrol duty when a secret informer disclosed that Bhupendra Singh and Amit Kumar, travelling in a white-coloured Hyundai Verna bearing registration No. HR35T-0219, were carrying ganja near Guru Brahmanand Ashram on Pehowa Road, Pundri. Acting upon the information, the police party reached the spot and apprehended both accused persons. Upon their request, DSP Gurvinder Singh, a Gazetted Officer, was called to the spot. In his presence, notices under Section 50 of the NDPS Act were served and, thereafter, the search of the vehicle was conducted. Six packets containing ganja were allegedly recovered from a white sack kept in the boot/dikki of the vehicle. The total weight of the recovered substance was found to be 31.730 kg, which falls within the commercial quantity. The contraband was taken into possession after drawing samples and sealing the parcels. The vehicle was also seized. The prosecution alleges that both accused were in conscious possession of the recovered contraband and, accordingly, the present FIR was registered under the provisions of the NDPS Act. The petitioner has remained in custody since 04.07.2025; the challan has been presented and 17 prosecution witnesses have been cited.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been in custody since 04.07.2025 and has no criminal antecedents. It is contended that the petitioner has been falsely implicated and that the prosecution has failed to attribute any specific act to him demonstrating conscious possession of the alleged contraband. As per the prosecution's own case, the petitioner was sitting on the conductor side of the vehicle, whereas the alleged 31.730 kg of ganja was recovered from the boot/dikki of the vehicle. Significantly, no contraband was recovered from the personal search of the petitioner. Thus, the question whether the petitioner was in conscious possession of the contraband, particularly when the same was allegedly concealed in the boot of the vehicle, is a matter requiring appreciation of evidence during trial.

Learned counsel further submits that the vehicle was not registered in the name of the petitioner and the registration certificate allegedly recovered from the vehicle was in the name of one Leela Ram. It is argued that mere presence of the petitioner in the vehicle, without anything more, cannot by itself establish conscious possession of the contraband allegedly recovered from its boot.

It is further submitted that the alleged recovery was effected in the presence of the DSP, who was called to the spot as a Gazetted Officer. However, despite the availability of an independent person, namely Ramesh Kumar, who allegedly came near the spot during the proceedings, he was not associated with the recovery and left after stating his personal difficulty. Learned counsel submits that the prosecution has not stated that any sincere effort was made to associate any other independent person from the locality.

Learned counsel also submits that there is a delay in forwarding the samples to the FSL. As per the FSL report dated 23.07.2025, the samples were received in the laboratory on 08.07.2025, whereas the alleged recovery was effected on 04.07.2025. It is contended that the prosecution has not satisfactorily explained the said delay in the final report.

Learned counsel further points out that the investigation is complete and the challan has already been presented on 23.09.2025. As many as 17 prosecution witnesses have been cited and, therefore, the trial is likely to take considerable time. The continued incarceration of the petitioner for an indefinite period, while the prosecution evidence is yet to be completed, would serve no further investigative purpose. The petitioner undertakes to comply with all conditions that may be imposed by this Court and to remain present before the learned Trial Court on each and every date of hearing.

Learned counsel also relies upon the order dated 07.09.2026 passed by this Court in CRM-M-35456-2026, whereby the co-accused in the same FIR has been granted the concession of regular bail. It is further submitted that the present petition is the third regular bail petition before this Court. The earlier two petitions were dismissed as withdrawn on 28.10.2025 and 08.05.2026.

Notice of motion.

Mr. Karan Veer Singh, Senior DAG, Haryana, has put in appearance on behalf of the respondent-State and has filed the custody certificate dated 15.09.2026, which is taken on record, subject to all just exceptions. As per the custody certificate, the petitioner has already undergone a total custody period of 01 year 02 months and 06 days.

Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition and submitted that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of bail by submitting that the alleged recovery is of 31 kilograms 730 grams of ganja flower-leaf (phool patti), which falls within the commercial quantity. It is further submitted that the quantity was duly weighed at the spot and the petitioner cannot seek to dispute the manner of weighing at the stage of bail. Learned State counsel further submits that the alleged recovery was effected from the vehicle in which the petitioner was travelling and, therefore, the petitioner cannot escape his liability merely on the ground that the contraband was recovered from the bootspace of the vehicle.

I have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at considerable length and have carefully perused the paper book as well as the material placed on record with their able assistance.

The right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The constitutional mandate is not confined merely to ensuring a fair trial but also obligates the State to conclude criminal proceedings within a reasonable time so that the process itself does not become punitive.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81, authoritatively held that the right to a speedy trial is an essential and integral part of Article 21, and that any procedure which permits prolonged incarceration without expeditious trial cannot be regarded as fair, just or reasonable. The aforesaid principles are in consonance with the Constitution Bench decisions in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (4) SCC 578, wherein it was held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 and constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene wherever inordinate and unexplained delay results in denial of substantive justice.

Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 and in Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC(Criminal) 271, the Court categorically held that "the right to a speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence." It was further held that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without commencement or reasonable progress of the trial, effectively converts pre-trial detention into a form of punishment and cannot be constitutionally sustained. The Court observed that if the State or the prosecuting agency is unable to secure an accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial, it cannot oppose the grant of bail merely on the ground of the seriousness of the allegations, as Article 21 prevails over statutory restrictions where continued incarceration becomes oppressive and justified.

This constitutional position has acquired greater significance in prosecutions under special statutes containing restrictive bail provisions. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is undoubtedly a stringent penal statute enacted to combat the menace of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The principle was specifically applied to prosecutions under the NDPS Act in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352. The Apex Court held that Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be construed so rigidly as to compel indefinite incarceration of an undertrial merely because the trial has not progressed. The Court observed that a literal interpretation of Section 37, divorced from constitutional values, would amount to sanctioning punitive detention before conviction. It was emphatically held that where the State is unable to conclude the trial within a reasonable time, the rigours of Section 37 necessarily yield to the constitutional mandate of Article 21. The Court further observed that Section 436A Cr.P.C. applies even to prosecutions under special statutes and constitutes an important legislative safeguard against indefinite pretrial detention.

Recently, in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC Online SC 1693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that prolonged incarceration militates against the most cherished fundamental right under Article 21. The Court observed that where the accused has remained in custody for an unduly long period and the trial is nowhere near completion, constitutional liberty must prevail over the statutory embargo contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court succinctly held that conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo when the constitutional guarantee itself stands threatened. Similarly, the Apex Court has recently reaffirmed these constitutional principles in.

Thus, the legal position that emerges from the above authorities is that while offences under the NDPS Act are undoubtedly grave and the statutory conditions governing bail are stringent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 remains paramount. Courts are required to balance the societal interest in effective prosecution with the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty. Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without meaningful progress in the trial cannot be justified merely by invoking the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In such exceptional circumstances, Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to harmonise the statutory restrictions with the fundamental right to personal liberty and ensure that pre-trial detention does not degenerate into punishment before adjudication of guilt. Where delay is inordinate and not attributable to the accused, constitutional courts are empowered to grant appropriate relief so as to prevent violation of Article 21.

It is equally relevant to note that while Section 37 prescribes stringent conditions for grant of bail, the NDPS Act itself reflects the legislative intent that such prosecutions should proceed expeditiously. Section 36 empowers the Government to constitute Special Courts for the very purpose of ensuring speedy trial of NDPS offences. Therefore, the statutory scheme itself proceeds on the assumption that greater restrictions on bail are constitutionally sustainable only when accompanied by equally expeditious adjudication. Where the State fails to provide the infrastructure necessary for speedy disposal, continued reliance upon Section 37 alone would produce an unconstitutional imbalance between individual liberty and societal interest. Delay defeats that legislative premise. If trials remain pending for years because of systemic inadequacies, repeated adjournments, non-production of witnesses, or institutional delays not attributable to the accused, continued incarceration ceases to be preventive and assumes a punitive character.

Be that as it may, the petitioner is in custody since 04.07.2025. The alleged recovery of 31 kilograms 730 grams of ganja flower-leaf (phool patti) has been effected from the boot/trunk of the vehicle and not from the personal possession of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised a specific contention with regard to the manner in which the alleged quantity has been calculated, submitting that while calculating the total weight of the contraband, the prosecution has also included the weight of the phool patti, which was required to be excluded for the purpose of determining the actual quantity of the contraband. In such circumstances, at this stage, it cannot be ascertained as to whether, after excluding the said weight, the actual weight of the contraband would fall within the commercial quantity. The question of actual quantity as well as the issue of conscious possession are matters which would require appreciation of evidence during the course of trial. The investigation stands completed and the challan has already been presented before the learned Trial Court on 23.09.2025. The prosecution has cited as many as 17 witnesses and, therefore, the trial is likely to take considerable time to conclude. It is also not in dispute that the co-accused in the same FIR has already been granted the concession of regular bail by this Court vide order dated 07.09.2026 in CRM-M-35456-2026. The petitioner has already undergone a substantial period of incarceration and is no longer required for custodial interrogation. Keeping in view the totality of the circumstances, particularly the period of custody already undergone, the fact that the alleged recovery was not from the personal possession of the petitioner, the dispute regarding determination of the actual quantity of the contraband and the likelihood of the trial taking considerable time, further incarceration of the petitioner would serve no useful purpose.

Accordingly, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be admitted on regular bail, subject to furnishing requisite bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned/Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate, as the case may be, and further subject to the following conditions:-