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Judgment
PER KRINWANT SAHAY, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER :
This appeal is filed by the assessee against the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC dated 24.03.2026 for the Assessment Year 2019-20. Grounds of appeal are as under :-
1.That the Ld. CIT(A) erred in upholding the reassessment and order u/s 148A(d), which are bad in law for non-compliance with mandatory procedure u/s 148A, as the assessee's reply and evidences to notice u/s 148A(b) were not considered, rendering the order illegal.
2.That the Ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the reopening of assessment based on vague and borrowed information without independent verification and application of mind by the AO, on existence of tangible material establishing escapement of income.
4.That the Ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the addition of Rs.1,72,14,502/- made by the ld.AO on account of alleged bogus purchases, ignoring the documentary evidences placed on record.
5.That the Ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the addition despite the fact that no defect has been pointed out in the books of account and the same have not been rejected u/s. 145.
6.That the Ld. CIT(A) erred in ignoring that the impugned purchases were fully supported by cogent documentary evidence viz: purchase invoices, e-way bills, GST records, stock details and bank payments with corresponding sales duly recorded and not disputed by the Ld. AO.
7.That the Ld. CIT(A) erred in sustaining the addition merely on the basis of suspicion arising from non-availability of the supplier, which cannot substitute legal evidence.
8.That the Ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the addition without any material on record to establish that purchases are fictitious or any cash has been received back by the Appellant.
During proceedings before us the ld. Counsel has filed additional grounds. The ld. Counsel argued that keeping in view the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of NTPC Limited Vs. CIT 229 ITR 383 (SC) this additional ground based on jurisdictional issue may kindly be taken up for hearing.
The Ld. DR argued that the matter may be taken up on merit.
During proceedings before us the ld. Counsel of the assessee has filed a synopsis on different grounds of appeal alongwith synopsis on additional ground which is also reproduced as under:-
Before the Hon'ble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “H” Bench, Delhi.
In re: Amit Jain, Rohini, Delhi vs. ITO Ward 49(1), Delhi
ITA No.4533/DEL/2026 for AY 2019-20
Date of hearing: 24.08.2026
SYNOPSIS OF ASSESSEE'S SUBMISSIONS ON ADDITIONAL GROUNDS
STATEMENT OF PRECISE FACTS
1.The Appellant is an individual engaged in the business of trading in PET bottles and scrap through proprietary concern M/s Shree Parsvnath Pet Udyog. The Appellant filed his return of income for A.Y. 2019–20 on 08.08.2019 declaring income of Rs.4,60,130/-, which was accepted u/s.143(1). Subsequently, notice u/s 148A(b) dated 31.03.2023 was issued alleging that the Appellant had made purchases of Rs.1,72,14,502/- from M/s R.S. International, stated to be a non-genuine entity.
2.The Appellant filed a detailed reply dated 06.04.2023 along with extensive documentary evidences including, Purchase invoices, E-way bills, GSTR-2A, Bank statements showing payments through banking channels, ledger accounts and Corresponding sales invoices establishing genuineness of purchases made.
3.The Id.AO, without considering the reply and evidences as mandated u/s 148A(c), passed an order u/s 148A(d) dated 13.04.2023 and issued notice u/s 148 on the same date with the prior approval of Pr.CIT Delhi-2.
4.The Appellant filed return in response thereto on 24.04.2023 where after, the case was taken in scrutiny with culmination of proceedings in passing of impugned order u/s.147 r.w.s.144BB on 03.03.2025, determining total income at Rs.1,76,74,630/- by making addition of Rs.1,72,14,502/- on account of alleged bogus purchases u/s 37(1).
5.The addition was made merely on the basis that the supplier was not traceable and was allegedly a "paper entity", without bringing any material on record to disprove the documentary evidences filed before the AO or to establish that goods were not actually purchased.
6.The Appellant preferred appeal before the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC, who vide order dated 03.03.2025 dismissed the appeal, confirming the addition solely on presumptions and investigation reports without rebutting the evidences of actual purchases, sales, and payments through banking channels.
7.The Appellant submits that both the reopening as well as the addition are illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to facts and law.
8.Further, the notice u/s 148 having been issued on 13.04.2023 is beyond three years from the end of A.Y. 2019–20, and hence approval ought to have been taken from the specified authority as per section 151(ii), which has not been complied with, rendering the reassessment void.
ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
1.148 notice issued beyond three years is bad in law, when not issued with prior approval of competent authority.
a)Notice u/s.148 issued on 13.04.2023 to reopen the case for AY 2019-2020, (Copy placed below at page 9) though falls beyond three years from the end of relevant assessment year, has been issued pursuant to order u/s.148A(d) passed on same date with prior approval of Pr.CIT, Delhi-2. But, in terms of clause (ii) of sec 151, the specified authority to grant such approval, where the notice was issued beyond three years from the end of relevant assessment year, was Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General.
b)Since the statutory notice u/s.148 has not been issued with the prior approval of competent authority prescribed under the law, the same is bad in law and all consequential proceedings/orders are also void ab initio. This issue is squarely covered by various decisions of the Hon'ble High Courts and also of the ITAT Benches across India, a few of which are cited below:
- Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Rinku R Rai vs. ITO (2023) 454 ITR 33 (Bom), where AO issued notice u/s.148 beyond the period of 4 years with the approval of Addl.CIT, which ought to have been obtained from Pr.CCIT or CCIT of PCIT or CIT in terms of sec 151, impugned notice was quashed. Importantly, SLP filed by revenue was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in ITO vs Rinku R Rai (2023) 151 Taxmann.com 479(SC).
- Agnello Oswin Dias Vs. ACIT Cir-20, dated 22.02.2024 in W.P.No.3249 of 2022 Bombay High Court. (Copy appended at Page 14 )
- Genpact India Holdings vs ACIT, Intl.Txn. of ITAT Delhi 'D' Bench dated 19.03.2025 in ITA No.1527/Del/2024 for AY 2016-17 (copy appended at Page 10-13)
- Siemens Financial Services (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2023] 154 taxmann.com 159/457 ITR 647 (Bom.), followed in Holiday Developers (P.) Ltd, Vs. ITO [2024] 159 taxmann.com 178 (Bombay) dated 29.01.2024.
- Hon'ble Madras High Court order dated 05.06.2025 in the case of Core Logistic Co. vs. Asstt.CIT (2025) TaxPub (DT) 3903 (Mad-HC) for AY 2016-17.
- Hon'ble ITAT Pune Bench order dated 07.05.2025 in the case of Chandrakant Vithal Bhopi vs. ITO (2025) TaxPub (DT) 3020 (Pune-Trib).
- In the case of Arthbharti Nagari Sahakari Patsanstha Maryadit vs ITO in ITA No. 1848/PUN/2024, AY 2018-19) 2025 TaxPub(DT) 1013 (Pune Trib) Dt.10.02.2025.
In the given facts of the case and in view of the judicial decisions supra, the jurisdictional notice u/s.148 having not been issued with the approval of competent authority, the same is liable to be quashed as illegal with consequent impugned order also to be held as void. It is prayed to be held accordingly.
Additional Ground No.2
Addition for alleged bogus purchases made under inapplicable provisions of section 37(1) of the Act.
i.After the reopening of case u/s.148, based on information from DDIT (Inv) 8(3), New Delhi that assessee had made payment of Rs.1,72,14,502 to one Mr Rohan Sharma Prop. M/s. R. S. International, a paper entity without any business, the Id.AO, overlooking all documentary evidence filed by assessee to justify actual purchases made from the said party, made addition of the said amount as bogus expenditure and disallowed the claim u/s.37(1) of the Act.
ii.In appeal, the Id.CIT(A) also upheld the addition (Para 6 on page 15-17 of appeal order) by relying upon investigation wing report that Mr Rohan Sharma Prop. R S International had bank a/c with DBS Bank showing credits of Rs.25.44 crore and debits of Rs.26.39 crores, but no ITR was filed. As per physical verification, no business was carried out at address of said party, which was a residential address no longer occupied. The party also did not respond to summons. Even during assessment also, the party did not respond to 133(6) notice. Hence, it was evident that M/s R S International was only a paper concern providing accommodation entries.
iii.Qua the GST status of the said party, the Id.CIT(A) in para 6.2 held that on checking the whereabouts of supplier on GST Portal, it was found that the two GSTINs associated with Rohan Sharma were invalid. One in the trade name of India Sales Corporation was cancelled on 02.07.2018 and the other in the trade name of RS International was cancelled on 20.11.2019.
iv.Also, as per the GST Portal, assessee's business of dealing in 'pet-bottle scrap' was not found mentioned in the goods listed in GST Portal of R S International.
v.Apropos various documents filed by assessee evidencing genuineness of purchases made from RS International, Id.CIT(A) in para 6.4 held that the same were intended to give colour of legitimacy to bogus transactions by routing the same thru bank accounts and by generating documents. Hence, on the face of overwhelming evidence showing R S International a paper entity, the purchases made from said party could not be treated as genuine.
Submissions before the Hon'ble Bench
i.The findings of the Id.AO that the assessee claimed bogus expenditure disallowed u/s.37(1), have been further strengthened by Id.CIT(A) by having access to the GST Portal of the supplier to establish that even his GSTINs were invalid.
ii.Therefore, when the Id.AO as also the Id.CIT(A) have firmly held that the assessee claimed bogus expenditure by taking accommodation entry and so, the whole of it was to be disallowed, then it could not fall within the ambit of sec 37(1) which applies to a case, where the expense incurred is not doubted or disputed, but the dispute is seen qua its use for the purpose of business.
Attention in this behalf is drawn to the decision of Hon'ble Delhi ITAT "E" Bench, in ITA No.3637/Del/2025 dated 31.12.2025 in the case of Harish Nagar Panipat vs. Pr.CIT, Rohtak, (copy appended below at page 15 - 22A) wherein the Id.AO having held that assessee had made bogus purchases of Rs.1,04,27,400/-, disallowed and added the same u/s.37(1) of the Act. But the Id.Pr.CIT, invoked powers u/s.263 and directed the AO to make the said addition u/s.69Cr.w.s.115BBE. In assessee's appeal filed before the Tribunal, the Hon'ble Bench, after comprehensively dealing with all facets of the matter, held that the invocation of section 37(1) was faulty and therefore, the order of Pr.CIT invoking section 69C, was upheld.
Identical view was also taken by the Hon'ble Delhi Bench "A" of ITAT in the case of Robust Resorts & Hospitality LLP vs DCIT in ITA No.4312/Del/2024 dated 12.11.2025 (Copy appended at page 23-25) wherein it was held that "The section 37 of the Act is a specific provision that disallows business expenses when it is found not to be wholly and exclusively for business. Where purchases and source of expense are not doubted and only doubt was regarding genuineness of expense, disallowance may be made under section 37(1) of the Act, by Assessing Officer and section 69C of the Act may not become applicable..."
Hon'ble Apex Court in CIT vs Indian Molasses Co(P)Ltd.(1970)78 ITR 474 (SC) held that to be an allowable expenditure u/s.37(1), the money paid out or away, must be (a) paid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business or profession (b) must not be (i) capital expenditure (ii) personal expense or (iii) or an allowance of the character described in sections 30- to 36. Paid out or away means,
Per contra the ld. DR argued that the jurisdictional issue taken up by the assessee that the notice issued u/s.148 of the Act is beyond the 3 years from the end of the A.Y. 2019-20 and as per law the mandatory approval u/s.151 to have been obtained from PCCIT concern whereas it has been obtained from the PCIT which renders the reassessment void-ab-inito.
The Ld. DR has also filed a written submission on this issue which is reproduced as under :-
BEFORE THE HON'BLE MEMBERS INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, H- BENCH, DELHI
In the case of : Amit Jain Appeal No. : ITA 4533/Del /2026 [ Assessee's appeal] Asst Year : 2019-20 Date of Hearing : 24.08.2026
MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONOURS
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
(On the additional ground relating to approving authority under section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961)
A. BRIEF FACTS
1.The present appeal pertains to Assessment Year 2019-20. A notice under section 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act") was issued to the Appellant on 31.03.2023, allowing 10 days to file a response.
2.After considering the reply filed by the Appellant, an order under section 148A(d) of the Act was passed and notice under section 148 of the Act was issued on 13.04.2023, with the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax ("PCIT").
3.By way of an additional ground, the Appellant contends that since the notice under section 148 was issued after a period of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the approval ought to have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax or Chief Commissioner of Income Tax ("specified authority" under section 151(ii)), and not from the PCIT. It is contended that the approval by the PCIT renders the reopening bad in law.
4.It is respectfully submitted that this ground is misconceived, both in law and on facts, for the reasons set out below.
B. STATUTORY SCHEME: SECTION 151 READ WITH SECTION 149(1)
5.Section 151 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, reads as under:
"Sanction for issue of notice.
151.Specified authority for the purposes of section 148 and section 149A shall be,—
i.Principal Commissioner or Principal Director or Commissioner or Director, if three years or less than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year;
ii.Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or [***] Chief Commissioner or Director General, if more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year;
[Provided that the period of three years for the purposes of clause (i) shall be computed after taking into account the period of limitation as excluded by the third or fourth or fifth provisos or extended by the sixth proviso to subsection (1) of section 149.]"
6.The above proviso to section 151 was inserted by the Finance Act, 2023 with effect from 01.04.2023. It expressly requires that, while computing whether "three years or less" have elapsed for the purpose of determining the approving authority under clause (i), the exclusions available under the third, fourth and fifth provisos to section 149(1), and the extension available under the sixth proviso to section 149(1), must be factored in.
7.The fifth proviso to section 149(1) excludes, for the purpose of computing limitation, the time allowed to the assessee to respond to the notice issued under section 148A(b).
8.The sixth proviso to section 149(1) further provides that where, after excluding the period covered by the third, fourth or fifth provisos, the time remaining for the Assessing Officer to pass an order under section 148A(d) is less than seven days, such remaining time shall be deemed to be extended to seven days.
9.It is submitted that these provisions must be read together and applied cumulatively to the facts of the present case in order to correctly determine the approving authority under section 151.
C. APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE
10.The relevant dates and the resultant computation are tabulated below:
Event Date Assessment Year 2019-20 (relevant AY ends 31.03.2020) Ordinary three-year period under section 151(i) expires on 31.03.2023 Notice under section 148A(b) issued (10 days allowed to respond) 31.03.2023 Response period under section 148A(b), excluded under fifth proviso to section 149(1) 31.03.2023 to 09.04.2023 (10 days) Residual time available to the Assessing Officer after exclusion, as on 31.03.2023 Nil (less than 7 days)
Deemed extension under sixth proviso to section 149(1) (7 days from expiry of exclusion) 10.04.2023 to 16.04.2023 Order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 issued, with approval of PCIT 13.04.2023 Conclusion 13.04.2023 falls within the extended period up to 16.04.2023. The case remains within three years for section 151(i) purposes. 11.As on 31.03.2023, the date of issue of the notice under section 148A(b), only nil/negligible time remained out of the ordinary three-year period (which itself expired on 31.03.2023). The 10-day response period granted to the Appellant, running from 31.03.2023 to 09.04.2023, stands excluded under the fifth proviso to section 149(1).
12.Since the residual time available to the Assessing Officer after this exclusion was less than seven days (in fact nil), the sixth proviso to section 149(1) operates to extend the available time to seven days, running from the expiry of the exclusion period, i.e., from 10.04.2023 to 16.04.2023.
13.The approval u/s 151, order under section 148A(d) and the notice under section 148 dated 13.04.2023, fall squarely within this extended period, which ends on 16.04.2023. Consequently, applying the proviso to section 151 in conjunction with the fifth and sixth provisos to section 149(1), the case continues to fall within "three years or less" for the purposes of section 151(i).
14.It follows that the approval of the PCIT, obtained for passing the order under section 148A(d) and issuing the notice under section 148, is the correct and legally valid sanction. There was no requirement in law to obtain approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner under section 151(ii).
D. THE PROVISO OPERATES PROSPECTIVELY AND IS SQUARELY APPLICABLE HERE
15.It is submitted that the proviso to section 151, having been inserted by the Finance Act, 2023 with effect from 01.04.2023, applies to actions taken on or after that date. In the present case, the order under section 148A(d) together with the notice under section 148 (13.04.2023) fall on or after this date, and the approval itself was accorded after 01.04.2023.
E. SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS
16.In view of the above, it is submitted that:
- The proviso to section 151, inserted with effect from 01.04.2023, is squarely applicable to the present case, since the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 were issued on 13.04.2023.
- On a correct computation under the fifth and sixth provisos to section 149(1), read with the proviso to section 151, the case falls within three years for the purposes of section 151(i).
- Approval by the PCIT was therefore the correct and valid approval in law, and the reopening cannot be held bad in law on this ground.
17.It is therefore respectfully prayed that the additional ground raised by the Appellant on the issue of approving authority under section 151 be rejected, and the order of the Assessing Officer be upheld.
We have heard both the parties on the jurisdictional issue and we have considered the written synopsis filed by both the parties on this issue. In our considered view the chart submitted by the revenue date wise clearly shows that the notice issued by the revenue in this case with the approval of the PCIT is within the required time as per the provision and amendments brought in the Act and, therefore, the additional ground on this jurisdictional issue taken by the assessee is dismissed.
Now we proceed to decide the case on merit. In the written submission filed by the Ld. Counsel of the assessee the issue on merit has also been discussed i.e. with regard to the conformation of addition made by the AO amounting to Rs.17214502/- as bogus expenditure of purchases. We find that the AO made this addition on the ground that the assessee could not substantiate the genuineness of actual purchases of material from one concerned i.e. M/s. R. S. International and the assessee also failed to provide any evidence in support of collection/ transport of material. Therefore, the AO treated the transaction as bogus expenditure claimed by the assessee. The Ld. CIT(A) on this issue as given his finding as under :-
6.The appellant has not denied that he effected "purchases" of Rs. 1,72,14,502 from m/s R.S. International (Proprietary Concern of Sh. Rohan Sharma (PAN: JRDPS8590A)). The appellant claims that the purchase was genuine.
6.1Investigation carried out by the investigation wing showed that this party (R.S international) was maintaining an account with DBS bank India Limited (A/c No. 820210215022). During the year it showed credits of Rs. 25.44 crore and debits of Rs. 26.39 crore. But he (Rohan Sharma) did not file any ITR. Physical verification revealed that no business was carried out at address of m/s R.S. International. The party of also did not respond to summons. During assessment also the party, Rohan Sharma (RS international) did not respond notice u/s 133(6). Physical verification showed the address of the concern was a residential address no longer occupied. Hence it is evident that m/s R.S. International is only a paper concern providing accommodation entries.
6.2In order to verify the genuineness of the supplier, its whereabouts was checked in the GST Portal. The information available is reproduced below shows that both the GSTIN associated with Rohan Sharma are invalid.
6.3it is also significant that as per the details in GST portal the party, RS International deals with the following goods: LIMESTONE FLUX WOVEN FABRICS OF SILK OR OF SILK WASTE, CRUSTACEANS, WHETHER IN SHELL OR NOT and the following services: "Other travel arrangement and related services nowhere else classified, Reservation services for accommodation, cruises and package tours".
6.4Appellant's business is completely unrelated. The appellant deals with pet-bottle scrap business. Therefore, the appellant cannot possibly have made purchases from RS international.
6.4The appellant filed various documents in support of his claim that "purchases" from RS international was genuine. It may be noted that the purpose of accommodation entry is to give bogus transactions the colour of legitimacy by routing the same through bank accounts and by generating documents. In the face of overwhelming evidence showing that RS international is a paper entity, the purchases from this party cannot be regarded as genuine. The addition made by the AO is upheld”
The Ld. DR relied heavily on the findings given below.
We have heard both the parties on the merits of this case and we have also considered the orders passed by the authorities below. We find that the AO has made the addition treating the entire purchases made from M/s. R. S. International a concern of Sh. Rohan Sharma as fictitious purchase, therefore, denied the expenditure u/s.37(1) of the Act and made the addition of that. The Ld. CIT(A) has also confirmed this addition accepting the logic from the addition made by the AO. But here it is important to note as pointed in the written submission filed by the Ld. Counsel of the assessee that the books of accounts were not rejected nor the sales made out of such alleged bogus purchases have been rejected by the revenue. It is also important to note that the profit earned on such sales have been offered by the assessee and the revenue has accepted taxes thereon. Therefore, in our considered opinion it is tantamount to double taxation if the entire purchases are denied. There is possibility that the assessee made purchases from grey market as sales have not been denied by the revenue of such purchases, therefore, instead of treating the entire expenditure for purchases as bogus only the profit evaded thereon should be brought to taxes. Therefore, in our considered view, in the fitness of things in case the net profit is enhanced by 2% on alleged bogus purchases, then the justice would be made. Accordingly, the AO is directed to re-compute income of the assessee and charge taxes there on.
In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed.
