Amit Agarwal and Others vs State of Sikkim and Another

S.P. Wangdi, J.—This is an application filed u/s 482 Cr.P.C whereby the petitioners have sought to quash FIR No. 23/2010 under Sections 406/ 420/ 498A/ 120B I.P.C. and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, under P.S. Singtam. Last Sikkim and all other proceedings emanating there from.

The undisputed facts of the case are that the petitioner No. 1 and the respondent No. 2 were married on 21.7.2007 after which they lived in their marital home at Sakti Nagar, Delhi. However, after sometime severe marital discord erupted between the two resulting in them separating on 6.3.2009 and the respondent No. 2 returning to her parental home at Singtam, East Sikkim. They have since been living separately. As expected various proceedings, both criminal and civil, were filed one against the other the details of which we may not go into, as being irrelevant for the purpose of disposal of the present proceeding. Suffice it to say that one of such case against the petitioners is FIR No. 23/ 2010 under Sections 406/ 420/ 498A/ 120-B I.P.C. and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, registered by Singtam. P.S., East Sikkim.

The parties appear to have ultimately arrived at a mutual settlement of the matter in terms of which it had been agreed by and between them that apart from making certain payments to respondent No. 2, cases filed against each other would be withdrawn. As it appears from the records. the parties did act upon the Memorandum of Understanding. (MoU) dated 25.7.2010 partially till such time the present proceedings were instituted by the petitioners. The present petition has been instituted on the sole ground of the marital dispute between the petitioners and the respondent No. 2 having been settled mutually on the basis of the said MoU. When the matter was moved on 12.10.2010, this Court. having been satisfied that a prima facie case have been made out by the petitioners, directed the State respondent not to give further effect to the FIR.

On 11.11.2010, however, the respondent No. 2 contested the version of the petitioners and submitted that she had agreed to enter into the MoU under compelling circumstances thereby completely transforming the dimension of the present proceedings. Being conscious of the circumstances under which jurisdiction of this Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised in matrimonial matters and, also keeping in view the oft repeated view of the Apex Court that considering the special features in matrimonial matters, it becomes the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlement of such disputes, this Court granted parties an opportunity to explore further possibilities for arriving at an amicable settlement of the matter.

As directed, the parties have submitted their respective reports facts of which need not be referred to as they stand admitted by them. But on the essential aspect there is a conflict. While the counsel for the petitioners seek further time for settlement, it is pleaded on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that as an amicable solution does not appear to be a possibility, the matter be heard and disposed off.

Mrs. Menuka Gurung, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners fervently prayed for adjournment of the matter on the ground of the senior counsel conducting the matter not being available today. This Court would have been inclined to grant such prayer under normal circumstances, but for the reasons aforesaid and today being the last working day before the long winter vacation, it is of the view that no useful purpose will be served in granting further time. The prayer is accordingly rejected and the matter taken up for hearing.

I have given thoughtful consideration of the entire records and respective submissions on behalf of the parties.

Contours of the power of the Court to quash a criminal proceeding, more particularly, in matrimonial matters have been well-established. The decision leading on the question is the case of B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, in which it has been held down as under:

The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H. V. Prasad and Ors., 2000 Cri LJ 3487, are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in matrimonial dispute by the courts, it was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counseled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case, There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts.

There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XXA containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code.

[Emphasis supplied]

It is thus clear from the above principle of law that in matrimonial matters, it would be most appropriate for this Court to exercise its power in quashing the FIR and the stages there from as prayed for, However, that would have been possible only if both the parties had been in unison so far as the factum of the mutual settlement was concerned. Unfortunately, in the present case, as have been already set out above, it is not. Under such circumstances, it would be impermissible in law for this Court to exercise the jurisdiction as is being sought for in the petition.

The gravity of the matter is that the order passed by this Court on 12.10.2010 has impeded the investigating agency from taking the investigation further to its culmination when it is so clear that there does not appear to be any reasonable possibility of the parties coming to a settlement. It would, therefore, be a travesty of justice in allowing the present circumstances to continue prevailing further.

In the above circumstances, the petition stands dismissed.

It is made clear that this order shall not in any manner impede the parties in arriving at an amicable settlement if they so desire.

No order as to costs.