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Judgment
Rakesh Kumar Garg, J.—Appellant filed a suit for declaration to the effect that he was deemed to have completed his 2 years'' probation on 29.06.1967 along with others and the orders extending his period of probation up to 30.09.1968 were illegal, null and void and that the plaintiff was entitled to the payment of arrears of pay and allowances for the period w.e.f. 29.06.1967 onwards along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
The aforesaid suit was contested by the defendants raising various preliminary objections including the objection that the suit was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as plaintiff had already filed a civil suit for declaration and the matter in question in the present suit and other suit was similar. On merits, it was submitted that probation period of the plaintiff was extended in accordance with the law.
After perusing the evidence on record and hearing the parties, the trial Court held that the plaintiff completed his probation period on 29.06.1967. However, the suit was dismissed being barred by limitation.
Appeal filed by the plaintiff against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial Court was also dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court vide impugned judgment and decree.
Still not satisfied, the appellant has filed the present appeal challenging the judgment and decrees of the Courts below.
I have heard the appellant who is appearing in person and counsel for the respondents. Record of the case has been perused.
The appellant was unable to show any perversity in the findings of the Courts below. However, It is relevant to mention at this stage that appellant had filed another suit i.e. Civil Suit No. 753 of 1994 which was decided on 24.10.1996 by Sh. T.C. Mangla, Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.), Jalandhar, wherein it was held that the plaintiff-appellant was confirmed as SDE w.e.f. 30.06.1967(i.e. On completion of 2 years of probation period). The aforesaid judgment and decree dated 24.10.1996 was challenged by the plaintiff as well as defendants by filing separate appeals which were dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 05.01.2001. The defendants-respondents as well as plaintiff filed Regular Second Appeals i.e. RSA No. 3143 of 2001 and RSA No. 2723 of 2001 which were decided on 29.08.2001 and 19.12.2007, respectively.
While dismissing RSA No. 3143 of 2001 the following order was passed:
The only submission of learned Counsel for the State in this case is that the Courts below have committed any illegality in going into the correctness of the adverse remarks recorded in the confidential reports for the period from 11.11.1966 to 31.3.1967; 6.6.1967 to 31.3.1968; 22.5.1968 to 31.5.1969 and 1.9.1971 to 31.3.1972.
After hearing learned Counsel and going through the record, I find that courts below have recorded a firm finding of fact that the representations made by the plaintiff against adverse remarks recorded in the aforesaid confidential reports were rejected by passing a non-speaking order i.e. "Considered and rejected" and that too after a lapse of period of 16 and 13 years. Lower Appellate Court has left it open to the competent authority to deal with the representations of the plaintiff pointwise and to pass a speaking order thereon.
Since liberty has already been given to the appellants to pass a fresh order on the representations made by the plaintiff, no prejudice has been caused to them. No other point has been urged. Dismissed.
While dismissing RSA No. 2723 of 2001, this Court noticed the fact that in pursuance to the directions contained in the order dated 29.08.2001 passed in RSA No. 3143 of 2001, the respondent-State has passed an order in compliance of the aforesaid directions in which the appellant has been cleared on probation w.e.f. 30.06.1967 vide order dated 14.12.2001. The aforesaid factual position could not be controverted by the appellant.
In view of the aforesaid findings, I find no merit in this appeal.
Thus, no substantial question of law arises for consideration of this Court. Neither any other substantial question has been shown to be arisen in this appeal.
Dismissed.
