Amar Singh vs Jangir Singh

Chopra, J.—This second appeal arises out of a suit for a declaration that an auction-sale of a vacant site in favour of the appellant will not bind the plaintiff''s reversionary rights after the death of the judgment-debtor. The site in question was sold to Amar Singh appellant for Rs. 44/- by an order of the Sub-Judge, Mansa, on 26-1-1998 in execution of a decree against Mt. Gurnam Kaur widow of Kartar Singh. Jangir Singh, a collateral of her husband, brought the present suit on 9th Jeth 2001. The trial Court originally decreed the suit, but the case on coming to the High Court was remanded for fresh decision on merits. It was then dismissed by the trial Sub-Judge, but the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda accepted the plaintiff''s appeal and decreed the suit. The defendant has come in appeal.

The only point that has been urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the District Judge was not right in holding that the sale was not for legal necessity. It is argued that a decretal debt by itself forms valid necessity for a sale of ancestral land, unless it is proved by the person impugning the sale that the debt was the result of extravagant habits of the judgment-debtor or was incurred for immoral purposes. The contention is not without some force. I am of the view that where an alienee who is an outsider, finds that the alienor''s debt is a decretal debt he need not make any further enquiry, and the reversioners will not be allowed to go behind the decree. This rule, however, will not apply where it becomes clear that the alienee''s suspicion could have been aroused by the surrounding circumstances or where it is proved that he actually had knowledge of the bad faith of the decretal transaction. Sale of property in execution, for satisfaction of a decree, would constitute a valid necessity, unless it is proved that the decree is collusive [or that the debts which resulted in it, were illegal or immoral. This principle of law appears to me to be well established. Even in a voluntary sale all that is required of an alienee is to see that the debts for which the sale is effected, are actually due and had not been incurred for immoral purposes or out of extravagance. In the case of a decretal debt the alienee can presume that the debts are actually due and unless the indications are that he must be aware or could have known that the debtor was of extravagant habits or used to lead an immoral life, he should be taken to have satisfied himself that it was a. just antecedent debt. In the case of an auction-sale during execution proceedings an outsider purchaser should, therefore, be presumed to have satisfied himself that the debt formed a valid necessity for the sale.

It has next to be seen if in the present case there were circumstances which should have led the auction-purchaser to believe that the decretal debt was raised for immoral or extravagant purposes. Partap Singh, the decree-holder, appeared as a defendant''s witness and stated that the debt had been advanced by him in small items at various occasions to Kartar Singh and to his widow after his death. The two witnesses examined by the plaintiff, who deposed that Kartar Singh was a drunkard, did not belong to the village of the parties. They could not say when Kartar Singh got into the habit of drinking. As already observed, the sale was effected in the year 1998 and no suit was brought by the plaintiff for more than three years. It is also significant that he himself was one of the bidders when the property was being sold. He must have been aware that the property was released in favour of the highest bidder. His not taking any action for three years and the fact that he gave a bid himself, go to show that he felt satisfied that the decree was for valid antecedent debts. Taking into consideration all the facts of the case, I feel satisfied that the auction-sale in favour of the appellant was for necessity and that the suit must fail.

The appeal is consequently, accepted with costs, the decree of the District Judge set aside and that of the trial Court restored.