Tribunals and Commissions(2004) 06 NCDRC CK 0059

AMAR KUMAR SINGH ROY vs W.B.S.E.B.

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 11 June 2004 · Citation: 2005 1 CPJ 415

HON’BLE JUDGES
M.K.Basu , S.Majumder , D.Karformas J.
RESULT
Appeal dismissed

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Judgment

2 paragraphs · 763 words
1.

BOTH sides are present through their learned Advocates. Petition for condonation of delay is first taken up for hearing. The delay in filing of this appeal amounts to practically 6 years and one month, certified copy of the judgment of Forum having been sent to the appellant on 22.8.1995 and the present appeal having been filed on 3.9.2001. The explanation given for such an inordinate delay is that after receiving the copy of the judgment of the Forum the appellant instead of filing any appeal, filed. Money Suit being No. 5/96 in the Court of Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Jangipur and that case was disposed of on 27.4.2001 against the appellant. Thereafter he filed this appeal before this Commission against the said order of the Forum challenging the same as illegal and unsustainable. Along with this appeal he has also filed a petition under Section 14 of the Limitation Act taking the plea that the period that was spent during pendency of that civil suit should be excluded. It has been urged by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the appellant was wrongly advised by his Counsel and without preferring appeal against the judgment of the order of the Forum. He filed the money suit before the Civil Court and the time was unnecessarily spent in conducting that case and this being not his intentional laches, the delay should be condoned. But we are unable to accede to such a contention. It is well settled that for Lawyer's fault the client cannot take a defence like this and cannot claim condonation of delay on such a ground. Section 14 of the Limitation Act only gives the Court discretion to consider a condonation petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a case where a lawful proceeding might have been started and in the prosecution thereof time was spent. But if any body institutes any proceeding not in accordance with the law, the provision of Section 14 cannot be invoked. In view of this position we are unable to treat this ground as sufficient for the purpose of condonation of the delay of about 6 years. The learned Advocate for the appellant has cited two decisions in support of his contention. In AIR 1972 Supreme Court 730, it has been held that the plaintiff was entitled to exclude under Section 14. The time spent in pursuing the earlier suit in computing the period of limitation and after this period was excluded the suit was found to be in time. But the facts and circumstance of this case are not at all identical with this present case. In that case under reference suit or the proceeding which had been commenced and in which the time was consumed was a lawful proceeding and under the law it had to be started and ended before the Court proceeding in question could be commenced. But in our case the position is far from this. Here a proceeding was started not in accordance with the law but as per the sweet Will and whims of the party concerned. Therefore, the time spent on it cannot be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. Another ruling which is relied upon by the appellant is the decision reported in AIR 1978 Supreme Court 537. It has been held here by Their Lordships that a delay which arose out of the failure of the petitioner to deposit the money within a specified time frame prescribed by the Code could not attract the rule of law of limitation and in such a case the delay should be condoned. It is needless to point out that in our present case the position is not similar to that. Here the delay arose out of the appellants preferring a legal proceeding which was not required under the law to be filed and which consumed the lion's share of the time and, therefore, the ruling which has been referred to above has absolutely no application to the facts of this case.

2.

IN view of the discussion made above we are constrained to hold that the cause that has been shown in the condonation petition is not at all sufficient or satisfactory and the delay which is huge cannot be held to be condonable. IN the result, the petition for condonation of delay is rejected on contest but, however, without any cost. Since the delay is not condoned the appeal appears to be hopelessly time-barred and in that view of the matter it is summarily dismissed without being admitted. Appeal dismissed.