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Teja Singh, C.J.—The questions involved & the relief�s claimed in the two petitions C.M. Nos. 3 and 4 of 1952 being common, they will be disposed of by one order. The facts are as follows:
On 10-2-1951 Under-Secretary to the Government, Home Department, forwarded a copy of the Farman-i-Shahi dated 16-4-1921 issued by the Government of the erstwhile Patiala State to the Deputy Commissioner, Patiala, and requested him to give effect to the said Farman-i-Shahi by mutating �the lands attached to different religious institutions such as deras, temples, etc., situated in the covenanting; states in the revenue record in the name of institution itself under the mohtamimship of the present mahant". For the information of the Deputy Commissioner it was also mentioned in the Under-Secretary''s letter that "mutation of lands of the religious institutions belonging to the erstwhile Patiala State already stands in the name of institution itself under the mohtamimship of Mahants". The Deputy Commissioner forwarded the Under Secretary''s letter to the Tehsildar Nabha for necessary action and when it got to the hands of the Patwari in due course he prepared two mutations; by virtue of the one, No. 1152 of 1951, 197 bighas. 10 biswas of land which previously stood in the revenue papers in the name of Amar Dass disciple of Jai Ram Das Sadhu Udasi of Nabha was mutated in the name of Dera Bawa Gursaran Dass and by virtue of the other, No. 1151 1951, 127 bighas 1 Biswa of land which previously stood in the name of Hari Dass disciple of Bawa Narain Dass Sadhu of Nabha was mutated in the name of Dera Sat Sahdia. The patwari''s reports on the basis of which the mutations were prepared in both cases were that the changes in the entries were being made in obedience to the Government''s Orders and the Tehsildar while sanctioning the mutations also observed that he did so because of the Home Department Order of 10-2-1951.
The Petitioners contended that the entire procedure adopted by the revenue authorities for substituting the names of the deras in question in place of their names without any notice to them was illegal. They further contended that the lands were their properties that they did not belong to the deras and the orders of the Government have resulted in depriving them of a fundamental right. Accordingly they prayed for the following reliefs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India:
That it be held that the title and possession of the Petitioner to the property mentioned above is lawful and absolute.
That quashing the mutation in favour of dera the property be directed to be mutated in the name of the Petitioner as owner.
That a writ in the nature of prohibition or mandamus or of any other nature be ordered to issue to the respondents restraining them from dispossessing the Petitioner from the property mentioned above.
That a writ of the nature of certiorari be ordered to issue directing them not to deny Petitioner''s title to the property except in accordance with due process of law.
That this Hon''ble Court may be pleased to pass such other order in addition to or in the alternative which it deems just and proper to protect the aforementioned rights of the Petitioner.
The respondents in both these petitions are (i) Government of Patiala & East Punjab States Union & (ii) Rehabilitation Tehsildar Nabha. In the written statements that have been put in on their behalf it was admitted that the Government addressed the letter in question to the Deputy Commissioner, Patiala, and ordered that action should be taken in accordance with the Farman-i-Shahi of 16-4-1921. They also admitted that it was in accordance with their order that the Petitioners'' names were removed from the proprietary columns of the revenue papers and in their place the names of the institutions were substituted but they pleaded that there was nothing illegal in what they did. Their position is that Farman-i-Shahi has the force of law that it applies to the cases of the Petitioners, that tine lands to which the mutations relate belong to the institutions and that the Farman-i-Shahi did not require any notice to the Petitioners before mutations in favour of the institutions could be sanctioned. Apart from the merits of the case the respondents maintained, that no application for issue of any kind of writ could be made by the Petitioners, because if they were really the owners of the lands and their names had been wrongly removed from the revenue papers they could institute suits in a civil Court for the establishment of their title and right. They further maintained that action has been taken by the Government in exercise of jurisdiction vested in them by law and accordingly there is no occasion for issue of a writ.
In order to determine whether the Government were within their rights in issuing directions that they gave to the Deputy Commissioner and whether the Patwari and the Tehsildar were competent, the former to enter and the latter to sanction the mutation, we shall have to start with the Farman-i-Shahi. The words of the Farman go to show that it was made on a petition submitted to the Ijlas-i-Khas regarding the appointment, status and rights of Mahants of the deras and religious institutions. The first part of the Parman is to the effect that recommendations made in the petition are accepted and directions should be issued that in future no land or muafi should be entered in the name of a nuihunt before his appointment is formally sanctioned by the Ijlas-i-Khas in the manner mentioned therein. It Is the second part which is relevant for the purposes of our case. The words of that part are:
This should also be recorded that the lands that pertain to deras should not be deemed to belong to the mahants nor should they be entered as the property of the mahants in the Government papers.
The Gurumukhi words in the Parman which I have translated as "the lands that pertain to deras" are:
Araziat jo kisay dere ke muttaliq hai." ...
..."Muttaliq may also mean "attached to.")
On the other hand such land should be shown under the management of the Mahants and the Mahants shall have no right to sell or mortgage the lands belonging to the deras. This should be brought to the notice of the revenue authorities and this order should be published in the gazette.
The Petitioners'' counsel conceded that the above Parman had the force of law in the erstwhile Patiala State and since according to Section 3 of the Ordinance, 16 of 2005, all laws in force in that State on the date the Union was formed came to apply to the whole Union with effect from that date, effect had to be given to its provisions. Whit he, however, contended was that the cases of the present Petitioners were not covered by the Farman. He particularly emphasized the opening words of the second part of the Parman and argued that there was nothing to show that the lands which have now been mutated in the name of the deras pertained to or were attached to the respective deras. I have no hesitation in holding that this contention is well-founded, because according to the entries contained in the proprietary columns of the jamabandies before the present mutations were sanctioned, the Petitioners were the owners of the land. It is significant that they were not even described as mahants. Hari Dass was described as the Chela of Narain Dass while Amar Dass was described as the chela of Jairam Dass. It was argued by the respondents'' counsel that the lands were originally given to the deras of which the Petitioners were respectively the mahants and since then they have descended from one mahant to the other. In my opinion, had this been the case the deras would have been
shown as proprietors in the revenue papers and in the possessory column Petitioners would have been shown as the managers pr karkuns or at least they would have been described as mahants. In any case the entries in the revenue papers as they stood before the mutations were sanctioned could give no indication that the lands were not the private properties of the Petitioners and before the Farman-i-Shahi could be applied to them, it was incumbent upon the revenue authorities to hold a sort of enquiry and to satisfy themselves that the lands pertained to or were attached to the deras. It may be mentioned that the law regarding the variations of entries in the revenue records is contained in Section 37, Land Revenue Act. The section says Entries in records-of-rights ,or in annual records, except entries made in annual records by patwaris under Clause (a) of Section 35 with respect to undisputed acquisitions of interest referred to in that section, shall not be varied in subsequent'' records otherwise than by
(a) making entries in accordance with facts proved or admitted to have occurred;
(b) making such entries as are agreed to by all the parties interested therein or are supported by a decree or order binding on those parties;
(c) making new maps where it is necessary to make them.
Clause (a) of the section has no applicability in the present case, because it was neither proved nor 1 admitted that the lands belonged to the deras. There was no question of the applicability of Clause (b) either, because the new entries were never agreed to by the Petitioners. In fact, as I have already observed, the Petitioners were not even informed that any change in the entries was going to be made and they were not given an opportunity of placing their view point. Clause (c) has no relevancy at all. The respondents counsel argued that in view of the orders of the Government contained in the Under Secretary''s letter mentioned above, the revenue authorities had no option but to change the entries in the revenue papers and since this change could only be effected by means of mutations, the Tehsildar was right in sanctioning the mutations. This contention appears to me to be wholly devoid of force, because the directions contained in the ''Under Secretary''s letter merely applied to lands attached to different religious institutions such as deras, etc., and there was nothing to show that the lands which are subject-matter of the mutations with which we are concerned here came within the above category. It is wrong to say that the Tehsildar had no option but to sanction the mutations. The condition would have been different if there was any material before the Tehsildar from which he could come to the conclusion that the lands were attached to the deras, but the orders made by him on the mutations leave no doubt that this was not the case. As I read the Under Secretary''s letter, it appears that it contained directions of a general nature drawing the attention of the Deputy Commissioner to the Farman-i-Shahi and was obviously meant: to lay down that the Farman-i-Shahi should be enforced in the cases which came within its ambit Whether or not these cases were governed by the Parman-i-Shahi, it was for the Deputy Commissioner or the revenue officer concerned to decide for himself. The mistake which the Tehsildar appears to have made is that instead of going Into the matter carefully and finding out whether these 3 lands were attached to the deras he took this fact for granted and sanctioned the mutations, therefore, hold that the entire proceedings beginning from the patwari''s reports to the final orders made by the Tehsildar on the mutations were illegal.
The question now is whether the removal of the Petitioners'' names from the proprietary columns of the revenue: papers and the substitution in their places the names of the respective deras, has deprived them of a fundamental right. The Petitioners'' counsel argued that Article 19 of the Constitution of India gives his clients the right inter alia to acquire, hold and dispose of property and this right has been taken away by the new mutations. The existence of the right to hold and dispose of the property cannot be denied and I also concede that this is a fundamental right, but I cannot understand how this right of the Petitioners has been violated. The revenue entries and the mutations by which the entries are varied, are no doubt evidences of title but they neither confer nor take away title. If the Petitioners were the owners of the lands in question they continued to be so in spite of the mutations. The only effect that the mutations will have upon the Petitioners'' right of ownership is that if the matter goes to a civil Court and some one denies the Petitioners'' title to the lands in question the onus to establish it will lie upon them, but I am not prepared to hold that this has taken away the Petitioners'' I right to hold and dispose of the land.
Coming now to the technical objections raised by the respondents'' counsel, I have had occasions to deal with them previously in other cases, but in view of the importance of the matter, I think it is necessary to re-examine the whole position in the light of the case law available on the point. There is also another reason for this. Petitions under Article 220 are daily increasing and the impression that I have formed is that there is a tendency among lawyers and litigants to apply for issue of writs in all kinds of cases. Whether this is due to ignorance or the desire to save money which a regular suit might involve or to some other cause, it is difficult to say, but this much is clear to me that quite a number of petitions are misconceived and some of them if entertained would lead to the abuse of the process of law.
First of all it must be stated that the powers given to the High Court by Article 226 to issue various kinds of writs vest these Courts with an extraordinary .jurisdiction which is of summary but coercive nature. See in this connection the remarks of Base J. in - Shyamapada Ganguly Vs. Abani Mohan Mukherjee, In that case a writ of mandamus had been applied for and the learned Judge remarked that it is an elementary principle that recourse ought not to be allowed to an extraordinary remedy when it is not really needed and a mandamus will never be granted to enforce the general law of the land which may be enforced by action. In - Indian Sugar Mills Association Vs. Secy. to Government, Uttar Pradesh Labour Department and Others, the applicants prayed for issue of write in the nature of mandamus, prohibition or such other writs or orders as the Court may consider proper restraining the opposite parties from enforcing a cetain notification or for such other order as the Court may deem fit under the circumstances of the case. The learned Judges of the Full Bench who decided the application observed that Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to provide an alternative method of redress to the normal process of a decision in an action brought in the usual Courts established by law.
Secondly subject to the limitation that every High Court must exercise the powers given to it by Article 226 within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction in other respects they are very wide and go much beyond the powers of the High Courts of England and of those of Presidency High Courts before our country became independent. The words of the Article are:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto & certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred on a High Court by Clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32.
Now these words make it clear (i) that powers of the High Court are not confined to the issuing of high prerogative writs but extend to the issuing of all kinds of direction and orders and (ii) that writs and directions etc, can be issued not only for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution but for any other purpose and to all kinds of authorities and public officials and even to any Government, i.e., to the Government of a State or the Central Government. Reference in this connection should be made to - ''New Transport Co. Durg v. Regional Transport Authority'' ILR (1952) Nag 69. The case of our High Court which is in point is - ''Devindar Singh v. Gurdial Singh 2 Pepsu L.R. 443 . In that case it was held by me that the issue of a writ cannot be refused by the High Court on the ground that it is not alleged to be necessary for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III of the Constitution of India. The concluding words of Article 226, i.e., for any other purpose are very wide and the clause read as a whole means that the High Court can issue orders and writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights but it can do so-for other purposes as well. The same view was taken by a Bench of the Orissa High Court in - Manjula Manjari Dei Vs. M.C. Pradhan, Director of Public Instruction, and it was held that the expression "for any other purpose" has been used to make it clear that the power of the High Court is not confined or limited only to the enforcement of the fundamental rights embodied in Part III but may also include any other right not, falling under that classification.
Thirdly the relief under Article 226 is discretionary with the Court and though, as was held in - Manjula Manjari Dei Vs. M.C. Pradhan, Director of Public Instruction, mentioned above, the discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or indiscriminately, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how it should be exercised. Each case must depend upon its peculiar facts. There is however, one point upon which there is consensus of opinion, i.e., that we must follow the same principles that were observed by the English Courts in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of our Constitution and other laws. This aspect of the matter was discussed by me in Devindar Singh''s case. It is not necessary to reiterate all those principles, but here are some that appear to me to be most important.
I. No relief should be given when the applicant is not possessed of sufficient interest. This rule was enunciated in R. v. Nicholson'' (1899) 2 Q.B. 455. It was held that the applicant must show some peculiar grievance of his own beyond the inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public. If the applicant is unable to show particular grievance of his own, the application would be refused. (II) The application should be refused where no legal injury has been caused to the applicant. -''Lady Dinbal Petit, v. M.S. Noronha'' AIR 1945 Bora 419. Even if the proceedings which have given rise to an application for a writ, etc., are not in some respects in accord with law if no injustice has been done, no writ or direction would be issued. - ''Mahabaleswarappa v. Ramehandra Row'' AIR 1936 Mad 669 . (IV). The application may be refused if the applicant has been guilty of laches or delay. The question whether there has been an undue delay justifying refusal of writ depends upon the circumstances of each case. It was held in - O.A.O.A.M. Muthiah Chettiar Vs. The Comr. of Income Tax, that though there is no period of limitation as such prescribed for application for the issue of prerogative writs, long delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to grant an application for the issue of such writs. There may, however, be circumstances which should make the H.C. take a more lenient view and entertain the application even after delay. (V) Application may be refused if the writ or direction, etc., applied for would be inoperative or would not be of any practical benefit to the applicant. -''The Queen v. Lord Newborough'' (1896) 4 QB 585. In Devindar Singh''s case it was held that the High Court can reject the application for a writ it it is satisfied that the writ would not servo any useful purpose. The same view was taken in ''Ishar Singh v. The State'' 2 Pepsu'' LR- 621 . VI. It being an extraordinary jurisdiction and the relief being discretionary the powers to issue writs or directions should be used very sparingly and only in cases where refusal to grant any relief would cause great hardship. Following are the observations made by the learned Judges in - Indian Sugar Mills Association Vs. Secy. to Government, Uttar Pradesh Labour Department and Others,
Those remarks are with reference to a suit. They are much more applicable to proceedings under Article 226 which are of a summary and of a coercive nature without providing for a normal trial or a right of appeal except in those cases where a substantial question of interpretation of the Constitution arises. This Court is being flooded with applications under Article 226 of the Constitution which is seriously affecting the normal work of the Court. We feel that the time has come when we may point out that Article 223 of the Constitution was not intended to provide an alternative method of redress to the normal process of a decision in an action brought in the usual Courts established by law. The powers under this article should be sparingly used and only in those clear cases where the rights of a person have been seriously infringed and he has no other adequate and specific remedy available to him.
These observations were followed in - ''Union of Workmen of R.S.N. & I.G.N. & Rly. Co. Ltd. v. The River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.'' AIR 1951 Assam 96 and in - ''Shyamapada Ganguly v. Abani Mohan Mukherjee'', and if I may say so with respect lay down the law correctly. VII. Where another specific and adequate legal remedy is open to the applicant, application under Article 226 should not be entertained.
Before the new Constitution was framed the High Courts of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay had powers u/s 45, Specific Relief Act, to make an order requiring any specific act to be done or forborne within the local limits of their respective ordinary original civil jurisdiction by any person holding a public office or by any corporation or inferior Court of jurisdiction but before a person could invoke that jurisdiction he had to satisfy the Court among other things that he had no other specific and adequate legal remedy.
The powers conferred by Article 226 upon the High. Courts, as mentioned above, are much wider than given to the three High Courts by, Section 45, Specific Relief Act. With all this almost all the High Courts are agreed that when it is shown that there is open to the applicant another remedy and that remedy is specific and adequate, an application under Article 226 does not lie. In my opinion this principle logically follows from those enunciated above. In addition there is a very good reason for it and it is this that if writs are issued indiscriminately and even in cases where the. applicant can protect his right and can have his grievances redressed by taking advantage of any other remedy provided to him by law, it will amount to a serious encroachment upon the functions and rights of ordinary civil Courts and in some cases even upon the jurisdiction of Criminal Courts. Whether the other remedy can be regarded specific or adequate must depend upon the facts of each case. The earliest case of our High Court in which the law on the point was discussed is ''Devindar Singh''s case'' 2 Pepsu LR 443 ) referred to above. The next case in point is - ''Devi Dayal v. The State'' CM No. 39 of 1952 (Pepsu). That was an application for issue of writs of mandamus, etc., against the State and the principal ground urged on behalf, of the Petitioner was that the agreement that, he had been made to execute in favour of the State was obtained from him by duress and undue influence, etc. Relying on Bukhtiarpur Bihar Light Rly. Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Others, I held that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for a declaration that the contract was void because, of duress, etc., was hardly the correct remedy and the proper course for the Petitioner was to go to a civil Court and file a regular suit. In -''Ram Singh v. The State'' ILR (1952) Patiala 165 the Petitioner prayed that a writ of mandamus or prohibition be issued to the State, the I.G.P. and the District Magistrate directing them to refrain from realising the costs of the additional police posted in his village, because the Notification by which the additional police was posted was ultra vires the I.G.P. and the Government. It was held that since it was open to the Petitioner to raise the question of the legality of the Notification in the proceedings that the District Magistrate would start against him for the recovery of the costs of the additional police and that constituted an effective remedy prayer for issue of writs could not be granted. In - Prabhabati Devi Vs. District Magistrate and Another, the respondents made an order requisitioning the Petitioner''s house. The Petitioner filed objections to the order and requested that she should be given a hearing before the final orders are passed on the objections. She was not given a hearing and the District Magistrate upheld his order of requisition. One of the points raised before the High Court on behalf of the District Magistrate was that the Petitioner should be called upon to file a regular suit for the redress of grievance and it was not a case in which extraordinary procedure of writ should be adopted. This is what the learned Judges observed:
In the present case the applicant complains of the infringement of her fundamental right under Article 19(1)(i) to hold her property. While we do not go to the extent of saying that in all cases in which there is an infringement of a fundamental right a relief under Article 226 should be granted necessarily nevertheless we are of the opinion that we must sec in each case whether in the circumstances it would be more convenient, effectual and beneficial to grant relief by means of a writ than to ask the applicant to seek it by a regular suit.
Then they dealt with the facts of the case and after pointing oat "that the Petitioner has been living in this city from 1943 onwards to pass her old age and widowhood in piety and with a view to continue to live here she built the house which has been requisitioned added "if she is asked to file a regular suit there is bound to be a great delay. She is an old lady & one does not know whether in her lifetime the ease will be finally decided. She is already 65. No alternative suitable accommodation has been provided to her. We think that in these circumstances it ''would be proper to grant her relief, if possible, under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The question was recently considered by a Full Bench of Allahabad High-Court in - Buddhu Vs. Municipal Board and Others, The respondent Municipal Board amended the byelaws regulating one slaughter of animals and inserted a new byelaw laying down that no bull, bullock, cow, call shall be slaughtered in any slaughter-house or in any other place. The Petitioner approached the High Court with a petition that writ or orders be issued to the Municipal Board restraining it from enforceing the new bye law. His plea was that the new bye-law was an infringement of his fundamental right conferred by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, that it is repugnant to Article 14 as it makes a distinction between those who slaughter bull, bullock cow and calf and those who slaughter goats and sheep and that the Municipal Board had no authority under the U.P. Municipalities Act to frame such a bye-law. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondent to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the Petitioner could have brought a suit for an injunction and an alternative remedy was open to him. The objection was disallowed but the observations made by Bind Basni Prasad J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench go to show that the learned Judges upheld the above principle. After referring to a number of cases this is what he said:
In - ''Wishwanath Ramkrishna v. 2nd Addl. District Judge, Nagpur'' AIR 1951 Nag 6 and In Re: Gadea Nagabhushana Reddi and Another, and in so many other cases, it has been held that if inhere is any other adequate remedy open to the Petitioner the Court will consider it before granting an application under Article 226. Indeed, if the contention that in every case in which a fundamental right is involved a writ must issue is I accepted then the result will be that a large number of suits which are instituted in the subordinate Courts will come up to this Court in the form of petitions of writs, a result which could never have been intended by the Constitution. Then he said.
I am not prepared to go to the extent of laying down as an inflexible rule that in every case in which a fundamental right is involved, a decision, should be given by the Court on merits on an application under Article 226. There may be cases in which the existence of an alternative remedy may be ground for the rejection of the application. The circumstances of each case should be considered and thou a decision should be taken whether or not the discretion should be exercised.
As regards the merits of that case the learned Judge remarked: "In the present case a general question of some public importance has been raised It is desirable that it should be speedily decided and the parties should not remain under suspense for a long time. On the determination of the question before us, the decision of the Petitioner and others of his class whether to continue in the present avocation or to take to some other will depend." In - ''V.N. Wanchoo v. Collector of Delhi'' 54 Pun LR 206 in which notice had been issued to the Petitioner by the Collector of Delhi u/s 3(3), Delhi Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Act, 1947, it was held that the remedy of appeal granted by Section 5 of the Act was not an efficacious remedy and that the High Court should not refuse the right of hearing to the applicants under Article 228 of the Constitution until such time as the appeal filed might be heard. This was an extreme view but was justified by the peculiar circumstances of that case. The learned Chief Justice disposed of the matter in the following words:
It is well settled that the existence of an. alternative remedy is not of itself a bar to the exercise of our jurisdiction under that Article, and if in fact the existing alternative remedy is found not to be efficacious, then an applicant should not be deprived of the remedy afforded to him by the Constitution. As already stated, certain of the present applicants did file appeals to the Chief Commissioner on 20-8-1951. An affidavit has been filed by the first Petitioner that these appeals have pot been decided and in. fact no date has been fixed for their hearing. This is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the State. When admitting the appeal it appears that the Chief Commissioner granted a stay order for a period of seven days only. In these circumstances it seems to me that by reason of circumstances, no doubt beyond the control, of the Chief Commissioner, the remedy of appeal granted by Section 5 is not an efficacious remedy in the present case...
So far as the present cases are concerned, it is not denied that the Petitioners can file a civil suit for establishment of their title, but the question is whether such a remedy can be regarded as specific and adequate. Specific no doubt it is but as regards adequacy it was urged by the Petitioners'' counsel that because the question involved was of public importance and it affected a large number of mahants of other deras in addition to the Petitioners the cases in this respect are analogous to - Buddhu Vs. Municipal Board and Others, He also argued that if these petitions were thrown out and the Petitioners were left to civil suits, this would subject them to great hardship inasmuch as the onus would be placed upon them to prove that the lands belonged to them whereas if the deras were to file suits against the Petitioners or worshippers of the deras take proceedings u/s 92, C.P.C, it would be for them to establish that the lands belonged be the respective deras and not to the Petitioners. On giving careful consideration to the matter I am of the view that these contentions must prevail and it must be held that these are not the kind of cases in which Petitioners'' prayer for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution should be refused because of an alternate remedy of a suit that is open to them.
As regards the objection that no writ or direction can be issued to the Government because whatever they did they did in exercise of jurisdiction vested in them by law, it will be seen from, what I have said above that should the Court come to the conclusion that the order made by the Government was wrong and there was no other objection to the issue of a writ or direction, it would be within its power to grant the appropriate relief, but I have already made it clear that there was nothing wrong in the letter that the Government addressed to the Deputy Commissioner and the cause of the whole trouble was that the Tehsildar had the mutations prepared and later on sanctioned without going into the matter carefully.
In the result I would allow the petitions as against respondent 2, quash his orders by which lie sanctioned the mutations in question and issue a writ prohibiting him from giving effect to those mutations. As regards the Government I would dismiss the petitions. In the peculiar circumstances of the case I would direct the parties to bear their own costs.
Gurnam Singh, J.
I entirly agree.