AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.] seeking quashing of FIR No. 076 dated 17.03.2026 (Annexure P-1), registered under Sections 109(1), 115, 118(1), 296 and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [corresponding to Sections 307, 323, 324, 294 and 506 IPC], at Police Station Urban Estate, Hisar, District Hisar, Haryana, along with all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioner, on the basis of the Compromise Deed dated 13.08.2026 submitted by the complainant (Annexure P-2).
Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are that the FIR was registered on the statement of Keshav, Supervisor in VYS Company, Nagar Nigam, alleging that on 17.03.2026, after a telephonic exchange concerning payment of salary, petitioner-Aman Kumar came to the plant at about 5:30 P.M., abused the complainant and allegedly inflicted knife blows on the right side of his abdomen and left side of his chest. The petitioner is further alleged to have extended a threat to kill the complainant. The alleged occurrence was stated to have arisen out of previous animosity, as the complainant had earlier brought certain complaints against the petitioner to the notice of the company authorities. The complainant was thereafter admitted to the Civil Hospital in an unconscious condition.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, during the pendency of the FIR, better sense has prevailed and the parties have amicably resolved their dispute through the intervention of respectable persons. The compromise dated 13.08.2026 was entered into voluntarily, out of the parties’ free will and without coercion, undue influence, pressure or inducement. The complainant has accordingly expressed his unequivocal consent to the quashing of FIR (Annexure P-1) and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioner. On these premises, learned counsel prays for allowing the present petition.
Notice of motion.
Upon advance notice, Mr. Ramesh Kumar Ambavta, learned Additional Advocate General, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.1-State, whereas Mr. Amit Kumar, Advocate, accepts notice on behalf of respondent No.2-complainant and tenders his power of attorney, which is taken on record, subject to all just exceptions. Learned counsel for the complainant endorses the compromise effected between the parties and raises no objection to the present petition.
Per contra, learned State counsel vehemently opposes the present petition, contending that the petitioner has been attributed a direct and specific role of inflicting knife blows upon the complainant’s abdomen and chest, thereby disclosing serious and grave criminality. It is submitted that the offences alleged are of a serious and non-compoundable nature and cannot be treated as a mere private dispute capable of being obliterated by a subsequent compromise. The State further submits that a private settlement cannot, by itself, efface the alleged criminality or override the societal interest in prosecution of serious offences. It is also pointed out that the petitioner’s prayer for regular bail had already been declined by this Court vide order dated 22.07.2026 passed in CRM-M-38759-2026, inter alia, on the ground of the compromise. Accordingly, learned State counsel submits that no exceptional circumstance warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction is made out and prays for dismissal of the present petition.
Upon a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the FIR, read in conjunction with the material collected during the course of investigation, this Court is of the prima facie view that it cannot be held that the impugned FIR fails to disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. Equally, it cannot be concluded that the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety as true at this stage, do not constitute the ingredients of the offences alleged, or that they are so patently absurd, inherently improbable or manifestly frivolous as to justify the exercise of the extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing the criminal proceedings. Consequently, the case of the petitioner does not satisfy any of the well-recognised parameters governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings, as authoritatively enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1991 (1) RCR (Criminal) 383. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder:-
"107.In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1.Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2.Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3.Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4.Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5.Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6.Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7.Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
108.We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice."
In M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401, a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively delineated the scope and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Reaffirming the settled legal position, the Court held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is extraordinary in nature and is to be exercised sparingly, with great circumspection, and only in exceptional cases, the expression "rarest of rare" being employed in a context distinct from that governing the imposition of capital punishment.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court is not expected to enter into disputed questions of fact or adjudicate upon the correctness, reliability or genuineness of the allegations levelled in the FIR or complaint. At such stage, the Court cannot examine the defence available to the accused, undertake a meticulous appreciation of evidence, or conduct a mini-trial. Interference would be justified only where the case unmistakably falls within the well-recognised parameters governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, particularly those enunciated in R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal (supra).
Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid settled principles, the present case does not satisfy any of the parameters laid down in Ch.Bhajan Lal (supra) or M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) so as to warrant the exercise of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction of this Court. At this stage, there is no material to prima facie indicate that the impugned FIR is manifestly mala fide, frivolous, vexatious, or actuated by an ulterior motive amounting to an abuse of the process of law. On the contrary, the allegations contained therein disclose the commission of cognizable offences, thereby necessitating a fair, impartial and complete investigation. Judicial interdiction at this incipient stage would, therefore, be wholly unwarranted.
Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and upon careful examination of the material placed on record, this Court is not persuaded to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for quashing the impugned FIR.
The allegations are grave and specific. The petitioner is alleged to have inflicted knife blows upon the complainant’s abdomen and chest with the requisite intention to cause death. The petitioner is specifically named in the FIR and a direct role involving the use of a dangerous weapon has been attributed to him. The petitioner’s prayer for regular bail had also earlier been declined by this Court vide order dated 22.07.2026 passed in CRM-M-38759-2026, inter alia, with reference to the compromise. Though the complainant has subsequently entered into a compromise and expressed no objection to the quashing of the proceedings, such subsequent settlement, at this stage, cannot by itself efface the prima facie criminality alleged or warrant termination of the prosecution.
The alleged occurrence involves the use of a knife and the infliction of grievous injuries in circumstances carrying an evident element of public wrong. The allegations, therefore, transcend a purely private dispute and implicate considerations of public peace, safety and the due administration of criminal justice. Consequently, the subsequent compromise between the parties cannot, ex debito justitiae, obliterate the alleged offence or furnish, by itself, a legitimate basis for exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
It is further significant that the prosecution has invoked Section 307 IPC, an offence which is non-compoundable. The mere willingness of the complainant to compromise or his disinclination to pursue the prosecution cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, override the statutory character of the offence or the larger societal interest involved.
The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS is undoubtedly wide, but its exercise is exceptional and circumscribed by the twin considerations of securing the ends of justice and preventing abuse of the process of law. Such jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be employed to stifle prosecution for serious offences involving an alleged attempt on the life of a person merely because the parties have subsequently arrived at a private settlement.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, permitting the prosecution to be brought to an end solely on the strength of the compromise would have the effect of diluting the seriousness of the allegations and the deterrent purpose underlying the penal provision invoked. The nature of the accusation, the specific attribution of a knife assault and the allegation of an intention to cause death constitute circumstances which, at this stage, weigh decisively against exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
Accordingly, this Court finds no exceptional circumstance, manifest illegality or abuse of the process of law warranting interference under Section 528 BNSS. The present petition is, accordingly, dismissed. It is, however, clarified that the observations recorded herein are confined strictly to the adjudication of the present petition and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the prosecution or the defence. The learned Trial Court shall adjudicate the case independently, on the basis of the evidence brought on record and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation contained in this order.
Consequent upon the final adjudication of the present petition, all pending miscellaneous, interlocutory or ancillary applications, if any, arising out of or connected with the present proceedings, shall stand disposed of accordingly. The final determination of the principal proceedings has rendered such ancillary applications infructuous, leaving no surviving issue requiring separate adjudication. No separate or further order is called for in respect thereof.