AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Srinivasan, J.—The Respondent as Plaintiff sued for a declaration of its title to half the produce in the suit lands and also to recover the value
of the produce for faslis 1366 and 1367. The claim was based on the ground that the Plaintiff temple was entitled to the lands as manibam. The
contention of the Defendant-Petitioner was that the suit lands are lands in which the Defendant has kudiwaram interest and that the civil Court has
no jurisdiction to try the suit. Upon these contentions issues were raised whether the suit lands are in an estate and whether Act XXX of 1956, is a
bar to the Plaintiff setting up that the suit lands are not in an estate. Though it is not quite clear from the issues, the principal point dealt with by the
trial Court (District Munsif''s Court, Manamadurai) was whether the civil Court had no jurisdiction to determine whether the suit lands are or are
not in an estate. The learned District Munsiff came to the conclusion that by reason of Section 10 of Act XXX of 1956, the question whether the
suit lands constitute an estate or part of an estate is not within the jurisdiction of the civil Court to determine. He accordingly dismissed the suit.
An appeal was taken by the Plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga examined the position and came to the conclusion that the
civil Court''s jurisdiction was not barred in so far as the determination of the question was incidental to the granting of the other reliefs. The decree
of the learned District Munsiff was set aside and the suit was remanded for fresh disposal. It is against this order that the present civil miscellaneous
appeal has been filed.
The only question that arises is whether Section 10 of Act XXX of 1956, operates as a bar to the determination of this question by the civil
Court.
Act XXX of 1956, was passed with the object of providing for the determination of questions whether any non-ryotwari area in the State of
Madras is or is not an estate''. u/s 5 certain Tribunals were constituted for the purpose of the Act and Section 3 provided that any person
interested may make an application to the Tribunal for a declaration that the area specified in the application is or is not an estate or part of an
estate as defined in Section 3, Clause (2), of the Estates Land Act, or that it is or is not an inam estate as defined in Section 2, Clause (7), of the
Abolition Act. Sub-Section 2 of Section 3 prescribes a period of limitation of three months from the date on which the Act came into force or
three months from the date of publication of the order u/s 3, Sub-Section 2, of the Rent Reduction Act, or of the notification u/s 1, Sub-Section 4,
of the Abolition Act whichever of the dates aforesaid was the latest, within which an application could be made by a person interested. Under
Sub-Section 3 the Tribunal was granted the power to allow further time not exceeding three months for making the application. It is common
ground that in so far as these lands are concerned no application had been made by any party interested within the period specified. Section 4 gave
a special period of limitation to the Government. Under this section the Government could file an application either to the appropriate Tribunal or to
the special Appellate Tribunal constituted u/s 7 of the Act within one year from the date on which this Act comes into force against a decision of
any Court or of a Settlement Officer or Tribunal constituted under the Abolition Act. It would appear from these provisions that even if a civil
Court had in the exercise of its jurisdiction before the coming into force of this Act or the other connected Acts given a finding as to the nature of
any area, that is, whether it is or is not an estate or part of an estate, or is or is not an inam estate, such a finding could be challenged by the
Government within one year from the date of coming into force of Act XXX of 1956. It is again common ground that in earlier suits between the
parties this question had been determined in a particular way by the civil Court at a time when it had unquestioned jurisdiction to decide that
question. It is not denied that those decisions were not challenged by the Government u/s 4 of the Act. It is again conceded that after the expiry of
the period specified in Section 3 of the Act, which period has in fact expired, no person could approach the Tribunal for a determination of this
question. The Tribunal even if it continues to exist for the performance of any of the other functions under this Act would no longer be competent to
determine this question for the simple reason that beyond the total period of six months provided by Section 3, Sub-sections (2) and (3), an
application to the Tribunal for the determination of such questions would be incompetent.
The present position may briefly be stated to be thus. Before the passing of this Act or the relevent Acts by which the determination of such
questions were otherwise provided for, the civil Court had undeniable jurisdiction to deal with such a question. On the passing of this Act, the
Tribunal acquired the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with this question on application made to it within a specified time from the passing of the Act.
Any decisions made earlier by a competent Court or a Settlement Officer or a Tribunal under the Abolition Act could be questioned by the
Government within the period of one year from the date of the passing of the Act, failing which such earlier decisions would continue to be in force.
The question is whether, under these circumstances, where the question has not been decided by the Tribunal constituted under this Act within the
period specified in the section and the Tribunal is incompetent to entertain an application for a decision of that question, the jurisdiction of the civil
Court stands ousted for all time.
It has been argued on behalf of the Appellant-Defendant, who objects to the order of remand made by the learned Subordinate Judge directing
the lower Court to try the suit afresh (holding that under the circumstances of the case this is a suit which comprises within its scope reliefs which
only a civil Court is competent to grant and the question of the nature of the lands is incidental to the granting of this relief), that the decisions of this
Court have held that the bar u/s 10 of the Act is absolute, and that at the best it could only be regarded as a lacuna present in the Act which it is
not the function of this Court to cure. According to the Appellant it is true that the determination of this question by the Tribunal is impossible for
the reason that the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to entertain an application made in that behalf beyond the period of limitation prescribed by
Section 3. It is also true that this is not a case which would be governed by Section 11 of the Act which deals with transitory provisions to cover all
suits, appeals or other proceedings pending at the commencement of the Act before any Court or Tribunal or Settlement Officer, and which
requires that such suits, appeals or other proceedings (other than those pending before the High Court) should stand transferred to the appropriate
Tribunal for the determination of the question relating to the nature of the land. But nevertheless it is claimed that Section 10 makes the bar to the
civil Court''s jurisdiction absolute. It would accordingly mean that this question about the nature of the land whether it is an estate or not, or
whether it is an inam estate or not cannot be tried by the Tribunal or even by the civil Court. It is argued that the Legislature failed to provide for a
situation like the one has arisen in the present case and that there is a lacuna in the Act which cannot be overcome.
In Bhaskaran v. Sellappa Goundan (1958) 72 L.W. 55, the question arose whether u/s 11(1) of Act XXX of 1956, the civil Court should
transfer a suit to the Tribunal in which the determination of the question is only incidental to the granting of other reliefs which would only be
granted by the civil Court. The learned Judge held that the terms of this provision could not be read so as to justify a transfer of suits where the
reliefs prayed in the suits could not be granted by the Tribunal and the section also contained no provision whereby after the determination of the
particular question by the Tribunal the suits were to be brought back to the civil Court for decision of other issues in the suit. The view of the
learned Judge was that notwithstanding that an issue whether a village was an estate or not within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act was
raised in the suit and there was a special provision u/s 11 of the Act, whereby a pending suit of that nature had to be transferred to the Tribunal for
the determination of that question, such a transfer was not warranted where there were other issues in the suit which only the civil Court could deal
with. This decision was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in B. Hariharamuthu Pillai Vs. Rani Subbulakshmi Nachiar, Hereditary
Trustee of Kattalais of Sri Thirukoshtiappar, etc., Temples and Others, The question that was principally considered by the Bench was as to the
scope and effect of Section 11 of the Act. It was held that the wording of Section 11 is so comprehensive that all proceedings in which such
questions arose for determination shall be transferred to the appropriate Tribunal for the determination of such questions, and the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal is not restricted only to cases involving implementation of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947, or the Madras Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948. The learned Judges observed that while it was true that there is no provision in any of the
three Acts that would enable the Tribunal to dispose of the suit and there was also no express provision in Section 11 for enabling suits to be re-
transferred to the file of the civil Courts from that of the Tribunals, the transfer of the suits to the Tribunal was only for a very limited purpose, viz.,
the determination of the question whether any particular area is or was an estate, or whether it is or was an inam estate. It was observed:
It will be noted that express words are used to oust the jurisdiction of every Court other than the Tribunals constituted u/s 5 or the Special
Appellate Tribunal constituted u/s 7, when these two questions arise for determination. Section 10 specifically provides that no civil or revenue
Court and no Tribunal constituted under any other law shall have jurisdiction to decide the questions. Section 11 provides that all proceedings in
which this question arose except those pending in the High Court shall be transferred to the appropriate Tribunal for the determination of the
questions. The words are so comprehensive that it would not be right to say that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would arise only in those cases
where efforts are made to implement the provisions either of the Rent Reduction Act or of the Abolition Act.
It will be noticed that the above decision really proceeded to explain the scope and effect of Section 11 and the more general question as to the
extent to which the jurisdiction of the civil Court stood ousted in circumstances as in the present case did not arise for consideration. It is no doubt
true that Section 10 purports to take away the power of the civil Court to determine such a question. But it seems to me that this provision has to
be read in the light of the other provisions of the Act. The Act itself was for the purpose of providing for the determination of such questions. As
has been made obvious by what I have said earlier, the position is that the Tribunal is incompetent to adjudicate upon an application calling for a
determination of this question. The transitory provisions provided in Section 11 cannot operate in the case of suits in which this question is raised
and which suits were not pending on the date of the commencement of the Act. The normal rule being that a civil Court has jurisdiction unless it is
expressly deprived of it the absence of any other Tribunal which can adjudicate upon that question seems to me to lead to the conclusion that the
jurisdiction of the civil Court which was taken away by Section 10 of the Act must be regarded as barred only during such period as the Tribunal
or other authority appointed under this or any other Act was competent to deal with this question. If the argument that there is a lacuna in the Act is
to be accepted, it would mean that the party cannot approach the Tribunal; nor can the civil Court have jurisdiction; and if the determination of this
question is necessary for the purpose of disposal of the suit before the civil Court, I fail to see in what manner the civil Court can discharge its
functions. A lacuna, to my mind, should not be easily inferred, unless the enactment taken as a whole, must necessarily lead to that result. The
conclusion is to my mind irresistible that the bar of jurisdiction contemplated by 10 of the Act was not intended to be operative beyond the period
when the Tribunal could be properly seized of the matter. Since it has been established that in this case resort to the Tribunal is out of the question,
the civil Court is competent to determine this question.
It is not necessary for me to go into the question whether the earlier decisions operate as res judicata. That is a matter which will be gone into by
the trial Court. The order of remand was rightly made and this appeal is dismissed with costs.