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Judgment
This writ petition has been filed for quashing the award of Labour Court dated 19.12.2006 published on 25.4.2007 (Annexure 6 to writ petition). Further a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to compel the petitioner to execute the award.
The facts arising out of present writ petition are that father of respondent No.2 was working as Khalasi died in harness, therefore, respondent No.2 being provided the facility of dependent of deceased employee was appointed as Khalasi on compassionate ground. The job of Khalasi in the department is digging of soil at the relevant time when there is necessity for laying/repairing down pipe lines to cater the water supply to the public at large in the city. On account of litigation by the employees of Sansthan, two persons were required to furnish the information and receive the communication from the advocate concerned, who were deputed by Jal Sansthan to discharge the function of Class IV employees i.e. bringing the records of the advocate, furnishing the information and bringing the letters and communications from the advocate to Jal Sansthan. However, taking into account the engagement of respondent No.2 in the High Court, the respondent No.2 claiming the benefit of salary and regularization as Class III employee preferred a writ petition before this Court. This Court finally disposed of the writ petition on 1522001 directing respondent No.2 to file a representation with all materials and the same may be considered. The representation was considered and dismissed on 1142001. While rejecting the representation, following three grounds were taken into consideration by the authorities.
Firstly, there was no post available in Class III vacancy.
Secondly, respondent no. 2 was never appointed as clerk in the office of Jal Sansthan.
Thirdly, benefit of Dying in Harness Rules cannot be conferred upon the employees two times in service career.
In addition thereto the respondent No.2 has never discharged the obligation against Class III post, as such, he was not entitled for salary as Class III post nor was entitled for regularisation. Being dissatisfied, respondent No.2 preferred again a Writ Petition No.28316 of 2001. The said writ petition was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy either to approach the Labour Court or to U.P. Public Service Tribunal. Dissatisfied with the order, petitioner has approached the Regional Selection Officer and the matter was referred to the Labour Court and the following questions were recorded for adjudication of the case; "Kya Sewayojako Dwara Vivad Patra Kb Sath Sanlagna Parishist May Ankit Sri Rajesh Kumar Pandey, Khalasi Avam Sri Baburam, Chaprasi Se Lipikiya Prakriti Ka Karya Liya Jana Kintu Lipik Ke Pad Par Sthaie Na Kiya Jana Avam Tadanusar Vetanman Va Anya Suvidha Na Diya Jana Anuchtt Avam Avaidhanik Hai''
Labour Court after due consideration upon entire material available on record rejected the claim by order dated 3072002. Petitioner again filed a writ petition against an award as Writ Petition No. 8934 of 2003 which was allowed by this Court vide its order dated 692006 and matter was remanded back to Labour Court for decision as fresh. Now, Labour Court on remand further considered the issue and pass impugned order dated 19122006, granting the relief to respondent No.2 for entitlement of regularisation/confirmation against Class III post and further order has been passed that respondent No.2 was entitled for payment of salary and other emoluments admissible and payable since 1991 and further promotion has also been ordered. Hence the present writ petition.
Sri C.B. Yadav, learned counsel for petitioner submits that unless and until an employee appointed against the post of class III vacancy in any capacity either permanently or on adhoc, such employee cannot claim regularisation or payment of salary against the said post. Admittedly, respondent No.2 was never appointed against Class III vacancy at any point of time in Jal Sansthan in any capacity, rather he was given appointment as Class IV under the Dying in Harness Rules. Therefore, he cannot claim salary and further submission has been made that as there is no post available under Class III in the department, therefore, Labour Court has no jurisdiction to direct the same. It is clear that one vacancy, which is available only for Scheduled Caste and respondent No.2 is a general caste candidate, therefore, he is not entitled to claim vacancy of Class III and respondent No.2 is also not entitled to get any promotion, therefore, judgement and award as passed by the Labour Court is not sustainable in law. Further submission has been made by learned counsel for petitioner that a person can claim promotion only when vacancy is available in the said category for which he belongs. In absence of vacancy he cannot claim any promotion, therefore, order passed by Labour Court for absorption of respondent No.2 against class III post is wholly arbitrary and contrary to law. No vacancy of any category was available, therefore, respondent No.2 could not be considered by the Jal Sansthan for promotion. As soon as vacancy occurred, claim of eligible persons will be considered. The appointments and promotions an always being taken place in accordance with law and Rules prevailing in the department. The respondent No.2 has failed to produce any relevant document to show that his appointment was against Class III vacancy. Further no Rules have been produced or shown by respondent to claim either appointment against ClassIll vacancy and regularisation thereto. The Apex Court in various judgements has already held that merely because an employee is discharging certain obligations of higher post, is not legally recognised and, therefore, neither equity nor legitimate expectation come forward to hold the respondent No.2 in any manner. Therefore, order passed by Labour Court is bad in law.
Further submission has been made that any appointment, confirmation promotion or regularisation is always subject to Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. No document has been brought on record or any Rule under which respondent can claim benefit as given by Labour Court. The Labour Court has granted relief to respondent No.2 since 2.11.1991 along with salary and other benefits, which is contrary to the Apex Court judgement. Reliance has been placed upon a judgement of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1995, Supreme Court, 1121, Director of Education and others v. Gajadhar Prasad Verma. Reliance has been placed upon paras 4 and 5 of the said judgement. The same is being quoted below:
"4. Be that as it may, the crucial question is whether the school of the respondent can claim reimbursement of the salary of such Clerk from the Government. The U.P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and other Employees) Act 24 of 1971 (for short ''the Act''), regulates the payment of the salary by the Government. Section 9 is relevant in that behalf. It provides that no institution shall create a new post of teacher or other employee except with previous approval of the Director or such officer as may be empowered in that behalf by the Directors. Admittedly, no steps have been taken by the Management to have obtained prior approval of the Director or any other authorised officer for creation of the additional post of Clerk. The prior approval of the Director of the empowered officer is a condition precedent and mandatory, for creation of an additional post (sic) the Government had before it the relevant data of the post for which the grant of aid was sanctioned. To make the Government to reimburse the salary of an additional teacher or an employee, the Government should have similar relevant material and data to have it duly verified and decision taken to grant sanction of the additional post. The inspecting and reporting officers are enjoined to make personal inspection and submit the report of the existing correct facts. The dereliction of duty or incorrect or false reports would be misconduct entailing them in disciplinary action for dismissal from the post held by them. Therefore, the failure to obtain prior approval disentitles the Management to obtain reimbursement of the salary of such teacher or other employee.
Shri Pramod Swarup, learned counsel for the respondent, placed before us the direction issued by the State Government for creation of an additional post when the strength of the students exceeds 1100. It is his contention that since the strength of the students has been more than 1100, the creation of additional Clerk has become necessary and that, therefore, the management has resolved to appoint the respondent as an additional Clerk. We are concerned with the creation of the additional post, may be, due to the increase in the strength of students. What is material is whether prior approval of the Director or the empowered officer has been obtained before creating that post. It is not the case of the respondent or the management that such prior approval had been obtained or given by the competent officer. Therefore, so long as prior approval had not been given, though the respondent might have been appointed by the management, the Government is not obliged to reimburse the salary paid to such Clerk. The management has to bear the expenditure from its own resources without claiming any reimbursement from the Government. The High Court, therefore, has committed grievous errors of law in not adverting to this crucial question and allowing the writ petition directing the Government to create the post and to make the payment of the salary etc. The directions are wholly illegal and legally unsustainable."
Further reliance has been placed upon a judgement of the Apex Court reported in (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 667 : (2006) 2 All LJ 14) State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and others. Paras 75 & 76 are being quoted below: (Paras 74 and 75 of AIR SCW)
"75. The facts that all appointments have been made without following the procedure, or services of some persons appointed have been regularised in the past, in our opinion, cannot be said to be a normal mode which must receive the seal of the court. Past practice is not always the best practice. If illegality has been committed in the past, it is beyond comprehension as to how such illegality can be allowed to perpetuate. The State and the Board were bound to take steps in accordance with law. Even in this behalf Article 14 of the Constitution will have no application. Article 14 of the Constitution will have no application. Article 14 has a positive concept. No equality can be claimed in illegality is not well, settled. (See State of A.P. v. S.B.P.V. Chalapathi Rao: (AIR 1995 SC 557) SCC para 8; Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh,: (AIR 1999 SC 1347) SCC para 13 and State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh : (AIR 2000 SC 2306) SCC para 30.)
In the instant case, furthermore, no post was sanctione. It is now well settled when a post is not sanctioned, normally, directions for reinstatement should not be issued. Even if some posts were available, it is for the Board or the Market Committee to fill up the same in terms of the existing rules. They, having regard to the provisions of the Regulations, may not fill up all the posts."
Further reliance has been placed upon Judgement Today, 2006 (8) 595 State of Madhva Pradesh v. Yogesh Chandra Dubey & others. Paras 10, 12, and 16 are quoted below:
"10. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the respondents were not appointed in terms of the statutory rules. Their services were taken by the officers only to meet the exigencies of situation. No post was sanctioned. Vacancies were not notified. It is now trite that a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, while offering public employment, must comply with the constitutional as also statutory requirements. Appointments to the posts must be made in terms of the existing rules. Regularisation is not a mode of appointment. If any recruitment is made by way of regularisation, the same would mean a backdoor appointment, which does not have any legal sanction.
A person, who had been appointed by a State upon following the Recruitment Rules, enjoys a status. A post must be created and/ or sanctioned before filling it up. The question recently came up for consideration in M.P. Housing Board & Anr. V. Manoj Shrivastava, (AIR 2006 SC 3499) wherein it was held:
"33. For the purpose of this matter, we would proceed on the basis that the 1961 Act is a special statute visavis the 1973 Act and the Rules framed thereunder. But in the absence of any conflict in the provisions of the said Act, the conditions of service including those relating to recruitment as provided for in the 1973 Act and the 1987 Rules would apply. If by reason of the latter, the appointment is invalid, the same cannot be validated by taking recourse to regularisation. For the purpose of regularisation which would confer on the employee concerned a permanent status, there must exist a post. However, we may hasten to add that regularisation itself does not imply permanency. We have used the term keeping in view the provisions of the 1963 Rules."
As the respondents did not hold any post, in our opinion, they are not entitled to any scale of pay."
Further reliance has been placed upon a judgement of the Apex Court reported in (2007)1 Supreme Court Cases. 408 : (2007) 1 All LJ 505 Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Reliance has been placed upon paras 37,38 and 40. The same are being quoted below:
"37. Creation and abolition of posts and regularisation are purely executive functions vide P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General. Hence, the court cannot create a post where none exists. Also, we cannot issue any direction to absorb the respondents or continue them in service, or pay them salaries of regular employees, as these are purely executive functions. This Court cannot arrogate to itself the powers of the executive or legislature. There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution, and the judiciary, too, must know its limits.
The respondents have not been able to point out any statutory rule on the basis of which their claim of continuation in service or payment of regular salary can be granted. It is well settled that unless there exists some rule no direction can be issued by the court for continuation in service or payment of regular salary to a casual, ad hoc, or dailyrated employee. Such directions are executive functions and it is not appropriate for the court to encroach into the functions of another organ of the State. The courts must exercise judicial restraint in this connection. The tendency in some courts/tribunals to legislate or perform executive functions cannot be appreciated. Judicial activism in some extreme and exceptional situations can be justified, but restoring to it readily and frequently, as has lately been happening, is not only unconstitutional, it is also fraught with grave peril for the judiciary.
The courts must, therefore, exercise judicial restraint, and not encroach into the executive or legislative domain. Orders for creation of posts, appointment on these posts, regularisation, fixing pay scales, continuation in service, promotions, etc. are all executive or legislative functions, and it is highly improper for Judges to step into this sphere, except in a rare and exceptional case. The relevant caselaw and Philosophy of judicial restraint has been laid down by the Madras High Court in great detail in Rama Muthuramalingam v. Dy. Supdt. of Police and we fully agree with the views expressed therein.
Taking support of these judgements learned counsel for petitioner submits that creation and abolition of posts and regularisation are purely executive functions. The appointment to the post must be made in terms of existing Rules. Regularisation is not a mode of appointment. If any recruitment is made by way of regularisation, the same would mean a backdoor appointment, which does not have any legal sanction.
Further reliance has been placed upon a Full Bench Decision of this Court reported in (1999)1 UPLBEC, 1 : 1999 All LJ 454 Gopal Dubev v. District Inspector of Schools, Maharaisanj and another and reliance has been placed upon paras 19 and 22 of the said judgement. The same are being quoted below:
"19. The argument of Sri S.K. Verma learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, was that since the Director of Education is ex officio Chairman of the Board under the Intermediate Education Act and the Board has accorded recognition to the Institution with sociology as one of the subject it is to be presumed that he (the Director) has sanctioned the post of Lecturer for the subject. This contention does not command acceptance. Section 9 of the payment of Salaries Act expressly mandates that no institution shall create a new post of teacher or other employee except with the previous approval of the Director or such other office as may be empowered in that behalf by the Director. Since the statute requires the thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner or not at all. It follows, therefore that prior approval of the Director in writing must be obtained before the management creates a new post of teacher in the recognised institution. The requirement of the statute cannot be presumed because the Director happens to be the authority or one of the authorities concerned in the matter of accord of recognition for opening a new subject in a college. It is relevant to note here that recognition for opening a subject in a College is accorded by the Director under the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act, which is a statute to establish a Board to regulate and supervise the system of High School and Intermediate Education in Uttar Pradesh, prescribe courses therefore and oversee related activities, whereas the Payment of Salaries Act is enacted to regulate the payment of salaries to teachers and other employees of the High Schools and Intermediate Colleges and to provide for matter connected therewith. The two statues, in our considered view, operate in different fields. While dealing with matters like recognition and payment of salary of teachers and other employees relevant matters to be taken into consideration are different. Regarding recognition, the authority has to satisfy itself about necessary infrastructure, the facilities available in the educational institution, the benefit to the students of the locality in opening the new subject in the Institution, the potentiality of the institution to cater to the needs of the students of the locality etc. while dealing with the question of granting approval for creation of post of a teacher or other employee in an institution, the primary consideration is the preparedness of the State Government to bear the financial liability of the new post proposed to be created. It follows therefore, that the contention that since the Director is associated with the matter regarding grant of permission/recognition for opening new subject in the institution, it is presumed that he has given his consent for creating new posts of teachers and other employees for the subject is not correct. This teachers and other employees for that subject is not correct. This contention, if accepted, may lead to situation that the management creates posts of teachers and other employees in connection with the new subject and the State Government is compelled to bear the financial liability without any further involvement in the matter. Such a situation, as we read the provisions of the two enactments, is not contemplated. It also does not appeal to common logic. The result is that for the purpose of creating a new post of teacher of other employee for/in connection with a new subject, which it has been permitted to pen, the management has to obtain prior approval of the Director as required under Section 9 of the Payment of Salaries Act. This statutory mandate cannot be said to have been satisfied by raising a presumption on the basis of recognition granted for that subject.
In view of the above discussion the answer to the question formulated by us is that on recognition being granted by the Board in respect of a subject in an Institution under Section 7A of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 it will not be presumed that the post of lecturer in such subject stands sanctioned by the Director of Education under Section 9 of the Payment of Salaries Act."
If a person has been appointed without obtaining sanction, he cannot claim salary and management too cannot claim itself reimbursement, therefore, there cannot be a presumption of sanction. In view of aforesaid fact, learned counsel for petitioner submits that award to this effect directing the respondent that he will be treated to be clerk from 26.10.1991 and from that date he will be treated to be permanent on that post and will also be entitled for said salary.
On the other hand, Sri Sheshadri Dwivedi, learned counsel for respondents submits that respondent No.2 was appointed on compassionate ground in the petitioner''s Sansthan on the assurance that later will be appointed as Class III employee in accordance with qualification. Further Government Order dated 5.11.1992 also provides that employment on compassionate ground in the local bodies would be provided in accordance with the educational qualifications. Having considered the educational qualification of the answering respondents he was attached to look after the work of pairokari in the Court and other courts. Work of pairokari has done by Class III employee i.e. clerk grade II employee. The Jal Sansthan has never taken any work of Khalasi from the answering respondent as he was continuously working, as such, he submitted several reminders to petitioner to pay the salary and wages. After direction issued by this Court, the Labour Court has duly considered the issue and by a reasoned and detailed order has allowed the claim of answering respondents. The Labour Court while considering the issue has passed an award in favour of answering respondent that answering respondent is entitled for the relief claimed therein. The Labour Court has also held that the employer themselves has admitted this fact that there is no vacancy of general category but there is a vacancy for Scheduled Castes. Treating this admission, the Labour Court has held that no post are reserved for scheduled castes and general category, it is only on the basis of reservation policy. Reliance has been placed upon judgement of this Court reported in 2005 (104) FLR, 413, U.P. State Electricity Board. Kanpur v. Vijay Tripathi and another. Taking support of the aforesaid judgement, learned counsel for petitioner submits that Labour Court has full jurisdiction to grant designation and promotion. In this case, the workman was working as Noter and Drafter and was also qualified, in such situation, Labour Court has granted him designation and payscale to him. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgement reported in 2006 (1) AWC 841, U.P. State Sugar andCane Development Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court Gorakhpur and others. This Court has held that Labour Court has wide powers and can create post. In 1991 (62) FLR, 583, National Textiles Corporation (U.P.) Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court. Kanpur and others if the management itself has permitted the workman to work on a particular post, the Labour Court has power to give him designation and pay of the said post. Further reliance has been placed upon 1995 (70) FLR 1137, U.P. State Electricity Board and others v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gorakhpur and others. Reliance has been placed upon para 6 of the said judgement. The same is being reproduced below:
"6. The question whether the Labour Court could grant promotion and the facts and circumstances of the present case require consideration by this Court which shows that it was the adjudication of the fact were the workman was working on a particular post and was entitled to get emoluments for the post and its designation. The judgement of the learned single Judge (supra) in para 4 relying on the Supreme Court decision is quoted as under:
"The question that remains for consideration is as to whether the Labour Court has in fact granted promotion to the workman. The Labour Court, after considering the evidence of both the parties and facts and circumstances of the case, has accepted the case of the workman to the effect that he has beenacting Travelling Salesman at the instance of the employer (petitioner) since 1981 and on this basis Labour Court has held that it is not a case of promotion but a case of giving designation and of the post in which the workman has been working for the past several years. The aware of the Labour Court appears to be perfectly justified. It is the function of the management to appoint person for a particular post or office and this managerial function of the management was performed at the time when the workman was asked to work and act as a Travelling Salesman. The management has itself permitted the workman, as per the finding recorded by the Labour Court, to act as a Travelling Salesman and that was nothing but a promotion/appointment by the Management without giving designation and pay. Managerial function being over already what the Labour Court has done nothing except giving designation and pay of the post of which he was discharging duties and performing functions."
This cannot be said to be case of promotion. In this connection reference may also DC made to para 12 of the decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of the Workmen v. Hindustan Lever: AIR 1984 SC 1683) (supra), relevant extract of which is quoted below:
"Even on the footing of law, as it stands at present in this country, that promotion is a management function, the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal was not one for claiming promotion. The Tribunal committed a grave error in so misinterpreting the dispute referred to it. The Tribunal overlooked the fact that the demand was in respect of workman already promoted i.e. in respect of whom managerial function of selecting personnel for promotion had been already performed. The demand was in respect of already promoted workmen, may be in an officiating capacity for their classification from acting of temporary to confirmed that is permanent, in the Higher Grade to which they were promoted, after a reasonable period of service which according to the Union may be three months of service. By no cannon of construction, this demand could be said to be one for promotion."
Further learned counsel for respondents has placed reliance upon a judgement of this Court in Writ Petition No.34205 of 2001 Kanpur Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (III) U.P. at Kanpur and others. Taking support of aforesaid judgement learned counsel for respondents submits that workman claimed that he was entitled to be given designation and wages of a routine grade clerk on the basis of working, which he was performing, the Labour Court was justified in granting the said relief to hold the post. Taking support of aforesaid judgement, learned counsel for respondents submits that case of petitioner cannot be accepted that Labour Court is having no jurisdiction to such effect.
Further by way of supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of respondents, it has been brought to the knowledge of the Court that the applications were invited from Class IV employees, who were passed Intermediate and having typing speed of 25 words per minute to apply for vacant post of clerk Grade n in the petitioner''s Sansthan but respondent No.2 submitted an application to that effect to the answering respondent that he may be appointed on the vacant post of Grade II in pursuance of the award dated 19122006. Further submission has been made that it is not a case of promotion but it is a case of fitment as the respondent was doing some work, as such, he was entitled for said relief and Labour Court after considering all the facts have granted relief in his favour.
After considering the submissions made on behalf of parties and after perusal of the record, appointment of respondent No.2 was under the Dying in Harness Rules as Class IV employee. It appears that due to work and contingency, petitioner was directed to look after some work and to do pairvi according to litigation pending against the Jal Sansthan. The question for consideration by this Court is whether the Court or authority has any power to create a post, if the employer is coming forward before the Court that there is no vacancy and as appointment of respondent No.2 was under the Dying in Harness Rules, therefore, benefit of Dying in Harness Rules can be provided only once in spite of fact that respondent No.2 was having such qualification for the purposes of appointment in Class III post. But as he has admitted employment, therefore he cannot say that he is entitled to be appointed in Class III as a clerk. If he was permitted to discharge some functions of Class III whether on that ground the Court can direct, in spite of the fact that it has been brought to the notice that there is no vacancy. In such situation whether, Labour Court can direct to promote or to confirm on the post of clerk from the date he was performing the duty of clerk on 26.10.1991. From various judgements of the Apex Court and this Court it is clear that creation of post, appointment to the post, regularisation, fixing of pay scales, continuation in service, promotion etc. it is only the authority to take a decision on the basis of availability of post and sanction of the post and it is a total function of executive or legislature. It is highly improper for the Court to step into this sphere. The Court cannot create a post nor issue direction to absorb or regularise temporary employee or to continue them in service or to pay them regular salary as they are purely executive or legislative functions. In Gopal Dubey (supra), Full Bench of this Court has specifically held that on being recognition by the Board in respect of a subject in a institution under Section 7(A) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 it will not be presumed that the post of lecturer in such subject stands sanctioned by the Director of Education under Section 9 of Payment of Salaries Act. In State of M.P. v. Yogesh Chandra Dubey the Apex Court has held that since the appointment was not in terms of relevant Rules, nor appointed against "any existing vacancy of any post cannot be considered to be holding any post and therefore, not entitled to any scale of pay."
In the present case it also appears that respondent No.2 was not appointed to look after the work of litigation in terms of statutory Rules. Their services were taken by the officers only to meet the exigencies of situation. No post was sanctioned. Vacancies were not notified. It is now trite that a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, while offering public employment, must comply with the constitutional as also statutory requirements. Appointments to the posts must be made in terms of the existing rules. If a person who has been appointed by a State upon following the Recruitment Rules, enjoys a status, a post must be created or sanctioned before filing it up. The contention as contended by respondents that it is not a case of promotion but it is a case of fitment, the said argument of the respondents cannot be accepted in view of the fact that admittedly there appointment is as Class IV employee on the post of khalasi. If due to contingency of work they have been directed to look after the work of litigation, cannot confer right upon an employee to claim regularisation or promotion and the pay scale of that post. It has been submitted by the petitioner that there is no vacancy. If there is no vacancy upon all the sanctioned posts, the employees were working and sanctioning a post is a total prerogative and jurisdiction of the State Government. Therefore, in such circumstances whether in spite of aforesaid fact, the Labour Court was justified in giving promotion to respondent No.2 on the Class III post and can create a post to that effect. In view of settled principle of law, in my opinion, the Labour Court was not justified in granting the relief as claimed, without being satisfied whether this creates a right upon the employee to get the said post on which he was in the exigency of work has been directed to work on that post.
In view of aforesaid fact, I am of the opinion that award passed by Labour Court dated 19122006 (Annexure 6 to writ petition) is not sustainable in law and is liable to be quashed? The writ petition is allowed. The order dated 19122006 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed.
No order as to costs.