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Judgment
Per: Justice B. P. Sharma
This appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been preferred by the appellants, assailing the order dated 14.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.31444/2024, whereby the writ petition preferred by the respondent herein was allowed, the order of termination was set aside, the appellants were directed to reinstate the respondent with continuity of service and 50% back wages were also awarded.
The facts, in brief, are that the respondent was initially appointed as Administrative Officer (Consultant) on contractual basis under the appointment order dated 16.11.2023. The appointment was for an initial period of one year, extendable subject to performance and institutional requirements. The terms and conditions governing the appointment specifically provided that the engagement was contractual and did not confer any right of regular appointment. During the course of service, several complaints were received against the respondent alleging misconduct, misbehaviour with staff members, violation of office discipline and conduct prejudicial to the functioning of the institution. On the basis of such complaints, a show cause notice dated 20.08.2024 was issued to him. After considering his explanation and the material available on record, the competent authority passed the order dated 23.08.2024 terminating his contractual engagement. The respondent challenged the said order before the learned Single Judge primarily on the ground that the termination was punitive and stigmatic and that no departmental enquiry had been conducted before inflicting such punishment. The learned Single Judge accepted the said contention and granted the relief noticed hereinabove. Hence, the present appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the respondent was a contractual employee and his rights were entirely governed by the conditions of appointment. It was argued that Clause 8 of the appointment order empowered the employer to remove a contractual employee whose conduct became prejudicial to the aims and objectives of the institution and, therefore, learned Single Judge erred in placing reliance upon Clause 12 relating to the applicability of the CCS Rules. It was further submitted that the respondent was issued a show-cause notice, his explanation was considered and sufficient opportunity was afforded before the termination order was passed. More importantly, it was contended that during the pendency of the writ petition the contractual tenure itself expired and the post was subsequently filled up, therefore no direction for reinstatement could have been issued. In support of the submissions, reliance was placed upon K. Ragupathi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2022) 6 SCC 346, State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691, and State of Haryana v. Satyender Singh Rathore, (2005) 7 SCC 518, to contend that contractual employees cannot claim continuation or reinstatement beyond the contractual period and their rights are governed by the contract itself.
4 . Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge and submitted that although the respondent was a contractual employee, the impugned termination order was not a simpliciter termination but was founded on serious allegations of misconduct which would cast a stigma upon the service career of the respondent. It was argued that no regular enquiry was conducted, the allegations were vague and unsubstantiated, and the respondent was deprived of an effective opportunity to defend himself. It was further submitted that the termination violated the principles of natural justice and adversely affected the respondent's future employment prospects. According to the respondent, the learned Single Judge rightly exercised writ jurisdiction in setting aside the stigmatic order and directing reinstatement.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the record.
The facts of the case reveals that the respondent was engaged purely on contractual basis and his appointment did not confer any right to continue in service beyond the contractual tenure. Although the learned Single Judge rightly noticed that the termination order referred to allegations of misconduct but the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that during the pendency of the writ petition the contractual tenure itself had expired. Once the contract came to an end by efflux of time, no enforceable right survived in favour of the respondent to seek reinstatement through a writ of mandamus. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satyender Singh Rathore (supra) observed as follows:
“9.We find that the High Court did not consider the question of stigma or the effect of any enquiry held before the order of termination was passed. The question whether the enquiry purportedly held provided the motive or the foundation was required to be considered by the High Court in detail. That has not been done. The question whether termination of service is simpliciter or punitive has been examined in several cases e.g. Dhananjay v. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Jalna (2003(2) SCC 386) and Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Limited and Ors. (2003(3) SCC 263). An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate. The recent two decisions of this Court in Dipti Prakash Bamerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta (1999(3) SCC 60) and Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences (2002(1) SCC 520) after survey of most of the earlier decisions touching the question observed as to when an order of termination can be treated as simpliciter and when it can be treated as punitive and when a stigma is said to be attached to an employee discharged during the period of probation. The learned counsel on either side referred to and relied on these decisions either in support of their respective contentions or to distinguish them for the purpose of application of the principles stated therein to the facts of the present case. In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra) after referring to various decisions it was indicated as to when a simple order of termination is to be treated as “founded” on the allegations of misconduct and when complaints could be only as a motive for passing such a simple order of termination. In para 21 of the said judgment a distinction is explained thus:
“If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as “founded” on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid. From a long line of decisions it appears to us that whether an order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a times the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. It may be difficult either to categorize or classify strictly orders of termination simpliciter falling in one or the other category, based on misconduct as foundation for passing the order of termination simpliciter or on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service.”
10.When the factual scenario of the present case is considered in the background of legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of termination."
The principles laid down by the Supreme Court makes it clear that the validity of an order terminating the services on a contractual basis depends upon whether the alleged misconduct constituted the foundation of the termination or was merely its motive. Where the employer records findings of misconduct, whether through a formal or informal enquiry, and such findings form the basis of the termination, the order is punitive and cannot be sustained without complying with the principles of natural justice. However, if the employer, without arriving at any finding on misconduct, merely considers complaints or doubts regarding the employee's suitability and chooses not to continue the employee, such complaints constitute only the motive, rendering the termination an order of simpliciter. Since the distinction between motive and foundation must be determined from the facts of each case, and the High Court failed to undertake this essential examination before interfering with the termination order, the Supreme Court held that such interference was unwarranted and upheld the order of termination.
A careful reading of the terms and conditions of the respondent's appointment leaves no manner of doubt that his engagement was purely contractual and for a fixed tenure. Merely because Clause 12 of the appointment letter provides that the provisions of the C.C.S. (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (referred to by the parties as the CCA Rules, 1966) shall apply in respect of matters relating to conduct, discipline and conditions of service, the same cannot be construed to confer upon a contractual employee the status or procedural safeguards available to a regular Government servant. Such a clause has to be read harmoniously with the other terms of the contract, particularly those governing the tenure and termination of the engagement. The applicability of the CCS (CCA) Rules is only to the limited extent contemplated by the contract and cannot override the fundamental nature of the appointment, which remained contractual throughout. A contractual employee engaged for a specified period does not acquire any statutory protection under the CCS (CCA) Rules akin to that available to members of regular civil service, nor does the incorporation of such a clause convert the contractual engagement into a regular appointment. Consequently, the respondent could not have claimed the benefit of a full-fledged departmental enquiry or other protections envisaged under the CCS (CCA) Rules as a matter of right, since his rights and obligations continued to be governed primarily by the terms of the contract under which he was appointed. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has committed an error for providing protection under the said rules to the respondent.
Nevertheless, considering that the respondent's services were terminated before expiry of the contractual tenure, we are of the view that he deserves limited monetary compensation in order to balance the equities. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd. v. P.V. Swaminathan, (2001) 10 SCC 83 , squarely applies, wherein it was held that although reinstatement cannot be granted after expiry of the contractual tenure, the employee may be awarded pecuniary benefits for the remaining contractual period. Applying the said principle, we hold that the respondent shall be entitled only to salary for the period from 23.08.2024, the date of termination, till 15.11.2024, and shall not be entitled to reinstatement, continuity of service, back wages beyond the aforesaid period or any other consequential service benefits.
Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 14.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.31444/2024 is set aside. The appellants are directed to pay the respondent the salary payable for the period from 23.08.2024 to 15.11.2024, if not already paid, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. Subject to the aforesaid modification, the respondent shall not be entitled to any further relief. The writ appeal stands allowed and disposed of accordingly.