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Gita Mittal, J.—By way of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the communication dated 2nd March, 2005 issued by the respondent No. 3 cancelling the admission granted to the petitioner for the B.Com(Pass) Part I course. The petitioner is stated to have been born on the 13th November, 1988 and passed the matriculation examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education in the year 2002. Thereafter, the petitioner passed the intermediate examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education in the year 2004 securing a first division. The petitioner applied for enrolment and admission to the School of Open Learning of the University of Delhi in July, 2004 seeking admission to the B.Com. (Pass) Part I course conducted by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The candidature of the petitioner was duly accepted and he deposited the annual course fee for the course on the 3rd August, 2004 as well as his original certificates. The petitioner was issued an identity card and the library card by the School of Open Learning and also issued the study material for the B.Com. (Pass) Part I Course in the first week of September, 2004. The petitioner was permitted to and regularly attended all the personal contact programmes, lectures and discussions and was preparing for the annual examination of the course which were to be conducted in the month of April, 2005. 2. To the utter dismay of the petitioner, more than eight months after the completion of the admission procedure, in the first week of March, 2005, the petitioner received a communication/order dated 2nd March, 2005 bearing No. 04-05/3347 whereby his admission was cancelled on the ground that the petitioner has not completed 16 years of age at the time of his admission for the session 2004-2005.
The communication dated 2nd March, 2005 reads as under:
School of Open Learning
University of Delhi
South Study Centre
South Moti Bagh,
New Delhi - 110021.
Date : 2/3/2005
No. 04-05 3347
Mr. Akhil Narang,
EI, A Omvihar Phase-V.
Uttam Nagar,
New Delhi - 110059.
Sub: Cancellation of Provisional Admissions
Ref : Roll Number 0402-02-002172
Dear Student,
On scrutiny of your admission case. It has been found that you have not completed 16 years of age at the time of admission which is minimum requirement of 1st year admission for the session 2004-2005. In this connection this is to inform you that you are not eligible for admission this year and provisional admission granted you is hereby stand cancelled. However as per University rules admission fees paid by you will be refunded in due course of time.
Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
Co-ordinator
The petitioner, and, on his behalf his father, immediately submitted representations to the respondents but receiving no reply thereto, was constrained to file the present writ petition impugning the decision of the respondents primarily on the ground of a promissory estoppel and for the reason that the respondents had the power to exempt compliance with any requirement under Ordinance X C of the Delhi University Calender.
The petitioner has made the following prayers in the writ petition:
a) To set aside the impugned communication/order dated 02.03.2005 issued by the respondent No. 3 cancelling the admission of the petitioner.
b) To issue appropriate writ/directions/orders to respondents, thereby confirming the admission of the petitioner in B.Com (pass) Part-I Course and allow him to continue his studies.
c) Any other relief which this Hon''ble Court may deem fit and proper in the light of above facts and circumstances.
The respondents appeared in answer to the notice to show cause and filed a counter affidavit. The respondents have contended that the age of eligibility for admission to a degree course in the Delhi University has been provided in Ordinance 1(2A) of the University Calender (Volume II) and have stated that the power to relax the age limit has been vested in the Vice Chancellor for a maximum period of one year. It was stated that in the prospectus for admission to under-graduate courses in the School for Open Learning (earlier known as the School of Correspondence Courses and Continuing Education), the age requirement has been stipulated as 17 years as on 1st October of the year in which admission is taken, in consonance with the provisions of the aforestated Ordinance. In view of this specific stipulation, the power of relaxation has been conferred on the Vice Chancellor only upto a maximum of one year. In these circumstances, it is submitted that there is no power in any authority to relax the age limit of a period beyond one year.
So far as the instant case was concerned, according to the respondents, the petitioner was born on 13th November, 1988 and therefore on 1st October, 2004 was approximately only 15 years and 10 months. Therefore, even if exemption of the age limit of a period of one year was granted, the petitioner was still not of age and therefore he did not fulfil the eligibility requirement.
It has further been submitted that the petitioner and his father gave an undertaking that the petitioner fulfilled the eligibility requirement and that in case he was found ineligible subsequently, his admission was liable to be cancelled.
Delay in the scrutiny of the application was sought to be explained on the ground that the applications in most cases are received through post and that initially there is no detailed scrutiny of the certificates, documents and other particulars. It is only upon completion of the initial stage of process of admission of students by the stipulated last date, that the process for scrutiny of individual applications and eligibilities is undertaken. The respondent states that upon such scrutiny, it was found that the petitioner did not complete the age of 17 years as on 1st October, 2004 or even 16 years to entitle him to admission upon the maximum condonation of the one year, permissible under the Ordinance. In these circumstances, the admission of the petitioner was expeditiously cancelled and it was decided that the fees paid by him would be refunded. The respondents have contended that apart from the petitioner, there were 12 other candidates whose admission was so cancelled.
It is further submitted that the petitioner was duly notified that his admission was purely provisional and subject to scrutiny and verification of the eligibility requirements and documents and that the petitioner could not claim any rights on the plea that he was granted admission in September, 2004. The respondents have asserted that in view of the petitioner''s ineligibility, delay in cancelling the admission does not regularise his admission nor confer or create any rights in the petitioner.
I have heard learned counsels for the parties. The original record relating to the application of the petitioner has also been produced before me.
Before adverting to the facts of the instant case, it becomes necessary to notice the legal provisions which govern the instant case and which read as follows:
Ordinance 1 (2 A) of the University Calender Volume II
No person shall be qualified for admission tot he University unless before the first day of October in the year in which he seeks admission, he is 17 years of age or if he seeks admission to the 1st year of the Post Graduate Degree/Diploma Courses LL.B., B.Lib. Sc., or B.Ed. Course he is 20 years of age or if he seeks admission to M.Phil. Course he is 22 years of age.
Provided that the Vice Chancellor may, on the basis of individual merits, relax the age limit up to a maximum period of one year.
Ordinance X C-Permisive Provisions
The Academic council may, in exceptional cases grant exemption from the operation of any of the Ordinances governing admission of students, migration, the courses to be pursued by them, attendance at lectures or sessional or other work or the examination of candidates and authorise what is proper to be done instead in such cases, provided that no such exemption and authority shall be deemed to have been granted unless not less than two-thirds of the members present of the Academic Council voted in favour of the motion for such exemption and authority made by or with the written authority of the Vice-Chancellor; and
Provided further that this two-thirds majority voting for the exemption should not be less than half the total strength of the Academic Council at the time
I further find that the School of Open Learning has stipulated the age requirement for eligibility for admission in its prospectus and has provided the following stipulation:
Age Requirements
No person shall be qualified for admission to the School in the first year of the B.A. (pass)/B.A.(Hons.)/B.Com.(Hons.) course, unless he/she is seventeen years of age, before the first day of October in the year in which he/she seeks admission; and in the Second Year unless he/she is eighteen years of age before the first day of October in the year he/she seeks admission.
Relaxation in age limit upto a maximum period of one year may be made by the Vice-Chancellor on individual merit of each case.
No student is entitled to admission if he/she is less than Seventeen years of age on the 1st day of October of the year of admission. Similarly admission will not be allowed to candidates with 11 years schooling.
There can, therefore, be no dispute that a candidate seeking admission to any course in the School of Open Learning is required to have completed 17 years of age before the first day of October in the year in which admission is sought. There can also be no dispute to the fact that the Vice Chancellor is empowered to grant relaxation in age limit only up to a maximum period of one year on the individual merit of each case and nothing beyond.
The petitioner was admittedly born on 13th November, 1988 and he was seeking admission to the B.Com.(Pass) Part I Course in the year 2004. Therefore, in terms of the requirements of the University Calender as well as the prospectus of the School of Open Learning, the petitioner was required to have completed 17 years of age by 1st October, 2004. In case this was not so, then in order to be eligible for admission and exemption of one year of age as per the stipulations, noticed hereinabove, the petitioner was required to have completed 16 years of age by 1st October, 2004.
By virtue of his date of birth, as on 1st October, 2004, the petitioner was completing only 15 years and about 10 months of age and remained deficient by about 2 months.
It has repeatedly been held that in matters of education especially admissions and examinations, compassion or generosity would not guide courts while pronouncing judgments. It is also settled law that no admission can be granted in violation of statutory rules and that courts cannot direct universities to disobey or violate the very statutes to which it owes its very existence.
In this behalf, I can usefully advert to the judicial pronouncements reported in Guru Nanak Dev University Vs. Parminder Kr. Bansal and another, ; State of Maharashtra Vs. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale and others, . Dental Council of India v. Harpreet Kaur Bal entitled Dental Council of India v. Harpreet Kaur Bal and Ors.; State of Tamil Nadu and Others Vs. St. Joseph Teachers Training Institute and Another, A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another, ; State of Punjab and others Vs. Renuka Singla and others, ; C.B.S.E. and Another Vs. P. Sunil Kumar and Others, and St. John''s Teacher Training Institute (for Women), Madurai, Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, etc. etc., . etc.
The Ordinance 1(2A) of the University Calender (Volume II) and the clause contained in the prospectus is clear and unequivocal so far as the eligibility based on the age of the candidate is concerned and the petitioner was clearly not eligible for grant of admission.
Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner had sought to explain the declaration given by the petitioner and his father to the effect that petitioner was of age on the admission form stating that they verily believed that the petitioner was eligible as he had passed his senior secondary examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education which had not objected to his candidature either at the class 10th or at the school leaving stage. It was also contended that the University Calender permitted exemption of the eligibility condition under Ordinance X C of the Ordinances.
I find that so far as the age limit is concerned, a power to grant condonation has been specifically granted to the Vice Chancellor under the proviso of Ordinance 1(2A) of the University calender (Volume II) and the same is relaxable up to a maximum period of one year only. Such specific power having been granted under the specific provision governing the age limit, no resort can be taken to the general provisions of Ordinance XC wherein a residuary power is granted to the Academic Council.
It has been pointed that the prospectus of the School of Open Learning of the Delhi University also contained a similar restriction.
The petitioner required exemption of a period of more than one year which was clearly not permissible legally and as such the petitioner could not have been given admission to the course to which he was admitted.
No relief can be given to the petitioner for continuation in the course. I would, therefore reject the writ petition.
However, in my view dismissal of the writ petition does not conclude the matter. I find that the petitioner had submitted his application form on 6th August, 2004 to the School of Open Learning, University of Delhi. The application form contained a column for the date of birth against which the petitioner had clearly stated that he was born on 13th November, 1988. Alongwith the application form, the petitioner had enclosed certificates including the mark sheets issued by the Central Board of Secondary Education wherein the same date of birth was mentioned.
The application form for admission contains a printed declaration which reads as under:
I declare that the particulars given above are correct. I further declare that I am eligible in terms of age and the percentage of marks as per requirement for the above course otherwise my admission may be cancelled and the required fee be forfeited. I agree to be abide by the rules and regulations given therein. I further declare that I shall submit myself to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Principal of the School, the Vice-Chancellor and other authorities of the University who may be vested with the power to exercise discipline under the Act, the Statutes, the Ordinances and the rules framed by the University in this behalf.
Much emphasis has been laid by learned Counsel for the respondents on this declaration.
This was in small print and was undoubtedly signed by the petitioner as well as his father. There is no dispute that the petitioner has given the correct date of birth in the application. I, therefore, find no reason to disbelieve the statement on behalf of the petitioner that they erroneously understood and believed that the petitioner was eligible as he had undertaken the school leaving exams without any objection.
The same application form contains the following certification by the office of the respondents.
In token of having verified necessary documents admit provisionally Mr./Miss/Mrs._______ to the First/Second/Third year of the B.A.(Pass)/B.Com.(Pass)/B.A.(Hons.) English/B.A.(Hons.) Pol. Science/B.Com.(Hons.)
This certificate bears the signatures of the person who received the application for its submission and the date when it was so certified.
The petitioner was required to and had deposited the fees upon grant of admission to the B.Com. (Pass) course on the 1st September, 2004. He was given registration No. 4-02-02-002172.
Nothing further was done by the respondents and almost the entire academic session was permitted to end till the respondents sent the letter dated 2nd March, 2005 to the petitioner cancelling his admission. I find that there is no explanation for the delay from 6th August, 2004 when the petitioner submitted his application form till the service of the letter of cancellation of the petitioner''s admission to him.
In this regard, I may refer to the manner in which the respondents have proceeded on the file. There are no separate notings in the file of the petitioner. However a photocopy of a note sheet of another file has been placed on recorder This contains a note dated 21st February, 2005 which reads as follows:
Placed below 13 cases of below age(list attached) admitted during the session 2004-05 in B.A.(P)/B.Com.(P). As per prospectus the student must have atleast 17 years of age and one year age can be relaxed with the approval of the Vice Chancellor, University of Delhi. Theses cases are belong to the below age category, which were admitted inadvertently during the rush period of admission. Therefore, these students are not eligible for admission in B.A./B.Com.(P) 1st year for the session 2004-05.
However keeping in view of above mentioned facts theses cases may be cancelled and fees paid by them may be refunded as per university rules.
Therefore, the only excuse for granting admission to the petitioner and permitting him to undertake the course was "inadvertence". Assuming that there was inadvertence during "rush period of admission", there can be no excuse for permitting almost an entire academic session to lapse before even detection of such inadvertence. While the petitioner may have been under age and therefore ineligible to pursue a degree course in the University of Delhi, he may have been eligible to pursue other technical or educational courses in order to enable him to acquire further skills so that he does not lose an entire academic year. It cannot be contended that an academic year it is of no significance in the life of a student. Loss of a whole year may irreparably jeopardise or damage the academic interests of a student and a professional career. One year''s delay may have the consequences of loss of seniority or promotional avenues in the future. Seen in the light of the cut throat competition faced by the students of today, every day becomes invaluable. Such action by virtue of the delay on the part of the respondents becomes unpardonable and reprehensible.
In any case, the petitioner was entitled to be told at the earliest that he was not eligible to undertake the course till he completed 17 years of age on the 1st October of the year in which he sought admission or in any case, 16 years of age to entitle him to exemption of the prescribed period.
The letter sent to the petitioner on 2nd March, 2005 was on a printed format. The respondents have still retained the admission fees paid by the petitioner and stated that the same would be refunded to him in "due course of time". There is nothing on the file or in the counter affidavit to show that the fees has been actually refunded to the petitioner.
At this stage, it becomes necessary to notice judicial pronouncements which have not persuaded the respondents to move despite the anguish repeatedly expressed by this court. While considering a matter of cancellation of admissions and delay on the part of the Delhi University to pass orders as back as in 1968, several observations were made by this court. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court was reported at University of Delhi Vs. Ashok Kumar Chopra and Another, Thirty five years ago the Division Bench observed thus:
xxx As far as the present cases are concerned, there can be no doubt whatever that the University owed a duty to the students concerned either to approve or to reject the provisional admission made by the Principals of the Colleges within a reasonable time. Though the University has the power of approval or rejection from the very nature of that power, it must be held that it is a power coupled with a duty. When the applications were taken from the students by the Principals of the College for forwarding the same to the University, the Principals were acting as agents of the University and the University also along knew that on the strength of the provisional admission granted to them by the Principals, the students are continuing their studies in the college and if they are to be told that they were not eligible for admission, they should be told as at an early time. What can be the reasonable time within which the University can reject the provisional admission of the students should be determined after taking into account the fact that they were young students studying in the colleges and for them every year matters in their life and career and the course itself for which they sought admission was of three years'' duration. As pointed out already Shir Ashok Kumar Chopra was informed of the rejection in November 1966. The common feature is that this rejection was communicated to the students after the three students have completed one year in the college. xxx We are unable to find any support for his case in the above sentence since we have already held that the University owed a duty towards the students to make known to them within a reasonable time whether the University had approved of their admission or not. In the absence of a compelling command or context, we are not disposed to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the University has got the power to reject a provisional admission till the publication of the results of the University examination and, therefore, at no time anterior to the said publication of the results the students can proceed on the belief that the University has approved of their admissions to accept such a contention will be to encourage and to put a premium on callous indifference on the part of the University officials and to allow them to play havoc with the life and career of thousands of young men and women seeking admission into the portals of University. Shri Avadh Behari did not deny and could not have denied that there had been inordinate delay on the part of the University in scrutinising the various applications and coming to a decision whether to confirm or to reject the provisional admissions already made by the Principals of the Colleges but sought to explain it away by pleading that such delay was inevitable since about 16,000 students sought admission and the staff employed by the University was a very small one. This can hardly be an acceptable explanation when the consequences to the students in case of delayed rejection are so serious and disastrous. When the University has undertaken the task, it must keep itself equal to it and such an explanation of inconvenience and, economy cannot, from the very nature of the case, be an answer, much less an effective answer, for failure to discharge the first and the most elementary duty it owed to the students. xxx
These observations of the Division Bench of this Court made more than 35 years ago have also not made an iota of differences to the functioning of the University. The Bench had observed extensively on the parameters of "reasonable time".
I may also advert to the observations by this Court in yet another Division Bench pronouncement relating to admission to a course in the Delhi University. In the judgment reported at 43 (1991) DLT 670 entitled Kanishka Aggarwal v. University of Delhi, this Court observed thus:
What do we find in this case? It is the Professor-in-charge who may make provisional admissions. It is he, who, as the so-called Convener, may admit provisionally even those who do not find their names in any of the Lists. There was no Waiting List and as many as 72 vacancies were crying to be filled up on the very last date of admissions. The petitioner was there. So were the like of him. They were all waiting in the wings with money in their wallets to pay admission fees. They were invited. They paid the fees. (It was argued by Mr. Rao that the petitioner must have named the person who had invited him to pay the fees. We regard it immaterial. There was some Barkes some-where who was willing a la David Copperfield. And, then how could fees be deposited without the other side willing to accept? Have we not heard and heard again that line from the Goblin Market : "One may lead a horse to water, twenty cannot make him drink?") They were issued regular receipts for the same. Let us not forget that as per Clause IX of the Bulletin fees is to be paid only by an "applicant selected for admission". Let us also not forget that before the payment of fees, the applicants admitted provisionally have to produce all the requisite certificates in original and their confirmation is to be made by none other than the Professor-in-charge himself, and as per the applicant, he had actually produced those certificates. (See Clause VII(c)) As per Clause IX(3). The applicant also furnished two copies of his latest passport size photograph, the same being essential to "effect his/her admission by payment of fees". He was allotted a roll number. He was issued even the requisite identity card. He was also assigned to one of the seven sections. He even started attending the lectures. And later, in all the communications of he University he was shown to have been provisionally admitted. Does all this not constitute a representation? What is all this if not the requisite ''conduct''? Was the applicant not justified, under the circumstances, to raise the assumption? (See : Sanatan Gauda Vs. Berhampur University and others,
xxx
We hold that the plea of estoppel is available and applicable.
Let us assume, the plea of estoppel is not available. Still, should the applicant be allowed to be thrown out? Should we deprive him of the rainbow of today and make his tomorrows bleak, barren and ominous? Whom shall we be serving thereby? An inefficient, if not corrupt, system which has been spreading its fangs year after year? The Rip Van Winkles who refused to come out of their deep slumber even in the face of the reverberations caused by loud protests of foul play and demand for a CBI enquiry? Those who found it well high impossible to even transfer certain clerical staff inspite of pressing demand by the teaching community? Should we serve them or this innocent student who bought a dream with his time and money? He played no fraud. His only fault was his assumption that vistas or knowledge were being opened to him. Must he suffer for this innocence? Where lies his fault? How much do we wish, somebody had whispered to the University : un pey de charite, voyons''.
Yes, Wells is right (Situated Decision making 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1727 (1990)) in pointing out that judges remain impartial spectators while hearing the witnesses and going through reports, but at the end of the trial they become agents by interacting not only with those who are involved in the case, but with unknown others also whose cases will be decided in accordance with this case and ultimately they become "situationalists" or "formalists" inspite of their having been trained in the same legal system. John Dewey (Logical Method and Law, in 15th Middle Works 1889-1924, 68 (1983)) quotes Justice Holmes as saying:
The whole outline of the law is the resultant of a conflict at every point between logic and good sense-the one striving to work fiction out to consistent results, the other restraining and at last overcoming the effort when the results become too manifestly unjust.
Though Dewey points out that Holmes uses "logic" in a narrow "sylogistic" sense, and himself advocates "experimental logic"(P 69), let us say, the formalist judge represents logic, while the situationalist judge represents good sense. With respect, it is the situationalist judges we find working in Rajendra Prasad Mathur Ors. Vs. Karnataka University and Another, Thaper Institute of Engineering and Technology, Patiala (Deemed University) Vs. Abhinav Taneja and others, and Ashok Chand Singhvi Vs. University of Jodhpur and Others, For, in all these cases, the Supreme Court protected the interests of the students though found having been initially ineligible for admission. Who would not love to be in such august company?
It would be appropriate to also notice here the observations of this Court in the judgment reported at 2002 (III) AD (Delhi) 81 entitled Liya Belliappa v. CBSE and Anr. to the following effect:
Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 has relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in Civil Appeal No. 2662 of 1998 CBSE and Anr. v. P. Sunil Kumar and Ors. in which the Apex Court has deprecated the practice of allowing the students to appear in the examinations of the Board or the Universities and then ultimately regularising the same by taking sympathetic view in the matter. It is also observed that the Courts by their fiat cannot direct the Universities to disputes to which they owe their existences. Learned Counsel also relies upon the orders passed by the Apex Court in SLP-18853/97 Central Board of Secondary Education v. Nikhil Gulati and Anr. On 13.2.1998 in which once again the practice of permitting ineligible students to undertake Board or University examinations was disapproved. However it was also added that unless the High Court can justify its decision on principle and precept it should better desist from passing such orders as it puts the rule of law to mockery. It is true that the Courts must not countenance in-fraction of rules nor should interfere with the rules, guidelines and policies made by the experts in academic matters but in a case like the present one where a student is shown to be put in an extremely disadvantageous position without any fault on his part the Court has the duty to intervene and set the equities right to ensure that the student is not made to suffer without any fault on his part.
Undoubtedly the admissions of the petitioners cannot be disturbed in such manner and at such stage and the impugned decisions deserve to be quashed to balance equities.
I had occasion to consider the delay in taking action on the part of the Delhi University in three writ petitions by three students. Migration of these students which had been permitted was cancelled at the end of the academic year. In the judgment passed on 9th February, 2005 in Writ Petition (Civil) 20013/2004 entitled Radhika Garg v. Delhi University and Anr., delayed action of the University was set aside and holding that its action must be prompt especially having regard to the fact that academic careers are involved.
Undoubtedly the petitioner was not of age and not eligible to be admitted. Such conditions have been laid under statutory ordinances. These stipulations of age requirements are based on considerations of welfare and ability of the students. As noticed above, the Apex Court has deprecated grant of relief to students dehors statutory stipulations on considerations of sympathy and compassion. As a result, despite my findings on the action of the respondents, no relief qua his admission can be given to the petitioner. However, it is evident that the officials of the University of Delhi have unreasonably delayed scrutiny of the application of the petitioner and have caused loss and damage of an entire year to the petitioner. All judgments noticing the disastrous consequences of delay in acting on the part of this University have not made a writ of a difference to its style of functioning. As back as in 1968, the Division Bench had observed that scrutiny of the admission forms was the first and most elementary duty owed by the University to the students. In these circumstances, I therefore propose to compensate the petitioner by imposing costs by way of damages on the University of Delhi and its officers.
I am fortified in so ordering by the pronouncement of the Apex Court reported at Lucknow Development Authority Vs. M.K. Gupta, entitled Lucknow Development Authority v. N.K. Gupta.
The Division Bench of this Court in a judgment reported at In Re: Mohan Exports India Ltd., . had occasion to consider delay on the part of officials-respondents relating in the right of a petitioner to join a M.D.(CHA) course. It was observed that even if the career of the petitioner was not marred by the delay, his valuable rights were frustrated. The court observed that the officers of the Delhi Administration slept over the application of the petitioner for study leave in that case without any reason causing irreparable loss and damage to him as he lost his seat on account of the delay. The Delhi University refused to permit this petitioner to join on the ground that he was late even though no fault was attributable to him. Reliance was placed on the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the Lucknow Development''s case(supra) and held as under:
In these circumstances, we propose to recompensate the petitioner by imposing heavy cost by way of damages on Delhi Administration and its officers. This cost we tentatively quantify at Rs. one lakh though it does appear to us that this will be a poor consolation to the petitioner, but we cannot help otherwise.
The court further directed production of the records and filing of the affidavits by the authorities.
After production of the file and further consideration of the matter, vide the judgment reported at Ravinder Kumar Mathur (Dr.) Vs. Union of India and Others, , the court granted further damages to the tune of Rs. 5 lakhs to the petitioner in addition to the amount ordered vide the earlier judgment which had been delivered on 8th April, 2004.
The University of Delhi was a party-respondent in the writ petition which was decided by the aforenoted judgment.
In a judgment reported at 1996 (3) AIJ 17 entitled Saroj Rani and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors., also the court noticed the wastage of precious time of students resulting from irresponsible action on the part of a college and awarded compensation.
It is apparent that despite repeated judgments specifically requiring the University to act expeditiously and emphasising expedition in consideration of applications for admission by the University, the same have been of no consequence. Deadlines and schedules notified by the University are being strictly enforced. The University has a reciprocal duty to act expeditiously especially in matters relating to scrutiny of application forms and completion of admission procedure. It was so held by the Division Bench in Ashok Kumar Chopra''s case (supra). The admission procedure which commences in July/August of a calender year cannot be permitted to spill over into the next year or to the end of the academic session.
In the instant case, the petitioner has been deprived of a full academic year on account of delay in scrutiny of his application and deserves to be compensated. In compensating the petitioner, I am guided by the quantum of compensation awarded by the Division Bench in In Re: Mohan Exports India Ltd., and Ravinder Kumar Mathur (Dr.) Vs. Union of India and Others, The petitioner in these reported judgments was seeking admission to the post-graduate course, while the petitioner before this Court has suffered at the threshold of his college education, in my view an amount of Rs. 50,000/- deserves to be awarded as compensation to the petitioner for the loss of an entire academic year.
Accordingly, it is directed that the respondents shall pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner as compensation. The respondents shall also refund to the petitioner the fees received by them. The amounts payable under the directions of this Court shall be paid within a period of four weeks from today.
This writ petition is disposed of in the above terms with costs which are quantified at Rs. 10,000/-