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Judgment
MANISHA BATRA, J.(Oral)
Prayer in this petition filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNSS') read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India is for grant of regular bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No.110 dated 02.10.2025 registered under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act') at Police Station Ajitwal, District Moga.
Briefly stated, the FIR was registered on the basis of a ruqa sent by ASI Ashok Kumar of CIA Staff Moga, who was on patrolling duty near the bus stand at Ajitwal, when he received secret information about co-accused Sarwan Singh and Harjinder Singh @ Jinda. The investigation was then taken over by ASI Sukhwinder Singh, who apprehended both of them at the bus stand of village Nathuwala Jadid at about 09:05 PM on 02.10.2025. Their search was conducted in the presence of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sub Division Nihal Singh Wala and 500 grams of heroin was recovered from a kit bag lying between them.
As per the prosecution, co-accused Sarwan Singh made a disclosure statement on 03.10.2025 stating that he had procured heroin through one Seth, a resident of Pakistan. As per him, the consignment had been delivered to him by the petitioner. On the basis of this disclosure, the petitioner was nominated as an accused and Section 29 of the NDPS Act was added. The petitioner was arrested on 03.10.2025 itself. He suffered disclosure statement admitting his involvement in the subject offences and got recovered a cloth bag containing four packets of heroin weighing 457 grams, 576 grams, 465 grams and 505 grams, totalling 2 kilograms and 3 grams, from bushes near a canal track on the road from village Rajatal towards village Sarai Amanat Khan.
The petitioner was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Moga on 04.10.2025 along with the case property. The inventory was prepared and samples were drawn in the presence of the learned Magistrate under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act (Annexure P-14) and the petitioner was remanded to police custody for three days (Annexure P-9/A). As per the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (Annexure P-15), heroin was found in the samples. After completion of investigation, the challan was presented, charges were framed on 18.02.2026 and the case is now fixed for prosecution evidence.
While in custody, the petitioner approached this Court for interim bail for the purpose of his marriage. Vide order dated 19.11.2025 (Annexure P-16), he was granted interim bail and was directed to surrender before the jail authorities on 01.12.2025. As per the challan and the reply filed by the State, a Look Out Circular had been issued against the petitioner. He did not surrender and was detained during the immigration process at the airport at Amritsar with his passport and boarding pass.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the arrest of the petitioner is in violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 52(1) of the NDPS Act. No grounds of arrest were served upon the petitioner or his relatives at the time of arrest. The memo of arrest (Annexure P-9) is a vague document which does not disclose any ground of arrest, its place or its basis. A copy of it was supplied for the first time along with the challan. The petitioner was made to sign blank papers and was threatened before his production for remand. It is further argued that information about the arrest given to the father of the petitioner is not the same thing as communication of the grounds of arrest. The burden to prove compliance is on the police and the State has made only a bare denial in its reply. Learned counsel has further argued that once a violation of Article 22(1) is shown, the custody becomes illegal and the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act does not stand in the way of bail.
On merits, learned counsel has argued that the petitioner has been implicated only on the disclosure statement of a co-accused. The police party left the police station within four minutes of recording that disclosure, in a private vehicle, without noting the names of the officials or the number of the vehicle. The petitioner was picked up from another district without joining any official of the local police station and without complying with the mandatory provisions of law. It is further submitted that the petitioner was actually picked up at about noon on 03.10.2025 and was not produced before the nearest Magistrate at Tarn Taran. The recovery is stated to have been planted, as it was made from an open place accessible to all, no independent or local witness was joined and the signatures of the petitioner were not taken on the recovery memo. No videography of the arrest or of the recovery was made, though the arrest of the co-accused was videographed on the e-Sakshya application. An application seeking the video recordings and the CCTV footage of the police stations is pending before the learned trial Court. Learned counsel has also argued that the petitioner was not told of his right to silence before his disclosure statement was recorded, that Section 52-A of the NDPS Act was not strictly complied with and that the FSL report does not disclose the purity of the substance. The petitioner is stated to be a young man aged 24 years, recently married, with no other criminal case against him.
To buttress his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the authorities cited as Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and others, (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another, (2025) 5 SCC 799; Ashish Kakkar v. UT of Chandigarh, Criminal Appeal No.1518 of 2025, decided on 25.03.2025; Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, Criminal Appeal No.2808 of 2025, decided on 23.05.2025; Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 272; Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India and another, SLP (Crl.) No.3326 of 2026, decided on 01.04.2026; Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1703; V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51; Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, SLP (Crl.) No.1136 of 2023; Ashok Kumar Sharma v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-16156-2025, decided on 12.05.2025; Thokchom Shyamjai Singh v. Union of India, W.P. (Crl.) No.1929 of 2024 (Delhi); Kshitij Ghildiyal v. Director General of GST Intelligence, W.P. (Crl.) No.3770 of 2024 (Delhi); D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416; State of Maharashtra v. Saeed Sohail Sheikh, 2013(1) RCR (Criminal) 200 (SC); Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh and others, SLP (Crl.) No.3543 of 2020; Vijay Pal Yadav v. Mamta Singh and others, SLP (C) No.20330 of 2023; Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani and another, AIR 1978 SC 1025; Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1; Subramanya v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No.242 of 2022; Darshan Singh v. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal Nos.216-217 of 2009; Bawa Singh v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-42585-2024 and Ajay Malik v. State of UT Chandigarh, 2009(3) RCR (Criminal) 649.
Per contra, learned State counsel has opposed the petition by referring to the reply filed by way of affidavit of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sub Division Nihal Singh Wala. It is argued that 2 kilograms and 3 grams of heroin, which is multiple times the commercial quantity, was recovered at the instance of the petitioner and the FSL report confirms the presence of heroin. The rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is, therefore, fully attracted. As per learned State counsel, the memo regarding grounds of arrest and the memo of personal search were prepared at the time of arrest and the information about the arrest was given to the father of the petitioner, who signed the memo of intimation. The petitioner was represented by counsel when he was produced for remand and never raised any such objection then. Learned State counsel has further argued that the petitioner misused the concession of interim bail granted by this Court and tried to go abroad, but was apprehended at the airport at Amritsar. Charges have been framed and the trial is at the stage of prosecution evidence. It is, accordingly, urged that the petition be dismissed.
This Court has heard the rival submissions at considerable length, besides going through the material placed on record.
The main plea raised on behalf of the petitioner is that his arrest stands vitiated for non-communication of the grounds of arrest, which entitles him to bail irrespective of the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, Section 52(1) of the NDPS Act and Section 47(1) of the BNSS are relevant for the purpose, which read as under:
“22.Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.— (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.”
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“52.Disposal of persons arrested and articles seized.— (1) Any officer arresting a person under section 41, section 42, section 43 or section 44 shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest.”
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“47.Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail.— (1) Every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.”
In Pankaj Bansal's case (supra) and Prabir Purkayastha's case (supra), which arose under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, it was held that a copy of the written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrestee and that a breach of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest and the remand. In Vihaan Kumar's case (supra), which arose out of an arrest under the Indian Penal Code, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the requirement of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1). The grounds need not necessarily be in writing, but their communication must be effective and meaningful. When the arrested person alleges non-compliance, the burden is on the investigating agency to prove compliance and a proved violation entitles him to release even where statutory restrictions on bail exist. The operative part of the judgment reads as under :-
“26.Therefore, we conclude:
26.1.The requirement of informing a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);
26.2.The information of the grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and method of communication must be such that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;
26.3.When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1);
xxx xxx xxx
26.6.When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.”
It may be noticed that in Vihaan Kumar's case (supra), the police had relied only upon a vague entry in the case diary and the arrest memo, which did not contain the grounds of arrest. The information given to the wife of the accused was only about the fact of arrest. In that context, it was observed that information about the arrest is completely different from the grounds of arrest and that mentioning the grounds in a remand report, which is not served upon the arrestee, is no compliance. Thereafter, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy's case (supra), (2026) 8 SCC 275, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that it is not necessary to furnish full details of the offence. The information should be sufficient to enable the arrested person to understand why he has been arrested and the grounds should be somewhat similar to the charge framed by the Court for the trial of a case. The arrest in that case was upheld after examining the grounds actually communicated.
Reference can also be made to State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan etc., (2026) 8 SCC 223, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted by the High Court on the ground of non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest. It was held that neither Article 22(1) nor Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') prescribes a particular form or insists upon written communication in every case. It was further held that a prejudice-oriented test is to be applied. Since the arrest memos and the remand records showed that the accused were aware of the reasons for their arrest, they were legally represented from the outset and no prejudice was shown, the procedural lapse was held to be at best a curable defect which could not by itself warrant release on bail.
The law was then authoritatively settled for all offences in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2026) 1 SCC 500, decided on 06.11.2025, wherein it was held that the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing in every case, in the language which the arrestee understands. Where it is not possible to do so at the time of arrest, the grounds may be conveyed orally, but a written copy must be supplied within a reasonable time and in any case at least two hours prior to production for remand. The operative part of the judgment reads as under:
“66.In conclusion, it is held that:
66.1.The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including offences under IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023);
66.2.The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the arrestee in the language he/she understands;
66.3.In case(s) where, the arresting officer/person is unable to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after arrest, it be so done orally. The said grounds be communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any case at least two hours prior to production of the arrestee for remand proceedings before the magistrate.
66.4.In case of non-compliance of the above, the arrest and subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and the person will be at liberty to be set free."
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"68.We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline therefore demand that this procedure as affirmed above shall govern arrests henceforth.”
In Dr. Rajinder Rajan's case (supra), the said mandate was applied to an arrest made under the NDPS Act on 02.05.2025, where the arrest memo was in a template form and merely recorded that the grounds of arrest had been explained to the accused.
Thereafter, in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, 2026 INSC 1022, which concerned an arrest made after the decision in Mihir Rajesh Shah's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered Sri Darshan's case (supra) and State of Meghalaya v. Sonam Raghuvanshi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1294 and held as under:
“21.1.1.This Court in Sonam Raghuvanshi noted that the decision in Mihir Rajesh Shah is prospective. The same was rendered on 06.11.2025 whereas respondent-accused was arrested on 09.06.2025 much before the date of pronouncement of the judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah. That apart, the Bench held that there is a fundamental difference between non-service of grounds of arrest and non-furnishing of adequate reasons thereunder. While the first category would vitiate the arrest, in the second category one has to see the prejudice caused to the accused. In the facts of that case, this Court noted that respondent was indeed served with the grounds of arrest."
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“22.Though Sri Darshan and Sonam Raghuvanshi may appear to strike a discordant note, we need not labor on this. Judgment in Sri Darshan was rendered before Mihir Rajesh Shah; likewise, in the case of Sonam Raghuvanshi, the arrest took place prior to Mihir Rajesh Shah. Therefore, it is Mihir Rajesh Shah which sums up the correct legal position and lays down the correct law which is binding. It is in tune with the consistent line of jurisprudence developed over the years by this Court.”
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“23.Having discussed the judgments, it would be apposite to sum up the core principles qua Article 22(1). The grounds of arrest must be in writing and in a language which is understood by the accused. .....Any breach or non-compliance would entail immediate release of the arrested person because such arrest is unconstitutional. .....When there is violation of the Constitution, question of prejudice or demonstrable prejudice does not arise. The safeguards adumbrated in Article 22(1) are not mere procedural safeguards; these are fundamental principles which are required to be followed in the event liberty of a person is sought to be curtailed. Therefore, it is not correct at all to say that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitles the accused to bail. .....”
It was further held that once an accused is released for breach of Article 22, his re-arrest must have the judicial imprimatur and that a violation of the Constitution is not dependent on the nature or gravity of the offence.
Reference can also be made to a very recent judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Jhabra Ram, 2026 INSC 1169, which concerned an arrest made on 30.01.2026. The Hon'ble Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted by the High Court solely on the ground that the written grounds of arrest had not been furnished before the remand. Applying the prejudice-oriented test of Sri Darshan's case (supra), it was held as under:
“22.As affirmed in Kasireddy Upender Reddy (supra) and State of Karnataka (supra), the constitutional framework requires that the arrestee be informed of the grounds of arrest but does not insist upon written communication as an indispensable formality irrespective of the attendant circumstances. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice or denial of an opportunity to defend, an alleged procedural defect in the mode of service cannot ipso facto invalidate detention or entitle an accused to regular bail, more so in cases involving grave allegations of espionage affecting national security and sovereign integrity.”
Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol's case (supra) is not referred to in Jhabra Ram's case (supra) and the two judgments take a different view on the relevance of prejudice in respect of arrests made after 06.11.2025. With utmost respect, it is neither for this Court nor necessary in the present case to go into the same, since the petitioner was arrested on 03.10.2025, i.e. prior to the decision in Mihir Rajesh Shah's case (supra). As per paragraph 68 thereof, that judgment governs arrests made henceforth and it has been held to be prospective in Sonam Raghuvanshi's case (supra), as noticed in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol's case (supra). The arrest of the petitioner is, therefore, to be tested on the touchstone of Vihaan Kumar's case (supra), i.e. whether sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds of arrest was effectively communicated to him, the burden being on the police. If not, the arrest stands vitiated and no prejudice is required to be shown. Where, however, the grounds are served but are inadequate, the prejudice caused to the accused has to be seen, as noticed in Sonam Raghuvanshi's case (supra).
Adverting to the facts, the memo titled 'Memo basis of arrest' (Annexure P-9) bears the number of the FIR and the sections of the NDPS Act and records that the offence is non-bailable, but it does not set out the basic facts on which the petitioner was arrested. The reply filed by the State, despite the order dated 14.07.2026, merely asserts that such memo was prepared. If this were the only material on record, the burden on the police could not be said to have been discharged. However, as per the memo of information to relatives (Annexure P-10), the father of the petitioner was informed of the arrest on 03.10.2025 itself and he signed the same. As per DDR Nos.33 and 40 (Annexures P-6 and P-7), the petitioner was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate on 04.10.2025 within twenty-four hours of his arrest. He was represented by the Legal Aid Defence Counsel, who opposed the remand. The remand order (Annexure P-9/A), passed in his presence, records the basis on which custody was sought, i.e. the recovery of 2 kilograms and 3 grams of heroin, its international sources and the cross-border links of the co-accused. No grievance regarding the grounds of arrest was raised at that stage.
Moreover, while seeking interim bail from this Court, the petitioner himself pleaded that he had been nominated as an accused on the basis of the disclosure statement of a co-accused, as recorded in the order dated 19.11.2025 (Annexure P-16). That is the very basis of his arrest. The plea of non-communication of the grounds of arrest was raised for the first time on 30.03.2026, almost six months after the arrest. The petitioner has not shown how he was handicapped in opposing the remand or in seeking bail. His pleas that he was made to sign blank papers and that he was picked up at about noon on 03.10.2025 are bald allegations which run contrary to the contemporaneous DDRs. Thus, no breach of Article 22(2) is made out either and Subhash Sharma's case (supra) is of no help to him.
In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds of arrest was imparted to the petitioner before his remand and the requirement of Article 22(1), as explained in Vihaan Kumar's case (supra), stands met in substance. At the most, the memo served upon him is deficient in its contents, which falls in the second category noticed in Sonam Raghuvanshi's case (supra). No prejudice has been shown in this regard. Since no violation of Article 22(1) is established, paragraph 26.6 of Vihaan Kumar's case (supra) is not attracted.
The other judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner on this aspect do not advance his case. Radhika Agarwal's case (supra), Arvind Kejriwal's case (supra) and V. Senthil Balaji's case (supra), as also the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Thokchom Shyamjai Singh's case (supra) and Kshitij Ghildiyal's case (supra), arose under special statutes which require the grounds or reasons of arrest to be recorded in writing. In Ashish Kakkar's case (supra), the arrest memo and the remand application were the only material relied upon, whereas the present finding rests on the cumulative material on record, including the stand of the petitioner himself before this Court. Kasireddy Upender Reddy's case (supra) in fact upheld the arrest. The guidelines in D.K. Basu's case (supra) and the observations in Saeed Sohail Sheikh's case (supra) lay down salutary norms which are not in dispute.
Coming to the merits, since the recovery is of commercial quantity, the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is attracted. In State of Kerala v. Rajesh, (2020) 12 SCC 122, it was held that the expression ‘reasonable grounds’ means something more than prima facie grounds and contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Reliance can also be placed upon Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, (2022) 18 SCC 374, wherein it was held as under:
“18.In our opinion the narrow parameters of bail available under Section 37 of the Act, have not been satisfied in the facts of the instant case. At this stage, it is not safe to conclude that the respondent has successfully demonstrated that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him, for him to have been admitted to bail. The length of the period of his custody or the fact that the charge-sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.”
In the present case, 2 kilograms and 3 grams of heroin, about eight times the commercial quantity, is alleged to have been recovered at the instance of the petitioner and the FSL report confirms the presence of heroin. He is further alleged to be the supplier of the co-accused at the instance of a person based in Pakistan. The pleas regarding the time gap between DDR Nos.32 and 33, non-joining of independent or local witnesses, absence of videography and planting of the recovery relate to appreciation of evidence and are matters for trial. The admissibility of the disclosure statement and the prayer for preservations of CCTV footage, which is pending before the learned trial Court, are also matters for the trial. On the material placed on record, this Court is unable to record a satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence alleged against him.
That apart, the petitioner was granted interim bail by this Court for his marriage and was to surrender on 01.12.2025. As per the challan and the reply, he did not surrender and was detained at the airport at Amritsar during the immigration process on the basis of a Look Out Circular, with his passport and boarding pass. His custody was obtained by the police on 03.12.2025. These averments have not been controverted. The petition is completely silent about this episode, though it describes the petitioner as a first offender who has been falsely implicated. Such suppression of a material fact disentitles him to the discretionary relief of bail. His conduct also shows a real danger of his fleeing from justice, which weighs against him under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act as well.
The petitioner has been in custody for a little over thirteen months, charges have been framed and the trial is at the stage of prosecution evidence. There is nothing on record to show that there would be any undue delay in conclusion of trial. In view of the above discussion, this Court does not find any merit in the present petition and the same is hereby dismissed. Nothing observed hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
