AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
R.S. Narula, C.J. and M.L. Verma, J.—In this appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing the appellants writ petition on the short ground that no manifest injustice has resulted to him by the impugned order, a preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Harbans Singh Gujral, the Learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, that the appeal is barred by time and should be dismissed as such The judgment of the learned Single Judge was pronounced on February 21, 1969. This appeal when filed on March 26, 1969, complete in all respects except that it was not accompanied by three spare copies of the paper-book was admittedly within time. It was returned by the Deputy Registrar to the counsel for the appellant on April, 1969, for being refiled within a week alonwith three sets of the entire paper-book. It was then refiled by the appellant on May 15, 1969, alongwith the requisite three sets of paper book. The appeal was again returned on June 1, 1969 for being refiled within a week after explaining the delay for refiling the case. It was then resubmitted on June 21, 1969, with the endorsement of the counsel for the appellant, dated June 12, 1969, to the effect that his client could not be contented, and, therefore, the delay may be condoned. The office did not press the objection any further and laid the case before the Motion Bench (Harbans Singh, C.J., as he than was, and Sandhawalia, J.) on July 28, 1969, when the appeal was admitted. The objection of Mr. Gujral is based on the Full Bench judgment of this Court, dated September, 1, 1972, in Mahant Bikram Dass Chela Mahant Lachhman Dass Mahant, Amritsar v. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue Punjab, Chandigarh and others, 1974 P.L.R. 451, wherein it has been held that an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent which is not accompanied by three typed copies of the paper-book required under rules 2 and 3 of Chapter 2 C of Volume V of the High Court Rules and Orders is no appeal in the eye of law, and should be deemed to have been filed for the first time on the date on which the requirement of filing three spare paper-books is complied with. It is further emphasised by the counsel that the maximum extension of time for refiling the papers which are incomplete in any respect that could be allowed by the Deputy Registrar was 40 days, and inasmuch as the appellant did not refile the appeal within 40 days from April 1, 1969, that is by May 1, 1969, but actually refiled it on May 15, 1969, the Deputy Registrar had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and the same should be deemed never to have been filed. Mr. Harnam Singh Wasu, the Learned Counsel for the appellant, has on the ether hand relied on the later Full Bench judgment of this Court in Amar Rath etc v. Mul Raj etc., Letters Patant Appeal No. 397 of 1971, decided on January 27, 1975, wherein the following question has been answered by the Full Bench in the affirmative :--
Whether the mere fact that according to the particular practice prevailing in the High Court before the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Mahant Bikrem Dass Chela Mahant Lachhman Dass Mahant, Amritsar (supra), Letters Patent Appeals were entertained by the office contrary to the requirements of rule 3 of Chapter 2-C of Volume V of the Rules and Orders of the High Court without being accompanied by three sets of spare paper-books and time was allowed to file the same, and on filing the copies even beyond the expiry of the period of limitation the appeals were entertained and admitted, does or does not in law constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the Letter Patent Appeals which were filed before the judgment of the Full Bench.
Since this appeal was filed prior to the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Mahant Bikram Dass Chela Mahant Lachhman Dass Mahant, Amritsar, and counsel for the appellant says that he was misled by the practice which was prevalent in 1969 in this respect, this case appears to fall within the dictum of the later Full Bench in Amar Nath''s case (supra). We, therefore, condone the delay in refiling of the appeal and proceed to decide the same on merits.
The solitary question which called for decision in the writ petition of the appellant on its merits was whether the order of Shri Prem Kumar, Director Rehabilitation (Rural, dated January 27. 1955 (Annexure ''B'' to the writ petition), directing reallotment of the whole village (Nahianwala, District Bhatinda) was within his inherent jurisdiction or not. The claim of the appellant is that sub-rule (6) of rule 14 of the Administration of the Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950 (as amended by the Central Government on July 22, 1952, and February 13, 1953) absolutely barred the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Administration of the Evacuee Property Act, 1930, to cancel the quasi-permanent allotment which had been made in favour of the appellant in 1950. In fact the petition of the appellant for revision of the order of Shri Prem Kumar had been allowed on June 7, 1956, on this short ground by the order of Shri Tara Chand Aggarwal, Deputy Custodian General (Annexure ''C''). Since, however, the property had passed out of the evacuee pool to the compensation pool by operation of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, before Shri Tara Chand Aggarwal decided the matter, the order of Shri Aggarwal was held to be without jurisdiction, and was quashed by the order of a learned Single Judge of the Court (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) in Kirpal Singh v. The Deputy Custodian General, etc., Civil Writ 325 of 1956, on April 21, 1961 (Annexure ''D'') and the present appellants L.P.A. 133 of 1961 against the order of Shamsher Bahadur, J. was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court (G.D. Khosla and A.N. Grover, JJ.) on August 10, 1961 (Annexure ''E'' to the writ petition) and the present appellant''s S.C.A. 9 of 1961, and his petition for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was also dismissed by this Court, and by the Supreme Court on March 2, 1965, and April 16, 1965, respectively, appellant was left with no option but to file writ petition Civil Writ 1180 of 1965) on April 29, 1965, from the dismissal of which the present appeal has arisen.
Before the learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition a preliminary objection was taken to the effect that the appellant''s petition should be dismissed on the short ground that no manifest injustice had been done to him without going into the merits of the controversy. For holding that no manifest injustice had been done to the appellant, the learned Single Judge has relied on the observations of Prem Kumar in the impugned order Annexure ''B'' and subsequent observations of Shamsher Bahadur, J. and the L.P.A. Bench based on and derived from the impuged order of Prem Kumar. If Prem Kumar lacked inherent jurisdiction to pass the impuged order (Annexure ''B'') on January 27, 1955, the said order has to be treated as non est and nothing stated therein can be read or relied upon for any purpose so as to affect the rights of the present appellant. In the view of the matter it appears to us that the learned Single Judge should have first decided the purely legal question as to whether the order (Annexure ''B'') was or was not wholly without jurisdiction. If the learned Judge came to that conclusion, it could not in view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the judgments of this Court herein below referred to, be held that no manifest injustice has been done to the appellant as the deprivation of a person of his property contrary to law must necessarily result in manifest injustice :--
(i) Joginder Singh and others v. The Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property and others, 1961 P.L.R. 735, read with the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court, dated March 26, 1952, in the same appeal ;
(ii) Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others,
(iii) S. Gurdial Singh v. Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Ferozepore and others, 1973 P.L.J. 659 ; and
(iv) Messrs Naunihal Thakar Dass v. Appellate Officer and others, Letters Patent Appeal 392 of 1963, decided on September 6, 1966, by Mehar Singh, C.J. and Mahajan, J.
In Joginder Singh''s case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed his appeal on May, 1961, on the short ground that the Custodian of Evacuee Property in the State of Punjab or the Custodian General hearing the appeal from an order made by the Custodian after July 22, 1952, has no power to cancel an allotment of rural evacuee property on a quasi-permanent basis except on the grounds set out in rule 14 (6) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Rules, 1950, as amended on July 22, 1952 (that is the precise question which has been raised by the appellant in his present litigation before this Court). After the decision of the Supreme Court an application was made by some of the respondents in that appeal for a review of the order of their Lordships. The first ground urged was that the writ jurisdiction should not be exercised unless there has been manifest injustice, and it was sought to be shown that on the facts of that case no injustice had been done to Joginder Singh and others. That argument was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the following words:--
As regards the fist point, it raises a general question. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is wide and the High Court and a fortiori this Court, while hearing an appeal from the High Court''s decision, is entitled to exercise it where it finds that an inferior tribunal has acted beyond its jurisdiction. Where an inferior tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction its action necessarily results in injustice to the party against whom action has been taken. For, justice has to be done according to law.
Again in Syed Yakoob''s case (supra), decided by a Bench of five Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court, the argument that the Court should refrain from setting aside the order impugned in that case on the ground that no injustice had been done was repelled by there Lordships, as the order in that case was based on no evidence, and was, therefore, equivalent to an order without jurisdiction. In Gurdial Singh''s case (supra), M.R. Sharma, J. negatived a similar objection and held that when an order is passed by a tribunal which has no jurisdiction it cannot be argued that such an order has not resulted in miscarriage of justice. In the case of Messrs Naunihal Thakar Dass (supra), P.D. Sharma, J. (as he then was) had dismissed the appellants'' writ petition in the light of the rule of law laid down by the Supreme Court in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Messra Raman and Raman Limited, 1952 P.L.R. 210, on the ground that no grave injustice had resulted to the appellants by the Competent Officer''s refusal to sell mortagage property to them at the assessed price. While allowing the appeal of the writ-petitioners in that case, and setting aside the decision of the learned Single Judge on the above point, the learned Judge of the Letters Patent Bench laid down the law in this respect in the fallowing words:--
The learned Single Judge has relied on the two Supreme Court decisions in G. Veerappa Pillai''s case A.M. Allison Vs. B.L. Sen, In our view, these decisions do not support the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge. As a matter of fact, the decision of the Supreme Court dated 26.3.62 in Joginder Singh and others v. The Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property, Mussoorie and others. Civil appeal No. 457 of 1958, clearly militates against the view taken by the learned Single Judge.
Mr. Gujral contended on the other hand that in view of the law laid down by the Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1956, to the effect that the judgment of a larger Bench of the Supreme Court should be preferred to the judgment of a smaller Bench in case two different views have been taken by the Supreme Court on the same point, we should follow the judgment of the Bench of the five Judges of the Supreme Court in G. Veerappa Pillai''s case, and not the subsequent judgment of a Bench of three Judges in Joginder Singh''s case. This argument of Mr. Gujral is based on a misapprehension of facts The question of preferring one judgment of the Supreme Court over another within the meaning of the dictum of their Lordships in Mattulal''s case can arise only were the two views expressed by the Supreme Court on the identical question of law are irreconcilably inconsistent. That is not the case here. There appears to be no contradiction between the view expressed by the Supreme Court in either of those two decisions. The general rule of law relating to the condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari was laid down in G. Veeraooa Pillai''s case. It was no doubt held there that the Court would not interfere if in justice is not done to the writ-petitioner. Neither any attempt was nor could be made to lay down any exhaustive list of cases in which it may be held as a matter of law that injustice would result to the writ-petitioner. One of the cases in which manifest injustice would he presumed to have been done to a writ-petitioner was illustrated in Joginder Singh''s case (supra). Moreover, Syed Yakoob''s case (supra) was also decided by a Bench of five Judges and was subsequent to the judgment of their Lordships in G. Veeraooa Pillai''s case, and therefore, the law laid down by their Lordships in Joginder Singh''s case (which is in accord with the decision of the larger Bench in Syed Yakoob''s case cannot be ignored because of the broad principles laid down in G. Veerappa Pillai''s case. Even otherwise, we are bound by the Divison Bench judgment of our own Court in the case of Messrs Naulihal Thakar Dass (supra) wherein the judgment of the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh''s case was followed after noticing the decision of their Lordships in G. Veerappa Pillai''s case.
Mr. Harbans Singh Gujral then invited our attention to the Full Bench judgment of this Court (to which I was a party) in Mange v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, 1967 P.L.R. 835. The writ petition of Mange was dismissed by the Full Bench on the around that no manifest in justice had resulted to him despite the fact that the opinion on the question of the impugned order being or not being without jurisdiction was divided, in fact I had myself stated that if we were not to dismiss the petition on the ground of no manifest injustice having resulted to the petitioner, I would have suggested that the point in issue might be referred to a full Bench. It is patent that the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh''s case had not been brought to our notice at that stage In fact that judgment was subsequently brought to our notice in the same case when Mange approached this Court for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The order which we passed in the S.C.A. after noticing the decision of the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh''s case has been reopened in Mange and others v. Additional Director, Consolidation of holdings, Punjab and others, 1968 P.L.R. 29 at pages 16 and 17 of the Short Notes. After noticing the decision of the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh''s case, the Full Bench held as below :--
It is contended that the Full Bench could not have dismissed the writ petition as has been done in the present case on the ground that the action of the inferior Tribunal had not resulted, in injustice although such Tribunal had acted beyond its jurisdiction. This decision of their Lordships was not brought to our notice when the matter was argued before the Full Bench.
The Court did not consider the case fit for appeal to the Supreme Court on a point which had not been raised before it at the hearing of the main case, and, therefore, declined to issue the certificate.
Though it may not be possible to lay down any hard and fast rule in the matter of this type, it appears to us that it an order by which a citizen has been deprived of his property save by authority of law and in a manner wholly unauthorised by law is impugned in a writ petition, it is normally not open to this Court to deny relief to the citizen on the solitary ground that no manifest injustice has resulted to him. Article 31 (1) of the Constitution prohibits the State from depriving anyone of his property save by authority of law. The land allotted to the appellant on quasi-permanent basis under a statutory claim for allotment of evacuee property was no doubt property within the meaning of Article 31 (1). If the law of the land prohibits the allottee of such property being deprived of the same save in the circumstances enumerated in sub rule (6) of rule 14 of the Administration of the Evacuee Property Rules, it cannot be said that an order directing his such deprivation contrary to such law would not cause manifest injustice to the allottee. The expression "jurisdiction" has been used in G. Veerappa Pillai''s case in its widest possible cannotation. It includes an order wholly without territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction, etc. The order of an authority which lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass the same is nonest, and must ordinarily be set aside ex debito justitiae particularly if it interferes with the fundamental rights of a citizen, unless there are other compelling circumstances which prohibit the adoption of that course or if there is a statutory bar or impediment in the way of sum an order being annulled. Applying the principles of law laid down by me above to the facts of the instant case must hold, with the greatest respect to the learned Single Judge that the order under appeal dismissing the appellant''s writ petition on the short ground that no manifest in justice has resulted to him (which finding was in turn based, as already stated, on the observations made in the impugned order itself), is erroneous and has to be set aside.
We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the learned Single Judge and direct that the appellant''s writ petition may now be heard and disposed of on merits in accordance with law Mr. Gujral wanted to raise various other defences to the writ petition and wanted to show that the impugned order of Shri Prem Kumar was in fact within his jurisdiction. We are not concerned with those points at this stage as those have not been dealt with by the learned Single Judge. It would be open to Mr. Gujral to urge all those points before the learned Judge who hears and decides the writ petition on merits. In the circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs.