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Judgment
Rakesh Kainthla, J
The petitioner has filed the present petition for modification of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 2, Shimla (H.P) (learned Trial Court), as affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla (learned Revisional Court) on 23.07.2025. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (“in short N.I. Act”). The learned Trial Court convicted the accused vide judgment dated 28.06.2024 and sentenced her to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and pay a compensation of ₹6,70,000/- to the complainant.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, and the complainant filed a revision which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla (H.P), who upheld the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and dismissed the appeal and the revision.
Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Revisional Court, the complainant has filed the present petition, asserting that the cheque was issued in 2018 for ₹6,30,000. A compensation of ₹6,70,000 was granted, which is on the lower side. The double of the cheque amount, along with the interest @ 9% per annum from the date of issuance of the cheque, should have been awarded. Hence, the present petition.
Mr Virender Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below have awarded inadequate compensati n, which should be enhanced. He relied upon the judgmen s of Jugjit Kaur vs Rajwinder Singh 2025:PHHC:033187 in support of his submission.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a revision before the learned Sessions Judge, which was dismissed. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan v. In Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241 that the High Court can intervene under Section 482 of CrPC (corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS) after the dismissal of the revision when there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:
“10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant — cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the c urts r the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or o der passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requi es correction, it is but the duty of the High Co rt to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of a criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed, and public justice can be ensured only when the trial is conducted expeditiously.
In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10], a three-judge Bench was to consider the scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put to facilitate expedient disposal of the cases, but in Section 482, it is provided that nothing in the Code, which would include Section 397(2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On a harmonious construction of the said two provisions on this behalf, it was held that though the igh Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order, still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In that case, when allegations of defamatory statements were published in the newspapers against the Law Minister, he State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under Section 500 IPC. After obtaining the sanction, on a complaint made by the p blic prosecutor, cognisance of the commission of the offence by the appellant was taken to trial in the Sessi ns C urt. Thereafter, the appellant filed an applicati n to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed the charges under Section 406. The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. On a preliminary objection raised on maintainability, this Court held that the power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code.
In V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [1980 Supp SCC 92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: (1980) 2 SCR 380] (SCR at p. 393) a four-judge Bench per majority had held that sub-section (3) of Section 397, however, does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Court under Section 397(1) of the Code. In the Rajan Kumar Machananda case [1990 Supp SCC 132: 1990 SCC (Cri) 537], the case related to the release of a truck from attachment, obviously on the filing of an interlocutory application It was contended that there was a prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397(2) of the Code. In that context, it was held that it was not revisable under Section 482 in the exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by provisions contained in Section 397(3), the revision is not maintainable. In the Dharampal case [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333], which related to the exercise f power to issue an order of attachment under Secti n 146 of the Code, it was held that the inherent power under Section 482 was prohibited. On the fac s, in that case, it could be said that the learned Judges would be justified in holding that it was not revisable since it was a prohibitory interim order of attachment covered under Section 397(2) of the Code but the observations of the learned Judges that the High C urt had no power under Section 482 of the Code were not correct in view of the ratio of this Court in Madhu Limaye case [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] as upheld in V.C. Shukla case [1980 Supp SCC 92: 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : (1980) 2 SCR 380] and also in view of our observations stated earlier. The ratio in the Deepti case [(1995) 5 SCC 751: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1020] is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case, an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of the Magistrate for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed the petition. In the revision at the instance of the accused, on a wrong concession made by the counsel appearing for the State that the record did not contain allegations constituting the offence under Section 498-A, the High Court, without applying its mind, had discharged the accused. On appeal, this Court, after going through the record, noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498-A IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused, leading to the miscarriage of justice. In that context, this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code In view of the fact that the order of the High Court had led to the miscarriage of justice, this Court had set aside the order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate.
The ratio of the Simrikhia case [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] has no applicati n to the facts in this case. Therein, on a private c mplaint filed under Sections 452 and 323 IPC, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class had taken cognisance of he offence. He transferred the case for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code to the Second-Class Magistrate, who, after examining the witnesses, issued a process to the accused. The High Court, exercising the power under Section 482, dismissed the revisi n. But subsequently, on an application filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court corrected it. The question was whether the High Court was right in reviewing its order. In that factual backdrop, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for the second time. The ratio therein, as stated above, has no application to the facts in this case.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for a decision on the merits after consideration of the evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. Since the High Court has left the matter to be considered by the Magistrate, it would be inappropriate at this stage to go into that question. We have only considered the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of the revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 397(3) and the inherent powers We do not find any justification warranting interference in the appeal.”
This position was reiterated in Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, (2001) 8 SCC 522, wherein it was held:
“…though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously, particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional j risdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure f justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High ourt may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. It was further held, “Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code.”
A similar view was taken in Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation, (2005) 2 SCC 571, and it was held:
“5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan [(1999) 6 SCC 326: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is a serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of he process of the court or when mandatory p ovisions of the law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court.”
This p siti n was reiterated in Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto, (2009) 3 SCC 310: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 8: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 292, wherein it was observed: -
“24. It is well settled that the object of the introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 397 was to prevent a second revision to avoid frivolous litigation, but, at the same time, the doors to the High Court to a litigant who had lost before the Sessions Judge were not completely closed and in special cases, the bar under Section 397(3) could be lifted. In other words, the power of the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482 was not subject to the prohibition under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code and was capable of being invoked in appropriate cases. Mr Sanyal's contention that there was a complete bar under Section 397(3) of the Code debarring the High Court from entertaining an application under Section 482 thereof does not, therefore, commend itself to us.
On the factual aspect, the Magistrate came to a finding that the appellants were entitled to possession of the disputed plot. It is true that while making such a declaration under Section 145(4) of the Code, the Magistrate could have also directed that the appellants be put in possession of the same.
The question which is now required to be considered is whether the High Court was right in quashing the order passed by the Magistrate, which was confirmed by the Sessions Judge, on the gr und that the application made by the appellan s under Section 145(6) of the Code was barred fi stly by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and also by virtue of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Delhi High Co rt also took a similar view in Surender Kumar Jain v. State, ILR (2012) 3 Del 99 and held:—
“5. The issue regarding the filing of a petition before the High Court after having availed the first revision petition before the Court of Sessions has come up before the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar of the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 82 (sic) Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. But that power was to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, particularly when the person approaching the High Court has already availed remedy of first revision in the Sessions Court. This was not that in every case the person aggrieved by the order of the first revision court would have the right to be heard by the High Court to assail the same order which was the subject matter of the revision before the Sessions Court. It all depends not only on the facts and circumstances of each case but as on whether the impugned order brought about a situation that is an abuse of the process of the court, there was a serious miscarriage of justice or the mandatory provisions of law were not complied with. The power could also be exercised by this Court if there was an apparent mistake committed by the revisional court. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limave v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal, (1979) 2 SCC 305: AIR 1979 SC 87, Rai Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) 1980 Cri LJ 202, Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Co po ation (2005) 2 SCC 571.”
It is apparent from the judgments that the High Court has a limited jurisdiction and it can rectify a serious miscarriage of justice or non-compliance with a mandatory provision of law while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of t e Cr. P.C.
A heavy reliance was placed upon the judgment of Jugjit Kaur (supra), but it was a revision filed against the judgment and order of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class. Hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case.
In the present case, the learned Courts below had the jurisdiction to impose the sentence of imprisonment and award the compensation; if the compensation was inadequate, the same would not fall within the definition of an incorrect sentence. It was a discretion vested in the learned Courts below, and if the same was exercised, the Court will not interfere with it while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.PC. The Court can interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction if it is arbitrary or capricious. In the present case, the awarding of less compensation cannot be held o be arbitrary or capricious by any stretch of imagination. The efore, the power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC cannot be exercised to enhance the compensation.
The legislature in its wisdom has provided one remedy of revision that cannot be circumvented by taking recourse to Section 482 of the Cr.PC to interfere with every order passed by the learned Revisional Court. This would set at nought the legislature's intention that only one revision can be filed by a person. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC is extraordinary and cannot be exercised as a second revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not possible to enhance the amount of compensation while exercising inherent jurisdiction Shailendra vs Ajay 2024: MPHC-IND:29875.
No other point was urged.
In view of the above, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the learned Revisional Court, hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed