High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 07 KL CK 1604

Ajay Pratap Singh vs State Of Kerala

High Court Of Kerala · Decided on 27 July 2026 · Citation: 2026 INSC 365

HON’BLE JUDGES
A. Badharudeen, J
CASE NUMBER
CRL.A NO. 5 OF 2015

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Judgment

81 paragraphs · 6,961 words

Judgment in C.C.No.26/2014 on the files of the Special Judge (SPE/CBI) - III, Ernakulam is under challenge in this appeal. The appellant herein is the sole accused therein.

2.

Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/accused and the learned Public Prosecutor. Perused the judgment under challenge along with the records of the Special Court.

3.

The prosecution case is that the accused, while working as Inspector, Central Excise, Service Tax Division, had, on 02.07.2011, demanded an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) as bribe from Shri.P.S.Vinod (PW1) for rectifying the defects in the Service Tax returns filed for the financial year 2009 - 2010, and that, after a series of negotiations with Shri.P.S.Vinod (PW1), he had, at about 5.30 p.m., on 07.07.2011, visited the office of PW1 in the building, by name Penta Menaka, repeated the demand for bribe, and accepted a sum of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) from him as illegal gratification, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for performing the official act of accepting the Service Tax returns. It is further alleged that the accused, by corrupt or illegal means and by abusing his official position as a public servant, had obtained a pecuniary advantage to the tune of Rs.15,000/-(Rupees Fifteen Thousand only), as stated above. On this premise, the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Section 7 and Sections 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the PC Act’ hereinafter), by the accused.

4.

In this matter, the Special Court framed charge for the said offences and proceeded with trial. During trial, PW1 to PW14 were examined, Exts.P1 to P49 and MO1 to MO13 were marked on the side of the prosecution. On the side of the defence, DW1 and DW2 were examined and Exts.D1 to D4 contradictions were marked. Although Exts.D7 to D9 were marked, but the same were not considered by the learned Special Judge on the ground that the documents were not supported by certification under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

5.

On appraisal of the evidence, the Special Court found that the appellant/accused committed offences punishable under Section 7 as well as Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988. Accordingly, he was convicted for the said offences and sentenced as under:

“In the result,

v.

The accused is sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for three months, for the offence u/s.7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

vi.

The accused is further sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- in default to undergo S.I for 3 (three) months for the offence punishable u/s. 13 (2) read with 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

vii.

Set off is allowed for the period from 07.07.2011 to 11.07.2011.

viii.

Sentences shall run concurrently.

ix.

MO1 series currency notes are the personal properties of Shri.P.S.Vinod (PWI). Hence MOI series shall be given to PW1 after the appeal period is over.

x.

MOs 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10 shall be confiscated to the State and MOs 4, 5, 6(a), 7(a), 8(a), 10(a) and 11 to 13 shall be destroyed after the appeal period is over.”

6.

The learned counsel for the appellant/accused argued that for multiple reasons, the verdict impugned would not sustain. He had pointed out the chronology of events. According to him, as per the evidence of PW1, he had filed returns for the period 2009 - 2010 and he failed to file return thereafter during the period from April 2010 to September 2010. On 30.03.2011, PW1 went to the Central Excise Office for the first time for filing returns of the said year. PW1 paid fine of Rs.2,000/- for the delay in payment of the first half yearly returns for the years 2010 and 2011, as per Ext.P2. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, thereafter on 02.07.2011 when PW1 met the accused, the accused told him that there were some mistakes in the returns filed for the year 2009 and 2010 and for the same, the complainant would have to pay Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh only) as tax and penalty. It was thereafter, on 01.07.2011, PW1 visited the office and met the accused and asked him to accept the returns for the period 2010 - 2011, but the accused was not ready to accept the same. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, it was thereafter at 5.30 p.m. on 07.07.2011, trap was arranged and pursuant to thereof, the accused alleged to have demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) from PW1. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, since the evidence of PW1 would suggest that he had knowledge regarding the procedure for filing returns and payment of tax, penalty etc., the allegation of demand of illegal gratification to the tune of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) is inherently improbable, unbelievable and contrary to the commonsense. It is pointed out that, since the total turnover for the financial year 2009-2010, as reflected in Exts.P3 and P4 series would come to Rs.11,89,900/- (Rupees Eleven Lakh Eighty-nine Thousand Nine Hundred only), the amount liable to be reckoned for the purpose of assessment of Service Tax was Rs.1,89,900/- (Rupees One Lakh Eighty-nine Thousand Nine Hundred only), after excluding Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only), which was exempted from payment of Service Tax. If so, the demand and the threat, at the instance of PW1 imposing tax penalty and interest to the tune of Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh only) in respect of the said return is an outright impossibility and therefore, the fundamental plank of trap is in the midst of doubt. According to him, this could be fortified by the evidence of PW5, the Superintendent, who also had occasion to discuss the issue with PW1 on the same day and it was disclosed that the amount involved in 2009 - 2010 returns was Rs.11,89,900/- (Rupees Eleven Lakh Eighty-nine Thousand Nine Hundred only). It is argued further that, in fact, there was no demand or acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only), as alleged by the prosecution and even though PW1 to PW3 deposed regarding the demand and acceptance, the same cannot be believed due to the improbability of the evidence highlighting that demand and acceptance of illegal gratification are the prerequisites to avail presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. The learned counsel placed three decisions, viz., State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K.Gaba reported in [2026 KHC 7287] with reference to paragraph Nos.11 to 16, Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi) reported in [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013] with reference to paragraph Nos.52 to 55 and 64 to 67, and Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police reported in [2015 (4) KLT SN 47 (C.No.53) SC] with reference to paragraph Nos.18 to 26, to contend that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act and for invoking the presumption under Section 20 thereof. It is submitted further that, in fact, Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thosuand only) was paid by the accused to PW1, who had been engaged in conducting tour programmes for a tour to be arranged in Wayanad and since the tour programme was not materialized, Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only), the advance amount was repaid on the date of trap and therefore, the entire prosecution case is liable to be disbelieved to enlarge benefit of doubt to the appellant/accused. It is submitted further that from the evidence of DW2, the father of the accused would establish the tour programme and other details supporting the defence case.

7.

The learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI strongly opposed these contentions and submitted that, when a tax assessee was threatened by an officer stating that a higher amount would be imposed towards tax and penalty, the assessee would not be in a position to know the exact basis on which the officer was claiming such a higher amount, for example, Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh only) in the present case. He also argued that the defence case put up and argued by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused relying on the evidence of DW2, the father of the accused not at all proved. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, since the evidence of PW1 to PW3 categorically established the ingredients for the offences punishable under Section 7 and Sections 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 including demand and acceptance of bribe, its recovery and the positive phenolphthalein test would establish the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubts and in such a case, there is no necessity to interfere with the verdict impugned and the same is liable to be set aside.

8.

Having appraised the rival submissions, the points arise for consideration are;

(i)

Whether the Special Court was right in holding that the appellant/accused committed offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act?

(ii)

Whether the Special Court was right in holding that the appellant/accused committed offence punishable under Sections 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act?

(iii)

Whether the verdict would require interference?

(iv)

The order to be passed?

Point Nos.(i) to (iv)

9.

The events led to lodging of Ext.P1 complaint by PW1 against the accused and the subsequent episodes are relevant in this case. Shri.P.S.Vinod, the complainant got examined as PW1, a prime witness for the prosecution in this regard. PW1 deposed that he was running a firm by name Sai Jobs and HR Consultancy in the building, by name, Penta Menaka at Menaka Junction, Ernakulam. He had obtained Service Tax Registration (Ext.P13) with the Central Excise Department. Service Tax returns were required to be filed twice in a financial year, namely, for the first half-yearly period from April to September and for the second half-yearly period from October to March. Service Tax was payable by a firm when its annual income exceeded Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only). However, NIL returns were also required to be filed even if the annual income did not exceed Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh only). PW1 had failed to submit the returns for the first half-yearly period of the financial year 2010-2011 due to personal reasons. He had, however, submitted the returns for the financial year 2009-2010 (Exts.P3 series and P4 series). During the relevant time, the accused was working as the Excise Inspector, Central Excise, 'C' Range, Kathrikadavu, having jurisdiction over the area in which the firm owned by PW1 was situated. PW1 met the accused at the Central Excise Office on 30.03.2011 for submitting the returns for the financial year 2010-2011. The accused pointed out certain defects in the returns submitted for the previous year and informed him that the returns for the financial year 2010-2011 would not be accepted unless the defects in the returns relating to the previous year were rectified. The accused further informed PW1 that he would have to pay Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh only) towards tax, including penalty and interest, and demanded a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) as illegal gratification to avoid the said payment after rectifying the defects. PW1 was unwilling to pay the bribe. He had informed the accused that the income of his firm for the financial year 2009-2010 had not actually reached the taxable limit and that his employees had inadvertently included the amount obtained as a loan and another amount received through a chitty in the statement of accounts and, therefore, he was not liable to pay Service Tax. On that basis, he had requested the accused to accept the returns for the financial year 2010-2011.

Thereafter, PW1 was not able to visit the Central Excise Office till 01.07.2011 as he was engaged in the construction of his residential house in his native place. On 01.07.2011, when PW1 again met the accused and produced the statement of account relating to his bank account (Ext.P5), the Day Book and the Account Books. Nevertheless, the accused refused to accept the returns. Thereupon, PW1 met Shri.K.B.Mohandas (PW5), Superintendent of Central Excise, 'C' Range, who summoned the accused and, after verifying the records produced by PW1, instructed the accused to accept the returns after rectifying the defects. When the accused and PW1 came out of the chamber of the Superintendent, the accused obtained the visiting card of PW1 and informed him that he would visit his office on the following day. On 02.07.2011, after contacting PW1 over his mobile phone, the accused visited his office at about 12.00 noon and, after verifying the relevant records, informed him that he had to pay Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh only) towards tax, including penalty and interest, which could be avoided by paying a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) as illegal gratification. PW1 was not inclined to pay the amount demanded. While so, the accused contacted PW1 at 9.30 a.m. on 04.07.2011 over his mobile phone, enquired about his decision and informed him of the consequences that he would have to face if he failed to pay the bribe. At that time, the accused reduced the demand to Rs.80,000/- (Rupees Eighty Thousand only). On 05.07.2011, PW1 contacted the accused over his mobile phone and requested him to accept the returns. The accused responded that he would have to pay Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) and informed PW1 that he would come in the evening on 06.07.2011. PW1 then informed the accused that his son had been hospitalised and that he would contact him after his son's discharge from the hospital. At 9.30 a.m. on 07.07.2011, the accused contacted PW1 over the landline telephone and demanded a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty-five Thousand only) to be paid in the evening. Due to the continuous demand for illegal gratification by the accused, PW1 decided to lodge a complaint before the CBI. Accordingly, on 07.07.2011, he preferred Ext.P1 complaint, which had been scribed by Sreejith (PW4), before the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Cochin Branch. On the basis of Ext.P1 complaint, Shri. Babu Mathew (PW14), Inspector of Police, CBI, registered Ext.P44 First Information Report.

10.

As regards to the pre as well as post trap proceedings PW1, PW3, PW4 and PW14 were relied on by the prosecution and acted upon by the trial court. Their evidence would reveal that the trap team led by J.R.D'Cruz (PW3), Inspector of Police, CBI, assembled at the SBI Guest House, Pullepady, at about 2.00 p.m. on 07.07.2011 along with the independent witnesses, including Mahendran (PW2), and the complainant, P.S. Vinod (PW1). At the Guest House, PW1, as instructed by PW3, contacted the accused over his mobile phone after putting the call on the loudspeaker mode. In response to a query from the accused as to whether he had arranged the money, PW1 informed him that he could arrange only Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) on that day and that the balance amount of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) would be arranged on Monday. The accused then instructed PW1 to arrange Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) on that day itself and agreed to come to the office of PW1 between 5.00 p.m. and 6.00 p.m. PW1 requested the accused to contact him over the phone before reaching his office, to which the accused responded in the affirmative. PW1 also showed the mobile number dialled by him to those present. Thereafter, PW1 produced MO1 series currency notes, as instructed by PW3, who directed Mahendran (PW2) to count the same. Subsequently, a phenolphthalein test by using sodium carbonate solution was demonstrated. Then MO1 series currency notes were smeared with phenolphthalein powder and kept at the pocket of PW1. PW1 to PW3 categorically deposed regarding the pre-trap proceedings during trial and the said evidence failed to be shaken during their cross-examination.

11.

Thus, PW1 to PW3 categorically deposed that the accused demanded and accepted the bribe amount of Rs.15,000/-(Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) on the date of trap. The crucial question to be considered is whether the improbabilities pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused have sufficient force to disbelieve the prosecution case and to believe the defence put up by the accused.

12.

In this connection, it is relevant to refer the finding of the Special Court as regards the same contentions raised in paragraph No.37 which reads as under:

“37.

Yet another defence challenge is that some of the circumstances brought on record by the prosecution are against natural human conduct. The defence projected the following circumstances in the prosecution evidence to be against natural human conduct.

a)

When the tax liability is only less than Rs.25,000/- it is not probable that an Excise Inspector will ask for Rs.1,00,000/- as bribe.

b)

When the accused is aware of the fact that PW1 had approached the Superintendent of Central Excise and appraised the matter in dispute it is unlikely that a young probationary officer will dare to ask Rs.1,00,000/- as bribe.

c)

If the accused had an intention to obtain bribe he would have demanded the same on 30.03.2011 or in the first week of April when the complainant had visited the Central Excise office

d)

It is highly unlikely that the accused would use his office phone having PABX system to freely communicate with the accused for negotiating bribe.

e)

It is against commonsense and natural human conduct to accept bribe in a public place.

f)

Given the fact that CBI office is adjacent to Central Excise office and the accused is familiar with the CBI officers in the trap team, if he had the intention to take bribe he would not have accepted the same in the situation pleaded by the prosecution.

g)

If the accused had gone to Penta Menaka to take bribe he would not have chosen to remain near the lift and directed the complainant to come out from the privacy of his office cabin.”

13.

In paragraph Nos.37.1 to 37.8, the learned Special Judge negatived the contentions. The same read as under:

“37.1]. Now I shall turn to analyze the acceptability of the contentions raised from the side of the defence in respect of the circumstances mentioned above.

37.2]. Firstly, it is contended that it is improbable that an Excise Inspector will ask for Rs.1,00,000/-as bribe when the tax liability is only less than Rs.25,000/-. The definite case of PWI is that the accused represented to him that he had to pay a sum of Rs.7,00,000/- as penalty and for avoiding the same he had to pay Rs.1,00,000/- as bribe. When this version of PW1 is accepted the improbability suggested by the defence loses ground.

37.3]. Secondly, it is contended that it is unlikely that the accused would ask Rs.1,00,000/- as bribe when the issue had already been brought to the notice of the Superintendent of the Central Excise. PWI has studied only upto 7 standard. It has come out in evidence that when the matter in dispute was brought to the notice of the Superintendent direction was given to the accused to look into the subject and thereafter the accused visited the office of PWI and represented to him that a penalty of Rs.7,00,000/- was to be deposited and for escaping from the said liability Rs.1,00,000/- was to be paid as bribe. It is highly probable that the accused might have tried to mislead PW1. So there is no improbability as projected by the defence.

37.4]. The third contention is that if the accused had an idea to obtain bribe he would have demanded it on 30 of March. In the evidence of PWI it has been made out that after March 2011 he had been busy with construction of a residential building in Wayanad and he came to the Central Excise office and met the accused only on 01.07.2011. So the said contention of the accused is also not merited.

37.5]. Fourthly, it is argued that if the accused had the intention to demand bribe he would not have used the land phone through PABX system. This contention also does not appeal to me.

37.6]. Fifthly, it is argued that accepting bribe in a public place is against commonsense. It has come out in evidence that the accused waited in front of a closed shop near the lift in the building. It cannot be said that the place selected by the accused is not fit for accepting bribe.

37.7]. Yet another contention of the accused is that it is improbable that he would accept bribe in the presence of CBI officials who are familiar to him. There is nothing on record to show that the accused is familiar with the CBI officials in the trap team. So this contention is also without merit.

37.8]. Finally, it is argued that if the accused had an intention to obtain bribe he would not have chosen to remain near the lift and directed the complainant to come out from his office. I find that the act of calling PW1 to come down from his office was for facilitating the transaction in privacy. So the said contention is also to be discarded.”

14.

Similarly, the learned Special Judge also disbelieved the evidence of DW1 and DW2, the learned Special Judge not acted upon Exts.D7 to D9 for want of certification under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and relied on other documents.

15.

Coming to the evidence of DW1, DW1 is Nazar Khan, the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise, it was through him Ext.D5, the letter containing the list of telephone numbers used by PABX at Central Excise Bhavan, Kathrikadavu from 01.07.2011 to 08.07.2011 was tendered in evidence and during cross examination, DW1 stated that PABX is a common facility for telephone service in a building, by which, one can call to another section as well as outside. In fact, the evidence of DW1 is having no much relevance to the fact in issue. Coming to the evidence of DW2, during chief examination, even though DW2 stated that his son had paid Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) to PW1, to arrange a tour programme to Wayanad, during cross examination, he conceded that he had only hearsay knowledge regarding the transaction and also he had no idea about the places in Wayanad. Therefore, the learned Special Judge disbelieved the same. In fact, hearsay knowledge/evidence is no evidence. Even otherwise, DW2’s evidence, if given, reliance through the same is absolutely hearsay, the same is quite insufficient to prove the defence case within the yardstick of preponderance of probabilities. In order to prove payment of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) by the accused to PW1, convincing evidence is necessary. Thus, in the absence of convincing evidence, the learned Special Judge rightly negated the defence case.

16.

Now, it is necessary to address the ingredients required to attract the offences under Section 7 r/w Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The same are extracted as under:-

“Section 7:- Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.

– Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government Company referred to in clause (C) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 13:- Criminal misconduct by a public

servant. – (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,-

a)

xxxxx

(b)

xxxxx

(c)

xxxxxx

(d)

If he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest. xxxxx

(2)

Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.”

17.

In this connection it is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [AIR 2023 SC 330], Neeraj Dutta Vs State, where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the P.C Act, 1988 to be said to be proved along with ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, and in paragraph 68 it has been held as under :

"68.

What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:

(a)

Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(b)

In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

(c)

Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

(d)

In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i)

if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

(ii)

On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1) (d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(e)

The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

(f)

In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

(g)

In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1) (d) and (ii) of the Act.

(h)

We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”

18.

Thus, the legal position as regards to the essentials under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the P.C Act, is extracted above. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law.

19.

In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar K. v. State of Kerala reported in [2025 KHC OnLine 983], in Crl.Appeal No.323/2020, dated 12.9.2025, wherein in paragraph No. 12, it was held as under:

“12.

Indubitably in Neeraj Dutta’s case (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.69 that there is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M.Narasinga Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no conflict between the judgments in the aforesaid three cases. Further in Paragraph No.70 the Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary,oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. In paragraph No.68 the Apex Court summarized the discussion. That apart, in State by Lokayuktha Police’s case (supra) placed by the learned counsel for the accused also the Apex Court considered the ingredients for the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act,1988 and held that demand and acceptance of bribe are necessary to constitute the said offences. Similarly as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Aman Bhatia’s case (supra) the Apex court reiterated the same principles. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials to be established to fasten criminal culpability on an accused are demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. To put it otherwise, proof of demand is sine qua non for the offences to be established under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and dehors the proof of demand the offences under the two Sections could not be established. Therefore mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of bribe or as undue pecuniary advantage or illegal gratification or the recovery of the same would not be sufficient to prove the offences under the two Sections in the absence of evidence to prove the demand.”

20.

In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in [2026 INSC 365] in The State of Kerala v. K.A.Abdul Rasheed, the Apex Court considered the decision [(2023) 4 SCC 731], Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) and in paragraph 13 the Apex Court held as under:

“13.

We pause here to notice that the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta had specifically dealt with the efficacy of the deposition of hostile witnesses. It referred with approval to Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration wherein it was held:

“52.

From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”

21.

The first point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused is that demanding bribe of Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees One Lakh only) and even reduction of the same for a lesser sum in the facts of the case is an improbability. The reason for the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused is that when the total amount assessed for the financial year 2009 – 2010 was Rs.11,89,900/- (Rupees Eleven Lakh Eighty-nine Thousand Nine Hundred only), the taxable amount was only Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only), for which, payment of imposition of penalty of Rs.7,00,000/-(Rupees Seven Lakh only) is an impossibility.

22.

The learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI resisted this contention, submitting that, under the service tax assessment procedure, even if the tax payable is initially less, by the efflux of time, the amount would become substantial due to the stringent statutory provisions providing for the levy and recovery of substantial penalties. He also would submit that in the instant case, the appellant/accused hesitated to accept the service tax returns for the year 2009 – 2010 and thereafter, he made a visit to the office of PW1 and after verification of the records, he, in fact, threatened PW1 with imposition of Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh only) as fine. Going through the evidence given by PW1, on 02.07.2011, when he contacted the accused through his mobile phone, the accused told him that the accused would visit his office at about 12.00 noon, that too, after the direction of PW5. Then the accused verified the relevant records of the concern of PW1 and he informed to PW1 that he had to pay Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh only) towards tax including tax penalty and interest which could be avoided by paying a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only). Reading the evidence of PW1 in the above line, on par with the argument advanced by the learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused that demand of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) which was reduced to Rs.80,000/- (Rupees Eighty Thousand only) and then to Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) is not an improbability in the facts of the case. The rationale is, an empowered officer to verify the records of the concern run by PW1, for assessing the returns, on verification of the records, informed PW1 that on his assessment, the income would come to an amount which would necessitate payment of Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh only), including fine, penalty and interest, PW1 would be in a helpless position and he would be forced to believe the same for the smooth conduct of his business. Therefore, this contention must fail. In view of the said finding, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused that PW1 met the Superintendent, a superior officer of the appellant/accused, who was examined as PW5, to discuss the issue, would make no difference, since, thereafter, the appellant/accused visited PW1 and demanded Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only), stating that otherwise he would impose Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Only) towards tax, penalty and interest.

23.

The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused that there was no demand or acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only), as contended by the prosecution. At the same time, the learned counsel for the appellant/accused conceded that the evidence of PW1 to PW3 would support demand and acceptance of bribe, but the same could not be relied on because of the improbability, as already discussed.

24.

The legal position pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused, relying on the decisions in A.K.Gaba’s case (supra), Aman Bhatia’s case (supra) and Satyanarayana Murthy’s case (supra), and the legal position discussed in this judgment otherwise would show that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act and to invoke presumption under Section 20 thereof.

25.

In the instant case, the consistent evidence given by PW1 supported by PW2 and PW3 would show demand and acceptance of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) from the appellant/accused on the date of trap with positive result of phenolphthalein test corroborated the same in continuation of the earlier demand. Here, the appellant/accused, in fact, admitted demand and acceptance of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) by him on the date of trap. But his version regarding acceptance of the same was towards repayment of the amount borrowed by PW1 from him to arrange a tour programme in Wayanad. In fact, the said defence case failed to be proved. In such case, the learned Special Judge is right in finding that the appellant/accused committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act and the conviction does not require any interference.

26.

Going through the sentence imposed by the learned Special Judge, the sentence imposed also found to be very reasonable, considering the gravity of the offences. Therefore, the sentence also is liable to be confirmed.

In the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court. Consequently, the order suspending sentence and granting bail to the appellant/accused stands cancelled and his bail bond also stands cancelled. The appellant/accused is directed to surrender before the Special Court to undergo the sentence, forthwith, failing which, the Special Court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail.

Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court, for information and compliance.