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Judgment
The question for decision before us in this appeal is whether the withdrawal of a suit instituted by the nearest reversioner a daughter without
obtaining permission to institute another suit is binding on the succeeding reversioner the daughter''s son so as to deprive him of the right to
challenge the alienation by another suit. The learned pleader who appeared for the appellants has entirely relied on certain general language used by
their Lordships of the Privy Council in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal ILR (1915) M. 406 and also Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyar
ILR (1916) M. 634. In the first case, their Lordships had to consider the question whether when the nearest reversioner who instituted the suit
died, that suit could be continued by the next reversioner and they held that it could be. In giving their reasons for the decision, they treated the next
reversioner as legal representative for the purpose of reviving the action, It is contended that it logically follows that if a suit which is instituted by
one reversioner is withdrawn or dismissed for default of prosecution, all the other reversioners will be barred and prevented from questioning the
alienation by a separate suit. We do not think that their Lordships of the Privy Council ever contemplated such a result when they held that when a
reversioner who instituted a suit dies, that suit can be revived by another presumptive reversioner. The scope of the decision is to enable one
reversioner whose interest is common with that of the reversioner who instituted the suit to carry on the same action for the protection of the estate.
It would be a violent conclusion to draw from such a decision to say that if a suit instituted by one reversioner has been dismissed for default or
without never being tried on the merits, a suit by another reversioner, challenging the improper alienation is barred. In the other case in Janaki
Ammal v. Narayanaswami Aiyar ILR (1916) M. 634 there is only some general observation to the same effect as in Venkatanarayana Pillai v.
Subbammal ILR (1915) M. 406 and no other authority has been cited before us which covers the present case laying down that the dismissal for
default or non-prosecution of a suit by one reversioner bars the institution of another suit by another presumptive reversioner.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.