Adv. P.T. Joseph vs State Of Kerala & Ors.

Devan Ramachandran, J.

The Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘KGLO Rules’), provide the manner in which a Government Law Officer is to be appointed at the District Court Centre, the Additional District Court Centre and the Sub Court Centre. It stipulates that such appointment shall follow the procedure contained in Rule 8 thereof; and this has been incisively examined and answered by another learned Division Bench of this Court in Aju Mathew and Others v. State of Kerala represented by its Secretary, Thiruvananthapuram and Others [2018 (5) KHC 770].

As per the aforesaid Rules, the District Collectors of every district are to prepare a list of advocates - from the roll of advocates of the Bar Council of Kerala - with at least seven years of practice at the Bar and found fit to be appointed, adverting to their qualifications, experience, integrity, reliability, reputation, character and antecedents; which is then to be sent to the District and Sessions Judge for consultation. The statutory mechanism then mandates that the District and Sessions Judge shall verify and endorse each name in the list with his/her remarks; based on which, the District Collector will prepare a Panel, from which, the Government being free to appoint, after the necessary verification of character and antecedents is conducted by the Superintendent of Police concerned.

As said above, in Aju Mathew (supra) – which was authored by one among us - this Court had the occasion to examine the applicable provisions; and the affirmative opinion rendered is ineluctably to the effect that the consultation with the District and Sessions Judge is to be real and effective; and that it is only those candidates who are approved through such consultation, who can be included in the Panel to be prepared by the District Collector.

For ease of reference and reading, we extract the following paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment:

After declaring as afore, the learned Bench then considered the impact of Section 24(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), since the appointment in that case was to the post of prosecutor; and answered thus, in paragraphs 38 and 39 thereof:

The afore, rather long preface, has been necessitated in these cases because, an advocate on the rolls of the Bar Council of Kerala applied to be appointed as the “District Government Pleader and the Public Prosecutor” in Alappuzha District; and he explains that he did so pursuant to a notification issued by the District Collector on 18.12.2024. He admits that the District Collector included his name in the list which he prepared and sent to the learned District and Sessions Judge; but, complains that the latter did not evaluate him correctly, but still found him unsuitable, even when others – who allegedly have lesser or no experience, especially in criminal trials - were found suitable.

Broadly, on the aforesaid allegation, the advocate in question filed W.P.(C)No.16469/2025 -which was heard along with another Writ Petition filed by another advocate - and allowed through a judgment delivered in both matters, setting aside the Panel prepared by the District Collector and directing the Authorities to prepare a fresh one. The learned Single Judge, however, allowed the person appointed, to continue until such time as the afore exercise is completed; and this has spawned the aforesaid three Appeals before this Court.

For the Record, WA No.610/2026 has been filed by the writ petitioner in W.P(C)No.16469/2025 (who will hereinafter be referred to as the ‘writ petitioner’); WA No.755/2026 by the 4^th respondent in the Writ Petition, who was appointed as the “District Government Pleader -cum- Public Prosecutor” from the Panel prepared by the District Collector (who will hereinafter be referred to as the ‘appointed person’), but which has now been set aside by the learned Single Judge; and WA No.865/2026 has been filed by the State of Kerala and its functionaries impugning the judgment.

Sri.B.Pramod – learned counsel for the ‘Writ Petitioner’, argued that the procedure adopted by the District Collector and subscribed to by the District and Sessions Judge, is in violation of the ‘KGLO Rules’, especially because his client has been excluded from the Panel prepared by the former illegally and based on an unjustified remark against him by the latter. He then argued that the credentials of the ‘appointed person’, even as found by the learned District and Sessions Judge, could not have justified her inclusion in the list or the Panel; and consequently, that her appointment by the Government, disregarding the two others in the Panel prepared by the District Collector, is luculently guided by extraneous considerations - specifically political - which is evident from Exts.P7 and P8 messages in a WhatsApp group, of which the parties were both members at one time.

Sri.B.Pramod then expatiated his arguments, saying that, going by the declarations in Aju Mathew (supra), it was incumbent upon the learned District and Sessions Judge to have cited specific reasons as to why he/she found his client not suitable to be included in the Panel to be prepared by the District Collector; and that this obligation flows from the statutory spirit of Rule 8 of the ‘KGLO Rules’ and Section 24(4) of the CrPC He contended that, when the learned District and Sessions Judge excluded his client merely recording that he was not suitable, it falls foul of the protectional umbra of the aforesaid provisions.

Sri.B.Pramod then argued, rather vehemently, that the ‘appointed person’ could not have been included in the Panel because, even going by the recommendations of the learned District and Sessions Judge, her competence is not in the area of criminal law, but in civil law - “including LAR cases, Labour Court cases, Family Court cases and matters before the Land Tribunal and Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum.” (sic) He conceded that though the word ‘criminal’ is also included therein, when it is compared to the manner in which the learned Judge discussed credentials of his client, nothing is mentioned as to if she had requisite experience in conducting trial of serious sessions cases, including murder cases or Appeals; and hence that her inclusion is untenable. In the same vein, he reiterated that, when the ‘appointed person’ was so incompetent – however, clarifying that she may be competent in other fields – her appointment by the Government, overlooking the other two in the Panel can only be construed to be for political reasons, which are fortified by Exts.P7 and P8 WhatsApp chat. He maintained that the learned Single Judge has considered all germane matters in its proper perspective, to set aside the Panel prepared by the District Collector, as also the appointment; but that it was unjust in having allowed the ‘appointed person’ to continue until a new list is prepared. He prayed that the impugned judgment, to such extent, be set aside.

Sri.T.B.Hood - learned counsel for the ‘appointed person’, submitted that the afore allegations of the ‘Writ Petitioner’ are sweeping in its nature, without any verisimilitude; and that it operates very uncharitably against his client. He asserted that, as rightly found by the learned District and Sessions Judge, his client has spent 24 years in the practice of law and that her experience is variegated, which includes not merely criminal cases, but also civil and other matters. He contended that, when the learned Judge found her practice in the criminal law arena to be satisfactory — which is manifest from the recommendations made — the ‘Writ Petitioner’ cannot call the same into question and that such opinions are not justiciable in any manner. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Of Punjab & Another v. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal & Another [(2016) 6 SCC 1] in substantiation; and prayed that, therefore, the impugned judgment be set aside, since the learned Single Judge was in error in having set aside the Panel and the appointment.

Sri.T.B.Hood then explained that, in fact, the learned Single Judge did not set aside the Panel, or allow the Writ Petition for the reasons urged by Sri.B.Pramod, but on account of the averments in the connected matter, namely W.P(C)No.16901/2025, in which the petitioner therein contended that the notification itself was bad, since the post notified is that of District Government Pleader and not “District Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor”. He pointed out that the Appeal from the said Writ Petition has been already allowed by this Court, through the judgment in WA No.909/2026; consequently, praying that this Appeal be also allowed.

Sri.T.Asaf Ali, Director General of Prosecution (DGP), instructed by Sri.Rashid C.Nooranad – learned Special Government Pleader, adopted the submissions of Sri.T.B.Hood; and then supplemented it, saying that the learned Single Judge ought not to have set aside the Panel or the appointment, merely because, in the notification, the words ‘public prosecutor’ had not been mentioned in one paragraph. He explained that, when one reads the notification in full, it will become irrefutable that the subject is the appointment to the post of “District Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor”; and that in its first paragraph it is merely recorded that the existing District Government Pleader had retired and that a new one would have to be appointed. He insisted that this would not, by any stretch, give an impression that the post to be filled up is that of District Government Pleader; and that these issues do not require to be argued any further, since it has been concluded to the contrary by this Court in the aforementioned judgment in WA No.909/2026. He then added that, in fact, the learned Single Judge has not allowed the Writ Petition in question herein because, when one goes through the impugned judgment closely, it has merely granted relief in the other Writ Petition, without answering any of the specific contentions urged by the ‘Writ Petitioner’ herein.

When we consider and assess the syllogistic positions of the parties, it becomes limpid that the pivot of the controversy is whether the learned District and Sessions Judge had assessed the credentials of the Writ Petitioner properly.

Sri.B.Pramod is vehement in his submission that the mere statement of the learned District and Sessions Judge, “that the remaining five candidates have no expected experience in conducting trial and sessions cases, including murder cases and Appeal matters, to appoint them as District Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor of this Court” (sic), is factually incorrect and untenable, particularly because one among such candidates was the then serving Public Prosecutor.

The pertinent question is whether this Court can sit in judgment over the opinion of the learned District and Sessions Judge, within the ambit of the “KGLO Rules”.

Our path is illuminated in this regard by the judgment cited by Sri.T.B. Hood, namely Brijeshwar Singh Chahal (supra), particularly by its declarations in paragraph Nos.41.12 and 49.2, which are as under:

Further, in Aju Mthew (supra), as perspicuous from its paragraphs extracted above, the learned Division Bench has declared, leaving little reason for any further polemic, that it is the opinion of the District Judge which ought to obtain primacy and that the District Collector is bound by the same in preparing the Panel. In fact, the “KGLO Rules” in Rule 8(2)(b) thereof, mandates that the District Collector shall prepare the Panel solely based on the list forwarded by him to the District Judge, without any capacity to include anyone else.

Going by the recommendations made by the learned District Judge, we notice that he gathered his impressions about the candidates through a very exhaustive mechanism which he devised - namely, by seeking a report/opinion from all Session Judges in the District and then having a personal interaction with each of the candidates. It can only be to peril if one is to forget that the Officer is a serving District and Sessions Judge, that too the seniormost in the district; and that he has collated information about each candidate from every other Sessions Judge, which is absolutely salutary in its ambit because, it is possible that certain Advocates may not have been appearing before him, either on account of their line of practice or lack of opportunity. However, it is indubitable that every Advocate, who desires to be a District Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, may have practiced in one or the other District Courts; and it is to cover this, that the learned District and Sessions Judge adopted the afore procedure, which we fully appreciate.

To paraphrase, the learned District and Sessions Judge did not make a subjective evaluation on its own – which sometimes can go wrong, because a particular Advocate may not have appeared before him; and then followed it up with a personal interaction with each of the candidates. Undoubtedly, the learned Judge travelled much beyond his obligation, as statutorily mandated under the “KGLO Rules”; and the corollary question, therefore, is whether this can be subject to judicial review.

The answer to the above is certainly to the negative because, the “KGLO Rules” concede us no competence to sit in judgment over the competence of the individual candidates - it being reserved only to the learned District and Sessions Judge; and, further because, the opinion formulated by the latter is not in the manner of an administrative function which this Court can judicially examine. As far as this case is concerned, it will all the more be imprudent for us to enter into the merits of the opinion of the learned District and Sessions Judge because of the process he followed - comprising of obtaining of inputs from every other Sessions Court and a personal interaction with each of the candidates.

When we find as afore, it is not necessary for us to answer the merits of the allegations of the “writ petitioner” against the “appointed person”. However, solely for the sake of completeness, we proceed to do so.

The specific imputation of the “writ petitioner” against the appointed person is that the learned District and Sessions Judge did not find her competent in conducting “serious criminal cases, including trial of Sessions cases involving murder and such other”. However, when we examine the learned Judge’s recommendations qua the appointed person, it records “she has 24 years of practice in the field of law by conducting Civil, Criminal including LAR Cases, Labour Court Cases, Family Court Cases. She has also appeared in Land Tribunal and Consumer Redressal Forum”(sic). True, the learned District Judge does not specifically say that the “appointed person” has experience in the conduct of trial of Sessions Cases, as he referred to in the case of the writ petitioner; but, a totality of reading of the afore opinion renders it incontestable that he found her competent in criminal matters also. Because the word ‘criminal’ has not been expatiated, it would take away nothing from the competence of the “appointed person”; and we see no reason to disturb her position based on such imputations.

The remaining assertion of the “writ petitioner” is that the “appointed person” has been selected by the Government for political consideration. Apart from the fact that we do not understand what is meant by “political consideration”, except that there are extraneous factors attracted, when the candidate has been included in the Panel prepared by the District Collector, exclusively adverting to the recommendations of the learned District and Sessions Judge, nothing stops the Government from appointing any person from it, as per their choice. This cannot be construed to be a political appointment, as has now been projected by the writ petitioner; and his case therefore, could not be bettered even by Exts.P7 and P8, which are stated to be chats in a WhatsApp platform – which, in any case, cannot be accepted by us since it lacks the necessary probative value under the statutory scheme.

Unnecessary to say in the above factual and forensic matrix, we cannot find favour with the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

In the afore circumstances;